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New NXP SoC Gives Android Its Apple Pay

dkatana writes: NXP, having worked with Apple on Apple Pay, is now launching its PN66T module for secure NFC mobile transactions — for Android. It's intended to implement the same functionality of Apple Pay. While NXP claims the module is OS independent, the features clearly indicate that Android devices are the likely recipients of the SoC. The PN66T is Europay, MasterCard, and Visa (EMVCo) certified, and also supports American Express ExpressPay, thus fully covering the three big credit card companies, ensuring compatibility and interoperability with existing and future payment methods.

122 comments

  1. SoC? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Insightful

    Software on Chip? It would be good if things were better defined in the summary.

    1. Re:SoC? by swimboy · · Score: 4, Informative

      SoC is system on a chip.

      --
      Ask me how the Heisenberg Principle may or may not have saved my life.
    2. Re:SoC? by jeffmflanagan · · Score: 0, Troll

      It wouldn't be necessary to define something as obvious as SoC on a technical blog, but I suppose that's not what /. is anymore, so maybe you're right that they need to dumb it down more for the new audience.

    3. Re:SoC? by AndyKron · · Score: 2

      I'm old. I'm still at ASIC running DOS.

  2. NXP is a huge secure element provider. by LWATCDR · · Score: 4, Insightful

    NXP making a secure element for any OS is about as shocking as nVidia making a GPU.
    That is what they do.

    --
    See my blog http://ilovecookes.blogspot.com/ for light hearted technical information.
    1. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Yes, it is what they try to do.

    2. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by i+kan+reed · · Score: 2

      Yeah, but see, since the apple marketing machine finally got around to making "replacing your credit cards" as essential feature of smartphones(in the US), everyone who already had all the tech to do it is eager to be the public face of doing it on Android.

      nVidia making GPUs would be "news" if somehow it became popular and cool to discuss GPUs in public.

    3. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by LennyDotCom · · Score: 1

      Exactly what Apple also did with USB

      Everybody had USB but nobody used it until the iMac

      That's how I remember it

      --
      http://Lenny.com
    4. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 2, Informative

      Actually, everybody had USB when the Mac had Firewire. Eventually, Apple caved in and added USB, then added USB support to the iPod, which was initially Firewire-only.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    5. Re: NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      Umm, no.

      Apple was the first vendor to ship machines that were USB only for peripherals. At that point USB had been on the market 2-3 years with virtually zero uptake.

      They boot-strapped the market for USB peripherals , by shipping a lot of machines that were USB only. It would have languished for at least another 3-5 years otherwise , if not longer.

      FireWire did not come on the scene from Apple for 2 years after that.

    6. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Anybody who wants to perform financial transactions via an RF protocol should have their head examined.

    7. Re: NXP is a huge secure element provider. by ahabswhale · · Score: 1

      It's 100% fucking true.

      --
      Are agnostics skeptical of unicorns too?
    8. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      Sadly, the less capable, less secure, less in just about every way except "cheap" USB won out over Firewire. I'd still rather have FW800 than USB 3. Hook 2 devices up to a USB 3 hub, watch yourself get lower than USB 2 speeds, even when you only access 1 device. What a win that is. Then there's the USB security issues. I love the fact that you can take over a computer by plugging in a storage device, or is it? USB should have been restricted to keyboards and mice only, as an improvement to the PS/2 connector.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    9. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1
      Firewire is a bigger security threat than USB in many ways, namely that it is a bus with direct memory access, meaning it can read and write anything in RAM at any time. The USB attack vector has nothing to do with USB itself; it's a flaw in a poor quality devices that allow their firmwares to be reprogrammed, enabling them to act as a different class of device. There is no reason Firewire would not be vulnerable in the same way, were a Firewire device's firmware made writable in the same way as the vulnerable subset of USB devices; only the exposure would be worse, given Firewire's DMA. Likewise with Thunderbolt, as it also has DMA.

      I love the fact that you can take over a computer by plugging in a storage device

      Citation? Maybe there's something I missed, but I think you're thinking of this, in which case: Nope. Well, no more than a device with direct memory access. In fact, a little less.

      Also, maybe try getting a USB3 hub that isn't a piece of shit. I don't have the speed problems you describe at all.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    10. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

      You obviously were not old enough to actually live through the 90's because if you had you would know that:

      1) USB was not even part of the original Winows 98
      2)Apple released the iMac in 1998 and only had USB ports, dropping all legacy ports
      3) the iMac was released three years before the iPod
      4) You suck at history

    11. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

      As opposed to what? A mag stripe?

      An NFC chip requires the device be within millimeters of a terminal to activate. The payment system itself is anonymous and provides perfect forward secrecy of your financial information. To activate the payment you have to have to authenticate. That can be done with a pin or in Apple's case, a thumb print.

      I will take that system over a stupid mag strip or even a chip and pin.

    12. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      Firewire is a bigger security threat than USB in many ways, namely that it is a bus with direct memory access, meaning it can read and write anything in RAM at any time.

      There is a DMA component, a quick search reveals they haven't fixed that either yet. Bah.

      The USB attack vector has nothing to do with USB itself; it's a flaw in a poor quality devices that allow their firmwares to be reprogrammed, enabling them to act as a different class of device.

      This is both wrong and technically right. It has everything to do with the design of USB, and nothing to do with any "flaws" in "poor quality devices". The problem lies in that USB trusts the device to be what it says it is, even if that is more than one thing.

      There is no reason Firewire would not be vulnerable in the same way, were a Firewire device's firmware made writable in the same way as the vulnerable subset of USB devices; only the exposure would be worse, given Firewire's DMA. Likewise with Thunderbolt, as it also has DMA.

      Might as well add expressCard, PCI, PCIExpress, and anything else with DMA capabilities.

      I love the fact that you can take over a computer by plugging in a storage device

      Citation? Maybe there's something I missed, but I think you're thinking of this, in which case: Nope. Well, no more than a device with direct memory access. In fact, a little less.

      I was referring to WIred's story

      Also, maybe try getting a USB3 hub that isn't a piece of shit. I don't have the speed problems you describe at all.

      I wasn't running on a USB3 hub, but directly off the motherboard (which AFAIK share multiple ports per controller and this is a high end Gigabyte motherboard, so not a POS either). The slow down is a direct result of the design of USB serial communications. If you have multiple controllers, you can avoid this issue by running drives on 1 port per controller. I have successfully done this as well, when doing some mass backups among multiple drives. It's how I confirmed the problem in the first place. You will need drives that are capable of relatively high transfer rates to see this problem, but it is still there in USB3.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    13. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      There is a DMA component, a quick search reveals they haven't fixed that either yet.

      You mean that drivers can determine whether they, themselves, require DMA? That's no worse than the device having DMA itself; in fact, it's damn sight better, given that Firewire device doesn't even have to identify itself, let alone have that identity accepted by the system, to gain that level of access, meanwhile a USB device must identify itself as a device whose driver required DMA, that driver must be present, and it must emulate that device well enough to fool the driver into actually talking to it; the bar is a fair bit higher with USB than DMA.

      The problem lies in that USB trusts the device to be what it says it is, even if that is more than one thing.

      That's all fine and dandy, the device still has to fool the driver, as well, whereas the OHCI 1394 specification (aka Firewire) allows for devices for performance reasons to bypass the operating system and access physical memory directly without any security restrictions.. In case Wikipedia isn't a strong enough source for you, here is the actual specification. A Firewire or Thunderbolt device or, as you correctly point out, ecpressCard, PCI, PCI-express (though you're really repeating yourself with that list) device doesn't even need OS or driver cooperation to be rejected by your system, it just pops on the bus and says "Let me see this RAM" and gets what it wants. Hell, it can do that repeatedly until it finds the bit of vulnerable code it's after and immediately turn around and overwrite it with an exploit. Actually, there's nothing stopping it from using that method to exploit your OS' I/O stack to allow itself to write arbitrary files on disk. All with no drivers, or authentication.

      If you're worried about USB, you need to be terrified about the other busses in your system.

      I was referring to WIred's story[...] ... which provides the same details about the same thing (BadUSB). So, then, I was right? You were talking about BadUSB? Good.

      The slow down is a direct result of the design of USB serial communications.

      Then why don't I see an issue with it when I connect 2 portable drives (bare enclosures in which I've put a couple of Samsung SSDs) via a USB hub? Also, if not a hub, why did you say:

      "Hook 2 devices up to a USB 3 hub, watch yourself get lower than USB 2 speeds"?

