CAT Scans Suggest Cause of Columbia Disaster

Kathy Miles writes "The latest information from Columbia's flight data recorder, along with CAT scan results from RCC layers from shuttle Atlantis' leading wing edge, may give clues to what really happened to Columbia. The flight data recorder shows that there was likely structural damage before Columbia began re-entry. Investigators have been looking at the remaining shuttles and have done CAT scans on Atlantis' reinforced carbon-carbon layers, which show gaps that should not be there. If Columbia had similar gaps, it could have doomed the orbiter."

Comments

Good Idea

[the_other_one]

On future shuttle missions they can just take a feline or two to do a wingwalk and scan for problems.

20 seconds

[geoswan]

Today's NY Times has an article about analyzing those recently found tapes. It says that there was something like 20 seconds from the loss of voice contact, and the shuttle's breakup.

I wished I could trust NASA...

[HotNeedleOfInquiry]

But I strongly suspect that any cause of the shuttle loss will be phrased so that Ron Ditmore doesn't have to lose his job.

He lost tons of credibility in the beginning when he stood up and said that it couldn't be the foam that caused the problem. Soon after, we learned that he refused the request of NASA engineers to have pictures taken of the craft while in orbit.

Re:I wished I could trust NASA...

[Anonymous Coward]

He lost tons of credibility in the beginning when he stood up and said that it couldn't be the foam that caused the problem. Soon after, we learned that he refused the request of NASA engineers to have pictures taken of the craft while in orbit.

First I will point out that Ron Dittamore is not the kind of person to cover up his mistakes. If only most of us Techs/Geeks had the honesty, engineering and management skills Ron has - maybe a lot of these dotcom's would still be around.

Part of the normal procedure is to analyze videos of the launch. When those pieces of ice and/or foam were seen, Ron held a series of meetings with some of the top NASA Engineers while the shuttle was still orbiting. The team determined the pictures wouldn't provide the detail needed to determine if it was a serious problem. The team decided that, not just Ron. A good manager listens to his team members, not like some of the dot bombs I worked for.

It isn't like the shuttle hasn't lost tiles before and landed safely, it has lots of redundancy. If in the very unlikely event military satelites had seen a serious gash, they couldn't have done anything about it when it was in space. And just what would they send up there to get them? It takes time to get something ready to go into space with enough room and docking capabilities to perform a rescue. The shuttle doesn't have months of provisions and fuel would not have allowed it to rendezvous with the space station.

Right now, the insiders at NASA think they have found the cause and if it these gaps between layers of multilayered reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) are the cause, it is Congress and President Bush who deserve the credit for the accident. The budget for NASA has been flat for too long, the NASA people are working 60-70 hours a week at the same pay rate (works out to a big pay cut), and they have had to take short cuts like reducing thorough and rigorous testing such as mentioned in the article. The article said "One NASA engineer commented that the in-depth checks had not shown cracks, and that, coupled with NASA's shrinking budget, forced them to do the less involved between flight checks."

Re:I wished I could trust NASA...

[WindBourne]

Not only is NASA being asked to do so much for so litle, but they are being held as a pawn's tool. W. came in and quickly killed X-33 just as it was about to make some inroads. Tests on the engines showed that they were awesome. The shell was finished. The only thing cuasing problems were the composite fuel tanks. The idea was to use stanless steel until the composites could be done up better.
This was the replacement for the shuttle, but W. was far more intrested in politics than in advancing science.

Re:I wished I could trust NASA...

[Anonymous Coward]

Given how little press this story is getting and the political priorities of the war and the economy (make the rich richer), it may be quite some time before we see any replacements for the shuttle...

In Michael Moore's book Stupid White Men a quote from President Bush June 1, 2001 while speaking to the Swedish Prime Minister Goran Perrson unaware that a live television Camera was still rolling "It's amazing I won. I was running against peace, prosperity, and incumbency".

