Software Fortresses
Oink.NET writes: "An interview with Roger Sessions discusses, among other things, his software fortress model for designing enterprise software systems, complete with guards, grunts, allies, and drawbridges. Enterprise systems are treated as mutually suspicious, marginally cooperating software fortresses, which he claims is perfect for the coexistence of J2EE and .NET systems."
No castle can be complete without the trolls living under the bridge.
This guy seemed to have very little positive to say about anyone/anything except himself and his own "ideas". I got nothing out of that really.
Go to the store and pay cash.
Perfect transaction security, privacy, and accountability.
When you are on a first name basis with The UPS driver, Fed Ex Driver, The alternate UPS Driver, The alternate Fed EX driver, The women who sound like they could rock your world from both UPS and Fed EX customer support, you decided to pave and widen your driveway just so the UPS truck would really deliver to your door, you opened up a secured visa online account to insure against shady vendors and the list of orders you are tracking requires it's own automated database that only delivers summaries of what is supposed to get here today and what needs your personal attention because it is over a week late, you really need to simplify your life.
If voting were effective, it would be illegal by now.
I think all the author has done is give names to what a significant number of sysadmins already try to do. Without really addressing issues like scalability or intra-departmental trust.
I'll say it once again... UML is NOT a methodology. UML stands for Unified Modelling Language. Please tell me where the methodology is in that?
Reading the article I was struck that I'd seen Bruce Schneier denigrating the 'passive defence' fortress security model in the past, and a quick search found the article - What Military History can Teach Network Security.
I'm not going to completely denigrate Roger Sessions here. At some point in a system components have to trust each other. However that point is not actually the firewall, which was Schneiers point - you need application level security. And Roger explicitly mentions firewalls as a fortress implementation technology (yes they may well be the walls but I wouldnt want them implementing the door as well).
A second problem with his model is the fact that he lets anyone at all through the door, after the guard ok's them. This is the kind of thing that led to problems in the early days of the web. Perl's taint model is better, and in Roger's world represents every messenger from the outside being followed round the fortress by a guard, or better still, sending someone out on a horse to parley instead of letting the messenger in in the first place.
To sum up, anyone implementing the security model as described in that article would actually be repeating an old set of mistakes (which curiously went by the same name, and Roger hasn't noticed). It does not describe an 'improved' level of security, rather it describes pretty much what is on the ground in most places. That may well have been his intent, though, time will tell.
-Baz
Any housewife could average 8 packages a day that without even trying.