      I'd figure there'd be no reason to mention a hub if you didn't use one.

      Did you just get caught debating dirty? Yes, yes you did. Bad Gr8Apes! No soup for you!

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    14. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Or I just didn't pay attention to Apple in the '90s and was too lazy to look it up. As a 2000 grad, I'd say I lived through the 90's. I also tend to get my history right when it related to something I actually care about. That being said:

      1) You're thinking of Windows 95, which didn't see USB support until OSR2.1.Windows 98 did, in fact, ship with USB support.
      2) USB 1.0 debuted in 1995, USB 1.1 in 1998. The iMac G3 did drop legacy ports as you claim, but is that a pair of Firewire ports I see? Yes, because Firewire was Apple's darling at the time and not a legacy port
      3) I won't argue this, as it's factually correct as far as I am aware; however: the first 2 iPod models did not support USB at all, and the 3 after it only supported sync, no charging via USB for them.
      4) Yes, you do.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    15. Re: NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Everybody had USB, I never said everybody used it. That said, I refer you to this post, with actual references, so you can see just how wrong you are. Firewire came out on 1994, by the way, on Macs, 4 years before they added USB to the iMac.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    16. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Before NFC was even common in cell phones yet, a security researcher, Christopher something -- I don't remember his last name but he's the same guy who read (and copied!) passport RFIDs from his car 30 feet away in San Francisco -- showed that with a few hundred dollars worth of body-carried equipment, you could snarf NFC credentials from phones from several FEET away. And the phones only had to have NFC turned on... they didn't even have to be engaging in a transaction.

      That's called "broken".

      There are several fallacies here, but one is that the RF can only travel a couple of centimeters. Nonsense. The only limit to the distance at which you can read the signal is how big of an antenna you can build.

      Using RF for financial transactions is stupid, and NFC in particular was cracked YEARS ago. Anybody who wants to use it for financial transactions -- I repeat -- needs to have their head examined.

    17. Re: NXP is a huge secure element provider. by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

      RFID technology is a diverse group of tech. NFC requires near contact to activate. RFID used in passports are not NFC, broadcasts without authentication and does not encrypt the data. NFC is nothing like that.

    18. Re: NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      Please read my comment again, because you seem to have missed most of it.

      I wasn't comparing this to RFID, I was just saying it was the same guy who did both.

      It was proven that not only can NFC connections can be made from any arbitrary distance, credentials can be snarfed even when the phone is not making a transaction.

      Distance for a transfer depends solely on the equipment used and size (or architecture) of the antenna. Anybody who knows much about RF will tell you the same thing.

    19. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      meanwhile a USB device must identify itself as a device whose driver required DMA, that driver must be present, and it must emulate that device well enough to fool the driver into actually talking to it; the bar is a fair bit higher with USB than DMA.

      I didn't see any of that in the Wired story. It essentially stated: "plug it in, it infects your PC, Antivirus software is useless, and future USB devices plugged into your system can be infected". When Bruce wrote about it along with quite a few others, the evidence seems to point to a rather bad security flaw.

      If you're worried about USB, you need to be terrified about the other busses in your system.

      The short answer to this one is I only usually have 1 set of devices that are relatively permanent for those other buses. It's not a thumbdrive that gets passed around.

      Then why don't I see an issue with it when I connect 2 portable drives (bare enclosures in which I've put a couple of Samsung SSDs) via a USB hub? Also, if not a hub, why did you say:

      "Hook 2 devices up to a USB 3 hub, watch yourself get lower than USB 2 speeds"?

      I'd figure there'd be no reason to mention a hub if you didn't use one.

      All USB controllers on motherboards have multiple ports via a hub, or called a "bus" depending upon what you're using for a reference. I have yet to personally see a 1:1 controller to port system on a motherboard. Drop 2 sets of file transfers through the disks on that one hub, and see what happens. You'll need to have those files coming from 2 separate disk subsystems so that you're not bottlenecked from a single source. I have about 10 disks hooked up and was copying files between 3 sets (3 full speed copy operations, including 2 SSDs) with each disk capable of +100MB/s on large file sequential read/write speeds. The slow down was more than 50%. As an addendum, this problem does not exist with eSata connections. Unfortunately, I do not have enough eSata external ports. It would be interesting to see what happens with a port multiplier though.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    20. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      I didn't see any of that in the Wired story. It essentially stated: "plug it in, it infects your PC, Antivirus software is useless, and future USB devices plugged into your system can be infected". When Bruce wrote about it along with quite a few others, the evidence seems to point to a rather bad security flaw.

      Well, as USB itself does not provide DMA (again, this is requested and handled at the driver level), a USB device can do absolutely nothing until the system recognizes it and starts talking to it (e.g. via a driver). You clearly didn't follow what you've read, or you'd understand that the nature of this vulnerability is that many devices don't have firmware programming disabled and can be reprogrammed to behave as other devices (in fact, you do seem to understand this, as you said "The problem lies in that USB trusts the device to be what it says it is, even if that is more than one thing", which is correct; it's equally correct that a USB device can be more than one thing, e.g. an audio device and a video device, so that's not a flaw, the flaw is in the devices being reprogrammable in the first place). Which, of course, means the devices have to be identified by the system and a driver has to exist for whatever they identify as.

      Further proof that it is a device issue here, and evidence that USB devices must be "accepted" by the host before they can to anything at all, here. Not that this should be necessary, given a basic understanding of what you're talking about and a bit of logic.

      Meanwhile, devices utilizing any of the DMA-enabled buses*[1] can just power up and happily start reading and writing your RAM, with the system being unable to stop them. If a cheap Firewire device was shipped with its firmware still writable, well, just imagine the possibilities. In fact, it's been done and the sky hasn't fallen yet, so I think we're okay.

      The short answer to this one is I only usually have 1 set of devices that are relatively permanent for those other buses. It's not a thumbdrive that gets passed around.

      That's you; Firewire is still fairly widely used in media production, and the devices using it include cameras, control boards, and DAT decks, which do get passed around. And without USB, where do you think you'd plug that thumb drive?

      Drop 2 sets of file transfers through the disks on that one hub, and see what happens.

      Okay, so you're doing two copy operations and are surprised when seek times slow them by more than 50%? You don't copy files on spinning disks much, do you? I do it all the time, albeit with SSDs, and have not once seen the slowdown you are talking about, so either you're full of shit, your equipment is full of shit, or you don't really know where the slowdown is coming from, but none of that is the fault of USB.

      I have about 10 disks hooked up and was copying files between 3 sets (3 full speed copy operations, including 2 SSDs) with each disk capable of +100MB/s on large file sequential read/write speeds.

      Which is it, 10 or 2? One, two, or three transfers? All this goalpost moging makes me think you're just full of shit.

      You state that your drives can handle 100MB/s; USB3 is 5gbps (that's 640MBps), while SATA is 1.5, 3., or 6gbps (187.5, 375, or 750MB/s) depending on whether you've got SATA I, II, or III ports. On a high-end mobo like you claim to own, it's probably SATA-III, so 6gbps. That includes a fair bit of overhead, so the best you can e

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    21. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      Which, of course, means the devices have to be identified by the system and a driver has to exist for whatever they identify as.

      I was relatively sure that part of the problem was that the system's USB controllers could also be coopted by plugging in a bad USB device, whether the system recognized said device or not. At that point, as long as your system recognizes any USB devices, you're toast. Correct me if I'm oversimplifying the problem.

      Firewire is still fairly widely used in media production, and the devices using it include cameras, control boards, and DAT decks, which do get passed around.

      Yes it is, although disappearing rapidly, at least from the set of cameras I looked at last year.

      And without USB, where do you think you'd plug that thumb drive?

      I could see thumb drives going to a ROM only version in the near future. That solves the trust issue with at least thumb drives. I know the arguments against ROMs, but if no one will use your drive because of a virus threat, well, then you have no market.

      Drop 2 sets of file transfers through the disks on that one hub, and see what happens.

      Okay, so you're doing two copy operations and are surprised when seek times slow them by more than 50%?

      I have about 10 disks hooked up and was copying files between 3 sets (3 full speed copy operations, including 2 SSDs) with each disk capable of +100MB/s on large file sequential read/write speeds.

      Are you truly that dense? It is 1 pair of drives per copy operation, going through 1 USB controller. Yes, the USB connection will slow down. In your case, I'll also bet your SSDs are on SATA connections, those are 1:1 internal, you mention that yourself.

