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Domain: imperialviolet.org

Stories and comments across the archive that link to imperialviolet.org.

Stories · 6

  1. POODLE Flaw Returns, This Time Hitting TLS Protocol

    It · Security · · posted by Soulskill · from the its-bite-is-worse-than-its-bark dept. · 54 comments
    angry tapir writes: If you patched your sites against a serious SSL flaw discovered in October you will have to check them again. Researchers have discovered that the POODLE vulnerability also affects implementations of the newer TLS protocol. The POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) vulnerability allows attackers who manage to intercept traffic between a user's browser and an HTTPS website to decrypt sensitive information, like the user's authentication cookies.

  2. India's National Informatics Centre Forged Google SSL Certificates

    It · Security · · posted by timothy · from the who-can-you-trust? dept. · 107 comments
    NotInHere (3654617) writes As Google writes on its Online Security Blog, the National Informatics Centre of India (NIC) used its intermediate CA certificate, issued by Indian CCA, to issue several unauthorized certificates for Google domains, allowing it to do Man in the middle attacks. Possible impact however is limited, as, according to Google, the root certificates for the CA were only installed on Windows, which Firefox doesn't use — and for the Chrom{e,ium} browser, the CA for important Google domains is pinned to the Google CA. According to its website, the NIC CA has suspended certificate issuance, and according to Google, its root certificates were revoked by Indian CCA.

  3. Google Forks OpenSSL, Announces BoringSSL

    It · Security · · posted by Soulskill · from the if-you-want-something-done-right dept. · 128 comments
    An anonymous reader writes Two months after OpenBSD's LibReSSL was announced, Adam Langley introduces Google's own fork of OpenSSL, called BoringSSL. "[As] Android, Chrome and other products have started to need some subset of these [OpenSSL] patches, things have grown very complex. The effort involved in keeping all these patches (and there are more than 70 at the moment) straight across multiple code bases is getting to be too much. So we're switching models to one where we import changes from OpenSSL rather than rebasing on top of them. The result of that will start to appear in the Chromium repository soon and, over time, we hope to use it in Android and internally too." First reactions are generally positive. Theo de Raadt comments, "Choice is good!!."

  4. Apple SSL Bug In iOS Also Affects OS X

    Apple · Macosx · · posted by timothy · from the sympathetic-reaction dept. · 140 comments
    Trailrunner7 writes "The certificate-validation vulnerability that Apple patched in iOS yesterday also affects Mac OS X up to 10.9.1, the current version. Several security researchers analyzed the patch and looked at the code in question in OS X and found that the same error exists there as in iOS. Researcher Adam Langley did an analysis of the vulnerable code in OS X and said that the issue lies in the way that the code handles a pair of failures in a row. The bug affects the signature verification process in such a way that a server could send a valid certificate chain to the client and not have to sign the handshake at all, Langley found. Some users are reporting that Apple is rolling out a patch for his vulnerability in OS X, but it has not shown up for all users as yet. Langley has published a test site that will show OS X users whether their machines are vulnerable."

  5. No More SSL Revocation Checking For Chrome

    Tech · Chrome · · posted by timothy · from the substitute-my-own dept. · 152 comments
    New submitter mwehle writes with this bit from Ars Technica: "Google's Chrome browser will stop relying on a decades-old method for ensuring secure sockets layer certificates are valid after one of the company's top engineers compared it to seat belts that break when they are needed most. The browser will stop querying CRL, or certificate revocation lists, and databases that rely on OCSP, or online certificate status protocol, Google researcher Adam Langley said in a blog post published on Sunday. He said the services, which browsers are supposed to query before trusting a credential for an SSL-protected address, don't make end users safer because Chrome and most other browsers establish the connection even when the services aren't able to ensure a certificate hasn't been tampered with."

  6. Blocking SiteFinder Service

    Yro · Internet · · posted by timothy · from the masking-tape-on-monitor dept. · 38 comments
    apankrat writes "Given VeriSign's position on wildcard redirection service, it looks like it's time for a simplier and more efficient ways of bringing things back to where they were. For those running BIND there is a patch; for those on the client side - there is a dnsfix for Windows and the usual iptables hackery under Linux. Aware of any other clean and easy ways to block wildcarding ? Post below."