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The Register: 4 Ways the Guardian Could Have Protected Snowden

Frosty Piss writes with this excerpt from The Register: "The Guardian's editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger fears journalists – and, by extension, everyone – will be reduced to using pen and paper to avoid prying American and British spooks online. And his reporters must fly around the world to hold face-to-face meetings with sources ('Not good for the environment, but increasingly the only way to operate') because they believe all their internet and phone chatter will be eavesdropped on by the NSA and GCHQ. 'It would be highly unadvisable for any journalist to regard any electronic means of communication as safe,' he wrote. El Reg would like to save The Guardian a few bob, and reduce the jet-setting lefty paper's carbon footprint, by suggesting some handy tips – most of them based on the NSA's own guidance."

233 comments

  1. Internal storage? by jasno · · Score: 2

    Johnny Mnemonic anyone?

    --

    http://www.masturbateforpeace.com/
    1. Re:Internal storage? by RabidReindeer · · Score: 1

      Johnny Mnemonic anyone?

      Charlie Stross (The Laundry). Memex? Carbon paper?

  2. The 4 Ways by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    (from the article)

    1. Encryption: It's not hard
    Keep your private key secret, encrypted and in one place (eg, not a police interrogation room)
    Meet the Advanced Encryption Standard
    2. Use clean machines
    3. How to shift the data securely
    4. Using hidden services

  3. May I suggest ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    ... using BitMessage and Tahoe-LAFS as a general rule? Both make spying near impractical.

    1. Re:May I suggest ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      BitMessage is what e-mail should have been from the beginning.

  4. Wait -- *their* guidance? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    "most of them based on the NSA's own guidance"

    Should you take guidance from people who have been proven to lie?

    1. Re:Wait -- *their* guidance? by Mr.+Slippery · · Score: 5, Informative

      Should you take guidance from people who have been proven to lie?

      The NSA is a deeply schizophrenic organization. On one side you have people seeking to defend and secure Americans' computer systems and networks against crackers, foreign spies, and the like. They'll propose BS like key escrow, but they're actually fairly honest: they know if there is a backdoor they can use, their adversaries can use it too.

      On the other hand you have people seeking to break into computer systems and networks, including those of Americans. They oughta be first against the wall when the revolution comes.

      --
      Tom Swiss | the infamous tms | my blog
      You cannot wash away blood with blood
    2. Re:Wait -- *their* guidance? by thoth · · Score: 2

      The NSA is a deeply schizophrenic organization.

      Not schizophrenic - they just have 2 conflicting missions. That would be signals intelligence (gather and decrypt) and information assurance (protect and defend).

      It could be that a split and reorg would be good - say move the information assurance folks and merge them with DISA. Then clamp down on any out of control signals intelligence programs.

    3. Re:Wait -- *their* guidance? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Do we really have to wait for the revolution?

    4. Re:Wait -- *their* guidance? by khallow · · Score: 1

      On the other hand you have people seeking to break into computer systems and networks, including those of Americans. They oughta be first against the wall when the revolution comes.

      But it probably wouldn't happen. Those kinds of people are so useful when it comes to putting other people against the wall.

    5. Re:Wait -- *their* guidance? by bluegutang · · Score: 1

      Don't anthropomorphise government agencies. They don't like it!

  5. spoiler alert by noh8rz10 · · Score: 5, Informative

    here are the four things, pulled from the article:

    1. Encryption: It's not hard
    * Keep your private key secret, encrypted and in one place (eg, not a police interrogation room)
    * Meet the Advanced Encryption Standard

    2. Use clean machines

    3. How to shift the data securely

    4. Using hidden services

    1. Re: spoiler alert by rullywowr · · Score: 1

      The first thing I got from the article is that it was submitted by Frosty Piss.

    2. Re:spoiler alert by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But I can read it on your machine before you encrypt it, cos I'm the NSA and if Microsoft won't give me a back door (usually they do), I just lean on Nvidia, Hewlett Packard, or someone to write me a trojan into their drivers so I can get my back door. It's trivial. So much for encryption and clean machines. "Shifting the data securely", that would be USB keychain, CD/DVD, hard drive, or some other storage medium which I can easily seize at a border, or obtain a rubber stamp warrant to seize it from your home or office. When you realize that I have the power to quickly mobilize any police force almost anywhere in the world to get what I want, you will realize by how much you are screwed.

    3. Re:spoiler alert by lightknight · · Score: 1

      If this is data that the American and British spooks presumably already have, why not just post it publicly? What's the point of keeping a copy of data they already have hidden from them?

      --
      I am John Hurt.
    4. Re:spoiler alert by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Give us your key and you will go to jail for the rest of your life under National Security grounds. Wait, that should be or you'll go to jail for the rest of your life. Meh, either works."

      Do you honestly expect anyone to not cave and give up their key?

    5. Re: spoiler alert by Frosty+Piss · · Score: 2

      Ahhhhhhhhhh. Yesssssss.

      I enjoyed the "submission".

      --
      If you want news from today, you have to come back tomorrow.
    6. Re:spoiler alert by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I use a secret code As i have to use tor to accees the pirate bay the letters of all the torrents I download spell out this weeks secret message.

      They will never crack that muwah wah!

    7. Re:spoiler alert by Duhavid · · Score: 1

      Just an idea....

      How about having two plain text inputs, one is the real message, the other is something you are OK with your opponent seeing.
      Two keys.
      If you provide the correct key, you get the real message, if you provide the forced key, you get the smiley happy nothing to see here plain text.

      --
      emt 377 emt 4
    8. Re:spoiler alert by Dare+nMc · · Score: 2

      1)Snowden was way short on resources to hide from the NSA, and until he proved he had something of real value, who with resources would help him?
      2) It was a ton of data, the NSA certainly detects the leak before it gets fully transferred to anyone, and shutdown before full transfer.
      3)In Snowden's case many of the original archives themselves had digital fingerprints in them indicating who could have downloaded them to begin with. If you break it up enough to disrupt the fingerprints, then it loses credibility (Very unlikely Snowden knew how to defeat the fingerprint.)
      So the idea (IMO) would be you encrypt it and send it to a news source (or Wiki Leaks, EFF, etc) with established credibility, they use the full document to verify your credibility enough to throw their weight behind supporting you. The news source could then be generic enough in releases to disrupt the document fingerprint to the NSA. They could also in turn throw resources at securing the leaker.
      In the case of this data mule, they didn't want to really help the terrorists, and en-danger relatively innocent sources in the documents in hand. They want to process, redact, and cross-reference with people the trust to do the work. If the NSA can see who has looked at what, they have a better chance of silencing them.

    9. Re:spoiler alert by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If you encrypt anything you are an evil terr'st (TM) and therefore guilty. If the things you decrypt aren't incriminating it just means you are hiding the crimes. Therefore you can never win. Not when we're talking National Security and evil terr'sm (TM) because absence of evidence is not innocence, it's subterfuge.

    10. Re:spoiler alert by squiggleslash · · Score: 1

      If only there was a single XKCD cartoon that exposed the folly of assuming encryption is an adequate safeguard against totalitarian government thugs who have the power to physically or psychologically torture people.

      Ah but there probably isn't so El Reg must be right...

      --
      You are not alone. This is not normal. None of this is normal.
    11. Re:spoiler alert by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Exactly. Snowden *was* smart enough to take precautions against the infamous $5 wrench attack, so it's kind of arrogant for the Register to be smartass about the whole thing when in fact they're pretty dilettante.

  6. What if... by MRe_nl · · Score: 3, Interesting

    When secret police come with secret orders based on secret laws signed by a secret court we secretly dispose of their bodies?

    --
    "Kill 'em all and let Root sort 'em out"
    1. Re:What if... by slick7 · · Score: 1

      When secret police come with secret orders based on secret laws signed by a secret court we secretly dispose of their bodies?

      Don't forget double secret probation.

      --
      The mind conceives, the body achieves, the spirit manifests.
    2. Re:What if... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First three words in your .sig answers your own question.

    3. Re:What if... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So... Secret murder is alright?

    4. Re:What if... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Everyone applauded the Hitler assassination attempt, so when there's no more defense, getting rid of these fascist fucks is alright.

    5. Re:What if... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      NSA: "We are arresting you!"
      Man: "On what charges?!"
      NSA: "That is Highly Classified and need to know... and you don't need to know!"
      Man: "But how do I defend myself if I don't know what I'm being arrested for?"
      NSA: "Hahahahah, oh man that is golden. I guess someone hasn't been keeping up with the news. You got no rights boy... your ass is ours now."

  7. 20-20 hindsight, but ... by ackthpt · · Score: 1

    Wasn't so long ago all the British press were under scrutiny in the wake News Of The World Phone Hacking Scandal. I think it's still fresh on the minds of many editors in the British press and more scrutiny is not something they would welcome. In this light it was probably intentional not to go out of their way to protect him.

    --

    A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    1. Re:20-20 hindsight, but ... by FatLittleMonkey · · Score: 1

      In spite of the headline, really the article isn't about protecting the source, it's about preventing the authorities from preventing you from publishing, or detaining your partner/data-mule under a vile security law that makes not incriminating yourself a serious criminal offence.

      (It doesn't say, but the paranoia exhibited in the article reinforces the recent claims that we're going to see less precaution from press in the future. They will just dump everything online at once, making no attempts to redact names/etc, for fear that they'll be shut down while they are trying to review the leaked documents.)

      --
      Science is all about firing a drunk pig out of a cannon just to see what happens.
  8. Simple solution by cold+fjord · · Score: 2

    Employ Mentats. Problem solved.

    --
    much of left-wing thought is a kind of playing with fire by people who don't even know that fire is hot - George Orwell
  9. Easier by gmuslera · · Score: 1

    If is meant to be eventually public, then just make it public. As Linus said "Only wimps use tape backup. REAL men just upload their important stuff on ftp and let the rest of the world mirror it" (ok, maybe not ftp right now, some more updated/social alternatives), The consequences of not releasing it (even in human lives) could eventually be worse than doing it unedited.

    1. Re:Easier by Immerman · · Score: 1

      I think that's the idea behind insurance files and multiple secret deadman switches - if all else fails the data *will* get out.

      But it can be very irresponsible to simply dump it into the public eye without first thoroughly reviewing it, which the leaker themselves can't realistically be expected to do - they stumble across a treasure trove of incriminating data (probably all mixed in with lots of junk and legitimate secrets) and they just want to get it into the hands of a responsible journalist as fast as possible before they're discovered and silenced. Once it's in the hands of the journalist(s) they can then publish all of it in an encrypted insurance file and then review, redact, and release the incriminating data in a more narrative form in order to maximize impact and minimize collateral damage. If anyone tries to silence the journalists then one or more of their deadman switches fires off and the entire raw dataset is dumped upon the world. Probably better for everyone to just let them do their job. A really good deadman switch would be one that is triggered even if you are willingly compromised - you wouldn't want bribes or threats to corrupt the story overmuch - your family is probably safest if the only way the insurance stays secret is if you do your job honestly.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
  10. Dump data into a darknet by Adult+film+producer · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The Freenet network is still alive and is very useful for this kind of thing.

    https://freenetproject.org/

    1. Re:Dump data into a darknet by FatLittleMonkey · · Score: 1

      Too few people are using Freenet today for the obfuscation to work against an adversary that has pwn'd the physical telecommunications infrastructure.

      --
      Science is all about firing a drunk pig out of a cannon just to see what happens.
    2. Re:Dump data into a darknet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Freenet needs to be rewritten to not use Java. You Java programmers have long forgotten what a nightmare it is to start and maintain Java applications outside your custom development and production environments. Java servers just don't play well, especially with Unix. Chaulk it up to another stupid move by Sun. Instead, Java services usually are built around one or two Java application server environments that already have the non-portable, Unix-specific daemon management bindings. Writing these things in plain C is easy; in Java, not so much.

      Notice that there are no official Debian or RPM packages for Freenet. Coincidence? Um.... no. It's not hard to write Debian packages. I just wrote 4 of them last week. It's hard to write packages for Java applications.

    3. Re:Dump data into a darknet by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Freenet is far less susceptible to attacks then Tor, principally because it's not realtime. With the NSA's realtime, global view of traffic, it's trivial to run timing attacks against Tor, even disregarding the fact that a substantial number of Tor nodes are government run. With Freenet, not so easy. You can push documents onto Freenet 6 months ahead of time, slowly, from various locations, before revealing the address hash. In Western societies at least (for now), it's publisher anonymity that matters here, not the reader.

      Freenet would be perfect for this kind of thing. Too bad, as I said elsewhere, it's written in Java. If it were easier for people to install and manage on their servers, including using things like chroot jails, BSD jails, syscall jails, and SELinux rules, many more people would run it. Note this isn't an opinion on Java as a language. I think it's pretty much an objective fact that Java is a PITA when it comes to general system interoperability and friendliness. Windows it's a little different because Windows admins don't really have any clue what's going on, so one crap installer and daemon manager is as good as another. On Unix and Linux, Java is just very awkward and painful to work with outside of development environments.

    4. Re:Dump data into a darknet by Raenex · · Score: 1

      What's so difficult about, "java foo.Server"?

    5. Re:Dump data into a darknet by TCM · · Score: 1

      Amen.

      --
      Of course it runs NetBSD. BTC: 1NT7QvbetmANwaMzhpVL6
  11. I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I might be part of the few people in the world who are able to implement attacks on cryptography or busting advanced malware in random hardware firmwares in a breeze.
    Still there might always be someone who knows some trick I'm not aware of, who is cleverer and more prepared, thus i don't feel safe.