      I'll lay it out specifically:

      • internal sata SSD 1 (Samsung 840) copy operation to USB hosted disk 1, controller 1.
      • internal sata WD Caviar Black to external USB hosted disk 2, controller 1.
      • Internal sata Samsung Spinpoint to external USB hosted disk 2, controller 2.

      All externals are newer WD or Samsung disks. 2 of those disks have eSata connectors on them. I've hooked them up as stated, and via eSata to split the data transfers across multiple busses. The throughput increased dramatically in the eSata configuration, leaving only the USB bus as the sucky culprit. Maybe it is the super cheap controllers, but USB has never come close to FW transfer speeds under anything but ideal 1 device per controller scenarios for anyone I know.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    22. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      I was relatively sure that part of the problem was that the system's USB controllers could also be coopted by plugging in a bad USB device, whether the system recognized said device or not.

      Then you've not read up on the issue as much as your stong opinions on it would seem to imply.

      Correct me if I'm oversimplifying the problem.

      I've been trying...

      I'll also bet your SSDs are on SATA connections, those are 1:1 internal, you mention that yourself.

      You know what else I mentioned?

      Then why don't I see an issue with it when I connect 2 portable drives (bare enclosures in which I've put a couple of Samsung SSDs) via a USB hub?

      Indeed, I've been trying in vain, as you clearly don't read. Mind you, these are drive I use every day for high-speed media transfer. I'm sure I don't know WTF I'm talking about, though, and the world is just bending to my will. Right?

      As you've shown a complete unwillingness to actually consider that you may be wrong, or to even read the posts you're replying to, let alone the linked information (because you're likely sure it'll prove you wrong), I think we're done here. I'm sure anyone reading this will have read everything, leaving you the only one who still thinks you're right.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    23. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      As you've shown a complete unwillingness to actually consider that you may be wrong, or to even read the posts you're replying to, let alone the linked information (because you're likely sure it'll prove you wrong), I think we're done here. I'm sure anyone reading this will have read everything, leaving you the only one who still thinks you're right.

      And yet you completely ignore the reference to the explanation of why USB speeds are far far lower than what you'd expect, and why your sanctimonious statements are nothing more than anecdotal hot air. Take a good look at the following snippets: From the spec:

      At a 5 Gbps signaling rate with 8b/10b encoding, the raw throughput is 500 MBps. When link flow control, packet framing, and protocol overhead are considered, it is realistic for 400 MBps or more to be delivered to an application.

      Just 1 Samsung SSD will outperform that speed. It's got a 500+MBps transfer speed. USB 3.0 devices employing ASMedia controllers deliver the best performance... isn't enough to push past 300 MB/s to the interface's peak potential.

      Now we're down to 300 MB/s.

      Isochronous transfer is typically used in audio/video devices like capture cards, because it resolves the problem of data loss (such as video frame dropping) when multiple USB devices are in use. Lastly, bulk transfer (bulk-only transport) is the mode that we are focusing on here, since it's used for transferring data to USB mass storage devices.

      Well, lookie there, multiple devices cause transfer problems. And bulk only transport, normally used for device drivers don't use the mode that will prevent dropped data, leading to, well, can we say REALLY SLOW transfer rates? I knew you could.

      I already knew you were full of it, as USB 3 cannot even feed a single high end SSD properly, much less more than one. Also, no one that really does AV editing would dream of using something as slow as USB 3. eSata or faster, thank you very much. USB 3 is fine for external backup storage, as long as you're only loading 1 at a time.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    24. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1
      Somehow

      ASMedia controllers deliver the best performance... isn't enough to push past 300 MB/s to the interface's peak potential

      got dropped prior to the line:

      "Now we're down to 300 MB/s."

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    25. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You're pulling shit out of your ass at this point and I've already said I'm done debating this with you. Your complaint was that you saw sub-USB2 speeds when using 2 USB3 drives via a USB3 hub, now your complaint is that you can't utilize an SSD to its full potential over USB3. Well, well, there's more goalpost moving, and you've dropped your security argument entirely now.

      Not even going to address your points in this post, since you'll just change your story again in your next post.

      Anyone who doesn't see through Gr8Apes' charade, please post in his defense; he needs the backup right now.

    26. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Forgot to log in... yes, that post was mine.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    27. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      You're still side-stepping. I stated:

      • there were performance issues with the USB bus.
      • running multiple connections on a single bus drop performance way way down.
      • USB can be compromised with merely plugging in an infected USB device.

      These are all true statements backed by references. I note that you mislead frequently by bringing in unrelated items (Tbolt, DMA, intentional confusion about hubs, etc). Because I keep moving back to these points mean I'm staying on topic, instead of going down whatever rabit hole you want to go. BTW, I did learn that Macs since 2012 are no longer subject to the DMA attacks. Thanks for that.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    28. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      there were performance issues with the USB bus

      Were. Moving on.

      running multiple connections on a single bus drop performance way way down

      Not nearly to the levels you claimed. I have not disputed that there is a performance impact; in fact, I discussed that in one of my posts.

      USB can be compromised with merely plugging in an infected USB device.

      It cannot. You need to actually read up on BadUSB. I've pointed you to a few references, and you've pointed out a few, yourself, that you've clearly not read, or at least not understood. It's either willful ignorance, you not being willing to adming you might be wrong and go back and actually read, or you simply are incapable of understanding the subject matter. In either case, there is no point arguing with you about it.

      Because I keep moving back to these points...

      each of which I have acknowledged and addressed, repeatedly.

      BTW, I did learn that Macs since 2012 are no longer subject to the DMA attacks.

      Yes, by way of disabling DMA for the Firewire bus. In short, any device that relies on it does not work on a Mac never than 2012, or works with reduced performance. For example, the LaCie Firewire drive that's been around my workplace for a few years now, consistently sees read speeds of 90MB/s and write speeds of 60MB/s on the 2010 and 2011 Macs in the office, because it is able to make use of DMA during transfers. On the 2013 Mac used by our designer, it struggles to keep up 40MB/s in either direction. Our designer ended up switching to a USB3 drive that's capable of sustaining over 100MB/s reads and 90MB/s writes.

      Notice how I'm now only pointing out flaws in your arguments, and no longer arguing the points. That is because I have said what I needed to say and provided references where applicable, and you have shown that you are not capable of following the conversation, as you think I've gone off topic when I most certainly have not.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    29. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Typo... adming == admit

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    30. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      there were performance issues with the USB bus

      Were. Moving on.

      running multiple connections on a single bus drop performance way way down

      Not nearly to the levels you claimed. I have not disputed that there is a performance impact; in fact, I discussed that in one of my posts.

      Still are, per your own admission. But moving on.

      USB can be compromised with merely plugging in an infected USB device.

      It cannot. You need to actually read up on BadUSB. I've pointed you to a few references, and you've pointed out a few, yourself, that you've clearly not read, or at least not understood.

      I trust certain people when they say "it is 'x' bad". Bruce is one of those. I briefly reviewed this again, and what I get out of it is if the bus is alive, this works. Obviously, if the bus is disabled, it's not going to be infected. So, is Bruce wrong?

      BTW, I did learn that Macs since 2012 are no longer subject to the DMA attacks.

      Yes, by way of disabling DMA for the Firewire bus.

      Interesting, thought it was to create a virtually mapped 4GB space, thus preventing random reading of the lower 4GB of potentially OS memory which shouldn't have that significant an impact on performance. That's more like daisy-chaining a few drives effect.

      Notice how I'm now only pointing out flaws in your arguments, and no longer arguing the points. That is because I have said what I needed to say and provided references where applicable, and you have shown that you are not capable of following the conversation, as you think I've gone off topic when I most certainly have not.

      I have noticed how you just assert and occasionally throw a link in as "proof" of your argument. Note how I took out quotes of my references? I also note you didn't dispute a single one of those.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    31. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Have you reviewed the two links Bruce added to his post on the issue? I suggest you do. The attack works by a USB device being reprogrammed to behave as a different device; logically, that would require that the host system recognize it as that device. A USB device without a driver does nothing. Period.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    32. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      I reviewed them more carefully. I get the following: if the USB bus is active and in use, at least some of the attack vectors work. Perhaps part of the miscommunication is that BadUSB isn't just 1 attack, but many different potential ones. I wrap them all up (perhaps incorrectly for this discussion) as a single attack vector. While being a supported device certainly expands the range of attack possibilities, being unsupported by no means eliminates the threat. The controller on the host can still be reprogrammed, for instance, and the bus communications can be sniffed, depending upon the connected device's capabilities. Nothing anywhere states that these are only done once the OS finally recognizes the device, in fact, several attack vectors occur before the OS is even in play. Finally, most systems will enable the keyboard USB device, so any claims of the original device not being supported are moot, since it can spoof itself as anything at any time, including the keyboard. (This is directly from several of the previous links, including the spec itself)

      So I say that your claim,

      A USB device without a driver does nothing. Period.

      is wholly incorrect in context of BadUSB. I suggest you shed some of that hubris you're carrying around, apparently it is interfering with your reading comprehension.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    33. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1
      Slashdot doesn't like posts with too many quote blocks in them, so I have to break up this reply.

