Why not adapt an existing ppc port to operate on this new architecture, or is it so wildly different to other ppc implementations? Afterall, surely the m68k based Amiga with a PPC co-processor is one of the strangest implementations of a ppc architecture...
Re:Why a new port?
by
augustss
·
· Score: 2, Informative
Well, none of the existing ports were really that close to how the pmppc looks. The pmppc ports shares most of its code with other ports, of course (that's the whole point).
Re:Why a new port?
by
Anonymous Coward
·
· Score: 2, Interesting
While it may seem "easier" for the average person to consider the Amiga and the Mac68k machines just "one M68K port", in reality other than the CPU itself there are drastic differences in the hardware. Memory on the Amiga may start at location 0x000000, whereas on the Mac's it may start at 0x100000. Different disk controllers, different video...
Some code ("pmap" code, for instance) is shared between both ports. Each I'm sure has a pile of very specific drivers for the various devices. Amiga uses some bus interface (I'm not an amiga person, so I don't know what), while the Mac68k's use NuBus. The code that generally gets shared is the basic MMU code (the same for any 68k system), or pretty much anything specific to the CPU but not the surrounding hardware.
Its like saying I have a Honda 4-cylinder, and you have an old Caddilac 8-cylinder. Hey, they are both internal combustion engines, why can't you just "adapt" your 8-cylinder engine into my Honda?
Yes, reasonably, you might be able to adapt the gas tank to fit... and maybe the plugs would fit, or the alternator... but only bits an pieces. The 8-cylinder engine probably just isn't going to "fit" for the smaller car (or for the different system in this case).
I think you miss the point about Net BSD - no matter what hardware you have, it'll probably run Net BSD. I inherited some POS Dell server at work with some adaptec scsi card that wasn't supported by Free BSD. I grabbed my trusty Wasabi CD ROM (thanks to sizzla...) and I had a DNS server in no time. Whenever I get weird hardware I want to use, I go for Net BSD....
Re:58th port
by
Anonymous Coward
·
· Score: 0
That's great! If it even supports strange hardware, it surely supports my nVidia GeForce2 MX video card, doesn't it?
Re:58th port
by
Anonymous Coward
·
· Score: 0
...and that's SO MUCH BETTER than having a GIRLFRIEND, isn't it? Everyone knows the chicks dig Linix...and THAT'S why *BSD IS DYING...total inability to mount, finger and spawn.;);)
Good Lord!
by
Anonymous Coward
·
· Score: 0
I don't know what's more alarming: That there's only 11 troll posts to this story... Or that there's only 6 On-Topic posts.
*BSD isn't dying...but it looks like it might get canncelled due to lack of interst.;)
Improving the Security of Your Site by Breaking Into it
Dan Farmer
Sun Microsystems 2550 garcia ave MS PAL1-407 Mountain View CA 94043 zen@sun.com
Wietse Venema Eindhoven University of Technology P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, NL wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl
Every day, all over the world, computer networks and hosts are being broken into. The level of sophistication of these attacks varies widely; while it is generally believed that most break-ins succeed due to weak passwords, there are still a large number of intrusions that use more advanced techniques to break in. Less is known about the latter types of break-ins, because by their very nature they are much harder to detect.
CERT. SRI. The Nic. NCSC. RSA. NASA. MIT. Uunet. Berkeley. Purdue. Sun. You name it, we've seen it broken into. Anything that is on the Internet (and many that isn't) seems to be fairly easy game. Are these targets unusual? What happened?
Fade to...
A young boy, with greasy blonde hair, sitting in a dark room. The room is illuminated only by the luminescense of the C64's 40 character screen. Taking another long drag from his Benso and Hedges cigarette, the weary system cracker telnets to the next faceless ".mil" site on his hit list. "guest -- guest", "root -- root", and "system -- manager" all fail. No matter. He has all night... he pencils the host off of his list, and tiredly types in the next potential victim...