    The Guardian's staff is in my opinion well aware of how to use Tor and such countermeasures. They just don't want to try their luck, because if they happen to fail this is ultimate failure.

    The Guardian is right and The Register is a usual a bundle of same sized wooden sticks.

    1. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by ackthpt · · Score: 1

      I might be part of the few people in the world who are able to implement attacks on cryptography or busting advanced malware in random hardware firmwares in a breeze.
      Still there might always be someone who knows some trick I'm not aware of, who is cleverer and more prepared, thus i don't feel safe.

      The Guardian's staff is in my opinion well aware of how to use Tor and such countermeasures. They just don't want to try their luck, because if they happen to fail this is ultimate failure.

      The Guardian is right and The Register is a usual a bundle of same sized wooden sticks.

      Also possible they fear relying upon any "safe" technology because they won't know when it is no longer "safe". Not like the NSA is going to send them a card saying "We are now watching you".

      --

      A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    2. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Also, what nobody is able to tell with confidence as of today is: "Does the NSA have MITM over half of active Tor exit nodes at all times ?".

      They well might be.

    3. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Does it occur to anyone else that following the NSA's advice might not be the best idea? I mean, there must be some reason they would like you to use the measures they recommend. And I certainly wouldn't trust any really heavy stuff to Tor.

    4. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      We have two hints that those advices are good:

      - They follow same guidelines for their own security.
      - The current state of all academical researches in the world as of today tells us that it is secure, maths don't lie.

      But hopefully there are billions of different ways you can screw this up in practice. Because "crypto IS hard".

    5. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Immerman · · Score: 1

      Math doesn't lie, but it's also limited by the perspective of the humans using it. Wasn't it just recently that it was discovered that some common encryption scheme was actually far less secure than previously believed? Something about a flawed assumption in the entropy model I think it was.

      Also, if anyone has a working quantum computer or other probability-bending code breaking machine I would expect it to be the NSA.

      But yeah, no reason we shouldn't use the securest methods available, and for gods sake wrap something up nicely behind an ultra-simple pretty front-end that any idiot can download and use without knowing what the $#@! they're doing. No, it won't be perfect, but it'll at least tilt the odds as far as reasonably possible when Granny stumbles upon some damning secrets and is trying to pass them on without guaranteeing that the black vans will be pulling up in short order.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
    6. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, that attack could reduce AES256 to the effectiveness of only AES128! At a billion attempts a second, that reduces the time needed to clear the keyspace to a mere 10790000000000000000000 years. Clearly encryption is worthless.

    7. Re:I don't feel quite safe either. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well, sure, that's what they all say...until they learn the 'attack cluster' is just one very stable IBM 386 residing in a massively accelerated time dilation field.

  12. Not sure what author of article is going for by VinylRecords · · Score: 4, Informative

    1.) Encryption: It's not hard

    Shouldn't really be a factor now that Snowden is known publicly. When Snowden was trying to escape the U.S. it was necessary for him to be paranoid and secretive. Now he's already given a full copy of all of his information to Greenwald in person. Snowden was protected well by his news contacts. They had him reveal himself to the world on his own time and not have his name leak before he wanted it to leak. He was safe when it mattered. The Guardian did an acceptable job getting Snowden to safety.

    2.) Use clean machines

    Extremely difficult. The US has deals with phone companies, operating system creators, and hardware manufacturers, to put backdoor systems into so many devices. They monitor so many email and phone companies. How can you be fully sure you didn't buy a machine that has a secret backdoor entry that the FBI or CIA can get into easily? How can you know that your PC isn't already set up for intercepts on all of your activity? You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored. And being passively monitored like how the NSA just copies everything sent anywhere.

    3.) How to shift the data securely

    The governments of the world can potentially intercept ANYTHING. Phone calls, emails, text messages, picture messages, faxes, voices through a hidden microphone, credit card transactions, smoke signals, bank statements, parabolic intercepts. Nothing is truly secure in this day and age. A reporter can use a courier by land or plane and that person can be held in a cell for nine hours while being interrogated. But an in-person intercept is known to both parties. A phone intercept is tough to fully know about unless you have an inside source telling you "your personal phones and prepaid phones are all tracked". Thanks to Snowden I now assume that EVERYTHING is tracked by the government.

    4.) Using hidden services

    The government is cracking down on those. Lavabit could not stop the government. Why would any other black site or anonymous exchange be able to stop the government? The government can stop billion dollar companies from operating overnight. Like a small email or messaging company can withstand the onslaught of a multi-national cyber-military operation?

    1. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The US? How about China? They've got the backdoors.

    2. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by dgatwood · · Score: 5, Informative

      2.) Use clean machines

      Extremely difficult. The US has deals with phone companies, operating system creators, and hardware manufacturers, to put backdoor systems into so many devices. They monitor so many email and phone companies. How can you be fully sure you didn't buy a machine that has a secret backdoor entry that the FBI or CIA can get into easily? How can you know that your PC isn't already set up for intercepts on all of your activity? You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored. And being passively monitored like how the NSA just copies everything sent anywhere.

      Not difficult at all. It's called an air gap. You buy a laptop specifically for the purpose of decrypting the messages. You set it up without connecting it to the Internet. You generate your private-public key pair on this machine and use a flash drive to manually copy the public key to a different machine so that you can provide it to whoever needs it. When you receive a message, you copy that to a flash drive, then copy it to the other machine, then extract it.

      Ideally, the private key should also be stored on a (different) USB key that you carry with you, to reduce the risk of physical theft by (hopefully) ensuring that the key and the encrypted data are never in the same place except when you are decrypting that data. If you are really paranoid, you can split the key into pieces so that multiple key dongles held by separate people must be stolen or confiscated before encryption is compromised.

      This is how high-security data handling works everywhere. If intercepting it could mean the end of (the|your) world, you build an air gap, and you ensure that the computers on the inside of that gap are never connected to the public Internet in any way, shape or form. And when you're done with the machine, you destroy its hard drive in accordance with DoD manual 5200.01.

      Of course, this ignores TEMPEST/Van Eck phreaking; chances are, you aren't that important, but if you are, you should also take precautions to physically secure your air gap room against any EM emissions from the computer in question.

      And as always, Keep Calm and Carry a Towel.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    3. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Dan+East · · Score: 5, Informative

      2.) Use clean machines

      Extremely difficult. The US has deals with phone companies, operating system creators, and hardware manufacturers, to put backdoor systems into so many devices. They monitor so many email and phone companies. How can you be fully sure you didn't buy a machine that has a secret backdoor entry that the FBI or CIA can get into easily? How can you know that your PC isn't already set up for intercepts on all of your activity? You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored. And being passively monitored like how the NSA just copies everything sent anywhere.

      I call BS on this one. "You'd need to be an expert on computer software, hardware, intercept technology, and so many other things just to detect that you were being actively monitored." No, you don't. It only takes ONE expert to find that Dell, HP, Microsoft, Apple, OSX, Windows, Linux, has all these supposed backdoors to blow the whistle. While we have cases where various cloud / online services have been forced to turn over information, none of what you're claiming has been reported with hardware and OS vendors.

      You're missing one important thing in your paranoia. Existing networks still have to be utilized to transfer this data. If every home PC had such a backdoor, then they still would have to use the internet connection to transmit that data. And yes, there are experts that do watch for this kind of thing, and keep an eye on what their machines are connecting to and why. Unless you're also positing the conspiracy theory that every machine has some totally secret wireless communication built in that talks to some government ghost network that no one has discovered either.

      Yes, the NSA is reaching way too far, but even so you've got your tin foil hat way too tight.

      --
      Better known as 318230.
    4. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Dunbal · · Score: 5, Interesting

      You are assuming that when you tell your computer to turn off the WiFi, the WiFi stays off. Now if cell phones that are "off" can record the conversations of mobsters without them knowing it, what makes you trust your computer all of a sudden? It would have to be an "air gap" somewhere in the countryside away from any wifi signal...

      --
      Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
    5. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Guest316 · · Score: 1

      >But an in-person intercept is known to both parties.
      Nobody seems to remember the ways this was done back in the days before all-electronic communications. Anything from binoculars and shotgun mics to planted wireless electronic bugs are just as useable today as they were during the Cold War.

    6. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by MaskedSlacker · · Score: 2

      Open up the laptop and remove the wifi antenna (at least in mine you could remove it with a pair of scissors, but other models may require mucking with board).

    7. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This.

      Like it or not, IPv4/6 is all there is for multihop communications on existing infrastructure. Unless Microsoft, Cisco, or Intel are cutting deals with foreign governments, they're not going to be able to keep a lid on backdoors. Labs in Berlin, Moscow, and Beijing are dedicated to analyzing outbound communications (including wireless RF) of American made hardware and software.

    8. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You are assuming that when you tell your computer to turn off the WiFi, the WiFi stays off.

      Nah, I think he's just assuming that you're using a computer without wifi. Be that a desktop without wifi, or a laptop with the card removed.

    9. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Obfuscant · · Score: 2

      Open up the laptop and remove the wifi antenna

      On most of the Dell systems I've dealt with over the last few years, the WiFi is on a small add-in board.

      Or you can just operate in a Faraday cage and avoid Tempest and WiFi and Bluetooth and all kinds of issues at the same time.

    10. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by melikamp · · Score: 1

      It only takes ONE expert to find that Dell, HP, Microsoft, Apple, OSX, Windows, Linux, has all these supposed backdoors to blow the whistle.

      What is your point? In all of these cases, you can count people with complete access to the source code with your fingers. Even in Linux there are binary blobs with no source. Each of these backdoors is known to 1-5 people in the world, so no one will blow any whistles.

    11. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Did you know that RMS has long been advocating the secure nature of free software as a way of protecting privacy? It is exceedingly difficult to have malicious features in free software that is publicly developed. Binary blobs also represent a security risk in that users are unable to reason the logic of the blobs. This is the reason why RMS supports the Linux-Libre project. I've noted in the past that for many here in Slashdot, any sort of suggestion to remove these Linux blobs for the sake of freedom are met with contempt with the reasoning that "hardware with binary blobs that work are better than hardware without blobs".

      RMS has been vindicated once again about the issue that if users do not control the software, the software controls the user.

    12. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Darinbob · · Score: 2

      It is amazingly unlikely that you buy a brand new machine at Best Buy and it is already set up to monitor all the communications you send from the moment it's turned on. Sure it might happen, but that would mean that everyone everywhere is being spied on every minute of the day, in which case the NSA will never be able to find the needle in the haystack. Instead a clean machine means that you use that brand new machine machine only for that task; you don't re-use an old machine, you don't install extra software, don't go browsing the web on it, don't stick it on the internet, and when you get your data you wipe the machine clean again (and you're doing all this in a VM on the clean machine).

      There's always the sci-fi possibility that your'e being followed all the time and the follower goes into the store, demands to be told the serial number of the machine that was sold to you, and from that number a back door is activated. Which is one reason why you don't stick that PC on the internet.

      If things are so bad that you're being followed everywhere all the time, with a full time team of people assigned to your case, then you're no good as a reporter in this area already. You only get one big scoop of the century in this area, after it's done you will be a high value target to the NSA instead of a petty part-time annoyance, and will never again be safe communicating with confidential sources.

      Lavabit was flawed in its set up. It had the ability to decrypt and divulge email if forced to which made it vulnerable. Security and convenience do not mix together well, and allowing a third party like Lavabit to act as a middle man with keys is convenient but not secure.

    13. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Preinstalled anti-virus could provide a mechanism to scan for certain keywords, identify the file as a "virus", and (depending on the settings) auto-submit a sample for "research".

    14. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by FatLittleMonkey · · Score: 1

      Of course, this ignores TEMPEST/Van Eck phreaking; chances are, you aren't that important, but if you are, you should also take precautions to physically secure your air gap room against any EM emissions from the computer in question.

      The article isn't about being monitored. It's about delaying detection long enough to a) get the source out of the country, b) publish before they raid you. If you are known enough to be actively monitored (and you're not a foreign spook or tech-company), then you've already been raided, your hdds seized or smashed, and/or your partner jailed, without warrant, lawyer, or trial.

      --
      Science is all about firing a drunk pig out of a cannon just to see what happens.
    15. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      You are assuming that when you tell your computer to turn off the WiFi, the WiFi stays off.

      You bought a computer just to do secure communication. Why did you buy one that has any form of wireless hardware?

    16. Re: Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As a high profile "target" journalist, would you play Russian Roulette with the lives of your sources, making an uneducated guess about whether the electronic devices and encyption methods you are using are safe from eavesdropping?

    17. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You think source code is needed to find backdoors? Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha! *cough* *cough* Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha!

    18. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by sacrilicious · · Score: 1

      3.) How to shift the data securely
      The governments of the world can potentially intercept ANYTHING. ... A reporter can use a courier by land or plane and that person can be held in a cell for nine hours while being interrogated. But an in-person intercept is known to both parties.

      Taking this concept further: after encrypting your data, xor the data with a onetime pad. Send only the pad by courier first; once the courier arrives at the destination with the onetime pad unmolested, send the other part of the data.

      --
      - First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then ???, then profit.
    19. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Don't use USB, remember Stuxnet.

      Print the received files with OCR-B font and use a scanner + OCR software on your never internet connected laptop

    20. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Try to find a laptop that doesn't come with WLAN hardware. I guess you shouldn't use second hand hardware because you don't know what kind of modifications happend to it under any previous owner (e.g. hardware bugs that the Chinese kindly put in during a trip the previous owner made or something like that).

      Buying a new, bulky desktop computer would work, but it's not as practical.

