P2P Data Not Private, But It Could Be
The police had used an automated P2P search tool to find evidence that child pornography was being shared from the defendants' computers, and then used that evidence to obtain probable cause warrants for searching their computers (where they subsequently found child porn being stored, and the defendants were charged accordingly). Last Friday, District Court Judge Christina Reiss ruled that the P2P search tool did not violate the defendants' 4th Amendment rights against unreasonable search, as they had argued.
I'm all for strong privacy rights and the right to exclude evidence at trial that was gathered improperly, but it's hard to see how the defendants thought they had a leg to stand on here. When you share a file on a P2P network where other users can download directly from your computer, by definition you are advertising that you have that file. Now, some of the time you might be sharing that file not out of the goodness of your heart, but because you're required to share the file in order to earn "credits" that you can use to continue your own downloads (BitTorrent requires sharing for this reason). But even then, you would still know that you were sharing the file (unless you really never realized how file sharing software works, but since it's actually called "file sharing software", that's kind of on you).
However, as I wrote in January, there's no reason why popular P2P programs couldn't re-route each download through a different user's connection, so that if you were downloading a file from another computer's IP address, you would never know if the file resided on that computer's hard drive. Obviously I'm not endorsing the use of such software by creeps like the ones who were arrested; I'm saying that regardless of how we feel about it, it's inevitable that proxified re-routed connections will become the de facto standard for P2P file sharing, if the following conditions remain true:
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It remains legal to run the software at all. This seems like a reasonable assumption in a mostly-free country like the U.S., where although piracy is illegal, file-sharing programs like BitTorrent are still legal even if they are frequently used for piracy.
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A user cannot be held liable for unknowingly forwarding data packets on behalf of someone else, even if the data packets comprise an illegal file (whether it's child pornography or a pirated movie).
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Bandwidth continues to get faster and cheaper. Today, if you download a 100-megabyte file by routing your download through three other users' computers, it will usually be much slower and more inconvenient than if you'd downloaded the file directly. In a few years, you won't notice the difference.
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If the police raid a suspect's house and seize their computer, if they see that the computer has an encrypted partition, the suspect can invoke their Fifth Amendment right to refuse to give the police the decryption password. You know how I feel about that, but the latest rulings on the question seem to affirm that you can refuse to decrypt your hard drive for law enforcement. So a good P2P client for "illicit" file trading would come with built-in support for an encrypted hard drive partition, where all saved files would be stored. (The software would probably come with a "kill switch" that you could use to instantly dismount your encrypted partition if you heard a knock on your door, and a five-minute inactivity timeout after which the drive would dismount automatically.)
In that previous article, I described a protocol in which any time a P2P user X (the "downloader") downloaded a file from another P2P user Y (the "sharer"), the connection would be routed through the computer of at least one "go-between" user Z (and possibly a chain of users Z1, Z2,... Zn). Each of the go-betweens simply downloads bytes from the next computer "up" the chain and sends those bytes on to the next computer "down" the chain, and none of the go-betweens know how far the chain extends in either direction. Because of the design of the protocol, from the point of view of any of the go-betweens, there is only a 40% chance that the computer they're downloading from, is the original "sharer." (See the January article for details on how this would be achieved.)
Now, does the analysis change if your adversary is the FBI looking for child pornographers, rather than the MPAA looking for movie pirates? Here are the variables that I think matter:
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The standard of proof to punish you is higher. In a civil lawsuit, the MPAA would only have to prove their case against you by a "preponderance of the evidence" (i.e. greater than 50%); to obtain a criminal conviction, the court would have to prove your guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." However in both cases, if all that the court knows is that the defendant's computer was identified as passing along bits and bytes of an illegal file, and the court understands that there's only a 40% chance that the computer owner actually possessed the illegal file, then this falls below the standard of proof in both cases. (Of course, this is contingent on no other evidence turning up to implicate you. If the police raid your house and find child pornography printouts lying around your desk, then so much for the "40% chance of guilt" figure.)