This seems to be the popular image of a system cracker. Young, inexperienced, and possessing vast quantities of time to waste, to get into just one more system. However, there is a far more dangerous type of system cracker out there. One who knows the ins and outs of the latest security auditing and cracking tools, who can modify them for specific attacks, and who can write his/her own programs. One who not only reads about the latest security holes, but also personally discovers bugs and vulnerabilities. A deadly creature that can both strike poisonously and hide its tracks without a whisper or hint of a trail. The uebercracker is here.
Why "uebercracker"? The idea is stolen, bviously, from Nietzsche's uebermensch, or, literally translated into English, "over man." Nietzsche used the term not to refer to a comic book superman, but instead a man who had gone beyond the incompetnce, pettiness, and weakness of the everyday man. The uebercracker is therefore the system cracker who has gone beyond simple cookbook methods of breaking into systems. An uebercracker is not usually motivated to perform random acts of violence. Targets are not arbitrary -- there is a purpose, whether it be personal monetary gain, a hit and run raid for information, or a challenge to strike a major or prestigious site or net.personality. An uebercracker is hard to detect, harder to stop, and hardest to keep out of your site for good.
Overview
In this paper we will take an unusual approach to system security. Instead of merely saying that something is a problem, we will look through the eyes of a potential intruder, and show _why_ it is one. We will illustrate that even seemingly harmless network services can become valuable tools in the search for weak points of a system, even when these services are operating exactly as they are intended to.
In an effort to shed some light on how more advanced intrusions occur, this paper outlines various mechanisms that crackers have actually used to obtain access to systems and, in addition, some techniques we either suspect intruders of using, or that we have used ourselves in tests or in friendly/authorized environments.
Our motivation for writing this paper is that system administrators are often unaware of the dangers presented by anything beyond the most trivial attacks. While it is widely known that the proper level of protection depends on what has to be protected, many sites appear to lack the resources to assess what level of host and network security is adequate. By showing what intruders can do to gain access to a remote site, we are trying to help system administrators to make _informed_ decisions on how to secure their site -- or not. We will limit the discussion to techniques that can give a remote intruder access to a (possibly non-interactive) shell process on a UNIX host. Once this is achieved, the details of obtaining root privilege are beyond the scope of this work -- we consider them too site-dependent and, in many cases, too trivial to merit much discussion.
bert/traceroute: traceroute to d7b166.dialup.cornell.edu (128.253.157.166), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
1 10.100.160.1 (10.100.160.1) 14.383 ms 14.583 ms 8.858 ms
2 syrcnyith-rtr1.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.227.57) 19.902 ms 10.15 ms 13.878 ms
3 ith-rtr-mcr2.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.225.149) 12.792 ms 13.562 ms 13.958 ms
4 syr-24-92-224-137.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.224.137) 14.439 ms 12.950 ms 13.112 ms
5 pop1-alb-P3-1.atdn.net (66.185.148.109) 15.329 ms 19.106 ms 25.923 ms
6 bb1-alb-P0-0.atdn.net (66.185.148.96) 16.21 ms 15.195 ms 19.617 ms
7 bb1-nye-P2-0.atdn.net (66.185.153.122) 22.850 ms 18.285 ms 20.316 ms
8 pop1-nye-P5-0.atdn.net (66.185.141.17) 19.799 ms 19.501 ms 21.764 ms
9 AppliedTheory.atdn.net (66.185.141.30) 22.847 ms 22.928 ms 21.61 ms 10 at-gsr1-nyc-1-0-OC12.appliedtheory.net (169.130.3.30) 25.377 ms 22.267 ms 31.8 ms 11 at-gsr1-syr-3-0-OC12.appliedtheory.net (169.130.3.42) 29.768 ms 23.255 ms 23.786 ms 12 at-gsr2-syr-1-2-cornelluniv-1.appliedtheory.net (169.130.253.6) 31.374 ms 25.422 ms 26.426 ms 13 core1-msfc-dmz1.cit.cornell.edu (128.253.222.5) 31.9 ms 30.217 ms 31.100 ms 14 ccc2-8540-vl8.cit.cornell.edu (132.236.222.138) 30.993 ms 26.882 ms 26.932 ms 15 * * * ... 64 * * * bjbj/keys: offered:
bd:16:4c:80:f5:bf:81:b8:a6:44:07:d7:d5:60:75:f6
real:
6a:a4:a0:74:ea:b6:f1:0d:b0:16:2e:0e:18:08:08:a8 b jbj/traceroute: localhost (66.67.64.39 from route print under w98) 10.100.160.1 wuhjuhbuh.2y.net
BSD is not dead.