I don't think were going to see much more leadership from the president or congress than wag the dog, it sucks for the space program, decent medical coverage for many americans and lots of other things.

Re:I wished I could trust NASA...

[chuckpeters]

Below are parts of a USA Today Article which I think show that Ron Dittamore has done all he could in insuring the safety of NASA's people. Lets's not forget one of the astronauts that died in the accident was a personal friend of Ron Dittamore. I have heard a bit about what others at NASA think about Ron and Safety, one particular astronaut thinks he is too cautious. Most agree with what Joe Rothenberg, the former head of human space flight for NASA, said. "Ron did not let time pressures, peer pressure, political pressure, or any other pressure keep him from putting safety first ... He's very competent technically, managerially. Great leadership. Very thorough."

USA Today
In October 2000, shuttle program director Ron Dittemore minced no words when the liftoff of the space shuttle Discovery was delayed after workers found a loose metal pin near the external fuel tank.

"I don't want to sugarcoat it," he said, noting the dangers the pin could have posed during the launch. "There was a mistake here ... Our inspection teams should have spotted it earlier than they did today."

That kind of candid, straightforward approach -- and meticulous attention to safety -- are hallmarks of Dittemore's 25-year NASA career. Now, since Saturday, he has become the public face of the Columbia disaster while he leads the public briefings.

Dittemore also warned the media and public that "it's certainly possible that we'll contradict ourselves from day to day" as more data is examined.

Perfectly in character, say those who have worked with Dittemore.

Joe Rothenberg, the former head of human space flight for NASA, describes his former colleague as impervious to pressure. At least twice before, said Rothenberg, Dittemore took the lead in insisting on delaying flights for safety reasons. "Ron was at the forefront of taking charge, or making decisions, to take those timeouts," said Rothenberg. "Ron did not let time pressures, peer pressure, political pressure, or any other pressure keep him from putting safety first ... He's very competent technically, managerially. Great leadership. Very thorough."

And very human.

Tommy Holloway, who preceded Dittemore as head of the shuttle program, phoned him Monday. He found Dittemore wondering what more he and others could have been done to prevent the tragedy.

"He holds himself personally accountable," said Holloway, now retired. "He has a great deal of compassion and caring, and it's clear he has a great deal of anguish and compassion for the families."

I know the REAL reason why the shuttle went down

[JPawloski]

it was moving too fast!

http://evil.minions.com/~bifrost/cnnsucks.jpg.

Culprits

[DoraLives]

What's got me worried, is the fact that this seems to be more and more a problem stemming from the damnable budget cutting processes where personnel and resources were simply NOT AVAILABLE to perform in-depth engineering and QC work.

The Shuttle program has been plagued with this since its inception, with congress demanding $5.00 worth of labor and material for $1.50 and then sending people into the most hostile environment we know of, assuming that somehow everything will work out.

When looking for culprits here, please don't forget your elected representatives in Washington DC. There's folks in DC who, to my way of thinking anyway, are guilty of cold-blooded murder.

The real problem

[Muhammar]

was that the manned space missions were always about politics/prestige stuff and military race with Soviets rather than about doing science. (I do not mean the space probes, and all the JPL good stuff)

There is not the political will to provide adequate funding. So NASA had to go into salesmanship stuff (bulshit - to get funds) and cost-cutting. This is not good for engineering.

They should have been honest to NASA: get the bloated agency cut down after the end of Apollo programm - to have the reduced money spend in more efficient way. NASA is now a hugely bureaucratised venue and aging fast, it does not attract talented young people anymore. Plans to save it are overdue and it is too bad that the radical reforms were resisted, after the Challenger disaster.

Re:The real problem

[RevRigel]

That's not the case. Are you an engineer? NASA has plenty of money to do what they do. The problem is they spend it all maintaining the pork barrel for their contractors.

