Domain: peeringdb.com
Stories and comments across the archive that link to peeringdb.com.
Comments · 11
-
Re:Very conveniently situated...
'Excellent connectivity' is an understatement. Frankfurt is the largest internet exchange in the world by bandwidth.
https://www.peeringdb.com/priv...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... -
Re:Alternative explanation
That's not how it works, either. There's settlement-free peering (the "real" peering) and there's paid peering and there's transit. Peering is when two networks exchange data which is destined for the respective other network. Transit is when two networks exchange traffic that is destined for some other network. Transit is the real cost factor, because nobody carries transit traffic for free: You want me to carry your data to someone else? What's in it for me? Whether peering is settlement free or not is a matter of negotiation. Most networks publish peering policies in which they describe where and with whom they will peer and what the conditions are. For example: Google, Comcast, Verizon, and few others. If you want to dig even deeper, there's a database of peerings (use guest login). It is indeed often a matter of size, and the resulting negotiating power, who pays whom. There are however "peering sluts": CDNs will typically peer settlement-free with anyone above a relatively small minimum size, even though CDNs are true behemoths on the internet. That's because their business depends on reaching everybody, and settlement-free peering is still a lot cheaper than the transit for their huge traffic flows. Netflix is in this category, for the same reason.
-
Re:TOECDN solves mostly all of your problems
Had you actually clicked the link instead of staring at it you would have been greeted with several pages of peers.
Good point. They need to learn how to design a webpage. Their sites on par with Geocities.
But that still doesn't solve all the other problems with their agreement requirements. It also doesn't solve the problem of netflix switching peers almost at random.
-
Re:TOECDN solves mostly all of your problems
Had you actually clicked the link instead of staring at it you would have been greeted with several pages of peers.
-
Re:terminology
They list their peering policy as Selective in their peeringdb entry https://www.peeringdb.com/priv.... They should have an open peering policy. Or is only open if you are a interesting content provider?
Probably. So what is wrong with that? "Interesting" to Google Fiber would be a content provider that is starting to use up enough transit bandwidth that it makes sense to move them to a peering port. That is always how things have worked on the Internet.
Exactly. And it sounds like a beautiful market solution without any ugly bureaucrats mucking up the works, yet.
-
Re:terminology
They list their peering policy as Selective in their peeringdb entry https://www.peeringdb.com/priv.... They should have an open peering policy. Or is only open if you are a interesting content provider?
Probably. So what is wrong with that? "Interesting" to Google Fiber would be a content provider that is starting to use up enough transit bandwidth that it makes sense to move them to a peering port. That is always how things have worked on the Internet.
-
Re:terminology
They list their peering policy as Selective in their peeringdb entry https://www.peeringdb.com/priv.... They should have an open peering policy. Or is only open if you are a interesting content provider?
-
Re:basically vertical integration with CDNs
You can look up peering details at peeringdb. It's kind of neat.
-
Re:Dark Fibre
For reference, they already peer vast quantities of traffic at IXs anyway : Google Peering Info
-
China's GFW and fat-fingers probably
This article is so-god-damned simplistic and more rumors. The Chinese didn't even try to hide it as per the BGPmon.net monitor. I'm 99% sure this was simply a fat-finger good old fashioned programming error on their peering/IP transit routers. This has HAPPENED MANY TIMES IN THE US/CANADA AND EUROPE. Oh and BTW, the Chinese great firewall/DPI (deep packet inspection) "Golden Shield" according to public documents these days is mostly Huawei high-end routers including the NE80E, SIG9800 and a few others. Huawei have sold this product WORLDWIDE including Europe and the Middle East and they simply market the product/engineer the product like Cisco & Juniper. The Chinese government (aka CCP, some propaganda department probably) is responsible for the operation of the filter lists which gets passed to the semi-nationalized telecom operators (China Telecom, China Unicom/(ex. Netcom), China Mobile and a few others licensed for international inter-connect). China Telecom uses AS4134 and Unicom/Netcom uses 4837 for international peering with foreign countries. There are a few other Chinese AS'es I believe but those are for special reserved usage like VPN. The way it works is very simple, there are two layers. There's an internal AS layer within the provinces of China (not connected to outside the country) and an international layer. All international peering/IP-transit traffic is connected to a Cisco/Juniper device which passes all traffic to a Huawei DPI (deep packet inspection) for high-speed ASIC based filtering. If a keyword matches (e.g. twitter, facebook) the packet is dropped and the Chinese have aggregate logged data of filtered data like any other commercial product off the Huawei device. It is technically impossible to do massive packet capture unless they are specifically targeting something. The Chinese-fucked up routes probably sent to Chinese-border international border routers, their Huawei DPI probably dropped those packets. They also manipulate/use faux-DNS using their Huawei DPI. (So if you use opendns in China the DNS