NetBSD ported to another architecture, News at eleven
My Karma isn't excellent, damn it! (And
It's how I first learnt a load of *nix skills, by putting NetBSD on an old Mac. My best wishes to the team...
- Oliver
The right to bear arms is only slightly less stupid than the right to arm bears...
Why not adapt an existing ppc port to operate on this new architecture, or is it so wildly different to other ppc implementations?
Afterall, surely the m68k based Amiga with a PPC co-processor is one of the strangest implementations of a ppc architecture...
http://spamdecoy.net - free throwaway anonymous email - avoid spam!
FreeBSD's "ports" are ported software, not platforms FreeBSD runs on. The terms are different.
(And yes, NetBSD also has thousands of ported applications -- we use a system derived from the FreeBSD ports mechanism.)
Yep. Unfortunately, they only have 37 users.
I don't know what's more alarming:
;)
That there's only 11 troll posts to this story...
Or that there's only 6 On-Topic posts.
*BSD isn't dying...but it looks like it might get canncelled due to lack of interst.
Last Updated: March 24, 1994
b jbj/traceroute:
Improving the Security of Your Site by Breaking Into it
Dan Farmer
Sun Microsystems
2550 garcia ave MS PAL1-407
Mountain View CA 94043
zen@sun.com
Wietse Venema
Eindhoven University of Technology
P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB
Eindhoven, NL
wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl
Every day, all over the world, computer networks and hosts are being broken into. The level of sophistication of these attacks varies widely; while it is generally believed that most break-ins succeed due to weak passwords, there are still a large number of intrusions that use more advanced techniques to break in. Less is known about the latter types of break-ins, because by their very nature they are much harder to detect.
CERT. SRI. The Nic. NCSC. RSA. NASA. MIT. Uunet. Berkeley. Purdue. Sun. You name it, we've seen it broken into. Anything that is on the Internet (and many that isn't) seems to be fairly easy game. Are these targets unusual? What happened?
Fade to...
A young boy, with greasy blonde hair, sitting in a dark room. The room is illuminated only by the luminescense of the C64's 40 character screen. Taking another long drag from his Benso and Hedges cigarette, the weary system cracker telnets to the next faceless ".mil" site on
his hit list. "guest -- guest", "root -- root", and "system -- manager" all fail. No matter. He has all night... he pencils the host off of his list, and tiredly types in the next potential victim...
This seems to be the popular image of a system cracker. Young, inexperienced, and possessing vast quantities of time to waste, to get
into just one more system. However, there is a far more dangerous type of system cracker out there. One who knows the ins and outs of the
latest security auditing and cracking tools, who can modify them for specific attacks, and who can write his/her own programs. One who not only reads about the latest security holes, but also personally discovers bugs and vulnerabilities. A deadly creature that can both strike poisonously and hide its tracks without a whisper or hint of a
trail. The uebercracker is here.
Why "uebercracker"? The idea is stolen, bviously, from Nietzsche's uebermensch, or, literally translated into English, "over man."
Nietzsche used the term not to refer to a comic book superman, but instead a man who had gone beyond the incompetnce, pettiness, and weakness of the everyday man. The uebercracker is therefore the system cracker who has gone beyond simple cookbook methods of breaking into
systems. An uebercracker is not usually motivated to perform random acts of violence. Targets are not arbitrary -- there is a purpose, whether it be personal monetary gain, a hit and run raid for
information, or a challenge to strike a major or prestigious site or net.personality. An uebercracker is hard to detect, harder to stop,
and hardest to keep out of your site for good.