Having too much money means you design systems that depend on having too much money. That means you get systems with exotic materials that no one understands, that are difficult to maintenance, and cost too much to launch. The Russian Soyuz launches for 10 million. The shuttle is 50 times more expensive. Given, for some increased payload capacity, but not that much payload capacity.

NASA (or someone else, since they're so broken..perhaps the private sector) needs to be told to design a new space vehicle on a Russian-sized budget, instead of a NASA one. I guarantee they'll come up with the functionality we need, at the price we want, and because it had to be designed on that budget it'll be simpler and more reliable.

Re:The real problem

[coyote-san]

They've already tried that, at McDonnell Douglas. The engineering prototype even did a few test flights.

But NASA shut it down in the contest to choose the successor to the shuttle fleet. Why go with proven technology when you can pin everything on the development of new hypersonic jet engines and similiar exotic materials?

Re:The real problem

[Lars T.]

Russian-sized budget like during the Cold War, or as in "We don't have enough money to pay the people working for us, or the lease on Baikonur"?

Re:The real problem

[10Ghz]

NASA (or someone else, since they're so broken..perhaps the private sector) needs to be told to design a new space vehicle on a Russian-sized budget, instead of a NASA one.

Are you suggesting that they pay the engineers and others Russian-sized salaries as well? Yeah, good luck with that one. Luckily you are not the one deciding these things

Re:The real problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Test.

there *are* things they could have done after find

[Tablizer]

If in the very unlikely event military satelites had seen a serious gash, they couldn't have done anything about it when it was in space.

That is not true from what I read. Some things that could have been done:

* Reduce the weight of the shuttle by tossing non-critical systems. This would decrease friction.

* Rotate shuttle to put damanged portion in shadow just before reentry. This would reduce tempurature a bit.

* I have read that there were ways to reduce the peak reentry friction by spreading it out over time

Re:there *are* things they could have done after f

[chuckpeters]

If in the very unlikely event military satelites had seen a serious gash, they couldn't have done anything about it when it was in space.

That is not true from what I read. Some things that could have been done:

* Reduce the weight of the shuttle by tossing non-critical systems. This would decrease friction.

* Rotate shuttle to put damanged portion in shadow just before re-entry. This would reduce tempurature a bit.

* I have read that there were ways to reduce the peak reentry friction by spreading it out over time

1. Tossing stuff sounds like you have been watching too many old movies. Maybe they could have ditched hundreds of pounds, but it isn't likely they could reduced the mass more than a percentage or two. It would not have been a significant enough reduction in friction or heat to make any difference. Worse is all that debris doesn't just fall to earth over night, it creates hazards of future space flights.

2. Rotation is more likely to have helped than ditching mass, but if the suspected cause is correct (and I think it is), it would not have made enough of a difference either.

3. Re-entry is already optimized to minimize heat and structural stresses.

I am fairly familiar with the space program as my Dad worked for JPL, he was on the navigation team for Pioneer, Voyager, Marineer and others.

Chuck

Re:there *are* things they could have done after f

[Tablizer]

but it isn't likely they could reduced the mass more than a percentage or two.....but if the suspected cause is correct (and I think it is), it would not have made enough of a difference either.

If people's lives are on the line, then every few percentage points may just be worth it. At least they could have brought those options into open discussion if they knew of actual damage.

Worse is all that debris doesn't just fall to earth over night, it creates hazards of future space flights.

They perhaps could have moved into a lower decaying orbit before they tossed stuff. In fact, the actual orbit they used was a decaying orbit in the longer run IIRC.

Changing the descent profile...

[geoswan]

Re-entry is already optimized to minimize heat and structural stresses.

IANA Rocket Scientist, but, the Columbia descent program put it through a several "S" turns. Wouldn't doing so have put favoured first one wing, then the other?

May I suggest that abandoning this profile, abandoning the idea that Columbia must land at Cape Kennedy, replacing it with a profile that continually favoured the left wing, may have made survival slightly more likely.

