Domain: nnsquad.org
Stories and comments across the archive that link to nnsquad.org.
Comments · 13
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Re:Astroturfing?
Reviewing the Network Neutrality Squad mailing list (http://www.nnsquad.org/archives/nnsquad/maillist.html) supports the above statements archives also shows a certain propensity for vitrol.
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Re:AKA
Unfortunately for me, my ISP seems to have installed some sort of brain-dead filtering that interrupts continuous connections after about 2 minute and makes them hang, probably as a Bittorrent blocking feature.
Here is a tool that was made to detect reset packets forged by the ISP to kill connections.
Also, you might try using some public DNS servers, like http://www.opendns.com/
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Along the same lines...
There are a few packages available on the Network Neutrality Squad's website:
- Testing Your Internet Connection for ISP DNS Diversions
- Network Measurement Agent
(These were mentioned on Slashdot a little while back)
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Along the same lines...
There are a few packages available on the Network Neutrality Squad's website:
- Testing Your Internet Connection for ISP DNS Diversions
- Network Measurement Agent
(These were mentioned on Slashdot a little while back)
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Re:There are more than 4,000 independent ISPs.
I've been following the Net Neutrality mailing list quite closely since it's creation. You've been a prominent poster on the list, who argues from the position of a small ISP. That doesn't make your opinion more correct or valid.
Numerous people have tried to convince you about the fallacies of your position, so I will humbly suggest that your ISPs bottom line problems might be precisely due to you and your ISP not understanding these issues.
I'm sorry, but I cannot endorse any of the positions you take (which are documented thoroughly in the nnsquad archive), namely that bandwidth overselling is the only way ISPs can stay alive and that justifies QoS and blocking P2P, that RST packets from an ISP are not forgery, etc. In fact, I consider you to be part of the problem, while ISPs keep having these opinions, we need legislation to provide fairness for internet users against ISPs. It's long overdue. Mail and television receives much more legal protection, but they are not even tenth as important to me as a correctly working internet access. -
Re:Open source throttling detector?
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Re:Comcast Caught Throttling 2 days ago with You T
There are several tools that attempt to directly measure things like forged reset packets, but I am not sure if there is a tools that tries to measure network throttling in general.
Here are some of the ones I found:
http://www.nnsquad.org/agent
http://www.eff.org/testyourisp/pcapdiff/
http://azureus.sourceforge.net/plugin_details.php?plugin=aznetmon
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problematic detection methodology?This link describes the manner by which problematic reset packets are detected. Apparently, an RST packet would be flagged as generated by the ISP based on the time at which it arrives, namely, if it arrives too early, or too late: spoofed resets have only a relatively narrow time window in which they can be both effective at disrupting connections and simultaneously be resistant to detection as potentially anomalous events. The question is what prevents the ISP from sending the packet within the said "narrow time window" and thereby avoid detection?
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Re:The race is onBecause, of course, ISPs could also forge legitimate looking TCP RST packets. If you read the methodology page, you'll learn that: It's much harder to fake the timing of a spoofed reset. This round trip time (RTT) is tracked internally by TCP protocol layers, however it can also be measured by external monitoring devices or software at the endpoints. When sending bulk data during a TCP connection, the RTT between two TCP endpoints usually settles into a narrow, predictable range. Spoofed resets which are injected into the stream will usually have an RTT well below the measured average. Reset packet spoofers could attempt to evade this detection technique and improve their "stealthiness" by first measuring the RTT of a connection that they are planning to disrupt, then delaying the transmission of their spoofed reset until timing falls within the "expected" RTT. The problem with this approach is the significant risk that the spoofed reset will arrive too late from the standpoint of the receiving endpoint. In short, spoofed resets have only a relatively narrow time window in which they can be both effective at disrupting connections and simultaneously be resistant to detection as potentially anomalous events. So yeah, in theory the ISP could, but anomalies are detected in a way that's hard to get around and still work.
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Re:Important,
Network Neutrality Squad has a forum and mailing list for posting and discussing test results.
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Re:Important,
Network Neutrality Squad has a forum and mailing list for posting and discussing test results.
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Re:Important,
Network Neutrality Squad has a forum and mailing list for posting and discussing test results.
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Website Quality
Their website (nnsquad.org) is awful. I know it's probably up there to be clean and simple, maybe even temporary, but it's hard to read and involves too much scrolling.
Divulging information about "blocking or disruptive manipulation of applications, protocols, transmissions, or bandwidth; or other similar behaviors not specifically requested by their customers." on a forum is flaky and tacky. Am I supposed to use the forum's search facilities to see if my information is already on their? Get real.
It's a nice idea, and one I'll keep an eye on, even submit information to, but make it usable and readble first.