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In a civil trial, the defendant can be called to the stand and made to answer questions (unlike a criminal trial, where the defendant can refuse to testify under the Fifth Amendment). So even if the MPAA's lawyer knew there was only a 40% chance that they had sued the right defendant, they could ask the defendant under oath, "Did you download this movie?" (Or they could sue 10 defendants at once, and argue, correctly, that on average about 4 of those defendants were probably guilty.) The defendant could invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to answer, however, in a civil trial, the court is free to consider this refusal to be evidence weighing in favor of the defendant's guilt. In theory, a defendant could simply say "No," and there would be no way to prove they were lying. In practice, the MPAA's lawyer might try to intimidate a defendant into confessing, telling them that the worst that can happen to them if they confess is just a monetary judgment, but if they lie under oath they could go to jail, etc.
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The punishment for getting caught for possession of child pornography is much more severe. I'm not sure if this changes the analysis though. It's not a case of "a 40% chance of losing a lawsuit vs. a 40% chance of going to jail." If the court in both cases can never establish your guilt with a probability of more than 40%, then since that's not enough to get a criminal conviction or a civil judgment, you actually have a 0% chance of losing in either case, provided you don't make any other errors (leaving illegal printouts by your computer), and provided the court actually understands that the "evidence" only establishes about a 40% chance of your guilt.
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The cost of being accused of possessing child pornography is much higher, even if you ultimately win in court. If the MPAA sues you for downloading a pirated movie (even if they know there's only a 40% chance they've got the right person), that would probably just increase your street cred among your friends. If you're a middle-aged computer nerd accused of downloading child pornography, not so much. Even if you're ultimately acquitted, your reputation will probably be ruined.
This last point suggests the only "attack" that I can think of that law enforcement could use successfully against this protocol. The police know in advance that if they arrest someone for transmitting an illegal file from their IP address, and if the defendant refuses to testify and the defendant's hard drive is encrypted, the state won't be able to get a conviction since there's only a 40% chance that the defendant was actually in possession of the file. However, if the defendant's life will be ruined by going to trial anyway, law enforcement could use this as a bludgeon to scare people away from even running the P2P protocol. Saying, in essence, "We're going to go out and do searches for illegal files to download, and we will file charges against any person whose IP address re-transmits an illegal file to us. Even though we know we won't be able to get a conviction, we'll ruin the lives of anyone we can identify in this way, so that's the risk that you're taking by installing this software, even if you yourself don't do anything illegal."
Whether this attack would be effective, depends on whether the courts would tolerate these kinds of "intimidation" prosecutions, where the law enforcement knows going in that they can never establish more than a 40% chance of the defendant's guilt (and hence no chance of conviction unless the defendant "cracks"), but they press charges anyway. I would call that an abuse of state power, and say that any prosecutor who knowingly pursues a losing case should be fired and compensation should be paid to the victim, but the courts might not see it that way, especially if the prosecutor finds a way to work the phrase "child porn" into every sentence.
We know you hate freedom and anonymity Bennet Assholeton. You are an expert in exactly 0 fields. Shut up and go away.
Read on for the rest.
Thanks for the heads-up, timothy. All the years I've been here I just stopped at the summary.
Here in the US, the courts have already decided that one's IP address is that person (thus convictions for CP possession even though there is none present, many RIAA/MPAA wins against defendants, etc.)
Just an open Wi-Fi access point can get one arrested and thrown into a PMITA prison (and due to the crime, maximum security classification.)
The 4th Amendment protects people, but it also has a place protection component. The Supreme Court has been explicit about this.
If you enter into my home or place of business without a warrant (or exigent circumstances) and fiddle bits on my computer, then you are violating the Constitution.
If you buy the Court's reasoning, then the feds could move data (stored by me on behalf of another) from one hard drive of mine to another without a warrant.
However, as I wrote in January, there's no reason why popular P2P programs couldn't re-route each download through a different user's connection, so that if you were downloading a file from another computer's IP address, you would never know if the file resided on that computer's hard drive.
You could build a network if you have friends using retroshare. Or you could torrent over i2p like the cool kids. I think i responded similarly last time this guy posted.
Please stop giving air to this ignorant blowhard.
Just stop.
Now.