Even if Columbia's hidden damage was so profound this change of descent profile could not have saved her, let me suggest that there would be some lower amount of damage where the decision to abandon the vehicle and save the crew should be considered.

IANA Rocket Scientist, but I spent quite a bit of time looking into this in February. I came across a web-site that talked about something called "soak-through". If I understood this problem, the tiles could only protect the aluminum structure of the orbiters for a limited amount of time. If I understood this problem, too much heat, or heat for too long a period, would "soak-through the tiles, and allow the Aluminum beams to heat, and warp. If I understood this problem, the soak-through damage could happen after the orbiter landed.

Are the current descent profiles designed to minimize this soak-through? If the orbiter is damaged, and their is a seriously increased risk to the crew-member's lives, would you agree that considering a descent profile that ignores long-term damage to the orbiter's structural elements would be worthwhile?

Re:there *are* things they could have done after f

[geoswan]

Tossing stuff sounds like you have been watching too many old movies. Maybe they could have ditched hundreds of pounds, but it isn't likely they could reduced the mass more than a percentage or two. It would not have been a significant enough reduction in friction or heat to make any difference. Worse is all that debris doesn't just fall to earth over night, it creates hazards of future space flights.

Wasn't Columbia carrying a big Science Module in the Cargo Bay, something of a size similar to Hubble? I don't know whether it was possible to ditch it, but if so, surely it weighed tons, not hundreds of pounds.

IIRC the shuttle orbiters weigh in at something like 50 tons.

Re:there *are* things they could have done after f

[kmiles]

I wanted to respond to several comments, not all by this person but I thought I'd try to get it all in here. First, tossing stuff out of the shuttle would be disasterous. NASA already tracks over 40,000 pieces of debris from spent rocket stages and dead satellites, all of which are a major hazard to the shuttle and anything else up there. Because of the speeds involved, even a paint flake becomes potentially dangerous. If it collides with the orbiter, it carries the punch of a 22 caliber bullet. In fact, the shuttles windows have already been hit with paint flakes and they have left pits. That is one of the reasons why the orbiter flys backwards while in space, to minimize exposure of oncoming debris from the crew cabin windows.

How would they have gotten rid of the science module? Columbia did not have it's remote arm to lift things out. And they cannot keep the payload doors open in lower oribt.

Someone else mentioned those "s" turns, I think it was with the idea that they could have somehow changed those to favor the left wing. Those s turns are very precise and are designed to reduce orbiter speed. They already plot a course for maximum reduction of speed and therefore exposure to higher temperatures. And trying to reduce heat by keeping the orbiter in a less steep descent would have been just as disasterous because it would have meant a longer period of time, even if in slightly lower temperatures. That was just as risky, and possibly more, than the descent carried out.

Someone else mentioned ditching the orbiter and saving the crew. How? Where would the crew go? Columbia was not outfitted to dock with the ISS, so that was out. There were no EVA suits on board so the astronauts could not go outside the orbiter. In fact, one of the reasons that KC was chosen for this flight was because it was a non EVA mission, because she was so small they had no suits to fit her. The crew couldn't leave, there was nowhere for them to go.

Another person criticized Ron Dittemore for not having the military take satellite images of the shuttle's wing. That was not a decision made solely by Ron. A group of engineers met repeatedly, all week, to discuss what to do about the issue of possible damage from the foam. For one thing, the military was already overtaxed trying to prepare for Iraq. Also, military experts did not feel that they could get any images that would show enough detail to be any help. Remember, it took a CAT scan to show the gaps in Atlantis' RCC.

