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Domain: allaboutvoting.com
Stories and comments across the archive that link to allaboutvoting.com.
Comments · 19
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Re:2004 US Presidential Election Stolen in Ohio
I agree to a degree. It's actually the "paper" that got us in the mess of e-voting in the first place. We would be on the same system if we had avoided the knee-jerk reaction of e-voting BEFORE ACTUALLY KNOWING what happened: "quality control revealed significant hanging and falling chad problems" http://allaboutvoting.com/2007/08/16/more-dan-rather-on-voting-machines/
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Re:Approval voting makes more sense than Range vot
(reposted comment with correct formatting)
>Might as well just go with the simpler Approval voting... It's simpler, and
>more effective in my experience.
I partially agree. The most effective strategy under Range voting is to
always vote max or min score for each candidate that you think is a real
contender to win. Any other vote could be considered a partial abstention.
If the voting instructions are poor or minimal many voters will accidentally
partially abstain which will understandably make them angry. But if the instructions
are well written then I do not think that this will happen to a significant degree.
I like Approval voting but I see allowing partial abstentions as being a small improvement. I don't like the idea of encouraging frequent accidental partial abstentions so my support for Range Voting is very sensitive to the context and voting instructions.
Some more of my thoughts on this:
http://allaboutvoting.com/2008/01/07/our-voting-system-is-a-loser/
See also the Range Voting advocacy site's comparison of Range vs. Approval and make up your own mind:
http://www.rangevoting.org/rangeVapp.html -
Re:Approval voting makes more sense than Range vot
>Might as well just go with the simpler Approval voting... It's simpler, and >more effective in my experience. I partially agree. The most effective strategy under Range voting is to always vote max or min score for each candidate that you think is a real contender to win. Any other vote could be considered a partial abstention. If the voting instructions are poor or minimal many voters will accidentally partially abstain which will understandably make them angry. But if the instructions are well written then I do not think that this will happen to a significant degree. I like Approval voting but I see allowing partial abstentions as being a small improvement. I don't like the idea of encouraging frequent accidental partial abstentions so my support for Range Voting is very sensitive to the context and voting instructions. Some more of my thoughts on this: http://allaboutvoting.com/2008/01/07/our-voting-system-is-a-loser/ See also the Range Voting advocacy site's comparison of Range vs. Approval and make up your own mind: http://www.rangevoting.org/rangeVapp.html
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Re:Yay! Now ban the machines
>If you had read the article, you would know that the problem was not the machines.
>The city did perform a dump of the data before they returned the machines to
>Diebold; that was the responsibility of the people in california. Diebold
>was clearing the machines and when told to stop they did, however only 20
>of the 400+ machines had not been cleared.
I did not see mentions of these details in the articles. Link?
I do agree with the point that the core issue here was that the county did not
successfully retain evidence that it had an obligation to retain. Such a thing
could have happened even with a hand-counted paper ballot.
Separately there is, of course, the issue of whether the use of an unverifiable
voting machine like those provided by Diebold can have a meaningful audit.
In terms of meaningful audits I see it as
end-to-end verifiable systems like punchscan
BETTER THEN hand marked paper ballot with optical scan and recounts against samples of the paper ballots
BETTER THEN hand counted paper ballots
BETTER THEN voting machines with voter-verified paper trails
BETTER THEN voting machines -
Re:Yay! Now ban the machines
>If you had read the article, you would know that the problem was not the machines.
>The city did perform a dump of the data before they returned the machines to
>Diebold; that was the responsibility of the people in california. Diebold
>was clearing the machines and when told to stop they did, however only 20
>of the 400+ machines had not been cleared.
I did not see mentions of these details in the articles. Link?
I do agree with the point that the core issue here was that the county did not
successfully retain evidence that it had an obligation to retain. Such a thing
could have happened even with a hand-counted paper ballot.
Separately there is, of course, the issue of whether the use of an unverifiable
voting machine like those provided by Diebold can have a meaningful audit.
In terms of meaningful audits I see it as
end-to-end verifiable systems like punchscan
BETTER THEN hand marked paper ballot with optical scan and recounts against samples of the paper ballots
BETTER THEN hand counted paper ballots
BETTER THEN voting machines with voter-verified paper trails
BETTER THEN voting machines -
EFF on HR811From the EFF article:
The news is good in California, but serious reforms are needed nationwide, including a voter-verified paper trail and mandatory random audits. Contact your representative today and voice your support for H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007.
EFF supports HR811 and considers it to be an improvement over our current system.
Some other prominent folks support it such as Avi Rubin.
Me? I'm still neutral on HR811. I have not taken the time to thoroughly research it and I find that the advice of those I trust is split on the matter.