    21. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by gmueckl · · Score: 1

      I think you are overestimating the difficulty in slipping unwanted hidden functionality into code. Take a look at the underhanded C code contest for some ideas. The number of entries in each contest suggests that it's easier than it looks to come up with that kind of thing if you really want to.

      --
      http://www.moonlight3d.eu/
    22. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The wifi is on a small add-in board, but not the antenna. The antenna is in the display frame around the screen. There is a cable connecting the board to it. Cut that cable and presto, no wifi.

    23. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Unfortunately an airgap won't help you. Not if you are *really* being paranoid about attacks from a highly motivated and resourced attacker.

      The levels of trust are now getting very low, which means that you can no longer trust anything.

      Turn off Windows autorun? Bah! Do you trust that?

      Imagine a virus that lives on a thumbdrive. The drive infects every computer that it can (or that matches a pattern which it is looking for) and the sole purpose of that virus is to report back to the NSA (or similar). It's not difficult to imagine that if no network connection is detected then it simply writes the package (encrypted) back to any thumbdrive that comes its way. Eventually that drive hits the internet and uploads the package. It won't offer real time reporting, but it will work.

      Remember, a good way to attack a target is to leave "lost" thumbdrives in their employee's carpark. Someone will pick one up and try to use it at work. It's a *great* way to get behind the corporate firewall.

      So, anyway, I just wanted to offer some insight into this problem.

      I actually believe that ditching the computer all together is exactly the right thing to do. And yes, it will probably be cheaper to fly the concerned parties around the world a dozen times, than to contract out the security responsibility to someone who is good enough to get it right.

    24. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Morpf · · Score: 1

      It happens that I just read an article in the CACM (DOI:10.1145/2492007.2492018) stating why exactly an air gap will not work, most of all because in most cases there isn't one (practical).

      Let's say you have all the required software on this laptop. How do you import new keys? Typing them in by hand? Since you want to send and receive encrypted messages: How do you transfer the encrypted and plain-text messages between your PC and laptop?

      The concept of an air gap sounds very easy on the first look, but in reality it requires heavy overhead and if not applied correctly it gives a false sense of security which will ultimately do more harm than good.

    25. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by AmiMoJo · · Score: 2

      It isn't hard to physically remove the wifi card from most laptops. Typically it is located just under a hatch or the entire base of the laptop can be removed.

      Also, even if the wifi were turned on with you knowing, unless there is an unsecured network or the government and a backdoor into a nearby AP what use would it be?

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    26. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I am aware of the difficulty of auditing code for malicious features, I have read some IOCCC submissions and these hacks are nothing short of awesome. I do recognise that people can place malicious features into the software by hiding it with techniques used here. I place blind faith to the open source mantrta which states, "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow"; as soon as a community member finds something wrong (it could take many years before this happens if it happens at all), they're probably going to fix the problem and send a patch to the maintainers. It happened to Debian's OpenSSH vunerability as an example and it happened to Noscript as another example. Finding such risky features then propogating the fixes would not be practical had these titles been proprietary software.

    27. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by fritsd · · Score: 1

      Preinstalled anti-virus could provide a mechanism to scan for certain keywords, identify the file as a "virus", and (depending on the settings) auto-submit a sample for "research".

      That's brilliant! All the three-letter-organisation has to do is, if an encrypted document is stolen, tell the anti-virus company to flag its MD5 sum as "dangerous virus to be deleted on the spot and e-mail the T.L.O. about it". Oh wait a minute ...

      --
      To be, or not to be: isn't that quite logical, Slashdot Beta?
    28. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by fritsd · · Score: 1
      LOL

      Turn off Windows ? Bah! Do you trust that?

      FTFY.

      --
      To be, or not to be: isn't that quite logical, Slashdot Beta?
    29. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by fritsd · · Score: 1

      I really don't see the problem.. either it's an isolated laptop locked up in a safe (I believe certification authorities use this set-up) where the people authorised to use it use USB sticks to transfer messages/certificates to/from the isolated laptop. I don't see how this can go wrong. Viruses are only a problem on really braindead OSes like MS Windows; why on earth would you use an OS that tried to execute anything that arrives on a USB stick for Real Work(TM)? It's a bogeyman that just doesn't exist on most OSes; I'll eat my hat(*) if bog standard Linux or FreeBSD installations try to execute anything on a USB stick unless it's rebooted with that stick as boot medium


      Or, you have a secured network, where every employee has two computers on the desk; one connected to the normal ethernet and one connected to the secure private *wired* ethernet network. The employees who have to sometimes work with sensitive data use only programs on the private network connected computer for this. Typing them in by hand, as you say. Anytime somebody reconnects a computer to the wrong colour network cable, somebody gets fired. In this case you wouldn't want the secure computers to have DVD drives or USB ports of course.

      (*) Disclaimer: I don't really have a hat, and I'm (obviously?) not a real security professional. Any corrections welcome.

      --
      To be, or not to be: isn't that quite logical, Slashdot Beta?
    30. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Morpf · · Score: 1

      Even though neither I have a hat or am a security professional, let's just view it from an overly paranoid view.

      There is one fundamental problem with your first idea. You assume your operating system behaves secure / sane. How could you prove it? Even though you compiled all your code by hand and read all the source code (good luck at that), how can you guarantee your compiler compiles only the code and doesn't introduce back doors? I think of two possible ways: First, it could just have a bug in the compiler, making even perfect code vulnerable. Second, it could intentionally introduce unwanted and unknown behavior. See the Ken Thompson hack for a reference. [0] In the end your only way would be doing it _all_ from scratch, software _and_ hardware.

      So, I would guess you are way better off transferring the data by typing it by hand, as you suggested with the second idea. This seems reasonable secure, but quite error prone and time consuming.

      [0] http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?TheKenThompsonHack

    31. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Kiwikwi · · Score: 2

      I'll eat my hat(*) if bog standard Linux or FreeBSD installations try to execute anything on a USB stick unless it's rebooted with that stick as boot medium

      They won't do that intentionally. But bog standard Linux machines can certainly be infected just by inserting a compromised USB stick.

      First of all, the stick will be mounted. Typically, this happens automatically, but if not, the user will still have to do it manually. The USB filesystem can be modified to contain just the right corrupt data structures to trigger a kernel bug, leading to a compromise of the machine. If you think this is far out, think again. This was 2006, but don't worry, the NSA has zero-days on file if they need them. It is well-known that kernel "oopses" (such as this bug in ext4 from 2013) can often be converted into full exploits by a sufficiently determined adversary.

      Assuming your Linux distro has a graphical desktop, you may next try opening the stick in a file browser, such as Nautilus. (Or it may even autolaunch when you insert the stick.) This too can cause your computer to be compromised, if e.g. the stick contains a PDF, which has been modified to contain just the right corrupt data structures to trigger a userspace bug in the program that generates the PDF thumbnail. By the time you think, "Wait, I never put any PDF on this stick", you're already compromised. If you think this is far out, think again. This was 2011.

      If you're really paranoid, you'll forgo filesystems and desktop environments entirely and just dd plain ASCII files directly to the USB block device. But if your networked computer has been infected, you can never be sure that it's only doing that...

    32. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I call BS on your call of BS. There is now a marketplace for 0-day OS bugs, and people who have sold such bugs are convinced all major governments have stockpiles of them for all popular OS's. The more they use the bug, the more likely it'll get discovered by some university like the Citizen Lab and publicized, after which it can be fixed and all your tired IT-guy "update your machine" nagging has value again, but there's a wide realm outside that advice: whether or not a government can infect a machine thus depends on how much they want to spend on you, not on whether you made any slip-ups.

      This means the best we can hope for is to raise the price of infection beyond the price of interrogation which gives us some idea when information is taken, which helps. The balance then becomes, how much are they willing to spend to get the information without your knowing about it. This clearly has lots of value to them since the organs of national security are tampering with laws at the expense of democracy to make achieving it cheaper.

      Maybe security through obscurity can help you---run FreeBSD on arm or something---but (a) that's not very comforting since it's against our basic mantra which particularly applies to the case of an APT, and (b) attempting to actually do it often leads to updating your machine much less often which leaves you open to old, well-known bugs, and (c) you really can't get anything done because so much stuff is broken.

    33. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Teun · · Score: 2

      Lots of people told me Linux sucks for WIFI support :)

      --
      "The likes of Facebook and WhatsApp are free to those whose privacy is of zero value."
    34. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by dwsobw · · Score: 1

      Honest question: Is there any source to back that up?

    35. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Dekker3D · · Score: 2

      Raspberry Pi?

      If your hardware is compromised, you've got a problem anyway. And it's more likely for commonly used computer systems to be compromised, like desktop PCs and laptops, than something as geeky as a Raspberry. Other than that, those things are far easier to carry wherever, and have no wifi built in as far as I know. Most/all of the storage is removable, and you could probably set said storage to be read-only.

      If you're going to build an air-gapped encryption/decryption device, you might as well go for a Raspberry Pi.

    36. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Sean · · Score: 1

      I have file system 0day. Be sure to dd the content to that flash drive and dd it back off!

    37. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Sean · · Score: 1

      It is a fact that the largest US defense contractors had *thousands* of workstations and servers backdoored for *years* before anyone wised up to it. These are networks managed by professionals who really do take security seriously.

      I don't think it's unreasonable to believe that tons of machines are trojaned prior to sale.

    38. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by toddestan · · Score: 1

      How about the Bluetooth antenna that most laptops have nowadays?

    39. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by fritsd · · Score: 1

      I thought there was recent research about the Ken Thompson hack, I haven't read it tyough.. something called double compilation iirc.. it was on the LWN site.

      Maybe you can use multiple redundancy like they do in mission critical environments: copy the message to three different USB sticks, put one in one laptop with FreeBSD and the program written in FORTRAN compiled with gcc, one laptop with new Ubuntu Linux and the program written in C compiled with clang, one laptop with the dustiest Debian that still works on it and the program written in Java, etc; an odd number of laptops. And if a particular message differs in its decrypted result, you know that at least one of the laptops has screwed up or been subverted, *and you can compare the decrypted messages* (should give you interesting information).

      With respect to back doors etc: the nature of the possible corruption from malfeasance is limited by the (narrow) nature of the result produced: a file on the USB stick (ok, for the next post by kiwikiwi, just dd the USB stick and put the length of the data in the first 3 bytes)

      Unless there really exists a "halt and catch fire" opcode, the nature of the damage is limited to writing different bytes to the USB stick in response to a message that triggers the attacker's hidden program on the laptop, i.e. a decrypted message that doesn't say what Alice wanted to say to Bob but what the infiltrator who had subverted the gcc compiler wanted to say in response to that particular encrypted message (what's the letter for this ? I never got further than A, B and Eve).

      The nature of the possible damage is limited, because the function of the laptop in the organisation is such that you only want to let it write to the USB stick. If it says "aww please, connect me to the internet for updates", burn it.

      --
      To be, or not to be: isn't that quite logical, Slashdot Beta?
    40. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by fritsd · · Score: 1

      Good point about not mounting the USB stick but using dd. Just take the length of the message then, dd the length to the first 3 bytes of the stick, followed by the message. Then it doesn't need to be mounted (can't even :-)

      Maybe it is possible to create errors in the USB stick hardware though..

      The laptop(s) don't have a graphical desktop; only minimal installation, + program to decrypt the message, + program to handle the USB stick insert/read/write/withdraw. The only actions with the laptop are: USB stick in, USB stick out after a minute. What you say with "autolaunch" is an insane idea, I haven't used Gnome in a long time but I can't imagine that Nautilus does this by default though.

      The decryption laptop needs to be highly secure: stored in a safe, not connected to anything, no WiFi, only USB stick work. Because it has to be re-usable: it is the only thing that contains the private key (ok maybe print out the private key in the old-fashioned Commodore 64 "short hex lines with checksum" way and put it in a safe in another building and burn the printer).

      When the message has been decrypted, and the decrypted message is written on the USB stick, you can read it on a computer with lesser security (is there a way to write-protect USB sticks physically, like the old-fashioned floppies?). This second computer just has to be mounted freshly from live CD and not connected to the network either. Even if the message triggers something bad, the state of the computer is not important: its function is to convey the message to Bob. (of course as you say e.g. xpdf or okular can be subverted to change the content of a particular decrypted message). Multiple redundancy here as well, then. Any PDF reader that gives a different message from the other ones is very very interesting for Bob, who knows not only what Alice probably wrote, but also what the PDF reader subverter has substituted.

      Since it seems to me that multiple redundancy would work well, and would yield both the original message and the subverted one for comparison, I conclude that this Ken Thompson attack is unlikely to be performed in practice, because it would yield too much information about what the attacker wants you to read in case of a special trigger message. (i.e. okular has been subverted but xpdf hasn't; and only if the message was about Barney the Dinosaur. Let's see who committed the change to okular that caused this.)

      It's fun to think about these things for a one-off, but I'd hate to stake my career on this kind of stuff.. I hope universities have classes for computer security protocols.

      In my career, I've just had lectures from various people about how they did things, and one thing I remember is that most serious sysadmins have spent years deeply thinking about how they could secure their bank/pension fund/public works in the best way.

      But don't forget that for the recent scandals, there is probably no technical solution. Slashdotters are techies so they want to find technical solutions to problems. But in some cases, the only thing you can and must do is VOTE when the time comes, and remember on that day how you felt and what you thought today or in the last few weeks. Don't get distracted in the meantime... good luck!