      I reviewed them more carefully. I get the following: if the USB bus is active and in use, at least some of the attack vectors work.

      BadUSB, by name, is a specific attack that requires cooperation of the host.

      Perhaps part of the miscommunication is that BadUSB isn't just 1 attack, but many different potential ones. I wrap them all up (perhaps incorrectly for this discussion) as a single attack vector.

      And there's our problem, yes. Perhaps, now that we've identified that, it's worth continuing this conversation.

      While being a supported device certainly expands the range of attack possibilities, being unsupported by no means eliminates the threat.

      But it does eliminate the threat we're discussing here.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    34. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      The controller on the host can still be reprogrammed, for instance

      In theory. In practice, it is the controllers on the devices that are being left in a programmable state; host controllers conforming to the spec aren't programmable from the USB bus, so a system susceptible to such an attack would be so in spite of the USB spec, not as a result of it. This is not BadUSB.

      and the bus communications can be sniffed

      Yes, as with any serial bus. However, the spec allows for shutting down ports with no recognized device connected, so the device would have to be recognized, or the host controller not compliant with the spec, for this attack to work. This is not BadUSB.

      Nothing anywhere states that these are only done once the OS finally recognizes the device

      Indeed, a device can come up on the bus and sniff traffic until the host shuts it down after a timeout. It'll take a few removals and reinsertions to get the data your after, having to sniff in 500ms increments. Theoretically, this could work, but it's not practical as it requires an immense amount of cooperation from your victim; though, retrieval of the sniffed data would be as simple as picking the device out of their trash when they throw it away, thinking it's broken. Also, this is not BadUSB.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    35. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      in fact, several attack vectors occur before the OS is even in play

      In fact, only one theoretical attack, based on a host controller violating the USB spec, occurs before the OS is in play (for purpose of a USB keyboard, the BIOS or EFI is the OS). This was discussed earlier in this very post and it is not BadUSB.

      Finally, most systems will enable the keyboard USB device, so any claims of the original device not being supported are moot, since it can spoof itself as anything at any time, including the keyboard.

      Wow! Now that is BadUSB! And if it spoofs a keyboard, it can do anything a keyboard can do. Nothing more. You can do some pretty awful things with a keyboard (as you've shown), but nothing on the level you're freaking out about. Spoofing a network adapter and sniffing and logging network traffic (think 3TB external drive with a reprogrammed controller, plenty of potential storage space) is a much more effective means of attack, also possible via BadUSB. But, again, it requires cooperation from the host and the network interface would be a listed device. You could sniff bus traffic, as well, I suppose, but at that point, why not just spoof a device whose driver implements DMA and rifle through RAM looking for the data you're after?

      So I say that your claim,

      A USB device without a driver does nothing. Period.

      is wholly incorrect in context of BadUSB.

      Actually, it's wholly incorrect in the context of reprogramming a host controller that violates the USB spec, or a device that sniffs bus traffic between insertion and timeout. It's spot on in the context of BadUSB.

      I suggest you shed some of that hubris you're carrying around, apparently it is interfering with your reading comprehension.

      Unless I'm misinterpreting this:

      Their central finding is that USB firmware, which exists in varying forms in all USB devices, can be reprogrammed to hide attack code.

      you, sir, are wrong. That's what BadUSB is, reprogramming a device to behave as another device. Nothing more. Does it enable a variety of attack vectors that were previously impractical? Yes. But it doesn't do so entirely silently. I suggest you familiarize yourself with the USB spec to further your understanding on this matter.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    36. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      you, sir, are wrong. That's what BadUSB is, reprogramming a device to behave as another device. Nothing more. Does it enable a variety of attack vectors that were previously impractical? Yes. But it doesn't do so entirely silently. I suggest you familiarize yourself with the USB spec to further your understanding on this matter.

      I see where the problem is, BadUSB isn't at all what you think it is. Your hubris is poking you in the eye again. From the Wired story:

      That’s the takeaway from findings security researchers Karsten Nohl and Jakob Lell plan to present next week, demonstrating a collection of proof-of-concept malicious software that highlights how the security of USB devices has long been fundamentally broken. The malware they created, called BadUSB, can be installed on a USB device to completely take over a PC, invisibly alter files installed from the memory stick, or even redirect the user’s internet traffic.

      It is a demonstration "malware" created by Nohl and Lell to demonstrate the entire collection of attacks I've been discussing, in the original quote way back

      Then there's the USB security issues. I love the fact that you can take over a computer by plugging in a storage device, or is it?

      which sparked this whole conversation on security. A valid side issue you brought up, DMA, has its admitted security issues. It could be argued that they are quite less severe than these since the DMA memory has been virtualized in recent hardware/OS systems and there is no persistence nor propagation of the threat once the bad hardware has been removed, unlike with the USB issue nor does DMA allow for BIOS/EFI corruption. So the USB issues are worse than I thought while DMA has had additional risk mitigation with recent systems.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    37. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      Really, familiarize yourself with the USB spec, then apply that knowledge to what you already know of the security vulnerabilities discussed in the articles we've both linked to. For the record, Wired isn't exactly a first-class source.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    38. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      For the record, Wired isn't exactly a first-class source.

      No, but I suspect you'll also find some issue with Nohl and Lell's presentation, and also perhaps the BadUSB homepage.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    39. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1
      No, those are both very good sources for information on the problem SRLabs discovered. In fact, I referenced their presentation (one of the links on Bruces post that I suggested you review). Your understanding if the issue at hand is still way off, which is why I referred you to the USB spec, so you can educate yourself. The only way in which a BadUSB "infection" can persist on a host is if that "infection" modifies files on the host, just as with any other infection. It's persistent on the affected USB device, and there's no way to tell if a device is affected by the issue (well, there is, I've mentioned it, but we'll assume you didn't identify the affected device prior to wiping the system it was connected to), which acts as an avenue for continued attack, or re-modification of the same files on the host even after the host has been cleaned up. That's not host persistence through any special means unique to BadUSB; host persistence, again, come from files being modified on the host, as with any persistent infection, while the device remains affected by the issue in order to repeat its attack should the host be cleaned up at a later date. That means the following is incorrect

      there is no persistence nor propagation of the threat once the bad hardware has been removed, unlike with the USB

      as it implies that the threat necessarily persists after the hardware is removed. This is only the case is the modified firmware on the USB device (again, this is a flaw in the device, and not all devices allow their firmware to be rewritten) modifies files on the host to make it so.

      nor does DMA allow for BIOS/EFI corruption

      I haven't seen where BadUSB does, either, but I may be wrong about this. Can I get a direct quote, since it's clearly eluding my eyes? It would be most appreciated. (nay, I have indeed found the quote and will discuss it below)

      This line, from the BadUSB homepage (linked from your post) would seem to support your claim of host persistence:

      To make matters worse, cleanup after an incident is hard: Simply reinstalling the operating system – the standard response to otherwise ineradicable malware – does not address BadUSB infections at their root.

      However, when you read the rest of the paragraph, Nohl and Lell go on to elaborate that this is because:

      The USB thumb drive, from which the operating system is reinstalled, may already be infected, as may the hardwired webcam or other USB components inside the computer.

      Ah, and there it is, actually, I do see a quote for the claim I questioned just a few lines above:

      A BadUSB device may even have replaced the computer’s BIOS – again by emulating a keyboard and unlocking a hidden file on the USB thumb drive.

      However, given the understanding of how a BIOS of EFI image would be replaced (this isn't something that can generally be done while a system is booted into an OS; on systems where this is possible, that is a flaw in the BIOS/EFI and not in USB), it becomes clear why keyboard emulation is required; the device would have to emulate a keyboard during boot and send the correct key sequence to enter the BIOS/EFI flash utility, then flash a correct BIOS or EFI image, lest the system fail to boot afterward. Either, or both, of us could be wrong on this point, and we won't know until they release further details, but I'm basing my position on knowledge built over nearly 3 decades of experience, and having read and understood the specifications for the technologies involved.