will still be manipulated, it's TIME FOR ENCRYPTED DNS!) Here's another open industry secret: The Chinese like any other international ISP have to connect their network to the international internet up-stream ISPs/ASN's right. I believe now they even have some of their DPI hardware in the US/Europe. Again all public data, see: https://www.peeringdb.com/private/participant_view.php?id=308 https://www.peeringdb.com/private/participant_view.php?id=730 If the US gov't really wanted to see China's internet filter lists they could theoretically do the following (again this would be POLITICAL SUICIDE I'M GUESSING AND possibly touch off a war with China, and would require a warrant obviously): Go to Any2 LA or Equinix San Jose or any other Chinese international peering/IP-transit place and go to China Telecom or China Unicom's cage. Seize the Huawei DPI device. Simple. Copy the data. Do analysis. Return it back to the Chinese!? LOL. It's a Chinese-registered APNIC IP with a public WHOIS registration of "FSKWC NET". Mhmm... F must standard for Firewall. Must be the Chinese-DPI-GFW firewall cluster. The internet community has discovered that all traffic to Mainland China passes through a FSKWC NET device before it goes further in-ward to China. Some of these devices we know are in the US and Europe where the Chinese peer before they are sent across the pacific on one of the Trans-pacific or Eur-Asia fiber-optic cables (TPE, etc...) The real problem with China is political and political change. I believe this will change over time as change evolves, develops and moves towards a more open model. As an engineer I really don't care about political crap, I wish they would just develop an open internet policy like HK or Singapore or Japan. Filtering political extremism is fine for stability (remember in Chinese thinking/culture it's all about "stability" ve
-
China's GFW and fat-fingers probably
This article is so-god-damned simplistic and more rumors. The Chinese didn't even try to hide it as per the BGPmon.net monitor. I'm 99% sure this was simply a fat-finger good old fashioned programming error on their peering/IP transit routers. This has HAPPENED MANY TIMES IN THE US/CANADA AND EUROPE. Oh and BTW, the Chinese great firewall/DPI (deep packet inspection) "Golden Shield" according to public documents these days is mostly Huawei high-end routers including the NE80E, SIG9800 and a few others. Huawei have sold this product WORLDWIDE including Europe and the Middle East and they simply market the product/engineer the product like Cisco & Juniper. The Chinese government (aka CCP, some propaganda department probably) is responsible for the operation of the filter lists which gets passed to the semi-nationalized telecom operators (China Telecom, China Unicom/(ex. Netcom), China Mobile and a few others licensed for international inter-connect). China Telecom uses AS4134 and Unicom/Netcom uses 4837 for international peering with foreign countries. There are a few other Chinese AS'es I believe but those are for special reserved usage like VPN. The way it works is very simple, there are two layers. There's an internal AS layer within the provinces of China (not connected to outside the country) and an international layer. All international peering/IP-transit traffic is connected to a Cisco/Juniper device which passes all traffic to a Huawei DPI (deep packet inspection) for high-speed ASIC based filtering. If a keyword matches (e.g. twitter, facebook) the packet is dropped and the Chinese have aggregate logged data of filtered data like any other commercial product off the Huawei device. It is technically impossible to do massive packet capture unless they are specifically targeting something. The Chinese-fucked up routes probably sent to Chinese-border international border routers, their Huawei DPI probably dropped those packets. They also manipulate/use faux-DNS using their Huawei DPI. (So if you use opendns in China the DNS will still be manipulated, it's TIME FOR ENCRYPTED DNS!) Here's another open industry secret: The Chinese like any other international ISP have to connect their network to the international internet up-stream ISPs/ASN's right. I believe now they even have some of their DPI hardware in the US/Europe. Again all public data, see: https://www.peeringdb.com/private/participant_view.php?id=308 https://www.peeringdb.com/private/participant_view.php?id=730 If the US gov't really wanted to see China's internet filter lists they could theoretically do the following (again this would be POLITICAL SUICIDE I'M GUESSING AND possibly touch off a war with China, and would require a warrant obviously): Go to Any2 LA or Equinix San Jose or any other Chinese international peering/IP-transit place and go to China Telecom or China Unicom's cage. Seize the Huawei DPI device. Simple. Copy the data. Do analysis. Return it back to the Chinese!? LOL. It's a Chinese-registered APNIC IP with a public WHOIS registration of "FSKWC NET". Mhmm... F must standard for Firewall. Must be the Chinese-DPI-GFW firewall cluster. The internet community has discovered that all traffic to Mainland China passes through a FSKWC NET device before it goes further in-ward to China. Some of these devices we know are in the US and Europe where the Chinese peer before they are sent across the pacific on one of the Trans-pacific or Eur-Asia fiber-optic cables (TPE, etc...) The real problem with China is political and political change. I believe this will change over time as change evolves, develops and moves towards a more open model. As an engineer I really don't care about political crap, I wish they would just develop an open internet policy like HK or Singapore or Japan. Filtering political extremism is fine for stability (remember in Chinese thinking/culture it's all about "stability" ve