      --
      To be, or not to be: isn't that quite logical, Slashdot Beta?
    41. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      Not difficult at all. It's called an air gap. You buy a laptop specifically for the purpose of decrypting the messages. You set it up without connecting it to the Internet. You generate your private-public key pair on this machine and use a flash drive to manually copy the public key to a different machine so that you can provide it to whoever needs it. When you receive a message, you copy that to a flash drive, then copy it to the other machine, then extract it.

      That doesn't work as well as it seems - see stuff like Stuxnet and Flame for proof that you can have an airgapped network, and STILL be infected.

      In fact, without proper data diode type handling, you'll never get protection as long as there's a two way communication of data between the networks. And yes, your reuse of flash drives is a communications medium. The PC connected to the internet gets infected, puts an infection vector on your flash drive, infects your "clean PC" and grabs the private key. That key is then carried back on the "public" flash drive for the internet connected PC to access.

      Data should flow one way only.

      If you need to send a response, you compose it on a "responding" computer (but you won't be able to quote. Encrypt it, then copy it off. That data is transmitted using the internet PC and ht media may be reused for copying to the receiving PC. Once it hits the receiving PC, the media is destroyed - you cannot trust its contents. You compose a reply on the responding PC - there is no data flow from the receiving PC and the responding PC other than visual.

      A determined person will be patient enough to wait.

    42. Re:Not sure what author of article is going for by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      The wifi is on a small add-in board, but not the antenna. The antenna is in the display frame around the screen. There is a cable connecting the board to it. Cut that cable and presto, no wifi.

      Why yes, there is, in addition to the small WiFi board, a magic djin living in the computer who uses the installed antenna to transmit magic pixie signals to the NSA using the closest satellite/Wendy's drive up order board/RFID reader/embedded traffic light sensor. It is much more efficient and betterer to cause permanent damage to a computer to prevent this signal from being transmitted than to just remove the board that creates the real WiFi signal so it can be replaced later if necessary and help maintain whatever resale value the computer has.

  13. MacOS secure!!!! by stanlyb · · Score: 2

    You wannt to use a compromised OS to generate secret keys!!! For.Real.?
    What about this:
    1.Use some old machine, very old machine, like CPU-486 Pentium, or even better, some chip on computer (Raspberry Pi) to install some minimal linux.
    2.Use some proven package to generate the private keys.
    3.Store them, write them down, on some piece of paper, and hide it somewhere secret. Even better, generate a set of PK, for every conceivable case.
    4.During all this steps, never, i repeat NEVER TURN ON THE ETHERNET ADAPTER.
    5.Once you have done with the PK generation, burn the damn computer, literally.
    6.Now you have a set of PK that are really secret.
    7.From now on, never forget, once you run Windows/Mac/Ubuntu, you are exposed. So try to use only some community build, with minimal set of features Linux, and also without any fancy GUI interface. And keep close track of all the services that you run n your computer. And log all the network traffic going to, or out of your little linux box.

    1. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by msobkow · · Score: 1

      Unless you're planning to build a distro from source and read all the source to make sure it has no back doors, you can't guarantee anything is "clean."

      --
      I do not fail; I succeed at finding out what does not work.
    2. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Dunbal · · Score: 4, Interesting

      No, even then you can't guarantee it. There was an article by Dennis Ritchie (yes, one of the co-authors of the C language) that pretty much proved how there could already be back doors in compilers which are slipping in back doors to executable files without anyone knowing it. You can't stop with reading the source code. You would actually have to go through the machine code, line by line.

      --
      Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
    3. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Blaskowicz · · Score: 1

      Rather than burning a 486 with lots of ram which can run linux, which I find evil, a dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda will do.

    4. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by cybersquid · · Score: 4, Informative

      I was about to post this!
      Here's a link to the article: The Ken Thompson Hack

    5. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Tastecicles · · Score: 1

      zeroing a drive is no guarantee of security. In fact, it won't stand up to much more than a casual analysis. The DoD specification is a 3-pass method involving zeroing, populating with 1's and then populating with randoms. Now you're in electron microscopy territory to recover *anything*.

      The absolute *minimum* I would in fact recommend if you're intent on making life difficult for any would-be data snooper is dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sda. I would also take the hard drive and zero it with a *different* kernel than the one it was originally written with (for Windows or Mac, use Linux, for Linux use a BSD kernel, for instance). There are utilities which have their own custom kernels which will do the job on any drive, for example Ultra-X (which in fact exceeds DoD 5520.22-M requirements by a wide margin). I like margins, I've been using Ultra-X for years now.

      --
      Operation Guillotine is in effect.
    6. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      We need to all just curl up into a ball now and wait for them to come and collect us.

    7. Re: MacOS secure!!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Am I the only nerd that use to sit around running packet captures on my computers in highschool? Try it, all day long you will see different processes connecting out to the internet, some it might be legit but how can you know.

    8. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by donaldm · · Score: 1

      The absolute *minimum* I would in fact recommend if you're intent on making life difficult for any would-be data snooper is dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sda.

      You are quite correct if you wish to reuse the disk drive although that is still no 100% guarantee, however if your data is so sensitive and you wish to completely erase it then destroying the drive by shredding and burning the platter(s) are the only option. Because disk drives are fairly cheap it would be better to just use a new disk and shred the old one. Of course then you have to seriously take into account what to do with all backups if any have been performed.

      I think the question that is worth asking is "Why do you think you need to actually ruthlessly reformat your disk or disks?". If there is a good enough reason then the safest is shred and burn, then remove all backups, however if they are in "The Cloud" then forget it.

      --
      There ain't no such thing as proprietary standards only proprietary formats. Standards are by definition open.
    9. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Without posting the known solution? Geez...

      https://www.google.com/search?q=on+trusting+trust+double+compiling

    10. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Schneier publicised a counter - http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_trus.html

    11. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I see people bring up the "Trusting Trust" story all the time, but nobody mentions one of the ways to counter it: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_trus.html

    12. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe there is a practical way to discover if this type of attack lives out there IMHO, something like David A. Wheeler's DDC but without requiring a trusted compiler (which is a logical fault, because thats exactly what you are looking for):

      In an automated way compare the binaries hash sums comming out of supposedly-identical compilers identical compilations of identical sources on identical platfoms. You find a no-mach? Then, dissasemble the binary with 2 dissasemblers compiled from the 2 different compilers, and with one (the clean) you will probably identify the problem.

      The only presupposition is that there must exist some clean versions of the compiler out there, which is more probable because, the opposite, is almost imposible.

      The paranoid part, is that if all binaries end up identical ther is no way to be sure if one single attack exist universally or not.

      (Of course I am talking only about compilers for simplicity, when the attack can apply also to assemblers, linkers, and whole toolchains)

    13. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by TCM · · Score: 1

      I don't see how this could be verified. Sometimes, even compiling the same code with the same compiler twice doesn't yield bit-identical binaries, let alone using a different compiler.

      Isn't Schneier being way too naive here?

      --
      Of course it runs NetBSD. BTC: 1NT7QvbetmANwaMzhpVL6
    14. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      And there's a new article for preventing that attack. In short: compile your candidate compiler with two other compilers (call them A and B), and then compile the candidate compiler with C and D, producing E and F. Compare E and F; if they're identical it's highly unlikely you suffer from a compromised compiler; if you did then either A or B would generate a compromised compiler (C or D), but it's highly unlikely that A and B would be compromised in exactly the same way, leading to identical binaries for E and F. There's some practical work in making A and B and C and D produce deterministic output, but the author of the paper that I am too lazy to look up did it.

    15. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by DMUTPeregrine · · Score: 1

      You also can't guarantee that your CPU is actually executing the instructions you send it, and only the instructions you send it. The NSA could easily have plants in the design teams at Intel/AMD/ARM working backdoors into the hardware.

      --
      Not a sentence!
    16. Re:MacOS secure!!!! by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      I'm not sure you quite get this.

      Take two compilers, A and B, and we have source for A, which I'll call A'. Now, we can create two compiler binaries by compiling A' with A and B, resulting in what I'll call AA' and BA'. If A and B come from reasonably independent sources, we can presume that they don't both compile the traps in A. Although they are significantly different in code, they should do the same thing. Now, we compile A' with AA' and BA', yielding two new binaries. The first one presumably has the trapdoor from the original A (since that's the whole idea), but the second doesn't. They should otherwise be very close to identical, differing possibly in timestamps and header, and possibly some deviation if A' was not a well-formed program. (Some languages are defined precisely. C, the usual language for compilers back then, isn't, but the changes should be pretty minor.)

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  14. Snowden didn't want protection by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    Snowden and the reporters he communicated with did use encryption and other means to preserve secrecy while he was initially doing the leaks. But once it became front-page news, he wanted the publicity, and he told them to go public.

  15. coinlock... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If you are going to leak some crazy stuff you might as well get paid for it.... (coinlock.com)

  16. fly around the world to hold face-to-face meetings by PolygamousRanchKid+ · · Score: 1

    So how is that any safer . . . ? The government knows if you are a journalist. They can check fly lists to know where you are flying to. They can alert their own folks or their pals in the place where you are flying to. They can put a tail on you right after you step off the plane . . . or even as you board the plane.

    Oh, you could get a friend to go for you. But the government know who your friends are . . . etc., etc., etc. . . .

    Sound like a bunch of paranoid spy fiction . . . ? Not any more, really.

    --
    Schroedinger's Brexit: The UK is both in and out of the EU at the same time!
  17. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I second this. Using stenography within kitten pictures and pseudonymous identities would be safer.... not that it would be safe - just safer.

  18. Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by sjbe · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Encryption: It's not hard

    Yes it is. It fails the mom test badly. More properly it is key management that is too difficult. The actual key generation can be automated mostly. Distribution and use of keys is inherently difficult with no obviously easy solution.

    1. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      If your Mom is needing to go to these lengths to secure her data... well... how is Mrs Rosenberg these days?

    2. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by Immerman · · Score: 4, Interesting

      But there's no reason it has to be. The newspaper could easily create/bundle a basic application that runs of a flash drive to handle all the encryption/decryption, tor tunneling, etc. The stripped down version:

      The informant-to-be downloads and launches the "Guardmail Program" for the first time
      - Personal public and private keys are generated silently and stored in a data file alongside the program
      - User writes an email and adds attachments as per normal
      - User provides destination address and public encryption key + CRC code available on The Guardian's contact page
      - CRC code is checked to ensure that there are no typos in the encryption key (is this normal? It should be if not)
      - email, attachments, and P.S.ed personal public encryption key are encrypted
      - Resulting data-file is then sent to the destination via whatever origin-obscuring pathways they decide to integrate.

      - Later the program is run again and told to "check mail" - it goes to whatever anonymized dropbox is being used, via whatever hidden pathway, and looks for messages directed to the User
      - Any messages are downloaded and decrypted. Attachments can be decrypted and saved just as you would from a webmail site

      From the users perspective all they did was fire up a special "magic" email program that lets them send things much more secretly, from an interface that looks essentially like any webmail frontend, but the data never sits anywhere unencrypted unless attachments are "saved" (exported) from Guardmail. Does such a program truly not already exist? If so, the why the $#@! not? Sure it's a bit limited and inflexible, but it would put reasonably secure communication in the hands of anyone who had a need for it, no technological knowledge required.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
    3. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by cool_arrow · · Score: 1

      I recently came across an interesting app/middleware platform in the google play store for android called musubi group chat. It uses a type of encryption called "Identity based encryption" (first theorized by shamir of rsa fame). It is dead simple to use with all the key management being done without user intervention. In order to send someone an encrypted message you only need their email address (you generate the public key for them). You do need a trusted 3rd party involved but I think that drawback can be overcome. Anyway, if you have android give it a try as I think it is impressive and I'd like to see more apps use this.

    4. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by newbie_fantod · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It fails the mom test badly.

      Yes, but any moms who are editors of respected international journalistic institutions are probably smart enough to understand and use encryption.

    5. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Unless they're editing for a tech journal, I sincerely doubt this to be the case.

    6. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by Immerman · · Score: 2

      I'm not a cryptography geek, but I doubt a trusted third party requirement can be conveniently overcome when "the opposition" has the sort of resources the NSA can bring to bear.

      Onion routing has a similar problem in that it only really provides security-through-obscurity. They come right out and warn you that if the entrance and exit nodes are monitored then it's trivial to trace your communication - and considering the pervasiveness of admitted NSA monitoring it seems naive to not asume that every known tor node is on their watch list.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
    7. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by aitikin · · Score: 1

      I'm sorry, but I found his comment to be rather witty. Frankly, my mother is not a Journalist. My mother never previously tried to secure her data (she actively would fill out surveys for coupons, for TV stations, for anything of the sort and ALWAYS used department store cards). Why should she need to now?

      Mrs. Rosenberg, on the other hand, she would have wanted to be thorough. Which should be true of reporters and journalists, but these days, I'm cynical of that.

      --
      "Don't meddle in the affairs of a patent dragon, for thou art tasty and good with ketchup." ~ohcrapitssteve
    8. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by mrchaotica · · Score: 1

      Your scheme failed in step 0, because the NSA used a man-in-the-middle attack to replace the download of the "guardmail program" with a backdoor'd version.

      --

      "[Regarding the 'cloud,'] ownership was what made America different than Russia." -- Woz

    9. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by RabidReindeer · · Score: 1

      Unless they're editing for a tech journal, I sincerely doubt this to be the case.

      Regardless.

      Remember "Business 2.0"? They're not longer around. Server crashed with all their assets on it. They hadn't been doing backups.

    10. Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      Even easier:
      Guardian creates a secure-submission app that contains the Guardian's public key, and all the software needed to send encrypted data to the paper.
      User just downloads the app, starts it up, enters the location of the data to be sent, and clicks SEND.