      It bears repeating that a BIOS or EFI that can be written from within a live OS is, itself, flawed, and that is not a flaw in USB. To clarify, on such systems (for example, a Sony VAIO laptop I own, which uses a Windows-based utility for BIOS updates*[1]), malicious software running within the OS can rewrite the BIOS or EFI. That includes a binary stored in "a hidden file on

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    40. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      Since I managed to find that last quote on my own, but I still cannot find any reference to DMA in relation to BadUSB, I'll ask, instead, for a quote or reference for that. Again, greatly appreciated.

      I think we've addressed everything else, so I'll clarify this one: the reference to DMA was to FireWire et al security issues, and the fact that DMA access won't allow you to reprogram your BIOS/EFI, at least not as far as I'm aware of. I meant nothing more by this statement, nor did I mean to imply that USB allowed DMA access.

      To sum up, BadUSB is a demonstration program of a collection of USB attacks allowed by a combination of poor spec security and bad controller implementation. If the USB bus is live, it is possible for a device to set itself up as a keyboard. On OS operation, a device can set itself up as any device the OS recognizes, including keyboards and network controllers. If the controllers were not reprogrammable, only the propagation of the attack set would be impacted, as USB devices could still be created, although now Tom the cracker down the hall would have a much harder time implementing any of the attacks.

      I don't dispute the technical hurdles you list regarding BIOS/EFI reprogramming nor the on the fly USB controller reprogramming. Both obviously are very special narrow cases restricted by the target hardware/firmware. The point wasn't to say this was a wide open attack that could be exploited by downloading a snippet of code, running it locally and pointing it at something and typing "attack". The point is that this shows the depth of what can be done given the current implementation and spec design short-comings, and some of this is suspected to have been used as long ago as 2010 with Stuxnet.

      In all, I learned a few things and it appears you did as well.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    41. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by BronsCon · · Score: 1

      The point is that this shows the depth of what can be done given the current implementation and spec design short-comings

      Except that these aren't shortcomings of the spec and, in fact, are never presented as such by Nohl and Lell. Quite the opposite, it is stated in their presentation that you (as a user) want these design features, the ability for a device to be multiple things (e.g. a video and audio device, a-la a webcam) and the ability for a device that can't talk to its driver to reattach itself to the bus as a CD-ROM drive to provide the driver. They referred to these as features, not flaws, and very clearly placed the blame on the devices, stating that the fix is to make the devices themselves not reprogrammable. I'm not arguing these points, as Nohl and Lell have already done so.

      I think we've addressed everything else, so I'll clarify this one: the reference to DMA was to FireWire et al security issues

      I was actually referring to you saying the following:

      There is a DMA component, a quick search reveals they haven't fixed that either yet. Bah.

      And, in any case, the OS providing virtualized DMA for Firewire (and it is an OS feature, though I'd genuinely love to be wrong about that, so please point me to a source that says I am) does nothing to stop a Firewire device from injecting a rootkit into RAM during the boot process. Virtualized DMA is also no longer Direct, nor is it as fast, so it's really not an ideal solution. Firewire keyboards also exist (the PowerBook Pismo's keyboard was connected via Firewire), as do Firewire webcams (e.g. a Firewire device that's actually two devices), and you can get Firewire ethernet controllers. What that means is that, from a technical standpoint, the only thing I can't confirm without testing devices directly is whether or not I'd be able to find a Firewire device I could reprogram to do exactly what Nohl and Lell did with USB. If one can be found that can be reprogrammed, one can be found to host something akin to BadUSB; let's call it BadWire.

      And, that says nothing of Thunderbolt, which many people use for permanently-connected displays and drives. That also uses DMA (in fact, it exposes one or more PCI-Express lanes, depending on which revision of the spec is implemented). A Thunderbolt controller could emulate a flash drive, ethernet controller, and a USB controller with a keyboard attached, and do these very same things. And I think you've missed that, for any of these attacks (via USB, Firewire, or Thunderbolt), an infected device need not be the initial route of infection; that could, instead, be the method of persistence (and re-infection), which negates your argument regarding the Firewire devices you use being more or less permanent.

      Of course, that assumes, as Nohl and Lell said, "that [the] devices can be reprogrammed", which, really, is the crux of the attack.

      As an aside, you can flash the firmware of a hard disk or SDD via SATA, as well, while the system is booted and operational; while it can't act as a keyboard, it can store a rootkit. And the attack principle is the same: modify the device's firmware.

      All of that said, yes, I think we did both learn things here.

      --
      APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
    42. Re:NXP is a huge secure element provider. by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      Except that these aren't shortcomings of the spec and, in fact, are never presented as such by Nohl and Lell...They referred to these as features, not flaws, and very clearly placed the blame on the devices, stating that the fix is to make the devices themselves not reprogrammable.

      I agree that they are features, and that the devices being reprogrammable is a problem. That still doesn't alleviate the fact that a bus designed to carry adhoc device traffic has 0 security features associated with it. There's no cryptographic signing, no validation. No notification that a new device hooked up. Etc. Those are the deficiencies in the spec. It's like saying that DOS has no design flaws related to user security. You can argue that there was no intent to provide system security, but that proves my point that the USB spec design has short-comings (in security).

      There is a DMA component, a quick search reveals they haven't fixed that either yet. Bah.

      That was still in reference to FireWire. Further reading shows that the DMA aspect can be mitigated, if desired, as some performance cost.

      And, in any case, the OS providing virtualized DMA for Firewire (and it is an OS feature,

      It's an OS feature only AFAIK.

      Firewire device from injecting a rootkit into RAM during the boot process. ...the only thing I can't confirm without testing devices directly is whether or not I'd be able to find a Firewire device I could reprogram to do exactly what Nohl and Lell did with USB. If one can be found that can be reprogrammed, one can be found to host something akin to BadUSB; let's call it BadWire.

      I get the impression that FireWire DMA access is OS driver based, not inherent in the interface, which makes sense to me. I'd bet that most FireWire devices have updatable firmware, much like every other device.

      And, that says nothing of Thunderbolt, which many people use for permanently-connected displays and drives. That also uses DMA (in fact, it exposes one or more PCI-Express lanes, depending on which revision of the spec is implemented).... Of course, that assumes, as Nohl and Lell said, "that [the] devices can be reprogrammed", which, really, is the crux of the attack.

      I think for the sake of argument that all classes of devices in question are most likely reprogrammable. USB is just the most susceptible because it's the most likely to have adhoc foreign devices being plugged into your system temporarily. The reason I state so strongly that it is a spec design flaw is because USB's purpose was to allow this type of connectivity.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
  3. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    They do. It's called Google Wallet. Do literally any research, dude.

  4. Why should I care? by danbob999 · · Score: 3, Funny

    I have a credit card since I am allowed to have one. I use it for all my purchase. It has never been cloned or compromised. New versions with chip and pin seems secure enough. Even if it wasn't, I am not liable in case of a fraud. So why would I want another payment system that would be more secure? At least my credit card doesn't run out of juice after 1-2 days in my pocket.

    1. Re:Why should I care? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe you should charge your phone at night.

    2. Re:Why should I care? by m.dillon · · Score: 1

      My physical credit card (normal mag stripe) is compromised at least once a year and sometimes more often. I might not be liable for the fraud, but it is VERY inconvenient when it happens, the card gets locked out, plus it also causes my bank to start verifying more of the transactions which is just as inconvenient if I don't answer the text message quick enough and the card gets blocked for no reason.

      It got so bad that around 2 years ago I got a second credit card so I could file it with trusted sites like Amazon and with charities that I donate to regularly and not have to give them all new card numbers every time my over-the-counter card got compromised. That's how bad it has been.

      Chip-and-pin is less convenient than ApplePay. Tap-and-pay cards are nominally the same convenience as ApplePay but still have physical security issues. Mag stripe is clearly going to die soon... the data breaches are occurring so often now that not fixing it is no longer an option for merchants. They will have to go to NFC whether they like it or not.

      I use ApplePay wherever I can now.

      -Matt

    3. Re:Why should I care? by jo7hs2 · · Score: 1

      Ditto. My number has been compromised about once a year for the past four or five years, too. It is why I keep a second credit card I use only minimally (for subscriptions like Netflix) for emergencies, and why I never expose my bank card number to anybody but the bank. The only benefit is that I get a nice new card...otherwise just really annoying few days without my card every year. In every instance, it wasn't a swiper or a stolen card, it was a data leak at a mid-sized or larger retail outlet.

