T-Mobile Wi-Fi Calling Was Vulnerable to Trivial MITM Attack
wiredmikey writes "A vulnerability discovered by researchers at UC Berkeley enabled attackers to eavesdrop on and modify calls and text messages sent using T-Mobile's 'Wi-Fi Calling' feature. According to Jethro Beekman and Christopher Thompson, both UC Berkeley graduate students, when an affected Android device connected to a server via T-Mobile's Wi-Fi Calling feature, it did not correctly validate the server's security certificate, exposing calls and text messages to a 'man-in-the-middle' (MiTM) attack. ... '[An attacker] could record, block and reroute SIP traffic. The attacker could change it by faking a sender or changing the real-time voice data or message content. He could fake incoming traffic and he can impersonate the client with forged outgoing traffic,' the report, released Tuesday, said. Beekman and Thompson said they notified T-Mobile of their discoveries in December 2012, and worked with the mobile operator to confirm and fix the problem. As of March 18, all affected T-Mobile customers have received the security update fixing the vulnerability, the researchers said."
By 'did not correctly validate,' they mean that the certificate was self-signed and the client blindly trusted any certificate with the common name it was expecting.
MiTM=prison4u
When the foot seeks the place of the head, the line is crossed. Know your place. Keep your place. Be a shoe.
This vulnerability is in a TON of software. Python 2.X (which most people are still using) doesn't even allow you to verify the CN without adding a bunch of code to make it happen yourself. http://bugs.python.org/issue1589 Most APIs allow you to do it both ways, but I think it is time that they stop making it optional. If you want to use SSL, use it properly otherwise it isn't worth wasting your time with it.
What'd've been useful: details of how/what to check to determine if your phone uses the vulnerable software, and what would indicate you've received an update. I tend not to use the WiFi calling anyway, but it'd be nice to be able to confirm the update. Looking at it my phone's still using the original release of the WiFi Calling app and hasn't had it's firmware updated since May 2012.
Who the hell are these clowns hiring to create their secure infrastructure? Using a self-signed cert and just validating the CN? That's just plain ignorant. And no audit caught this? IT management needs a shake-up over this.
So this affects the Wifi Calling App. I wonder if those of us running Cyanogen need to upgrade to a new version of Cyanogen, or just update the Wifi calling app..