I also have concerns that it will too sharply limit promising end-to-end verifiable systems such as Punchscan.
I don't consider end-to-end verifiable technologies to be ready for widespread deployment, but I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
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EFF on HR811From the EFF article:
The news is good in California, but serious reforms are needed nationwide, including a voter-verified paper trail and mandatory random audits. Contact your representative today and voice your support for H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007.
EFF supports HR811 and considers it to be an improvement over our current system.
Some other prominent folks support it such as Avi Rubin.
Me? I'm still neutral on HR811. I have not taken the time to thoroughly research it and I find that the advice of those I trust is split on the matter.
I also have concerns that it will too sharply limit promising end-to-end verifiable systems such as Punchscan.
I don't consider end-to-end verifiable technologies to be ready for widespread deployment, but I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
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EFF on HR811From the EFF article:
The news is good in California, but serious reforms are needed nationwide, including a voter-verified paper trail and mandatory random audits. Contact your representative today and voice your support for H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007.
EFF supports HR811 and considers it to be an improvement over our current system.
Some other prominent folks support it such as Avi Rubin.
Me? I'm still neutral on HR811. I have not taken the time to thoroughly research it and I find that the advice of those I trust is split on the matter.
I also have concerns that it will too sharply limit promising end-to-end verifiable systems such as Punchscan.
I don't consider end-to-end verifiable technologies to be ready for widespread deployment, but I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
-
EFF on HR811From the EFF article:
The news is good in California, but serious reforms are needed nationwide, including a voter-verified paper trail and mandatory random audits. Contact your representative today and voice your support for H.R. 811, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007.
EFF supports HR811 and considers it to be an improvement over our current system.
Some other prominent folks support it such as Avi Rubin.
Me? I'm still neutral on HR811. I have not taken the time to thoroughly research it and I find that the advice of those I trust is split on the matter.
I also have concerns that it will too sharply limit promising end-to-end verifiable systems such as Punchscan.
I don't consider end-to-end verifiable technologies to be ready for widespread deployment, but I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
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Re:Common sense from the dutch>Well done!
I agree that they are switching to a better system.
>Computer voting sounds good but the reality is very different.
>No system should be trusted without a full, audited paper trail which allows recounts.
I agree. But even paper systems (or paper and eVoting hybrids) can be hacked if
shenanigans happen when the votes are being counted.
Election fraud has a long history in the US.
"It's not the people who vote that count. It's the people who count the votes."
-Joseph Stalin (allegedly)
The good news is that there is active research and some light deployment of voting systems that ensure end-to-end verifiability without compromising the secret ballot. Voters can be confident that their vote was counted-as-cast and not dumped in the garbage dump.
Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
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Re:Common sense from the dutch>Well done!
I agree that they are switching to a better system.
>Computer voting sounds good but the reality is very different.
>No system should be trusted without a full, audited paper trail which allows recounts.
I agree. But even paper systems (or paper and eVoting hybrids) can be hacked if
shenanigans happen when the votes are being counted.
Election fraud has a long history in the US.
"It's not the people who vote that count. It's the people who count the votes."
-Joseph Stalin (allegedly)
The good news is that there is active research and some light deployment of voting systems that ensure end-to-end verifiability without compromising the secret ballot. Voters can be confident that their vote was counted-as-cast and not dumped in the garbage dump.
Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
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Re:Online voting has basic structural problems.
I agree that online voting has serious issues. Among these is the essential loss of the 'secret' ballot which means that vote buying and coercion can become big issues in the US again as they were in the 1800s.
-AllAboutVoting
http://allaboutvoting.com/ -
paper voting systems are not enough>With a paper system, you're reduced to rigging the results one
>vote at a time. With electronic voting, you could change thousands
>of votes at once.
There is some truth here. eVoting can enable 'wholesale' fraud where only 'retail' fraud was available with a paper system.
But fraud is very possible with paper ballots and there has been a long history of election fraud in the US. Consider that the careers of 6 out of 11 post-WWII US presidents were heavily influenced by election fraud.
It is possible to have election systems that have a high level of election integrity and still have a secret ballot. Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
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paper voting systems are not enough>With a paper system, you're reduced to rigging the results one
>vote at a time. With electronic voting, you could change thousands
>of votes at once.
There is some truth here. eVoting can enable 'wholesale' fraud where only 'retail' fraud was available with a paper system.
But fraud is very possible with paper ballots and there has been a long history of election fraud in the US. Consider that the careers of 6 out of 11 post-WWII US presidents were heavily influenced by election fraud.