And finally, on to the personel of NASA and the integrity of Ron Dittemore. I am sure that, like any other organization, there are those who would play politics and do things to protect their jobs. I do not believe this portrays most of NASA and I certainly don't believe it indicative of Ron Dittemore. Take a look at these articles about Ron:

Houston Chronicle story and this on in USA Today

Ron didn't come in to NASA from the management side, he is an engineer, and a darned good one, and a good guy altogether. Let's give him a chance. The orbiter is a very complex vehicle, as I am sure most of you know. Let's not see conspiracy everywhere and get lost in "what ifs" and "should have/could have" because in doing so, we could easily lose sight of fact. I don't think this is going to be a case of management vs engineers like Challenger. I don't know if any of you have read Richard Feynman's books, but he sat on the investigation board for the Challenger disaster. He commented that one of the hardest things to do, but that which they had to do, was put what ifs and suppositions out of their minds and try to deal with the facts.

Dittemore has never given anyone any reason to believe he will deliver less than the truth. I think the real enemies here are the politicans who have cut away at NASA's budget forcing people to not only work for less pay, but to even work overtime for free. These kind of people do this because they love what they are doing. Let's please give them a chance. Kathy

A failure of imagination

[geoswan]

Someone else mentioned those "s" turns, I think it was with the idea that they could have somehow changed those to favor the left wing. Those s turns are very precise and are designed to reduce orbiter speed. They already plot a course for maximum reduction of speed and therefore exposure to higher temperatures.

I am sorry, but I don't think you have given the suggestion of abandoning the "S" turns a real answer. Answering that NASA has plotted the descent profile with great precision is not a meaningful answer at all.

Yes, I am sure that NASA has some of the best engineers, technicians and technologists working in America. I read the assertion that the programs that control the orbiter's descent are among the most reliable realtime control software ever written -- that they have terrificly well thought-out test-suites, bench-checks, and so on. I am ready to believe that.

But, none of that prevented Columbia sticking with a descent profile that was wildly inappropriate for an Orbiter with a damaged wing.

Let me suggest that what we saw was a failure of imagination.

What did those famous programs do? Information flowed from the Orbiter's sensors that it was having trouble following the descent profile. Information flowed from those sensors that could have been interpreted to mean, "The left wing is experiencing unexpected and alarming drag". But the famous programs apparently were not written to recognize the implications of this unexpected drag. So the program doggedly kept trying to fly level, and bring that lazy left wing back into line, so it was carrying its fair share of the burden of re-entry.

This was exactly what it should have been doing if the wing was undamaged, and the primary goals of the descent profile were to maintain the orbiter's working life to the 100 missions it was designed for, and to make sure it arrived at Kennedy.

In a press conference a week or two after Columbia's loss I heard Ron Dittemore speak about Columbia's reaction to that increased drag. I heard him say that when the flight control surfaces were insufficient to deal with the mounting extra drag on the left wing, the control programs would have kicked in with the attitude control jets, until they were exhausted.

And I thought to myself, "And when the jets are exhausted, boom, Columbia tumbles out of control."

This reflects a clear failure of imagination during the specification of the descent control software. I am ready to believe that NASA engineers made sure that the Orbiter's descent software is marvellously within spec. But, it seems to me, that the specifications were deficient, and that no shuttles should fly until the software can cope better with this kind of damage.

Would Columbia have survived if the control software had been prepared to recognize that the unbalanced drag implied serious damage portside, and adapted to it? This seems unlikely. It looks like the damage was too profound.

But I remain disturbed that the software didn't try adapting.

And trying to reduce heat by keeping the orbiter in a less steep descent would have been just as disasterous because it would have meant a longer period of time, even if in slightly lower temperatures. That was just as risky, and possibly more, than the descent carried out.

Excuse me, you expressed this opinion very authoritatively. Can you justify this opinion?

I am not a rocket scientist. Nor do I claim to be. I give my opinions here. And I have explained my reasoning. You haven't.

"Just as risky" you say? Risky to the 100 mission goal of the shuttle design team? Or risky for the life of the crew?

Re:A failure of imagination

[dpilot]

Your inability to survive re-entry in just a space suit is due to a failure of imagination, too. Sometimes the parameters of the circumstance are just too tough no matter how much we all want Plan B. (or C or D or...)

