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Domain: middleeastreference.org.uk
Stories and comments across the archive that link to middleeastreference.org.uk.
Comments · 7
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Re:Ignorance and the Death of the TruthI worked in the intelligence field at the time he made this speech so I know the "facts" Baloney. Don't try to pull a false appeal to authority on me. You had no need to know, you were not cleared for access, the best you might have known were no more than rumors one step above what the public hears. And if you *had* been cleared, you would not be talking about the details on slashdot. In the entire speech there is only one questionable statement "buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium...". More baloney. For example, the entire bit about anthrax was pure deception. The referenced defector, Hussein Kamal, revealed a program that had existed prior to 1991 and was (at the time in 1994) long defunct. Furthermore, Kamal also stated that all of the anthrax from that program and all other WMDs had been destroyed at the end of the gulf war at his specific direction. This is a perfect example of Bush's half-truths and deceptions.
I'm not even going to touch your aluminum tube joke. -
Re:Removing Salami vs. trying to reform Islam
This is something i found after a quick google search: http://middleeastreference.org.uk/iraqweapons.htm
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Re:Another nail in the coffin of journalism.
Okay, "unaccounted for" is not the same thing as "we know where it is". Fragments of anthrax in warheads is a "historical document" not live, weaponized anthrax.
Between documented use against the Kurds and Iran, admittance by Iraq of some of these weapons, and discovery of others by UNSCOM, and Bush's invasion, did the statement 'there are no WMD's' become true? When was that? And why didn't whoever was in power at the time scream it from the mountaintops?
It became true in the 1990s, starting in July 1991. It wasn't shouted from the mountaintops because there were questions about verification, and because it would have interfered with continuing sanctions. That's if you accept that the US intended sanctions to bring down the Hussein government, not simply to block WMD creation.
Your first quote references Hussein Kamel, who I also referenced. In 1995, Hussein Kamel said: "I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed."
Iraq admitted the program, and had tried to conceal the program, but by the time of the speech had already destroyed the WMD in question. This had been reported in real time - the point of the speech (as far as I know) was to push for continued inspections and verification of the Iraqis, not claiming that there were 'secret stocks'.
Do you know what the shelf life of the Iraqi anthrax was, anyway? -
Re:Agreed
"Iraq told the United Nations in 1995 it had produced 30,000 liters of biological agents, including anthrax and other toxins it could put on missiles."
Apparently you need to learn the meaning of the word "Had". Should I get you a link?
"that they believed might still be in the country."
I suppose I'll have to get you a link to the word "might" as well
Well that was a very humanitarian thing for him to do...
First, you need some background on the subject; you should start by reading up on Hussein Kamel. Back then, nobody had any clue that there would be such a witch hunt over the inspections; Iraq just wanted the inspectors to be done and get the heck out of there.
"Nuclear" and "WMD" are not synonymous.
Nuclear is a subset of WMD.
I agree that the Bush administration was wrong about Iraq's nuclear ambitions, but the biological/chemical aspect of things was plenty bad enough.
It was obvious that he was wrong - almost everyone said they were wrong. And yet they kept pushing it, and trying to use the most terrifying language possible. And there was a lot of doubt coming from the inspectors themselves and intelligence agents in various countries (including our own); it just wasn't usually published in the US (the British, French, Spanish, Italians, Germans, etc all published it extensively before the war).
Sure, from an article you linked
According to Mr Hage, the Iraqis offered a package of "concessions" to the US administration:
[snip](including)
- Handing over Abdul Rahman Yasin, a top al-Qaeda suspect wanted in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
Yasin was in an Iraqi *prison*, and they had offered to turn him over previously. Don't you bother to look things up before you post?
At any rate, as I said I don't have time to respond to your entire post...
The typical response of someone who doesn't have an answer to points raised. I'll keep checking this thread - come back when you have an answer.
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Re:WMDs not Bush's issue rather Blairs.Since you're determined to sleep, here's some bedtime reading..
Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons
even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts (Peter Ricketts (Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), letter to Jack Straw, 22 March 2002)
The source Duelfer didn't quote. The head of the Iraq Survey Group knows regime change was the aim
Scott Ritter, The Guardian Saturday October 9, 2004 - During this week of American election debates, Charles Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspectors and current head of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, delivered to Congress his much-anticipated report on Iraq's WMD capabilities. Among his controversial conclusions is that, contrary to pre-war assertions by both the George Bush administration and Tony Blair's government, Iraq had neither stockpiles of WMD nor dedicated programmes for the manufacture of WMD. Duelfer's report did note that Iraq maintained so-called "dual-use" facilities (those with legitimate civilian and/or military functions, but which could be configured for proscribed use), but his ISG has found no evidence that any such conversion had taken place.
One would expect the ISG's conclusions to take the wind out of the sails of those who repeat the mantra that Iraq was a grave and growing threat. But Duelfer has provided a convenient escape from such criticism, by concluding that Saddam Hussein in fact fully intended to convert his "dual use" factories into WMD production facilities once UN weapons inspectors left. In one fell swoop, Duelfer has provided the ideal cover for the justification of the war.
Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, was quick to note that Saddam was, according to the ISG report, "a gathering threat that needed to be taken seriously, that it was a matter of time before he was going to begin pursuing those weapons of mass destruction". The UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw, commenting on the report from Baghdad, was likewise quick to jump on the notion of intent. "Where this report breaks new ground," Straw said, "is by producing extensive new evidence showing that Saddam did indeed pose a threat to the international community
There are, however, several problems with this finding - first and foremost the notion of legality, especially in light of UN secretary general Kofi Annan's comments that the US-led invasion of Iraq represented a violation of the UN charter and international law. Bush and Blair have argued that because the Iraqi government had failed to comply with previous security council resolutions regarding Iraq's obligation to disarm, the right of enforcing these resolutions is implicit.