  19. The NSA would like to thank you very much by hyades1 · · Score: 5, Interesting

    From TFA:

    "El Reg would like to save The Guardian a few bob, and reduce the jet-setting lefty paper's carbon footprint, by suggesting some handy tips â" most of them based on the NSA's own guidance".

    Since the NSA gets a lot more information from metadata than from the message itself, I imagine they'd be delighted to have journalists encrypting everything important (lazy buggers that they are, they probably wouldn't bother with anything that wasn't).

    By jumping through all the hoops in the NSA guidelines, you just sorted yourself into a tiny minority that has something to hide. You can guarantee you'll have spooks from every spy agency in the free world tracking where you go, who you talk to, who THEY talk to and what all of you do all day, where you keep your money, where you spend it, and who makes your morning coffee when the wife's out of town.

    And laughing. You just KNOW they'll be laughing.

    --
    I've calculated my velocity with such exquisite precision that I have no idea where I am.
    1. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by TapeCutter · · Score: 5, Informative

      Personally I think El-Reg may be experiencing some professional jealousy. The patronising tone paints the Guardian reporters as political ideologues in trouble, but the fact is that investigative journalism is hard and expensive, and the Guardian are world leaders in the art.

      --
      And did you exchange a walk on part in the war for a lead role in a cage? - Pink Floyd.
    2. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by pepty · · Score: 1

      So after step two use steganography and post the messages as pics to facebook or instagram?

    3. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by hyades1 · · Score: 1

      You're right about that, my friend. The Guardian is one of the few papers left in the entire world that still deserves the title. They do good work.

      --
      I've calculated my velocity with such exquisite precision that I have no idea where I am.
    4. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are now resources devoted to detecting steganography on public networks like Facebook. It's been known for many years (think late twentieth century) that Al Quaeda was using steganography to hide documents. There were more convenient routes for communicating and probably better ones, but they went with stego, using porn as the cover. When you see stories like this one:

      Exclusive: Pornography found in bin Laden hideout: officials

      remember that extensive archives of digital porn, arriving on hand-couriered usb drives, doesn't mean porn-addiction but video-based steganography.

      The Russians do it too. See this story from 2010:

      How even the dumbest Russian spies can outwit the NSA

      Don't think for a second that known stego routines aren't now checked for in collected data from sources like Facebook (PRISM).

    5. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Personally I think El-Reg may be experiencing some professional jealousy.

      There's nothing professional about the way the "journalists" at El-Reg write. It's somewhere between a tabloid and a blog. It's not a newspaper like The Guardian, not even close. I've yet to read an article that wasn't dripping with personal bias and goofy sensationalism.

    6. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I agree. The article is dubious advice delivered in a condescending and smug manner. I would not want to leak to the paper giving such advice---they seem likely to be confidently wrong about a security decision.

    7. Re:The NSA would like to thank you very much by pepty · · Score: 1

      I was thinking of steganography on a very popular site as a way to make a blind drop; further encryption would still be necessary to hide the actual message.

  20. Plain old mail? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How about plain old mail? If you worry about it being intercepted encrypt your data
    on a micro flash drive and mail it. You could also use other carriers like FedEx or
    UPS. To increase the chance of it getting through use a PO Box for both the destination
    and the return address. If it "disappears" then nothing is lost and you can suspect that they
    are also reading your mail.

  21. Pfff by ikhider · · Score: 2

    As much as the NSA/CIA/FBI whatever like to make you think they are God, they are in fact not. There are MANY ways to make a secure chat between two parties. No organization can be on top of all computers and all software all the time. If the parties involved have a chance to avoid physical surveillance, they are set. How will the spooks going to know which channel to listen in on? All of them? Fine. Needle in a haystack. Good luck.

    --
    "SO we bide our time, waiting for a purer kick to bloom and the future is still bleak, uncertain and beautiful" -GSYBE
    1. Re:Pfff by Tastecicles · · Score: 1

      ELS looks interesting... how many book titles have ever been printed? Pick one, that's your primer.

      --
      Operation Guillotine is in effect.
    2. Re:Pfff by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No organization can be on top of all computers and all software all the time.

      ... yet.
      Your argument is short-sighted and disproven by historical advances. Ten years ago, "no organization can be on top of 75% of all electronic communication." would have been the line to use. Now the NSA can do just that. It's folly to think that given technological advances the remaining 25% will stand for eternity.

      How will the spooks going to know which channel to listen in on? All of them? Fine. Needle in a haystack. Good luck.

      Indeed, good luck. You are to defend against algorithms and data processing that always increase in complexity and scope, detecting patterns that you did not know existed or could not conceive of even if presented with the systems' findings. Far less of the system's capabilities and algorithms are public knowledge, the rest is held secure behind closed doors, somewhere.
      Remember, the NSA changed the S-boxes for AES in a manner which nobody understood at the time. Years later it was declassified that these changes actually improved security of Rijndael by preventing an attack then only known to the NSA. They are years ahead of the public in a variety of fields. My guess would be that one of those fields is data mining and pinpointing of needles in haystacks.

  22. Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 2

    It is ridiculously easy to agree on continuously changing keys for one-time-pad encryption. All you need is a bit of imagination.

    If the media companies are really so afraid that they will spend millions to do face-to-face encounters, I would happily take half of those millions and give them a far easier, faster, at-least-as-secure alternative.

    Seriously. This is utter madness based on ignorance.

    1. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Addendum:

      TFA implies that public-key is a panacea. This is not true either. SOME of the vulnerabilities are mentioned. But while security through obscurity is not itself real security, the FACT is that public-key cryptography is simply not suitable for all situations.

      In fact, given THIS situation, public-key cryptography presents exactly the SAME vulnerabilities as other methods that might be more secure in these circumstances. Namely, key management.

    2. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      It is ridiculously easy to agree on continuously changing keys for one-time-pad encryption. All you need is a bit of imagination.

      "The one-time-pad is the binary from the current 'This Week in the NSA' podcast."

    3. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "The one-time-pad is the binary from the current 'This Week in the NSA' podcast."

      Maybe I missed the morning news, but I'm not sure what you're saying there.

      One Time Pad is the only encryption that mathematics says is not even theoretically breakable. As long as, that is, you use proper key management. Which isn't trivial, but it also isn't hard.

    4. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      Maybe I missed the morning news, but I'm not sure what you're saying there.

      I'm saying that finding a common set of suitably pseudo-random bits to use as a one-time-pad is rather trivial -- an MP3 (at least the bits that are the compressed data and not the text tags), a wav file from a commercial audio CD track, the jpeg image from an online newspaper, etc. And that you can display irony by using something the NSA itself produces (which of course there is no real podcast by that name or source, but irony needs not be factual to be irony) such as from here. You just have to agree ahead of time what to use.

    5. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "I'm saying that finding a common set of suitably pseudo-random bits ..."

      Hah! Yes, I'm feeling a bit dense today. I should have picked up on what you meant right away.

      Exactly. It doesn't have to be "random", it only has to be "random enough", which a podcast (starting at, say, 8 minutes 22.000 seconds) certainly is. As long as the key is unknown to others, and is halfway well-chosen, it might as well be "completely" random.

    6. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      A lot of people (including many cryptographers today) seem to have forgotten that effective entropy and actual, objective entropy are two different things. It all has to do with available information. If you don't have the information necessary to put semi-random bits into perspective, they may as well be completely random.

      But again, it still depends on the bits being "random enough". What that is varies by circumstance.

    7. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Haha. Ooops. Should have been 8:23.000. A good example of the problem of key management.

    8. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      An MP3 is anything but random. MP3 files are highly structured, and even the compressed bits have structure. If you XOR an MP3 file with a text file, it'll be trivial to decrypt it, _especially_ by the NSA, who have been dealing with such tricks for decades.

      One-time pads are the preserve of neophytes. OTPs are only "perfectly secure" if they come from _real_ random sources, and even then they're not perfectly secure. Imagine a string of all 0s, which if randomly generated should be technically as likely as any other bit pattern of that size. Now imagine that you intercept a message that is perfectly coherent; what's more likely--that's the RNG emitted all 0s, or that it was broken? Now imagine you have a file where the patterns of high bits suspiciously look like that of an MP3? What then? Obviously you assume a 7-bit file was XORd with an MP3 file, and soon you decrypt the whole thing, without even needing the original MP3. And the engineering to do it is taught in Crypto 101.

      OTPs aren't used for real security engineering these days, except by old school spooks using ancient equipment. PKI is much more dependable.

    9. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 0
      Nobody said anything about .mp3. "Podcasts" are often video, and depending on how the bitstream is interpreted, it can be quite "pseudo-random". The important part is how it is interpreted.

      "One-time pads are the preserve of neophytes. OTPs are only "perfectly secure" if they come from _real_ random sources"

      You are naive. OTP is still used as the MOST secure encryption by "black" security forces around the world. We know that, both from "leaks" and from spies who have been caught.

      And you completely missed my point about effective entropy versus "objective" entropy. You are doubly naive.

      You are spouting exactly the "security engineering" bullshit propaganda that I was speaking against. You have blinders on. Wake up.

    10. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 0

      "OTPs aren't used for real security engineering these days, except by old school spooks using ancient equipment. PKI is much more dependable."

      And since you insisted on injecting your amateur opinion on this topic, I will clue you in to something else:

      OTP does not have to be just XOR or some other kind of simple "manual" manipulation. It can include very sophisticated OTHER bitstream or block or other cipher techniques to achieve its goals. The only DIFFERENCE is that it's OTP. And that's where you show your blatant naivete.

      Did you learn your stuff from the CSI shows on TV?

    11. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      But again, it still depends on the bits being "random enough". What that is varies by circumstance.

      One of the other similar non-OTP methods of encoding a message is called a book code. A text message becomes a string of numbers giving page/line/word numbers of the desired cleartext word. The "shared key" is the knowledge of what book is being used. Since the same word can almost always be encoded as a different number set each time it appears, and the message can contain any number of nulls, this code is reasonably hard to break. Nobody would dare claim that the key is anything close to random, yet the code is effective.

    12. Re:Holy Crap. Get A Grip. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1
      You are making a distinction that is no real difference. That's just a slightly modified form of OTP. The difference is just that the "pad" is agreed upon using a separate key.

      "Nobody would dare claim that the key is anything close to random, yet the code is effective."

      Exactly. You are making my point for me. It isn't random... but it's "random enough" for the intended purpose. That's the effective entropy I was talking about, as opposed to true entropy.

      However, I would argue that a typical book code really isn't "random enough", if the encoded message is reasonably long. Word breaks and other features of plaintexts can sometimes be analyzed to break small bits... which leads to larger bits.

      But if you did it twice, using different passages, it is probably "good enough". Or if the encoded message is pretty short.

  23. Don't Do The Crime... by wrackspurt · · Score: 1
    ...If You Can't Do The Time!

    With all the assets governments have arrayed against citizens of all nations you've got to assume you're going to burn.

    1. Re:Don't Do The Crime... by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "With all the assets governments have arrayed against citizens of all nations you've got to assume you're going to burn."

      Wow. That's about the most pessimistic thing I've heard or read in ages. Next to, maybe, the guy on the streetcorner telling us all that we were all going to Hell, no ifs, ands, or buts.

      (To be honest, I think maybe HE is the one going to Hell, and it has something to do with his butt. But I'm only guessing.)

    2. Re:Don't Do The Crime... by wrackspurt · · Score: 1
      Generally I think I'd rate as overly optimistic about the future but since 9/11 I think we've come to be so over policed and scrutinized that if you're going to go up against the system in a big way you're going to get caught and you're better off going in thinking you're likely to get caught.

      cheers

    3. Re:Don't Do The Crime... by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1, Interesting

      "Generally I think I'd rate as overly optimistic about the future but since 9/11 I think we've come to be so over policed and scrutinized that if you're going to go up against the system in a big way you're going to get caught and you're better off going in thinking you're likely to get caught."

      I don't necessarily disagree with what you say... as long as you're only seeing it from that point of view. But try looking at it from a different (and probably more practical) point of view. That is to say, an engineering point of view, and Signal to Noise Ratio (s/n):

      Someone just recently (and quite rationally) campaigned for EVERYONE to publicly start publishing lots of noise. By noise, I mean:

      BOMBS. TERRORISM. DEATH TO INFIDELS. MAGNESIUM. RED PHOSPHORUS. WHITE PHOSPHORUS. SARIN. RICIN. MASS DESTRUCTION. AK-47. AR-15. M4. C4. 20mm. MINE.

      FREEDOM

      According to reports, that last word gets scored as highly as any of the others. A bit strange, that.

      The answer is not to be a sheep, and say "I'd better not say it or I will be in trouble."

      The answer is to look them in they eye, and if necessary spit in their eye, and SAY IT ANYWAY.

      Anything else and YOU are the enemy. Believe it.

      ---

    4. Re:Don't Do The Crime... by wrackspurt · · Score: 1

      I'm a rationalist and an empiricist. Any bald injunction to "Believe it." leaves me heading for the nearest exit door. I'm nowhere ready to give up on democracy and the justice system. I'll leave the grandstanding to the cowboys posing on both sides. Good luck with all that.

    5. Re:Don't Do The Crime... by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 0

      "Any bald injunction to "Believe it." leaves me heading for the nearest exit door."

      And any knee-jerk heading for the exit door makes you NOT a rationalist or empiricist. You'd better look at the data, first.

      I agree with you that you shouldn't believe it based on my saying "believe it". That wasn't intended to mean "believe it because I say so". I meant "believe it because the data says so."