I suspect you're thinking of having Columbia do a series of leftward corkscrews to favor that wing. I seriously doubt if would have been enough. In addition, it would have left them with no path to the runway, since their energy expendature just gets them to Florida.

The runways where the shuttle is rated to land are triple-length, and it needs a lot of that even under good circumstances. I don't know how many of those there are on the flight path. I did read that the only way ditching in water is survivable is if the cargo bay is empty. For Columbia, the sudden decelleration of a ditch would have brought the Spacelab crashing forward through the crew compartment.

That said, this is one aspect of the shuttle design that is terribly brittle. There are these RCC panels, and behind them, aluminum. IMHO that would have been the spot for a few key structural titanium members. I don't know if titanium and aluminum can be bonded without nasty electrochemical effects, though. Most other aspects of the orbiter have some "damage survivability" built in. The RCC panels and their associated fit pieces obviously have none.

Re:A failure of imagination

[kmiles]

Your inability to survive re-entry in just a space suit is due to a failure of imagination, too. Sometimes the parameters of the circumstance are just too tough no matter how much we all want Plan B. (or C or D or...)

The engineers actually thought of that, way back with STS1. Unfortunately that shrunken budget reared its' ugly head and quashed that. Now, after the STS107 tragedy, those ideas are back on the discussion board, however, they will have to deal with the budget issue.

I suspect you're thinking of having Columbia do a series of leftward corkscrews to favor that wing. I seriously doubt if would have been enough. In addition, it would have left them with no path to the runway, since their energy expendature just gets them to Florida.

During the many meetings held by the engineers to discuss the possibility of damage to the left wing by the foam, they discussed ways of trying to bring the orbiter in with a left wing. If there had been a way, they could and would have tried it. The problem is, the temperatures and speeds with which the orbiter descends are already at critical levels, you can only make things so safe. Unfortunately, there wasn't a lot of leeway to change the orbit and the engineers decided that there was nothing they could change that would have made any difference.

The runways where the shuttle is rated to land are triple-length, and it needs a lot of that even under good circumstances. I don't know how many of those there are on the flight path.

There are a few alternatives, such as White Sands. However, the orbiter has to plan for that long before Columbia atarted having problems.

Bottom line: give NASA a good budget and you'll see those guys get real imaginative with safety. We can help that by pushing politicans to address the issues.

Re:A failure of imagination

[geoswan]

Your inability to survive re-entry in just a space suit is due to a failure of imagination, too.

Bzzt. Bum rap.

Back in February I wrote, in detail, about what I found out about the Emergency egress system put in after the Challenger crash. (Only useful if the orbiter could be slowed to sub-sonic speeds. Explosive bolts blew the door. Then a pole was extended that the astronauts would hook up to, and slide down, that would guide them out of the slipstream, much like a ww2 paratroopers static line.) I earned myself a bunch of moderation points for these comments.

Sometimes the parameters of the circumstance are just too tough no matter how much we all want Plan B.

I know this. In an earlier article in this thread I said " Even if Columbia's hidden damage was so profound this change of descent profile could not have saved her, let me suggest that there would be some lower amount of damage where the decision to abandon the vehicle and save the crew should be considered." And, in the article you responded to, I said, "Would Columbia have survived if the control software had been prepared to recognize that the unbalanced drag implied serious damage portside, and adapted to it? This seems unlikely. It looks like the damage was too profound."

... left them with no path to the runway, since their energy expendature just gets them to Florida.

So? I know the last orbiter cost over $5 billion dollars. I know it used up crucial spare parts, so a new orbiter would cost even more. But, assuming those with the authority to make the decision know the orbiter is unlikely to survive re-entry if it has to land at Cape Kennedy, surely it is worth considering other descent profiles?

The orbiters do have those emergency egress systems. The crew has a chance of survival if they bail out, and ditch the shuttle, if the oribiter's speed can be reduced to subsonic.