Duelfer's report slams the door on that line of thinking, since it is now clear that Iraq had in fact disarmed in compliance with security council resolutions. One of the tragic ironies of the decision to invade Iraq is that the Iraqi WMD declaration required by security council resolution 1441, submitted by Iraq in December 2002, and summarily rejected by Bush and Blair as repackaged falsehoods, now stands as the most accurate compilation of data yet assembled regarding Iraq's WMD programmes (more so than even Duelfer's ISG report, which contains much unsubstantiated speculation). Sadd
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Re:WMDs not Bush's issue rather Blairs.Since you're determined to sleep, here's some bedtime reading..
Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons
even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts (Peter Ricketts (Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), letter to Jack Straw, 22 March 2002)
The source Duelfer didn't quote. The head of the Iraq Survey Group knows regime change was the aim
Scott Ritter, The Guardian Saturday October 9, 2004 - During this week of American election debates, Charles Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspectors and current head of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, delivered to Congress his much-anticipated report on Iraq's WMD capabilities. Among his controversial conclusions is that, contrary to pre-war assertions by both the George Bush administration and Tony Blair's government, Iraq had neither stockpiles of WMD nor dedicated programmes for the manufacture of WMD. Duelfer's report did note that Iraq maintained so-called "dual-use" facilities (those with legitimate civilian and/or military functions, but which could be configured for proscribed use), but his ISG has found no evidence that any such conversion had taken place.
One would expect the ISG's conclusions to take the wind out of the sails of those who repeat the mantra that Iraq was a grave and growing threat. But Duelfer has provided a convenient escape from such criticism, by concluding that Saddam Hussein in fact fully intended to convert his "dual use" factories into WMD production facilities once UN weapons inspectors left. In one fell swoop, Duelfer has provided the ideal cover for the justification of the war.
Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, was quick to note that Saddam was, according to the ISG report, "a gathering threat that needed to be taken seriously, that it was a matter of time before he was going to begin pursuing those weapons of mass destruction". The UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw, commenting on the report from Baghdad, was likewise quick to jump on the notion of intent. "Where this report breaks new ground," Straw said, "is by producing extensive new evidence showing that Saddam did indeed pose a threat to the international community
There are, however, several problems with this finding - first and foremost the notion of legality, especially in light of UN secretary general Kofi Annan's comments that the US-led invasion of Iraq represented a violation of the UN charter and international law. Bush and Blair have argued that because the Iraqi government had failed to comply with previous security council resolutions regarding Iraq's obligation to disarm, the right of enforcing these resolutions is implicit.
Duelfer's report slams the door on that line of thinking, since it is now clear that Iraq had in fact disarmed in compliance with security council resolutions. One of the tragic ironies of the decision to invade Iraq is that the Iraqi WMD declaration required by security council resolution 1441, submitted by Iraq in December 2002, and summarily rejected by Bush and Blair as repackaged falsehoods, now stands as the most accurate compilation of data yet assembled regarding Iraq's WMD programmes (more so than even Duelfer's ISG report, which contains much unsubstantiated speculation). Sadd
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Re:WMDs not Bush's issue rather Blairs.Since you're determined to sleep, here's some bedtime reading..
Claims and evaluations of Iraq's proscribed weapons
even the best survey of Iraq's WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts (Peter Ricketts (Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), letter to Jack Straw, 22 March 2002)
The source Duelfer didn't quote. The head of the Iraq Survey Group knows regime change was the aim
Scott Ritter, The Guardian Saturday October 9, 2004 - During this week of American election debates, Charles Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of the UN weapons inspectors and current head of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, delivered to Congress his much-anticipated report on Iraq's WMD capabilities. Among his controversial conclusions is that, contrary to pre-war assertions by both the George Bush administration and Tony Blair's government, Iraq had neither stockpiles of WMD nor dedicated programmes for the manufacture of WMD. Duelfer's report did note that Iraq maintained so-called "dual-use" facilities (those with legitimate civilian and/or military functions, but which could be configured for proscribed use), but his ISG has found no evidence that any such conversion had taken place.
One would expect the ISG's conclusions to take the wind out of the sails of those who repeat the mantra that Iraq was a grave and growing threat. But Duelfer has provided a convenient escape from such criticism, by concluding that Saddam Hussein in fact fully intended to convert his "dual use" factories into WMD production facilities once UN weapons inspectors left. In one fell swoop, Duelfer has provided the ideal cover for the justification of the war.
Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman, was quick to note that Saddam was, according to the ISG report, "a gathering threat that needed to be taken seriously, that it was a matter of time before he was going to begin pursuing those weapons of mass destruction". The UK foreign secretary, Jack Straw, commenting on the report from Baghdad, was likewise quick to jump on the notion of intent. "Where this report breaks new ground," Straw said, "is by producing extensive new evidence showing that Saddam did indeed pose a threat to the international community
There are, however, several problems with this finding - first and foremost the notion of legality, especially in light of UN secretary general Kofi Annan's comments that the US-led invasion of Iraq represented a violation of the UN charter and international law. Bush and Blair have argued that because the Iraqi government had failed to comply with previous security council resolutions regarding Iraq's obligation to disarm, the right of enforcing these resolutions is implicit.
Duelfer's report slams the door on that line of thinking, since it is now clear that Iraq had in fact disarmed in compliance with security council resolutions. One of the tragic ironies of the decision to invade Iraq is that the Iraqi WMD declaration required by security council resolution 1441, submitted by Iraq in December 2002, and summarily rejected by Bush and Blair as repackaged falsehoods, now stands as the most accurate compilation of data yet assembled regarding Iraq's WMD programmes (more so than even Duelfer's ISG report, which contains much unsubstantiated speculation). Sadd