    4. Re:Why should I care? by Ancil · · Score: 1

      At least my credit card doesn't run out of juice after 1-2 days in my pocket.

      Give it to your wife. She can make that happen. [rimshot]

    5. Re:Why should I care? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      WTF are you guys doing? The wrong way, that is...

      My American Express charge card has been with me for 35 years (number changed about 20 years ago, because my billing address changed continent around then). My MasterCard debit card has been with me for almost 20 years. On Visa and MasterCard credit cards, I have alternated between them, but generally about 10 years on each. No credit card number or debit card number has EVER been compromised, on either side of the Atlantic, and they get used quite a lot. At present, my AmEx and my debit card each get through 30-50k€ per year. The AmEx used to get used even more, when I was travelling a lot.

  5. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    Android has had a secure payment system, Google Wallet. Flagship Android phones used to include secure elements until Google implemented host card emulation in Android with KitKat. HCE eliminates the need for a hardware secure element. Europay, VISA and Mastercard have allowed the use of HCE for a while and American Express ExpressPay announced support for HCE a few days ago.

  6. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by robmv · · Score: 1

    In my understanding of the Android docs and this blog, yes it can have one, Google Wallet use the harware secure element on supported devices. Recent Android releases added APIs too, for applications to emulate cards without access to the secure element, pure CPU based implementations, less secure but still an option.

  7. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by i+kan+reed · · Score: 1

    Jeez, it's almost like an open software ecosystem can have a lot of variation.

    Can you believe that there are droids with no cameras or touchscreens? Some aren't even phones!

  8. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by sl149q · · Score: 1

    The only people that won't like this are the companies pushing CurrentC and the scammers stealing credit card numbers.

    Its a good thing for both Apple and Android users as it will help push the marketplace towards supporting sane and safe and private credit card transactions.

  9. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by mlts · · Score: 3, Informative

    Some devices have had a NFC based pay system. SoftCard comes to mind. It uses NFC, and an application on the SIM card, which is harder to attack than just another app on the phone.

    Of course, there is the fact that SoftCard requires one to use a specific credit card... but the technology has been in place in a secure manner from the SIM card on up.

    I'm just hoping Android's implemention of this is decently secure. CurrenC is waiting in the wings, and if Apple Pay and Android implementations flop, this will be waiting to become the primary payment provider... and it completely bypasses the credit card fraud protections, so if money is stolen... the consumer is stuck with the losses.

  10. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The only people that won't like this are the companies pushing CurrentC and the scammers stealing credit card numbers.

    If only! With CurrentC, they'd be out to steal bank account / debit card numbers; which is way worse...

  11. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    HCE eliminates the need for a hardware secure element.

    If you think that some software sandboxing is the equivalent of a "secure enclave" chip in terms of secure-ness, you're sadly mistaken.

  12. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by pherthyl · · Score: 1

    >> Android has had a secure payment system, Google Wallet.

    Purchase data is shared with Google. By definition that is not secure

  13. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    we have only had this functionality since NFC came out three years ago with Google Wallet. The Japanese had it for almost 10.

    Apple drags the US mass market out with marketing and making it so your grandmother can do it.

  14. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by DigitAl56K · · Score: 1

    HCE eliminates the need for a hardware secure element.

    If you think that some software sandboxing is the equivalent of a "secure enclave" chip in terms of secure-ness, you're sadly mistaken.

    I was under the impression that where phones have hardware (e.g. Nexus 5) it'll use it, and it provides emulation elsewhere so that Wallet can work across all Android devices with NFC, and the idea was to broaden support for the platform, not to say emulation is better or even preferred.

  15. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Not exactly. What Google has been doing was acting as a "cloud" intermediatary. This works fine as a protection mechanism but utterly fails as an "improvement". Likewise the "Banks" want HCE so they can roll out their own apps and bypass carriers, while the Carriers want SIM-based NFC SE's so they get a cut of the transactions.

    HCE is a non-starter because "cloud" storage is not secure. The biometric can be completely bypassed. Likewise SIM-based SE's get bypassed by taking the SIM card out of the device and putting it in another. Both are more secure than physically handing the card over to be swiped, and marginally better than straight chip+pin, since anyone who knows your PIN can use a chip+pin card. A biometric-based security (there's more than one way BTW. Using the camera on the phone can be a poor-mans biometric applied against a face recognization, but it can be fooled with a photo. Replicating a finger print or blood requires technology that doesn't really exist in any practical sense, when a thief would save time by cutting off the finger.)

  16. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Not terribly. It's a lot harder to USE stolen banking numbers. You can't just punch the banking numbers into something and withdraw money, you have to have another US banking account... and write fake checks or something with it, which are then held. No the biggest flaw with CurrentC is taking that information and putting it on someone elses identity, and then using that stolen identity to commit fraud.

    CurrentC's plan is ripe for identity theft, any solution that involves tracking consumer habits is. If such systems were being used to detect fraud I could probably get on board with it, but that has never been the case except with PayPal. PayPal already knows more about you than you think. Any name, address ,credit card, bank account, billing address that you have ever used since inception is stored.

  17. Equivalence by DrYak · · Score: 4, Informative

    Functionnally: They are equivalent.
    - In both case, it's a payment system, and supports NFC protocol so that you can pay wirelessly just buy putting the phone next to the payment machine.

    Hardware-wise: They are not exactly the same.
    - Google Wallet is just a generic payment system (like PayPal, etc.) In most phone, it's simply the OS (Android) being able to talk over NFC to the payment machine. It's up to the OS and Application to hangle security any way they choose (might or might not involve hardware - most implementation do not. But some smartphone did have some form of it).
    - Apple's system specifically uses a separate piece of hardware: a TPM-like chip that is secured and hardened and holds the actual banking information (which never leaves the chip). Security is by definition handled by the specific chip.The whole systems works like a wireless credit-card with a smartphone bolted next to it, the smartphone being able to act as a GUI to the credit card, but the card handling the transaction themselves.
    Some Android Smartphone did in fact work exactly like that. (Had a dedicated chip which was more or less a micro credit card, which handled the NFC talk it self and the smartphone merely interfacing with the card).
    - NXP is a vendor of chip that makes hardware components for payment. They've worked on Apple's chip. They are now selling this chip for android smartphone manufacturers too.

    Apple's emphasis is on security: They want their "dedicated non-hackable credit-card-on-a-chip" approach.
    Google's emphasis is on making the technology available everywhere. High end phone will have a chip, low-end phone will simply emulate a virtual credit card by having a piece of software talk over NFC. But it's going to be available as widely as possible.

    From a security point of view:
    Meh.
    Google's idea isn't the most secure ever: it rellies on the OS being good at correctly isolating and sandboxing apps. But bugs happen.
    Apple's idea isn't perfect either. In theory, a separate piece of hardware is easier to make tamper proof. In practice, it's just a subpart of the same piece of silicon as the rest of the system (they are SoC. System-on-chip. Nearly the whole modern smartphone is a single chip) hacker are bound to find a way to leak sensitive data (I mean, for fuck's sake: hackers have been able to deduce GPG private key by reading signals leaking out of a compute. Noise. Captured by a smartphone's mic. If they can steal your crypto just by listening caps singing over a crappy mic, do you really think that a core on the same piece of silicon is isolated enough ?!)

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
    1. Re:Equivalence by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Have you read the specification? The Secure Element of the NXP chip suports JavaCard.

      That means you can implement any frigging payment system by writing Java code. The same is true for the NFC controllers built into Android Phones starting from the Nexus-S. Based on JavaCard as well.

      The new NXP chip may have some new functionality, more RAM and storage, but from the functionality they are essentially the same.

      This is no news. The technology for this has been around for several years now.

    2. Re:Equivalence by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      Google's emphasis is on making the technology available everywhere.

      Google's emphasis is on saying "we did it first" without actually doing anything useful.

      Google Wallet is not available outside of the USA. It works outside of the USA but it's not available nor supported. Actually that's a lie, it USED TO WORK outside of the USA with Google recently locking down the use of credit cards used outside the USA and not registered to addresses in the USA.