      The difference is that the latter can be checked. If you leave without bothering to check, you are neither rational or empiricist.

  24. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by Tastecicles · · Score: 1

    STFU, now they're going to start arresting six year old little girls with Hello Kitty motifs on their carry-on...

    --
    Operation Guillotine is in effect.
  25. 5. First Amendment by globaljustin · · Score: 5, Interesting

    TFA (& everyone else it seems) misses a key option: release anonymously using US First Amendment protection.

    The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**

    Accept it...in fact, the Guardian is working with NY Times to release future Snowden info *precisely* because the US has the 1st Amendment. From The Guardian's editor:

    Journalists in America are protected by the first amendment which guarantees free speech and in practice prevents the state seeking pre-publication injunctions or "prior restraint"

    Not only that, in the US, journalists may use **anonymous sources**...they risk their reputation and job, and it has to be cleared by their editors, but it is done routinely (ex: Deep Throat).

    If journalists release secret info, they can be subpoenaed to reveal their source. IF THEY REFUSE...the journalist can be jailed ONLY a short period of time, never more than 6-9 months as a 'coercive tactic'...but the gov't HAS TO LET THEM GO if they still don't talk!!!

    This process is something every college journalism major learns.

    Glenn Greenwald is using Snowden to further his career...the way he's shopping Snowden interviews around proves it.

    The Guardian could have done this **completely differently** and Snowden would still have his job, and Greenwald would have a book deal and a ton of street cred...

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
    1. Re:5. First Amendment by erikkemperman · · Score: 5, Informative

      The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**

      wrong, according the journos themselves at least; US doesn't even make it into the top 30.

      --
      Gosh, thanks. That must be why the other ships call me Meatfucker -- GCU Grey Area (Eccentric)
    2. Re:5. First Amendment by erikkemperman · · Score: 1

      Oh and as an afterthought.. Note that this index is compiled by an organization which, if anything, stands accused of pro-US bias. link

      --
      Gosh, thanks. That must be why the other ships call me Meatfucker -- GCU Grey Area (Eccentric)
    3. Re:5. First Amendment by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Perhaps Snowden got his data in a way that he knew would be eventually discovered if the admins were audited with enough effort by the NSA. You can be sure that there would be a huge amount of audit effort expended to discover the leaker once the data came out. So it's quite likely that Snowden had to flee simply because he knew he'd be likely to be discovered even if his identity was never revealed by any of the people he was in contact with. In that case he'd face torture in US custody like Bradley/Chelsea Manning did (which is well documented - the judge gave him/her a slightly shorter sentence to compensate), which isn't a risk he likely wanted to face.

    4. Re:5. First Amendment by mdragan · · Score: 1
      You are the one missing the point.

      in the US, journalists may use **anonymous sources**

      The whole point of the issue is that anonymity is impossible in the surveillance state. The Government does not need to arrest journalists to get to their sources. It has set in place a system that works around the "process that every collage journalism major learns".

      Glenn Greenwald is using Snowden to further his career...the way he's shopping Snowden interviews around proves it.

      Way to go, attacking the person with uninformed opinions. It was Snowden's choice to disclose the information without hiding behind anonymity, and I see a number of practical and moral reasons for that, one being exactly that the Government would have known anyway.

    5. Re:5. First Amendment by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      TFA (& everyone else it seems) misses a key option: release anonymously using US First Amendment protection.

      The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**

      Sorry, but that koolaid? Yeah, not good for you.

      You do remember 2 days ago, don't you? This "country with the most journalistic freedom in the world" just sentenced a whistleblower working with the press to 35 years of hard time. And they act disappointed that he might see the light of day before he is dead, too.

      Accept it...in fact, the Guardian is working with NY Times to release future Snowden info *precisely* because the US has the 1st Amendment. From The Guardian's editor:

      Journalists in America are protected by the first amendment which guarantees free speech and in practice prevents the state seeking pre-publication injunctions or "prior restraint"

      Not only that, in the US, journalists may use **anonymous sources**...they risk their reputation and job, and it has to be cleared by their editors, but it is done routinely (ex: Deep Throat).

      If journalists release secret info, they can be subpoenaed to reveal their source. IF THEY REFUSE...the journalist can be jailed ONLY a short period of time, never more than 6-9 months as a 'coercive tactic'...but the gov't HAS TO LET THEM GO if they still don't talk!!!

      This process is something every college journalism major learns.

      And everything we learn in college turns out to be 100% correct in the real world. You know, the one with rendition, the one with state-sanctioned indiscriminate murder from the sky, the one where the definition of torture is changed to suit the needs of the day, the one where the most prominent "news network" is a not-thinly-veiled-at-all pure propaganda machine, and the one where journalists don't necessarily need to be coerced to give up information, they just need to be surveilled 24/7 with an abundance of technology to wait for the one minute they screw up something (like using their secret password on a computer that already has a trojan installed by those first-amendment-fearing goons).

      Glenn Greenwald is using Snowden to further his career...the way he's shopping Snowden interviews around proves it.

      The Guardian could have done this **completely differently** and Snowden would still have his job, and Greenwald would have a book deal and a ton of street cred...

      Yes, you are clearly qualified to judge the situation when you don't even understand why Snowden did not go to the New York Times directly in the first place. Mr. Snowden, by all accounts, is a pretty damn smart man. There's a reason things unfolded the way they did. A track record of lacking whistleblower protection, the treatment of Manning, the mere lip-service to first amendment protection, and the general ineptitude of most major journalistic powerhouses in the US are part of that reason.

    6. Re:5. First Amendment by leandrod · · Score: 1

      The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**

      wrong, according the journos themselves at least; US doesn't even make it into the top 30.

      Journos are hardly the best judges, as they have their collective bias as well. And it seems to be Leftist: notice how Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Israel are all lumped together, while Venezuela has effective persecution of the press; Argentina is trying to follow on its heels, fortunately less effectively; and Brazil is solidary with these governments. In fact, the three governments have the same tendencies; I would argue the difference in the effectiveness of political censorship is less a difference of substance in the government and more of different strengths of the civil societies.

      Israel should be about par with Europe and North America, which shows journos ignored the circumstance of its living in a continuous state of war.

      --
      Leandro Guimarães Faria Corcete DUTRA
      DA, DBA, SysAdmin, Data Modeller
      GNU Project, Debian GNU/Lin
  26. Its not even that hard. by Karmashock · · Score: 1

    When you're considering moving files around like that the transfers won't be random. They'll happen at specific prearranged times. As in "I am talking to you on the phone, send me the file now"... in such an environment, you could turn a home system into a file server for a couple minutes... pull the file down or push it or whatever... and then after the transfer was complete turn the file server software off. When things only blink into existence and are gone when called for it gives the black hats less time to mess with it. Sure, they could compromise your machine in addition to that. However, tracking and hacking will be more complicated.

    --
    I've decided to stop wasting my time responding to AC trolls/sockpuppets... so if you want a response from me... login.
  27. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by niftydude · · Score: 1

    I second this. Using stenography within kitten pictures and pseudonymous identities would be safer.... not that it would be safe - just safer.

    300+ gig is a lot of kitten pictures.

    --
    You can never know everything, and part of what you do know will always be wrong. Perhaps even the most important part.
  28. Not just the NSA and GCHQ by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Its not just the NSA and GCHQ you have to worry about, that's only 'Two Eyes' and there are 'Five Eyes':
    USA – National Security Agency
    United Kingdom – Government Communications Headquarters
    Canada – Communications Security Establishment
    Australia – Defence Signals Directorate
    New Zealand – Government Communications Security Bureau

    The 'Five Eyes' have ongoing multi-lateral agreements to share information. So, for example, the NSA claims that it does not spy on Americans, and that is 100% true, (cross the heart, pinky swear), *but* they share with others, this is also true, so the CSE (Communications Security Establishment) in Canada 'Intercepts' information on 'Foreign' targets (Americans) and then the CSE shares that information with the NSA. Likewise the NSA doesn't spy on Americans, but *does* spy on Canadians, then shares the information with the CSE. Rinse, repeat. Its not just the CSE gathering American 'Foreign' intelligence, Britain can gather a certain amount of information from the American East Coast via Bermuda and via remote offices in the Grand Cayman Islands and Jamaica. Remember that the NSA can spy on Canadians from Alaska too, and Canada's east coast can be intercepted from either New York or from Britain. Overlap means (We're Watching You)^5. (Australians spy on the Kiwis, the Kiwis spy on the Aussies). There are American bases in Britian with NSA intercepts. But the information is promiscuous, so all information is pooled and shared (Britain can spy on Americans via the CSE, likewise Britain can spy on Canadians via the NSA). Actually 'spy' is not quite the right word here... 'information gathering, sharing and threat assessment'... maybe that's a better term. Oh, they also spy on countries outside of the 5 eyes, pool and share all of that too.

  29. hung him out to dry by globaljustin · · Score: 4, Insightful

    it was probably intentional not to go out of their way to protect him

    I agree...and I think you are being overly fair to the Guardian and Greenwald. They could have done this completely differently and Snowden would still have his job and hot 'girlfriend'...

    Anonymous source.

    IMHO, Greenwald and the Guardian led Snowden around like a sheep, taking advantage of his internal motivations for releasing the info.

    The truth is, Snowden's info isn't actually revealing of any *new* info, only operational details of already-reported on programs...and seriously it's common knowledge that the Feds could spy on us via the Patriot Act.

    Read it for yourself, from USA Today in 2006:

    The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth, people with direct knowledge of the arrangement told USA TODAY.

    He broke the law technically, revealing info that was Top Secret, but it's not exactly "news"....unless you muckrake and take advantage of the fact that most journalists never understood what the Patriot Act allows.

    It's all hype...we definitely could have had a "national conversation about privacy and surveillance" without all this flap!

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
    1. Re:hung him out to dry by Obfuscant · · Score: 3, Informative

      The truth is, Snowden's info isn't actually revealing of any *new* info, only operational details of already-reported on programs...

      Our local senator is one of the ones who has been hinting to us that this is going on since early this year. He couldn't tell us what it was, but ...

      He also didn't think it was enough of a problem to bother trying to stop it.

    2. Re:hung him out to dry by duke_cheetah2003 · · Score: 1

      It may not be news to a lot of veteran computer folks like probably most of us on this site. It is news to the general public though.

      It's also news in the fact, it's proof. Sure, we as computer folks may have for YEARS said, "Well, duh of course they're capturing all the packets", but now it's like.. there's evidence. Now it's a FACT instead of just a well accepted assumption.

    3. Re:hung him out to dry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why wasn't there a "conversation" in 2006 but there is one now? Your own example demonstrates exactly the opposite of what you are claiming.

    4. Re:hung him out to dry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      After Snowden are news (a fact), beforew Snowden only were rumors. The NSA lied, the goverment lied, Obama lied, now this are facts not rumors.

    5. Re:hung him out to dry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So basically he should have used Wikileaks?

    6. Re:hung him out to dry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think it more likely that he could not deduce a /way/ of stopping it or making the general public care until they too became of of those statistics.

      The NSA gets off on my porn.

  30. Just RTFA by FatLittleMonkey · · Score: 3, Informative

    I can read it on your machine before you encrypt it

    The "clean machine" never connects to the 'net. It handles the encryption and is the only machine that sees the decrypted data. The machine that touches the net (somewhere remote to your home/office connection) only sees the encrypted file.

    When you realize that I have the power to quickly mobilize any police force almost anywhere in the world to get what I want, you will realize by how much you are screwed.

    "If you just want to "stay anonymous from the NSA", or whomever good luck with that. My advice? Pick different adversaries."

    --
    Science is all about firing a drunk pig out of a cannon just to see what happens.
  31. More by Burz · · Score: 2

    5. Protect against remote exploits with an OS like Qubes. Use its TorVM and DisposableVM features to isolate different communication domains from each other. (Certain late-model hardware configurations are best used with Qubes.)

    6. Go one better than Tor and use I2P. It uses routing that is more decentralized than Tor, and since everyone shares routing bandwith by default there is bandwidth to handle virtually all kinds of traffic... even bulk transfers and bittorrent. Security is also enhanced by having more users route traffic, and by communicating only with other I2P users by default. I2P have so far been successfully testing a distributed email system (I2P-Bote) which is far less vulnerable to attack than what you find on Tor (e.g. TorMail).

    1. Re:More by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "Go one better than Tor and use I2P. "

      No. What you want is OneSwarm.

      Not only does it store data in an encrypted, distributed fashion, it makes sure that it is not even theoretically (today) possible to tell what nodes on the network are supplying any particular data. That puts it a step above most other solutions, because it protects the sources, not just the downloader.

    2. Re:More by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Great post, Qubes looks interesting.
      The rest of this reply is because I am unfamiliar with the https://geti2p.net/ address.

      Here are the internet addresses from www.i2p2.i2p/index.html i.e. from inside i2p

      https://geti2p.net/
      https://geti2p.net/

      www.i2p-project.de
      www.i2p-project.de

      https://www.i2p2.de
      https://www.i2p2.de

      The last one is probably the most common and can also be found on the Wikipedia page about I2P.

    3. Re:More by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And I manage to make an error...

      The first option should have been:

      www.i2pproject.net
      www.i2pproject.net

      Not the https://geti2p.net/ that I don't know who runs.

    4. Re:More by Burz · · Score: 1

      Think of I2P as an anonymized IP stack. Its general purpose and therefore has the potential to spread to many more machines, providing greater anonymity. I2P has a distributed filesystem called Tahoe-LAFS in addition to bittorrent and iMule programs.

      OneSwarm is specific to a single application--file sharing--so its potential for anonymizing traffic is more limited.

