The New Yorker Launches 'Strongbox' For Secure Anonymous Leaks
Today The New Yorker unveiled a project called Strongbox, which aims to let sources share tips and leaks with the news organization in a secure manner. It makes use of the TOR network and encrypts file uploads with PGP. Once the files are uploaded, they're transferred via thumb-drive to a laptop that isn't connected to the internet, which is erased every time it is powered on and booted with a live CD. The publication won't record any details about your visit, so even a government request to look at their records will fail to find any useful information. "There’s a growing technology gap: phone records, e-mail, computer forensics, and outright hacking are valuable weapons for anyone looking to identify a journalist’s source. With some exceptions, the press has done little to keep pace: our information-security efforts tend to gravitate toward the parts of our infrastructure that accept credit cards." Strongbox is actually just The New Yorker's version of a secure information-sharing platform called DeadDrop, built by Aaron Swartz shortly before his death. DeadDrop is free software.
Because things are always more secure inside of a bunker.
Wasn't there a guy who tried this once before?
"better ways of doing things eventually just replace the inferior things" - Linus Torvalds 09-08-07
Strongbox technically is very strong, without a doubt. But, being TOR based, it will be hard to use. Worse, a potential leaker not only must use their own computer (ideally a throwaway computer), but they can never have VISITED the Strongbox information page from work, because otherwise any leak to the New Yorker will be suspicious.
And Strongbox's information page drives Ghostery crazy! Not a good sign for a privacy tool.
Probably more important is general Operational Security, including burner phones and/or burner computers.
Julia Angwin has an excellent additional point: Physical mail (dropped in a random post-box with a bogus return address) is perhaps the best way for anonymous one-way communication. The USPS will record address information when asked by law enforcement, but (currently) doesn't record this on all mail. Thus there is no history and, even if there was, this can only be traced to the processing post office. Perhaps the best use of the mail is simply to send the reporter a burner phone preprogrammed so that the reporter can call your burner.
Test your net with Netalyzr
I have the impression that TOR is probably compromised by an assortment of constitution trampling three letter agencies, I just don't get why it keeps getting pushed as some shining beacon of privacy. I have to assume that 1/3 of the exit nodes are the feds fishing, 1/3 are criminals fishing and 1/3 are privacy advocates who somehow don't seem to know about the other 2/3.
Please educate me if I am wrong.
So they put these files on a thumb drive and put it onto this computer which can't be hacked. How are they getting it from the strongbox server to the USB thumb stick? Are the files only decrypted once they're on the super secure laptop?
Now they'll decree the press are terrorists and say it's illegal to do this since it prevents 'awful' monitoring.
I think this whole snooping on the reporters thing has them deciding to fight back and send a big "F you".
Lost at C:>. Found at C.
After the recent news of AP's guys being hacked, eavesdropped, etc, and which is more important, NO REACTION from all of the other news groups (really, i thought this would be the number ONE news!!!), could you be sooo naive to believe that NewYorker would be a safe harbor for your little pretty leak?
I am not idiot, what about you?
Obligatory Al Gore "Lock Box" Reference:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9pqmW-D14I&t=1m39s
Oh yeah... how is the laptop erased? Is it a software based method using mutiple overwrites or hardware/firmware encription built into the drive itself or something else?
Put your telephones inside this StrongBox and how it works for you.
I rather go with the idea that I WILL be followed and things WILL be recorded then to trust that nobody does. If being traced is a problem for you, then assume that you ARE being traced and people who say they won't are lying.
If I had anything to share and it should be anonymous, sending a thumb-drive should be a lot easier. Darn, just send all sources an SD card via snail-mail. With the prices of what they are, the most expensive part will be posting. And it can be done from almost anywhere in the world as well. (Note: Just don't fill out the return address)
Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
Who finds it frightening as hell that the press now has to do this? It's a dark day when the press has to take measures like this because the government is ignoring the first amendment.
"The publication won't record any details about your visit, so even a government request to look at their records will fail to find any useful information. " Until Congress decides that all such communication must be logged by law.
Good intentions, but it appears that they have no idea what they're doing.
The New Yorker's Strongbox page says it won't record IP addresses or track you or set cookies - while it's setting cookies for newyorker.com, crwdcntrl.net, demdex.net, and omtrdc.net. If they want people who care about this stuff to take their commitment to anonymity seriously, they can't embed tags in their Strongbox main page that causes browsers to go do GETs on other domains' URLs because that reveals the visit to Strongbox to those third parties.
Now all the FBI has to do is subpeona Adobe's AudienceManager's web logs. Advice to journalists with good intentions: Do this right or don't do it at all.
Now, even if I knew anything, I could never submit it to Strongbox because the New Yorker has already compromised my anonymity to those third parties.
Strongbox is an anti-account sharing tool that's been around for the better part of a decade -- http://www.bettercgi.com/strongbox/ . It's well-known in the porn industry.
tos is an insecure piece of shit. those in government black projects know it's highly monitored by the powers-that-be
So yeah, put all of your leaks through some insecure monitored shit - Perfect place for that kind of thing!
..can't make their login work, or remember user login credentials, we can rest assured that no one will ever be able to read what gets put in the strongbox either.
Mission: To provide products that consume time and energy as entertainingly as permitted by the laws of thermodynamics.
The OPSEC on the part of the source is only part of the issue. The possibly bigger one is credibility. If there's only a single anonymous source for the tip, one unavailable for recontact, then pretty much any attempt at getting a secondary source could be futile. And if there's no second source, most papers are loathe to run the story, no matter how "juicy." (I'm talking national-security, major criminal stuff, etc. Not is so-and-so pregnant. They'll print any of that crap.) And let's say they do get a big one, run with it with a single source and it turns out to be true. So next up the government inserts a big, bogus tip off via the secure system, seemingly from a well-placed anonymous source. They run with it and the government is able to prove that the tip was bogus, blowing the news outlet's credibility all to hell. And as soon as it happens, sources will lose faith in the publication. It's an easy enough PSYOP to plan and run.
care of the PhBI.
... a laptop that isn't connected to the internet, which is erased every time it is powered on ...
I hope it's erased every time it's powered OFF, as well. (That way nobody can seize it while it's off and sniff the disk.)
Note the "as well". You still want to erase it on the way back up, just in case the power failed before the shutting-down erase is complete.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
Given the New York Times has a recent history of ignoring leaks, this is the next logical step - ignoring leaks securely.