      When Apple release most of their "ground breaking" features I typically just yawn and think it's about time they caught up.
      When Apple released Apple Pay on the other hand I was hoping that this would be the catalyst for Google and the rest of the very VERY fragmented mobile payment industry to pull their respective fingers out and stop releasing products that don't work everywhere for absolutely no technical reason what so ever.

    3. Re:Equivalence by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

      in both cases neither Google or apple relay your financial information to the vendor. Google generates a one time credit card number, apple uses a secure one time token as proof the funds are being credited to the vendor.

    4. Re:Equivalence by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

      You realize that political and regulatory reasons are harder to overcome than technical ones right?

    5. Re:Equivalence by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      That depends entirely if you try or not. What Google does is no different than Paypal, they offer an intermediate payment service. What Apple has done is significantly harder in terms of politics and regulations.

      So why does Paypal work everywhere? Why has Apple had an *almost* round the world launch of their service? Why has Google Wallet been out 3 years (yes a FULL 3 YEARS) and yet not supported outside of one country so far?

      All hurdles are insurmountable if you don't even bother attempting the jump. Google *could* do this. They *choose* not to.

  18. *yawn* by Nemosoft+Unv. · · Score: 1

    So another quick-pay scheme, intended to snoop a few seconds off the time it takes to do a payment (and a few percent of the money..) Now if they would implement a quick-get-rich scheme the same way I would be all ears :)

    --
    "Fix it? It has been disintegrated, by definition it cannot be fixed!" - Gru in Despicable Me.
  19. Convenience! by mmell · · Score: 1

    Now if only there were some vendors around town actually accepting tap-to-pay . . . :^S

    1. Re:Convenience! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There's been pay to tap in vegas for decades now. I'm not sure if it's the same thing though. Just what I've heard.

    2. Re:Convenience! by ChunderDownunder · · Score: 1

      1st world problems.

      Visa in my country has been quick to upgrade their pos terminals for contactless payment. Who needs an iPhone?

  20. Welcome to SIGINT by DrYak · · Score: 2

    If you think that some software sandboxing is the equivalent of a "secure enclave" chip in terms of secure-ness, you're sadly mistaken.

    If you think that a "secure enclave" is really secure, when its implemented as a SEPARATE CORE ON THE SAME FUCKING SILICON, you really don't believe in SIGINT.
    In a world where scientist have been able to guess GPG private key just by analysing signal.
    Accoustic signals: Noise.
    Over a smartphone's crappy mic.
    (Ref).
    Do you really think that a "secure" core on the same piece of silicon stands any chance?

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
    1. Re:Welcome to SIGINT by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Not to say that secure elements are totally and completely secure, but they're more secure than crypto implemented in software (as your link so generously shows). They may both be vulnerable to government agencies, but software elements are vulnerable to casual physical (or remote, possibly) access to the device.

      Side channel attacks on secure elements are not at all new. NXP et al actually design these chips with them in mind.

      Your argument is comparing apples to oranges: because a gun was able to shoot through a T shirt (with chainmail printed on it), a purpose-built bulletproof vest is useless!

  21. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by sribe · · Score: 1

    Guess what - if you use Apple's wallet app, Apple will have access to your purchase data - or did you think Apple just hired all of the world's best psychics and decided to take 'em on faith?

    Well, Apple "has access" in the sense that the data is there and they could upload it to their servers, but they won't. (You could argue that iCloud backup does so, but not in a way that they're collecting...)

  22. (Ref) by DrYak · · Score: 4, Informative

    I mean, for fuck's sake: hackers have been able to deduce GPG private key by reading signals leaking out of a compute. Noise. Captured by a smartphone's mic.

    Ref

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
  23. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by tlhIngan · · Score: 3, Informative

    by mmell (832646) Alter Relationship on Friday November 07, 2014 @02:42PM (#48337609)

    It's also shared with your vendor and your credit card company. Same holds true if you use ISIS wallet - someone who is not either your vendor or your credit card provider has access to your credit and purchase information. Guess what - if you use Apple's wallet app, Apple will have access to your purchase data - or did you think Apple just hired all of the world's best psychics and decided to take 'em on faith?
    But don't worry - you just go ahead and enjoy your applesauce.

    Except Apple doesn't.

    Apple Pay is a virtual credit card. Google Pay is a debit account linked to a credit card.

    When you use Apple Pay, the transaction details are between your bank and the retailer - Apple's involvement is in the set up part of the equation. Just like a credit card.

    When you use Google Pay, the retailer hits your debit card (a virtual one when you set up Google Wallet), who then talks to Google to get funds to transfer to the account. Google gets all the transaction details because it's involved in the transaction.

    That's the difference - Apple isn't involved at all in the transaction, and I'm sure that's true because every Android fanboy around is going to verify that fact for everyone.

    It's also why Apple Pay counts as a card-present transaction, and Google Wallet doesn't.

  24. NFC alone isn't enough by m.dillon · · Score: 2, Informative

    You need NFC (which many Android devices have had for years)... but you also need an actual secure chip (not a software emulation or intermediary), and the ability to initiate payment without having to turn on the phone or type in a security code (i.e. a fingerprint reader), and you have to be able to do it with the phone locked and turned off (meaning you need low power hardware to detect the NFC and wake the phone up). And then you need the OS integration to make it all work together seemlessly. And it has to not leak information to anyone except your bank which obviously needs to have the information anyway... and there is no smart phone app on the market other than ApplePay which can make that guarantee. Certainly not Google Wallet. Or CurrentC. Or anything else. And it's better than chip-and-pin and tap-to-pay which both have physical security issues (though they are much better than mag stripe).

    Android is missing too many pieces and it will be at least 1-2 years before it has them all. And even then there will be such a huge percentage of *new* android phones that won't have all the pieces that it will only create mass confusion for the general consumer.

    The reason Google Wallet has been a failure to-date is that it (and all other smartphone-based payment systems except ApplePay) is simply not convenient to use compared to swiping a credit card. The reason ApplePay became the #1 smartphone payment mechanism overnight is because it's utterly trivial and convenient to use.

    It took me exactly 3 seconds at the local Whole Foods to pull out my phone, tap it with my finger on the finger print reader, and put it back in my pocket. It takes me about as long to swipe my card if I don't have to sign, but half the time I do have to sign so ApplePay immediately wins because I never have to sign (at least not so far).

    Eventually all smart phones will do it the Apple way. For now, though, and for the next 1-2 years at a minimum, Apple is the only smartphone game in town that actually works well. Chip-and-pin and tap-to-pay cards work almost as well... they can even be more convenient in some situations, but they don't cover all the security bases.

    -Matt

    1. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by DigitAl56K · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The reason Google Wallet has been a failure to-date is that it (and all other smartphone-based payment systems except ApplePay) is simply not convenient to use compared to swiping a credit card.

      Bullshit. There is virtually no difference in the operation of either system except one has a fingerprint reader.

      The reason ApplePay became the #1 smartphone payment mechanism overnight is because it's utterly trivial and convenient to use.

      More bullshit. The reason ApplePay became the #1 mechanism overnight is because Apple leveraged their marketing and the media around it. Google hasn't ever done the same. In fact, it would be easy to be oblivious to the fact that Google Wallet even exists - it's almost as if Google doesn't give a crap in terms of marketing it (who knows why..)

      It took me exactly 3 seconds at the local Whole Foods to pull out my phone, tap it with my finger on the finger print reader, and put it back in my pocket.

      It takes me no more time to use Google Wallet.

    2. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by pherthyl · · Score: 1

      Virtually no difference isn't good enough. Convenience is king as had been proven again and again and again.

      Also there is no way in hell that I would hand over my purchasing data to an advertising company. That's the big difference from my point of view

    3. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by ahabswhale · · Score: 1

      One thing that's not bullshit: ApplePay is far more secure.

      --
      Are agnostics skeptical of unicorns too?
    4. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      The reason Google Wallet has been a failure to-date is that it (and all other smartphone-based payment systems except ApplePay) is simply not convenient to use compared to swiping a credit card. The reason ApplePay became the #1 smartphone payment mechanism overnight is because it's utterly trivial and convenient to use.

      Really? That's the reason? I would have gone with lack of advertising, lack of international support, not being a default in devices including the Nexus series itself, and brutal lock-down of people who hack their way into getting it working in other countries.

      But difficulty? You haven't used it have you?

      The only thing remotely difficult or time consuming was setting it up, and then only because I had to fake the fact that I wasn't in the USA because it isn't supported. For the most part Google Wallet has worked anywhere you have NFC payment terminals for the best part of the last 3 years and it certainly is not any more complicated that pressing a single button and swiping the phone on the terminal.