KTHXBAI
b&
All but God can prove this sentence true.
edonkey/Emule used to be the big thing before torrents came along and was kept for direct peer to peer transfers (including these nefarious ones) long after the music &movie hunters ran to other more popular transmission mediums.
As to the original theme of the post. There is already something that does this sort of thing, Tor. Though from what I've heard it does a less than fantastic job with torrent style file sharing as it isn't exactly intended for that use. So I can understand the desire for an alternate method of transmission.
Further to that if there is a new version of torrent/emule distribution that catches on "because it's the new & untraceable way to share" despite poor execution of the distribution of connections, then there are going to be a lot of unfortunate & unaware people caught up in the middle of any future prosecution mess. I for one can say "good luck with that" as there no way in hell that I am even going to consider running a program that re-routes other peoples packets if there is a chance of that sort of data passing through my link and leaving me potentially liable for their mis-deeds.
I've seen some extremely dodgy file names when using emule which I've happily never been curious enough to attempt a download of. Then again I've found a LOT of neat stuff (predominantly software) on those networks that I couldn't find anywhere else. So this concept like any other has it's uses, both for good & bad.
I'm really not sure why all this crap is being stung together. I can already establish a tunnel between my computer and another computer, so P2P networks can already be "secured" in a reasonable way for reasonable use. If the police tried to break into that line, it's called wire tapping. If they have no warrant, evidence gathered is mutable to not admissible (depending on jurisdiction and crimes).
In the case of the pr0n operators, they were not just sharing files between sick friends. They were advertising these files to others on a P2P service to anyone that wanted them.
Now I agree that IP/MAC spoofing, routing through insecure routers, etc.. is possible. That's not what happened here. I have no confidence at all that routing data alone would lead to a warrant, let alone an arrest. They found these guys by P2P services advertising, then tracked them down to arrest them. The nail in the proverbial legal coffin will be admission of their confiscated computers showing that they housed the files being shared. Without all of those things, it would be hard to get to trial. Prosecutors don't go to trial based on hunches or nothing (well, some do but..). They go to trial when they reach a certain level of confidence with a conviction.
-The wise argue that there are few absolutes, the fool argues that there are no probabilities.
We have encountered exactly this situation with TOR. TOR is quite cool to use, but there is a big difference between using it versus running an exit node.
It would be the same with a P2P program. If a couple nodes are brutally made examples of with criminal/civil actions due to other people's stuff coming out, said program will end up completely disused.
as you promised. admit i only scanned your article...
i think i smell a wumpus.
But its used for a lot more than just bittorrent. Its a network anonymity layer (a bit like Tor) with the important difference that everyone re-routes traffic by default and so creates the expectation of bandwidth-sharing... Nodes which don't share bandwidth might experience problems getting their own traffic forwarded.
So the task of routing packets is itself carved up among participating nodes in a decentralized P2P fashion. This has four really good side effects:
1) One's own traffic gets mixed-in with a lot of other encrypted packets
2) A much greater degree of decentralization than Tor making the network more resistant to attack
3) Nodes are more likely to behave and cooperate, as many sorts of attacks will show up as leeching
4) The flexibility to handle many different types of applications, even torrents, without staggering under the load.
I'd say that what I2P lacks is a nice user interface; Its currently stuck in a clunky 2000-ish web interface. Most of us would love to see someone with UI design skill get involved.
If you buy the Court's reasoning
This probably happens a lot.
Not surprising, TLDR.
Today it's the pedos. Tomorrow it might be anybody who shares something that casts the government in a light they don't care for.
Welcome to the slippery slope, my useful idiot friend.
This guy again? He's like that over-friendly, know-it-all co-worker from your dad's office who would come to your parents' Christmas party and try to show off his worldliness (in spite of his role as a custodial engineer, just so you know) but in the end made you feel uncomfortable and socially awkward even though you were only six.
Try out GNUnet, it's pretty much exactly the architecture the author describes.
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The last digit of pi is four.
aren't you that retard that doesn't think anybody needs 4th amendment rights? Oh, unless it involves child pornography.
I guess the author has never heard of Perfect Dark (and it's predecessors, Share and Winny), which already work in exactly this manner. With extra bouts of encryption and obfuscation to boot, as well as distributed search.