It is possible to have election systems that have a high level of election integrity and still have a secret ballot. Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
-
secret ballot + election integrity - is possibleIt is possible to have a secret ballot and still have election integrity. Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
-
secret ballot + election integrity - is possibleIt is possible to have a secret ballot and still have election integrity. Systems that do that are called end to end verifiable. One such system is PunchScan.
Some end-to-end verifiable systems involve voting machines. Some do not. A common theme is that voters take home some sort of 'receipt' with which they can verify that vote was counted as cast but where the receipt does not reveal how they voted.
I do not think end-to-end verifiable voting systems are yet ready for wide deployment. I do think:- that they should be discussed and seriously considered
- that additional funding for basic research of E2E verifiable technologies should be supported
- that limited deployment of E2E verifiable systems should be allowed and encouraged
- laws that frustrate any of the above are misguided
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Detailed review - correct thesis, poisonous toneI've written up a detailed review of this report.
Here is a summary and here is a point-by-point dissection.
I agree with the basic premise of the report that the debate about electronic voting needs to be broader and include other verification technologies than voter-verified paper audit trails. I am in basic agreement with the policy recommendations of the paper but I feel that these recommendations need some caveats.
I disagree with much of the setup of the report. The susceptibility to fraud of electronic voting machines is downplayed too much as is the ability of voter-verified paper audit trails to mitigate that. The tone of the report when talking about organizations promoting voter verified audit trails or promoting distrust of eVoting is absolutely poisonous and Mr. Castro should be ashamed.
The recommendations
The report makes three recommendations:- Congress and the states should allow the use of fully electronic ballots, not restrict electronic voting systems to those that create paper ballots.
I do not fully agree. For such a recommendation to be acceptable it must be coupled with the system having an acceptable verifiable audit trail. It is my fear that this report will be used to justify continued use of electronic voting systems without any sort of verifiability. - Congress and the states should require that future voting machines have verifiable audit trails, not require machines with verifiable paper audit trails.
I agree. I am concerned that this recommendation does not limit the continued use of non verifiable systems that are currently in use. I am also concerned about the details of what is considered an acceptable verifiable audit trail. - Congress should provide funding for the US Election Assistance Commission to issue grants for developing secure cryptographic voting protocols and for pilot testing new voting technology.
I agree with the principle of this recommendation. Ideally funding is for open academic research of voting technology. I am unsure if the EAC is the correct vehicle for providing this funding.
- Congress and the states should allow the use of fully electronic ballots, not restrict electronic voting systems to those that create paper ballots.
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Detailed review - correct thesis, poisonous toneI've written up a detailed review of this report.
Here is a summary and here is a point-by-point dissection.
I agree with the basic premise of the report that the debate about electronic voting needs to be broader and include other verification technologies than voter-verified paper audit trails. I am in basic agreement with the policy recommendations of the paper but I feel that these recommendations need some caveats.
I disagree with much of the setup of the report. The susceptibility to fraud of electronic voting machines is downplayed too much as is the ability of voter-verified paper audit trails to mitigate that. The tone of the report when talking about organizations promoting voter verified audit trails or promoting distrust of eVoting is absolutely poisonous and Mr. Castro should be ashamed.
The recommendations
The report makes three recommendations:- Congress and the states should allow the use of fully electronic ballots, not restrict electronic voting systems to those that create paper ballots.
I do not fully agree. For such a recommendation to be acceptable it must be coupled with the system having an acceptable verifiable audit trail. It is my fear that this report will be used to justify continued use of electronic voting systems without any sort of verifiability. - Congress and the states should require that future voting machines have verifiable audit trails, not require machines with verifiable paper audit trails.
I agree. I am concerned that this recommendation does not limit the continued use of non verifiable systems that are currently in use. I am also concerned about the details of what is considered an acceptable verifiable audit trail. - Congress should provide funding for the US Election Assistance Commission to issue grants for developing secure cryptographic voting protocols and for pilot testing new voting technology.
I agree with the principle of this recommendation. Ideally funding is for open academic research of voting technology. I am unsure if the EAC is the correct vehicle for providing this funding.
- Congress and the states should allow the use of fully electronic ballots, not restrict electronic voting systems to those that create paper ballots.
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links related to the Diebold division name changeSome useful links.
Coverage by the Brad Blog:More than anything, however, the move may well be a harbinger of a coming declaration of bankruptcy for Diebold/Premier, as we see it. With the unit now spun off from the blue chip Diebold parent, declaring bankruptcy or dissolving the company altogether might be less trouble for investors and the main company as a whole, as their extraordinary legal and financial liabilities continue to mount...
Mentions by:- Media articles linked to by the Daily Voting News
- Why Tuesday