  32. Cryptonomicon by blackanvil · · Score: 1

    I'm reminded, in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon, that the sultan of a fictional country declared that there, at least, there would be no monitoring, government interference, or strongarm tactics on the local Internet infrastructure. While I didn't learn of underwater-tapping submarines until the christening of the Jimmy Carter in 2004, I felt it was a bit of a stretch to assume that any transcontinental underwater cable wasn't tapped and monitored. Still, it seems it's better than the modern world, where I have yet to hear any country declare that here, at least, your communications, data, files, and so on are safe, even at an official level. I probably wouldn't believe it if one did declare itself a data haven, but still, it might help restore some belief in humanity if every single government wasn't essentially declaring war on its own citizens in the name of security. I don't see how this can end well.

  33. Cheap Yet Devastaing Solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The simplest answer: Encryption.

    The huge edifice of intelligence gathering infrastructure, costing billions of dollars, that has been constructed by the NSA (and its foreign associates) can be toppled like a frail house of cards through the use of encryption.

    If you don't understand encryption now, then learn. It's not difficult.

    Using encryption will make the NSA, et.al. totally powerless now and for all future times.

  34. Easy one by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Open hardware machine, open source operating system, and good encryption.

    The hardware is the only tricky part here but, in Snowden's shoes, I'd consider a ThinkPenguin running on battery good enough. For software I'd go with Trisquel or Debian (FOSS only). There are many good pieces of encryption software, just don't try to roll your own or use anything closed source or obscure.

    If you're not prepared to go this far then you'll have great difficulty. Most important is to stay off the internet at all times! Maintain a 100% air-gap and transport data in person. This way you can use standard commercial hardware and more popular operating systems (and encryption is not required) but one must be prepared to destroy any hardware so utilised at a moments notice (very difficult). A raid can come at any time and, any such hardware seized in tact is a potential data breach.

    I guess the Guardian has never really asked itself about trustless technical security before. However, just seeing that what they want to do can't be reliably done with Window's Dell machines is no justification for "It can't be done". There are plenty of people out there have to take real security seriously and manage.

  35. Now you understand.. by GigaBurglar · · Score: 1

    Why hackers do what they do.

  36. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by Darinbob · · Score: 1

    Are they doing this to every journalist everywhere? I don't think so. They will do it to higher profile journalists working in certain areas. Ie, the reporters who worked with Snowden had already been harrassed in airports quite a lot so they had reached this risky level already. But you're sort of stuck here, the other journalists were probably all off writing stories about kittens or repeating verbatim what happened in a press conference, and those may not be the ones you can trust.

    And yet they were able to talk to Snowden securely, his cover wasn't blown premature but at a time of his choosing, and there is still secure data that has not been released. So things are not completely to the syfy level yet.

  37. Dumb title but article may clue a few by yusing · · Score: 1

    What a BS title. Snowden and Greenwald -were- using GPG/PGP ... long-established fact.

    --

    "You must try to forget all you have learned. You must begin to dream." -- Sherwood Anderson

  38. Dead man switch by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

    The recent approach of releasing encrypted insurance files is a good way to go. You put the data on a torrent and create thousands of copies, then give the key to a few dozen trusted friends. If shit goes down, one of the friends posts the keys in a public forum. It is simple and reliable.

    1. Re:Dead man switch by hazeii · · Score: 1

      The weak link there is "a few dozen trusted friends" - if you know them well enough to trust them, they''re likely to be easily identified. And it only takes one of them to be tricked, hacked or persuaded...how would you know if your "insurance" had been compromised?

      --
      All your ghosts are just false positives.
    2. Re:Dead man switch by MichaelSmith · · Score: 1

      The friends don't control the data, only the key to decrypt it. The only way that can fail is to not release the key, or to release the key at the wrong time. If they change the key the data will be just noise. The data goes out on bit torrent long before the keys go out.

    3. Re:Dead man switch by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's the GP's point: what if one of your friends gets forced or paid to hand the key to somebody?

      They could assess how damaging the insurance file actually is, and act accordingly. If they deem the damage acceptable, they could make it public, bereaving you of your insurance.

  39. Freenet population to rise? by BenEnglishAtHome · · Score: 1

    When the FBI took down Freedom Hosting, apparently most Tor hidden services for obscene material closed down. If all or some significant portion of those people move to Freenet, it'll have lots of traffic. Right?

  40. Most importantly. by FatLittleMonkey · · Score: 4, Insightful

    7. Start doing steps 1-6 NOW. Routinely. Across your entire media organisation. When you don't need it.

    Don't wait until you're doing something you want to hide, then suddenly start using high-end crypto and data obfuscation and special networks to shout "LOOK AT ME, I HAVE SOMETHING TO HIDE".

    --
    Science is all about firing a drunk pig out of a cannon just to see what happens.
  41. Side effect by DaveAtFraud · · Score: 2

    One interesting side effect of this article and others like it is the spook job just got much harder. Lots of people will be looking into using encryption and some actually will becuase they simply don't want someone else reading their e-mail. Previously, the very use of encryption flagged an e-mail as being suspicious since the spooks could assume that peope with nothing to hide (e.g., no plots or plans for nefarious deeds) wouldn't bother with encrypting their data. Now lots of people with nothing to hide will encrypt their messages just becuase they don't like the idea that someone could read it.

    Think about what happens if encrypted e-mail goes traffic from .1% to 1% of all e-mail (I have no idea how many people use something like GPG now).

    Cheers,
    Dave

    --
    They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither safety nor liberty.
    Ben
  42. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by Desler · · Score: 1

    How exactly is using shorthand safer? And how do you use shorthand within a picture? What does that even mean?

    Or were you perhaps referring to steganography?

  43. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by donaldm · · Score: 1

    300+ gig is a lot of kitten pictures.

    Considering 2TB USB 3 external disk drives are fairly cheap you can put six times that and still carry around it in your shirt pocket. In fact you will soon be able to get 512 GB and 1TB USB thumb drives although initially they will not be cheap.

    --
    There ain't no such thing as proprietary standards only proprietary formats. Standards are by definition open.
  44. The elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why is everyone trying to hide from so-called democratic governments? Entities who are supposed to work for the people and not against them? Why encrypt instead of telling these governments to take a hike?

    1. Re:The elephant in the room by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      well you answered your own question

  45. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by niftydude · · Score: 2

    300+ gig is a lot of kitten pictures.

    Considering 2TB USB 3 external disk drives are fairly cheap you can put six times that and still carry around it in your shirt pocket. In fact you will soon be able to get 512 GB and 1TB USB thumb drives although initially they will not be cheap.

    The point I was (rather poorly) trying to make is that steganography gives pretty rubbish data ratios. Even assuming you can get as good as something like 1:10, the 300 GB of Snowden files is going to become 3 TB of kitten pictures when you use steganography.

    You can't use the same kitten picture for each image because then it is pretty obvious to someone searching your HD that you are using steganography and you are busted, so you have to find about 2.7 TB worth of different kitten pictures.

    So, I stand by my statement: that's a lot of kitten pictures.

    --
    You can never know everything, and part of what you do know will always be wrong. Perhaps even the most important part.
  46. Paper is always a great alternative by mendax · · Score: 1

    I am an inveterate letter writer. I dislike sending e-mail to friends, preferring to commit my thoughts and comments to paper. It seems that this is the most secure form of communication available since I can take steps to ensure that the recipient knows that the envelope was not steamed open in transit. That leaves the photos the postal service has been taking of the front and back of every envelope going through the mail , and I can even sabotage that a bit by using phone a phony name and return address and an alias for the recipient. Even the letters I write to and receive from my correspondents in jails and prisons are more secure than my electronic communication. While everything I send and receive has been read first by the jail or prison staff, they're not going to be particularly interested in my political and religious ramblings. They're far more interested in things that affect the security of the jail or prison and the inmates, gang activity, and things of an obvious criminal nature. So, bring on the snail mail!

    --
    It's really quite a simple choice: Life, Death, or Los Angeles.
  47. You didn't RTFA by AliasMarlowe · · Score: 3, Interesting

    But I can read it on your machine before you encrypt it, cos I'm the NSA and if Microsoft won't give me a back door (usually they do), I just lean on Nvidia, Hewlett Packard, or someone to write me a trojan into their drivers so I can get my back door. It's trivial.

    This is one of the reasons that El Reg pointed us to the NSA's own recommendation to USE LINUX. Specifically, use a hardened Linux which is far more secure than any version of Windows, and rather less prone to insertion of back doors into drivers. Here's the relevant bit from El Reg:
    "Buy new machines for cash from a shop and harden them against attack: why not (again) take the NSA's own advice and make sure you're using Security-Enhanced Linux, a series of patches for the open-source OS that are now part of Linus Torvalds' official mainline kernel."

    --
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. - Voltaire
  48. El Reg Being Assholes. Again. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Five dollar wrench neuters the "protection" of #1 and #4.

    El Reg are attacking a leftwing paper. Nuff said.

  49. Two Words: Leveson : Hypocrisy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Well this is the paper that was trumpeting how it would sign up to the 'Leveson Report' Recommendations - which is essentially a reduction on press freedom in the UK. Now this Miranda 'hysteria' - man suspected of having classified British Secrets from Snowdon passing through UK gets stopped and questioned (oh the horror!) they decide it is bad?

    I'll take the Guardian seriously on this particular stance once they stick two fingers up to Leveson and all it implies. Yes their journalists uncovered a great story with Snowden (and Wikileaks saga too), but the editor - fuck him.

  50. Ask Mordechai Vanunu by sa1lnr · · Score: 1

    how good The Guardian is at protecting sources.

  51. that was a questionaire by globaljustin · · Score: 0

    I followed your link, and it was to a wikipedia article about a questionaire...

    I can see it...they probably used a 7-point Likert Scale.

    Look, the proof of the pudding is in the tasting. The Guardian editor *himself* contradicts you and the questionaire you linked to...he chose the *UNITED STATES* and his given reason was that it's legal protection is the strongest.

    End of story.

    Their lawyers looked at all the countries on that list and chose the US.

    You're arguing with a questionaire, i'm saying what has happened.

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
    1. Re:that was a questionaire by erikkemperman · · Score: 3, Informative

      No. I am arguing that one might give more weight to the results of polls among a large number of journalists around the planet, rather than the opinion of this single guy -- Guardian editor or not.

      And even if he's right that NYTimes are better equipped for this kind of thing, that's still a far cry from saying that the US does therefore in its entirety have "the most journalistic freedom" in the world -- which was what you were arguing.

      --
      Gosh, thanks. That must be why the other ships call me Meatfucker -- GCU Grey Area (Eccentric)
  52. going public to hide? by globaljustin · · Score: 1

    First, your post is full of 'perhaps' and 'probably' and 'likely' and ....'conjecture'...

    But I'll address this:

    he knew he'd be likely to be discovered even if his identity was never revealed

    So, let's look at your argument:

    Snowden went public because if he tried to release anonymously his identity might become public.

    By that logic, I should run every red light b/c if I tried to stop I might cause an accident.

    He could have released anonymously AND moved to Russia. Or France. Or West Virginia.

    Or not moved at all and relied on the professionalism of The Guardian and Glenn Greenwald to protect him....

    And about how he would have 'likely' gotten caught, literally *thousands* of techs at Booz Allen had his access, they would have had no clue...most of it was powerpoints anyway. Even with his name revealed the Feds still don't know all he took!!!

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
    1. Re:going public to hide? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or not moved at all and relied on the professionalism of The Guardian and Glenn Greenwald to protect him....

      Since we are talking in hypotheticals anyway, maybe Mr. Snowden knew a tad bit more about how much access the NSA had and has to communications of journalists, which may have swayed his decision to be proactive instead of reactive with revealing his identity.

      And about how he would have 'likely' gotten caught, literally *thousands* of techs at Booz Allen had his access, they would have had no clue...most of it was powerpoints anyway. Even with his name revealed the Feds still don't know all he took!!!

      Where do you derive this conclusion from?
      a.) how do you know "thousands" had that access? Don't you mean "hundreds" or "tens"? Or could you have written "millions" with the same backup?
      b.) how do you know "the feds" do not know what he took? Do you assume that there was no access logging going on just because it was "powerpoints"? Do you assume that systems of the NSA do not have access tracking because they are incompetent?
      c.) have you worked in his position and is it possible he knew more about the likelihood of his capture than you do?

  53. You mean Europe by globaljustin · · Score: 1

    I followed your link as well...

    It was to the 'criticism' section of parent's wiki link.

    This is what it says:

    In 2007 John Rosenthal argued that RWB showed a bias in favor of European countries.[76]

    Later, the words 'United States' are typed...they are in the paragraph, technically, but the criticism is mostly about France.

    You're both trolling and I think I know why...it might have something to do with the fact that your rebuttals don't mention the main point of my original post.

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
  54. Overblown by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm still amazed when I see this rubbish, would you rather that countries like Russia and China have these facilities? In those countries, it's quite easy, common even, for people to vanish without trace. At least the UK and USA are reasonably free countries with a open media that is permitted to talk about such things. Frankly, I don't give a sh*t whether people are sad enough to watch what I do online and I'm glad we have these powers, as opposed to say, North Korea or Iran.

  55. Why privacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Complete privacy on the internet seems unattainable. At the very least, people with power will always be able to access information stored electronically, because technology itself depends on hierarchical levels of control. A more just solution to the privacy problem might not be to try (and fail) to insulate systems, but to make everything available to everyone. It becomes less worrisome that the government can read your Facebook messages if everyone can. And once everyone can, privacy becomes intuitive. If you want to keep something private, write it down.