    5. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The functionality of Apple Pay is similar to contactless cards, at least the ones we use in Europe. It only takes a few seconds to pay and, if the amount is less than € 20 ($25) no pin is necessary.

      What Android was missing is the ability to provision the necessary credentials of a new smartcard (Credit Card, ID, Transit) easily. Now the PN66T provides the platform for it.

      You may want to check this article about the subject: Carriers Should Leave The Mobile Payments Ecosystem

    6. Re:NFC alone isn't enough by Dahan · · Score: 1

      But difficulty? You haven't used it have you?

      The person you replied to didn't say it was difficult; he said it wasn't convenient: "it ... is simply not convenient to use compared to swiping a credit card." And it's not. You have to wake up your phone, unlock it, and then enter the Google Wallet PIN. With Apple Pay, you just have to hold the phone with your thumb at the correct location; the phone display doesn't need to be turned on first, and the fingerprint reader takes the place of the unlock and PIN entry.

      I've tried Google Wallet a few times for the novelty value, but using a regular credit card takes fewer steps, and hence is faster.

    7. Re: NFC alone isn't enough by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Is it really all i need to steal from a person is their iphone and their fingerprint. And The fingerprints are all over the iphone.

  25. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by m.dillon · · Score: 1

    CurrentC has no chance of becoming the primary anything. It uses QR codes for gods sakes... virtually nobody will use it, no matter how much the merchants try to push it. It's already DOA and it hasn't even been officially launched yet.

    -Matt

  26. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Access to the hardware secure element in android phones is blocked by all carriers except Sprint. Because of this even on phones with secure elements host card emulation is used instead of the secure element.

  27. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Beyond initial setup where you enter your card info and Apple's servers negotiate with your banks to get your secure tokens (which are then stored in the secure enclave of your hardware itself), Apple does not know anything about your transactions. The transactions are between you, the vendor, and your card issuer, as with any CC purchase.

  28. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by pherthyl · · Score: 1

    >> Apple will have access to your purchase data

    No they don't. Maybe try actually educating yourself before spouting off on a topic.

    Big difference between VISA and my bank having my purchase data and me handing it over to an advertising company like Google. Never going to happen.

  29. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

    Most mid and high end Android phones still use the secure element, which is also used for storing things like encryption keys. They are very cheap these days, much like how most business oriented laptops have TPM because it costs so little to implement.

    HCE is so that very cheap phones can still do payments with Google Wallet. That will be really important in places like China, Asia and South America.

    --
    const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
    SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
  30. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I certainly hope using QR "bar" codes isn't the reason CurrentC dies. QR codes have been used for payments on large scales in some places (of note, Japan). What should kill CurrentC is the complete lack of liability protection; the payment processor has no liability for breaches (therefore there won't be any security), while the consumer will be liable for all transactions. I suppose the end result is the same, but the latter seems rather more significant to me.

  31. I have to say by LennyDotCom · · Score: 1

    I was just at walgreens and saw a small Apple Pay logo on the checkout screen for the first time,

    It made me smile

    --
    http://Lenny.com
    1. Re:I have to say by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Just like I did years ago when I saw a Google wallet icon on it.

      Apple is that douchebag who shows up late for a party that everyone else is at and proclaims "*now* the party can start!"

  32. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Nemyst · · Score: 1

    CurrentC is fighting against another thing though: the existing plastic credit cards. Scanning a QR code is far more awkward than just pulling out the bloody card from your wallet and waving it above the RFID sensor.

  33. You're still paying for the fraud by rsilvergun · · Score: 2

    in the form of higher merchant fees. A substantial amount of the fees Card Issuers and Merchant Banks charge is to cover the inevitable fraud. Cut that down and the merchants get charged less (there's tonnes of competition in the payment world, contrary to popular belief. Just look at Square). Merchants get charged less are likely to pass less of those fees on to you. So there you go.

    --
    Hi! I make Firefox Plug-ins. Check 'em out @ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/youtube-mp3-podcaster/
  34. Re: So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalen by jrumney · · Score: 1

    The idea was to open up access to other card providers. With the secure element being in hardware, operators were controlling the provisioning, so only very few phones came provisioned for Google Wallet, and none with major credit card companies, because those companies won't bend over and accept the operators' demands for a cut.

  35. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by BronsCon · · Score: 1

    It's also why Apple Pay counts as a card-present transaction, and Google Wallet doesn't.

    From the retailer's perspective, actually, it does, as the virtual card Google Wallet presents is just as present as the details presented by Apple Pay. On Google's end, when they charge your card, it is not, so I guess you're partially correct. Assuming, of course, that you're funding your purchase with a credit card; it's a moot point if it's coming out of checking.

    --
    APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
  36. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Man, is there any more sure-fire way to sound like a *complete* douche than to say "try educating yourself" in any conversation? I sure don't think so.

  37. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by BronsCon · · Score: 1

    Supporting documentation?

    --
    APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.
  38. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    So when presented with some people claiming that Android already has a feature and one article indirectly claiming that it doesn't, the mindless Apple fanboi unquestioningly latches on to the version that paints Android in a negative light. What a shocker.

  39. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Damarkus13 · · Score: 1

    HCE was implemented mainly to force Google Wallet on Verizon. Verizon refused to active the secure elements on their phones instead ISIS used a secure element on their SIM cards, which they refused to allow Google Wallet to access.

  40. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by boondaburrah · · Score: 1

    Personally, it's really annoying to me that they did this with KitKat. I used to enjoy NFC payment with my phone that has a secure element, but then google switched to the software method and my phone won't be updated. They discontinued google wallet service for secure element phones back in April. Now I have to use my card again.

    Long story short, I'm pissed that by 'upgrading' they took a feature I had and regularly used away.

  41. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by pherthyl · · Score: 1

    When you're wrong all you have left is insults.

  42. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    When you're wrong all you have left is insults.

    True. Especially insults like "try educating yourself".

  43. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    yep if the payment thing requires the user to launch an app it's dead in the water as everyday debit/credit card replacement.

    really the simplest is to just build phone cases/backplates with compartments for the contactless credit cards. everybody happy, can put any card you want in there, the hongkong metro card or whatever(that you can buy booze with).

    and to put things into perspective mobile phone tied paying has been tried to bring into the mainstream for the past 15 years, since nokia 7110.

    and for various reasons this chip doesn't change the game at all, not on android and not on any - and the title is misinformed.

  44. Re: So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalen by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    From a 'I did not make that purchase, reverse the charges, please' perspective ?

  45. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They might not have the complete details, but some they must have - how else make sure they get their percentage? Can't see Apple blindly trusting the card companies on a money issue...

  46. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The problem with HCE is provisioning. In order for HCE to work the issuing bank needs to develop their application, have a cloud hosting service for tokenization and the phone needs to be connected to the internet.

    The PN66T solves all those issues handling security on the chip. Provisioning of the credit card is done once and then an encrypted version of the card is stored on the phone.

  47. NFC Bitcoin Checkout is more secure by codebonobo · · Score: 2

    http://blog.bitpay.com/2014/11/04/bitcoin-checkout-one-tap-mobile-bitcoin-payments.html

    Yes, I understand the downsides of fewer merchant acceptance but there are plenty of upsides as well for everyone.

    Orders can be priced in 150+ currencies, and past payment information is only a few taps away.

    We’re now rolling out the app to every mobile market worldwide, in the 40 languages spoken by 99.99% of the world’s population.

  48. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    LOL, I think pherthyl would have been better going with 'you're as thick as shit, Android weenie'.

  49. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

    You better be using cash for all your transactions if you care about purchase history.

    Your history, unless you are doing something shameful is not what people are after. they want access to your accounts and PH does not provide that.

  50. Re:So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalent by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

    weird, since both Apple pay and Google Wallet carry the same costs for transaction.

  51. Re: So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalen by modmans2ndcoming · · Score: 1

    It is kind of hard to claim that for GW since you have to claim that, on top of someone stealing your device, they also have to have your wallet pin. then you have to explain why you did not suspend your wallet account when the device was stolen.

    further more, you will probably get stuck with the charge if you failed to encrypt your device since you had the least secure technology in the chain of the transaction.

  52. Re: So Android DOESN'T have an Apple Pay equivalen by BronsCon · · Score: 1

    Now I almost feel bad for tearing you apart so bad in that other post. Almost.

    --
    APK quotes people (including myself) without context and should not be trusted. Just thought you should know.