As I said before, it now looks like the hidden damage was so profound that this change of profile would not have been enough to preserve the orbiter.

But I maintain that it was a failure of imagination that no provision was made for orbiters to adopt a profile optomized to try to preserve the life of the crew, at the expense of the orbiter, when profound damage was detected.

Re:A failure of imagination

[kmiles]

I am sorry, but I don't think you have given the suggestion of abandoning the "S" turns a real answer. Answering that NASA has plotted the descent profile with great precision is not a meaningful answer at all.

If you want to abandon those turns, then how else do you suggest slowing down the orbiter? I think you are maybe trying to compare this to an airplane and there is little comparison.

Excuse me, you expressed this opinion very authoritatively. Can you justify this opinion? I am not a rocket scientist. Nor do I claim to be. I give my opinions here. And I have explained my reasoning. You haven't.

I am not claiming to be an engineer, or a propulsion expert. My degree was in astronomy. Since I was interested in the shuttle program, I did a multi-course grad level study of the program. Since I am not an engineer, I can't always explain some things well. I aploogize for that, but my studies did take me to KSC and I got to know some of the people who are enginners down there and who work on the shuttle.

Too many people try to compare the orbiter to airplanes and jets and you just can't do that. The orbiter operates in very difficult conditions at best. There is little room for error. One tiny mistake can snowball to disaster. It is a delicate system at best. Can we do better? Sure, and we will, but there will be mistakes along the way. And, given their budget, NASA is crippled from the start.

Re:A failure of imagination

[geoswan]

If you want to abandon those turns, then how else do you suggest slowing down the orbiter? I think you are maybe trying to compare this to an airplane and there is little comparison.

What role do the "S" turns play in dissipating the orbiter's kinetic energy?

My understanding was that the orbiter dissipated energy by presenting its heat-sheilded belly to the upper atmosphere. My understanding was that there was a narrow envelope of relatively stable orientations where the orbiter could safely bare its belly, without risking tumbling out of control.

So, how are the turns executed? Yes, I know that the upper atmosphere is too thin for the shuttle to fly like an airplane. But my understanding, and Ron Dittemore's comments at that press conference I mentioned seemed to verify this, was that some limited amount of steering was possible by changing the orientation within that narrow envelope. Ah, "pitch". Maybe "pitch" is what NASA types call it.

Dittemore said if the orbiter was experiencing unusual drag it would first use its elevons to try to compensate, and, if that didn't prove sufficient, it would use its control jets.

The first sign of damage that was noticed that day was that the left wing was experiencing unusual drag.

The orbiter's control programs tried to compensate for this drag.

In terms of extending Columbia's working life right up to the 100 missions it was originally specified to fly, this, on the surface, this seems the correct approach. Under normal circumstances making sure wear and tear is spread evenly on both wings makes sense. That lazy left wing was holding back. The control program worked to plunge the left wing into the full plasma stream.

Under the abnormal circumstance, where it can be recognized that a wing is damaged, it seems to me this was the wrong thing to do. It seems to me that the control program should have adopted a descent profile which put as much of the thermal burden as possible on the intact wing. And that means abandoning the "S" turns, and turning in just a single direction.

The most recent reports seem to indicate that Columbia lost a large, essential, chunk of the leading edge tile, and that nothing could save her. But there are three remaining orbiters, and they will probably be put to work again.

I am not an American. My tax dollars don't pay for this. But, I'd sure like to see the orbiters programmed to recognize damaged wings, and adapt to the situation.

Re:there *are* things they could have done after f

[Alizarin Erythrosin]

I remember reading in an article in the local paper here (probably reprinted from another paper) that talked about Ron. I found it very interesting he doesn't even have a phd (only a master's degree), yet he is head of a very large NASA program. I think that speaks very highly of him and his education and personality.

I enjoyed watching him giving the press conferences and briefings after the disaster happened, as I knew I'd get the facts with no BS. Once they switched over to the bureaucrats, I stopped watching.