  56. Obligatory XKCD reference by alanw · · Score: 1

    Five dollar wrench neuters the "protection" of #1 and #4.

    http://xkcd.com/538/

  57. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by squiggleslash · · Score: 1

    The NSA is currently, reportedly, collecting the meta data of every phone call made through the US. It's all simple source/destination/time/duration information, and they collect it regardless of whether the originating phone is owned by Glenn Greenwald or your mother.

    (I'm assuming your mother is not a major whistleblower or some other dangerous subversive the government feels the need to keep tabs on.)

    So why wouldn't they collect similar metadata from every airline and other transportation concern in the country about every single trip anyone makes that has a termination or origination or both point within the US? There's going to be less data to store than the phone metadata thing, and it's going to be just as useful.

    --
    You are not alone. This is not normal. None of this is normal.
  58. Navigation by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yawn, yet another article on how to navigate a cesspool without hitting a turd.

  59. Use CONFIRMED D-H or other key exchanges by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    While public/private keys work as specified, note that if you just run a Diffie-Hellman exchange (preferably using elliptic curve crypto), that protects against wiretap but not against MITM. To do that, one way (thanks Phil Zimmerman) is to get, say, a voice line and by voice compare a few digits of the key or of a
    hash of the key (prefer the latter) with someone whose voice you recognize. It is very hard for a MITM to just happen to guess keys in a D-H exchange
    that will match several digits of a hash. If you know that the hashes match (at least in part) you can be pretty sure that your exchange is direct with
    the person you mean to communicate with, not with some fake.

    The problem with certificates is that they can be forged (hack the CA or if you are a government, force the CA to give out a signing key). Direct asymmetric
    crypto is good, though you want to be careful of various mathematical pitfalls. At least it does not depend on a CA.

    Such methods could be used by the likes of the Guardian to get new copies of the material that was destroyed.

  60. QE IS unfortuately too hard to understand. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Quantum Entanglement as a means of key distribution.

    BTW Stenography should be an important part of anyone's toolkit.

  61. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by mrchaotica · · Score: 1

    So what you're really saying is that icanhascheezburger is a secret data dump?

    --

    "[Regarding the 'cloud,'] ownership was what made America different than Russia." -- Woz

  62. apples!=oranges :: laws!=opinions by globaljustin · · Score: 1

    First, the Guardian editor did indeed say that they were coming to the United States for it's 1st Amendment protection...it's right there in my post.

    It is because of the laws of the nation not any one publication. Re-read it. Go on. Maybe click the link too and read the whole thing.

    Second....

    one might give more weight to the results of polls among a large number of journalists around the planet, rather than the opinion of this single guy -- Guardian editor or not.

    Wrong AGAIN.

    The questionaire was of **attitudes** of survey respondents. That kind of data is VERY LIMITED in the conclusions you can draw. It's like asking 1000 people if they are hungry.

    The Guardian editor...well HIS ASS IS ON THE LINE and he's in a better position to know the legal specifics.

    You're comparing apples and oranges because you think it proves some kind of greater point about Snowden.

    Face it, the Guardian editor...the Guardian's lawyers...they were looking at **LAW CODE**

    That survey is asks **opinions** of everyday writers about political moods.

    This is pointless because you're obviously trolling...

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
    1. Re:apples!=oranges :: laws!=opinions by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is pointless because you're obviously trolling...

      I am sorry, but each and every one of your previous arguments just fell flat to the ground when you decided to end your post with the above nonsense. That ending demonstrates that you don't believe that your arguments can stand on their own.

  63. Um Re:Encryption IS unfortuately too hard by mjwalshe · · Score: 1

    You have an over inflated idea of the technical chops of those in the media the uk especially (cp snows two society is still relevant) most journalists dont have much knowledge of IT and security. I doubt that Duncan Campbell would have made such silly mistakes though.

  64. Under-blown by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    At least the UK and USA are reasonably free countries with a open media that is permitted to talk about such things.

    "Reasonably Free".

    Two years ago you would have said, "Free".

    Give it another two.

    In my opinion, when you can have your house descended upon for making a Google search for pressure cookers, you don't live in a country which is even "reasonably" free. Nor when you can be randomly stopped and frisked on the streets of New York without any compelling reason. Nor when you can have your car and possessions seized for fun and profit by police forces.

    But ain't it great that we can still talk about it?

  65. Daft suggestions against spooks by mrex · · Score: 1

    These suggestions might be acceptable for someone under the radar, but for an organization like The Guardian which is no doubt being actively targeted by intelligence agencies, these suggestions are not very useful.

    The NSA and its sister agencies are well equipped to monitor unintentional sources of EM emissions: keyboards, monitors, etc. all radiate EM that can allow an advanced attacker to see what you see and what you type in real time at a considerable distance, without any need to physically hack into systems or tap communications links. Faraday cages, physical security, and other surveillance countermeasures would be better suggestions than using GPG and Tor.

  66. You can shift data securely. Here is how by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The key thought: you run something like a Diffie-Hellman exchange to get a shared key. This will work and not reveal the key even to an eavesdropper.

    To keep a MITM from faking both ends, have each end hash the final shared key. Over voice, where you recognize one another's voices,
    compare several digits of the hash. If they compare, there's no MITM with high probability. Go ahead and use the key for data transmission.

    Repeat this procedure for every bunch of transmissions.

  67. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by modecx · · Score: 1

    Well, there is a lot of pussy on the net.

    --
    Constitutional rights may be respected, repealed, or modified; but they must never be ignored.
  68. Who do we start encrypting with? by vlueboy · · Score: 1

    Don't wait until you're doing something you want to hide, then suddenly start using high-end crypto and data obfuscation and special networks to shout "LOOK AT ME, I HAVE SOMETHING TO HIDE".

    I'm considering it but the friends that could technically do it may not care. They also use gmail for their mail, which even encrypted and pre-Snoden, I've not trusted much*.

    Network effect is horrible for this, so I'll never be able to go full encryption. SO... Is there some forum frequented^W dominated by slashdotters (away from bugged FB, Google et al) where we could seriously test this, and maybe implement more lasting trust relationships? of course, the focus would be via communicating with email instead of the commenting system here or at that place. Barring that, is there some #irc channel?

    * Stuff like Google Latitude sounded like a bad idea when it came out in pre-android, pre-google plus, pre-wifi-collection scandal days, let alone now.

    1. Re:Who do we start encrypting with? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Agh, ignore the pre-android bit. Latitude was out in 2009, AFTER android. I just forgot to change that after researching.

    2. Re:Who do we start encrypting with? by Burz · · Score: 1

      There is an email subforum at forum.i2p (within I2P) and an IRC server you can get to from www.postman.i2p.

    3. Re:Who do we start encrypting with? by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      I'm considering it but the friends that could technically do it may not care.

      You can do a lot to reduce their ability for traffic analysis if you just start sending encrypted messages on a regular basis. Your friends don't even have to be able to decrypt them, it's the traffic on the wire they're analyzing. I.e., if you send 19 meaningless encrypted emails a day for six months, then when you start sending 19 real encrypted emails a day the pattern will have already been established. They may have spent the time breaking some of your email the first month, but after a while you'll be lower on the suspect list than someone who just started sending encrypted emails and your sudden use of encryption to send sensitive information won't raise a red flag bringing you back into focus.

      They also use gmail for their mail, which even encrypted and pre-Snoden, I've not trusted much.

      Properly encrypted, Google will get nothing from an email that passes through their system. If you're scared even when using encryption, you need to use better encryption. Maybe change from ROT13 to ... ROT26?

  69. Re:fly around the world to hold face-to-face meeti by Darinbob · · Score: 1

    Meta data means they know when and to whom the phone call was made, and it's saved to be reviewed later when needed. No one is sitting monitoring phones calls of everyone all the time. So you can make headway and sneak around the spying if you're not on the top of the list; it is NOT yet time for journalists to all give up as a hopeless cause and the advice given should be very useful in protecting the sources even after you're discovered.

  70. we all knew since Patriot Act by globaljustin · · Score: 1

    It may not be news to a lot of veteran computer folks.....It is news to the general public though......Now it's a FACT instead of just a well accepted assumption.

    It was **fact** the moment the Bush administration signed the Patriot Act!

    Patriot Act. That's where this next level of surveillance started and progressed from there.

    I won't argue with you about what 'the public wanted to know' and when...it's a troll-trap, look at the AC comments below...the fact is people have been **screaming their fool heads off about the Patriot Act** and surveillance since it was signed.

    Bush's critics were consistent all the way through.

    In 2006, the article I linked above, reported that "The NSA has massive database of American's phone calls"

    You need to learn something about the news industry right now. I used to be a Republican believe it or not, and I had a promising career in broadcasting at a Fox affiliate in Iowa around 2001. I have worked in a newsroom, so I know what I'm about to tell you from experience:

    The editorial function in news, essentially the 'brain' of the newsroom, has been systematically destroyed by bean counters and marketers (and some illuminati types re: News of the World scandal) in a desire to control human behavior through the media. Sure sales is persuasion, but it's like they're slipping us a date-rape drug with modern marketing and news.

    THAT...that one factor more than all the others...the rise of mainstream national news networks that function as PR and Propaganda arms of a political interest while claiming to be 'news'...it ruined an industry.

    The death of the news editor is why CNN is so awful. It's why, in 2006 when anonymous sources leaked that "The NSA has massive database of American's phone calls" no one had the balls to **challenge the Bush administration**

    I hope this clears things up for you. I think you are coming from a genuine place but as a person who's worked in print and TV news it's obvious you don't know how it works.

    We should have had a 'national conversation' about this shit in 2001...the mainstream media guides the 'national conversation'...not until after Bush did these stories get any traction...what does that say about the mainstream media and Obama?

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
  71. freedom of the Red Herrings by globaljustin · · Score: 1

    just sentenced a whistleblower working with the press to 35 years of hard time

    Look, I'm copying some relevant parts from my original post:

    If journalists release secret info, they can be subpoenaed to reveal their source. IF THEY REFUSE...the journalist can be jailed ONLY a short period of time, never more than 6-9 months as a 'coercive tactic'...but the gov't HAS TO LET THEM GO if they still don't talk!!!

    This process is something every college journalism major learns.

    it's about *codified legal protection*

    The US has the strongest laws on the books, with a process that allows someone to **release top secret information** without being charged with a crime. The news entity that *reports* can be only temporarily detained and again it's not a crime to report it.

    Also (I mentioned this before too with quotation from Guardian editor), the US forbids prior restraint...something England does not enjoy.

    I read the links to those questionaires...I understand that 150 journalists surveyed about their attitudes of press freedom ranked the US lower...that isn't evidence that helps your contention in any way.

    I'm saying "Mexican Coke has cane sugar not high-fructose corn syrup" and your rebuttal is, "Wrong! Surveys show people choose Pepsi over Coke 2 to 1 in a head to head blind survey...BAM I win"

    AC...look...you're dragging a Red Herring across the trail when you argue against my phrase "The US has **the most journalistic freedom in the world**"...the tactic you're using is to isolate one fuzzy area and create controversy to avoid the other evidence.

    Beyond all I've said, the fact that when the Guardian editors were put in this situation, in the real world just recently, they obviously listened to alot of legal advice from some very good lawyers. It is safe to assume they are aware of how journalistic protections compare globally.

    They chose the USA. They stated **explicity** why: our codified legal protections are the best in the world...I linked and quoted them above.

    As far as Manning goes...after he was caught, tell me what could anyone have done? Are you suggesting Obama by fiat declare that Manning be released? Is that really your contention? If not, what then?

    You must answer because you only presented half an argument.

    Brad Lee/Chelsea Manning's fate was a legal certainty.

    I agree with you, that 35 years is too much...I said s/he should have gotten time served (originally I was in favor of charging him with misdemeanors).

    But these are **legal minutia**....yes it matters, but there is no alternative. Obama could not have directly intervened once he was caught without alienating moderates and the military.

    Obama could have freed Manning technically, but it would have cost him the election.

    Seriously, can you imagine the Fox News headlines "Obama lets terrorist go free"

    It would have alienated a sizable portion of his own cabinet as well.

    Nope...

    --
    Thank you Dave Raggett
  72. Easy fights against secure by sjbe · · Score: 1

    It is dead simple to use with all the key management being done without user intervention.

    See that is THE problem because how do you know the key management software has not been compromised? How do you revoke and replace the keys without any user comprehension of the process? How do you ensure that a third party has not intercepted the keys during distribution? How do you make sure the keys are securely stored at the end points? That is why it is so hard to automate key management. I'm not going to say it is impossible, I'm just saying that establishing a truly secure communication path is genuinely hard to do and I have yet to see any way to make it truly easy for more than a portion of the process. You can have it easy or you can have it secure but so far easy and secure is a bridge too far. Don't get me wrong, I hope someone figures it out. I'm just not optimistic that anyone will.

    You do need a trusted 3rd party involved but I think that drawback can be overcome.

    It really cannot in most cases. The whole point of encryption is to ensure that third parties cannot read the document. If you trust a third party then you pretty much by definition have no way to know if your keys have been compromised. The concept of a trusted third party is close to being a non-sequitur. While not impossible (trusted third parties do sometimes exist) it's not a particularly safe state of affairs. Kind of like in physics, three body systems are inherently unstable.

  73. Assymetric encryption by DrYak · · Score: 1

    Distribution and use of keys is inherently difficult with no obviously easy solution.

    By using a Private/Public key pair, several of the difficulties are simplified.
    (The journalist publishes her/his own public key out in the open, and keeps the private key completely hidden and offline).

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]