Overview
In this paper we will take an unusual approach to system security. Instead of merely saying that something is a problem, we will look
through the eyes of a potential intruder, and show _why_ it is one. We will illustrate that even seemingly harmless network services can
become valuable tools in the search for weak points of a system, even when these services are operating exactly as they are intended to.
In an effort to shed some light on how more advanced intrusions occur, this paper outlines various mechanisms that crackers have actually
used to obtain access to systems and, in addition, some techniques we either suspect intruders of using, or that we have used ourselves in tests or in friendly/authorized environments.
Our motivation for writing this paper is that system administrators are often unaware of the dangers presented by anything beyond the most
trivial attacks. While it is widely known that the proper level of protection depends on what has to be protected, many sites appear to
lack the resources to assess what level of host and network security is adequate. By showing what intruders can do to gain access to a remote site, we are trying to help system administrators to make _informed_ decisions on how to secure their site -- or not. We will limit the discussion to techniques that can give a remote intruder
access to a (possibly non-interactive) shell process on a UNIX host. Once this is achieved, the details of obtaining root privilege are
beyond the scope of this work -- we consider them too site-dependent and, in many cases, too trivial to merit much discussion.
bert/keys:
putty (w/ security warning):
ea:4e:58:33:56:e3:00:1e:36:d0:80:67:22:2e:46:64
ssh localhost:
b3:81:e3:1b:75:9a:23:0b:50:10:75:a0:ad:97:da:37
bert/traceroute:
traceroute to d7b166.dialup.cornell.edu (128.253.157.166), 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
1 10.100.160.1 (10.100.160.1) 14.383 ms 14.583 ms 8.858 ms
2 syrcnyith-rtr1.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.227.57) 19.902 ms 10.15 ms 13.878 ms
3 ith-rtr-mcr2.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.225.149) 12.792 ms 13.562 ms 13.958 ms
4 syr-24-92-224-137.nyroc.rr.com (24.92.224.137) 14.439 ms 12.950 ms 13.112 ms
5 pop1-alb-P3-1.atdn.net (66.185.148.109) 15.329 ms 19.106 ms 25.923 ms
6 bb1-alb-P0-0.atdn.net (66.185.148.96) 16.21 ms 15.195 ms 19.617 ms
7 bb1-nye-P2-0.atdn.net (66.185.153.122) 22.850 ms 18.285 ms 20.316 ms
8 pop1-nye-P5-0.atdn.net (66.185.141.17) 19.799 ms 19.501 ms 21.764 ms
9 AppliedTheory.atdn.net (66.185.141.30) 22.847 ms 22.928 ms 21.61 ms
10 at-gsr1-nyc-1-0-OC12.appliedtheory.net (169.130.3.30) 25.377 ms 22.267 ms 31.8 ms
11 at-gsr1-syr-3-0-OC12.appliedtheory.net (169.130.3.42) 29.768 ms 23.255 ms 23.786 ms
12 at-gsr2-syr-1-2-cornelluniv-1.appliedtheory.net (169.130.253.6) 31.374 ms 25.422 ms 26.426 ms
13 core1-msfc-dmz1.cit.cornell.edu (128.253.222.5) 31.9 ms 30.217 ms 31.100 ms
14 ccc2-8540-vl8.cit.cornell.edu (132.236.222.138) 30.993 ms 26.882 ms 26.932 ms
15 * * *
...
64 * * *
bjbj/keys:
offered:
bd:16:4c:80:f5:bf:81:b8:a6:44:07:d7:d5:60:75:f6
real:
6a:a4:a0:74:ea:b6:f1:0d:b0:16:2e:0e:18:08:08:a8
localhost (66.67.64.39 from route print under w98)
10.100.160.1
wuhjuhbuh.2y.net