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Calling Out a GAO Report That Says In-Flight Wi-Fi Lets Hackers Access Avionics

An anonymous reader writes A new report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) warns that in-flight W-Fi, including wireless entertainment and internet-based cockpit communications, may allow hackers to gain remote access to avionics systems and take over navigation. At the same time, a cyber expert and pilot called the report "deceiving" and said that "To imply that because IP is used for in-flight WiFi and also on the avionics networks means that you can automatically take over the avionics network makes about as much sense as saying you can take over the jet engines because they breathe air like the passengers and there is no air gap between passengers who touch the plane and the engines which are attached to the plane."

113 comments

  1. Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains it by xxxJonBoyxxx · · Score: 5, Informative

    This is a dup story, so here's my dup comment:
    See DefCon 22's avionics preso from 2014 to see what you can and can't do from a hacker's perspective.
    https://www.defcon.org/images/...
    (Since the summary doesn't even often a link or name...this MIGHT even be exactly what the submitter is talking about.)

  2. Hmmm .... by gstoddart · · Score: 4, Insightful

    So, Mr cyber Expert and Pilot, other than saying "nuh uh", do you have anything to suggest there is no chance of this?

    We know people can hack air gaps, and if the in-flight wi-fi is at all connected to the electronics in the airplane, there's potentially a lot of attack vectors.

    And since there is no actual article, just a summary which says some guy says it can't happen ... I call "bullshit" on the whole story.

    Seriously, timothy, a link to a story or this is nothing more than innuendo.

    --
    Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    1. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think this guy is credible, but you can use your own judgement about how much salt goes with it...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?...

    2. Re:Hmmm .... by ceoyoyo · · Score: 0

      If you can hack an air gap down in the avionics bay, you can hack the one where a control cable runs by inches from your seat. That doesn't have much to do with the wifi.

      If the wifi network is connected to the avionics network, i.e. with no air gap, that's stupid and should be fixed.

    3. Re:Hmmm .... by timothy · · Score: 1

      Sorry -- I cut-and-not-pasted that link; now fixed.

      --
      jrnl: http://tinyurl.com/c2l8yr / foes: http://tinyurl.com/ckjno5
    4. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Do we know if they are connected? I mean, conceivably they could just be different VLANs or something similar and be on the same switches which would mean that an exploit of the admin interface on the switch would lead to the ability to jump to the "other" network. I have no knowledge of the plane's setup though; it may be completely separate at a hardware layer for all I know.

    5. Re:Hmmm .... by gstoddart · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Honestly though, we see pretty much daily that the number of security holes in a system is proportional to its complexity.

      A modern aircraft is an immensely complex maze of wiring. A 'modern' aircraft could be easily 10-15 years (or more) old, and full of systems which weren't designed with security in mind.

      If you've ever sat in an aircraft seat and seen the navigation display which shows your position, altitude and speed ... you can bet your ass there is some connectivity among the systems.

      So, if the default assumption in security is all software has bugs, and all systems have weaknesses ... it's reasonable to conclude that we simply don't know the risks here.

      But you don't simply say "oh noes, teh evidence isn't there so it's teh safe". Be it IP or not, if there are physical connections between the components, there is probably an exploit.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    6. Re:Hmmm .... by st2434 · · Score: 2

      The story isn't saying that there's absolutely no way to hack a plane. Rather, there was a GAO report released saying that in-flight Wi-Fi and entertainment can be used to hack into avionics systems and take over autopilot, and this other expert is saying "that's bullshit."

    7. Re:Hmmm .... by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 4, Informative

      https://www.defcon.org/images/...

      Different physical network. Someone in GAO misread the original report.

    8. Re:Hmmm .... by ledow · · Score: 5, Insightful

      You know that little screen they put in the back of the seats? Do you think they're stupid enough to cable that into the engine management?

      The air-phones? Do you think they're stupid enough to just tie that into the cockpit comms?

      When you're talking life-dependent systems (which pretty much no-one here will ever have to deal with and certify, which is why all your electronics ALL say that it's not to be used in life-support devices etc.) like airbag deployment and plane avionics, it's heavily regulated, heavily specified, heavily tested and heavily scrutinised. Rarely does a aircraft system specified on the "jumbo jet" level do anything more than exactly what it's designed to do. Plane crashes are caused by outside influences, human input overriding the computer and by DESIGN decisions, not software failure because someone forgot to renew the licence of two DHCP servers fought over who assigned IP's to the engines.

      It's an entirely different class of system that you want to hope that you never have to deal with. That's WHY large planes cost HUNDREDS of millions of dollars and you have to train for decades to be allowed near the switches - even if you're servicing them.

      And, no, VLAN's would never operate in a system like that and if they did they'd be proven-safe mathematically and, hell, even my cheap commodity switches only respond to management requests on the management VLAN and no other.

      They is why the guy responding is so clear on this. It's just not done. Ever. If you change a cable, or a panel, or redesign a bit of hatchway, or push out a software upgrade for a commercial airliner, it takes hundreds of people checking it, re-certification of the end-result, testing and all sorts.

    9. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      "If you've ever sat in an aircraft seat and seen the navigation display which shows your position, altitude and speed ... you can bet your ass there is some connectivity among the systems."

      And this interconnectivity is typically done using something called VIDEO. Imagine a "server" that is connected to the internal avionics bus on one side and has an HDMI output on the other. It reads the avionics signals for position, etc. and produces an image. Then a second "server", that is not connected to the first one except via an HDMI capture port, takes that HDMI output signal and streams it over the aircraft wifi like a little local netflix server.

      Please explain the attack vector where you can gain access to the aircraft.

    10. Re:Hmmm .... by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 1

      It would not much fail to surprise me if it wasn't done this way; but something like those seatback location/direction displays require relatively little data transfer(you wouldn't need more than the 4800 baud NMEA spew you'd get from a standard GPS device, and you could likely get away with less) and no responses from the seatback unit; so you could do everything you'd need over an isolated, intrinsically unidirectional, link.

      Put the avionics on the emitter side of an optoisolator, blindly blinking out location and heading data, the controller for the seatback entertainment system on the receiver side, listening, and you get an arrangement where there simply isn't anything to attack at the software level(you could probably hose in flight entertainment for the entire aircraft one way or another; but boredom isn't very lethal); and where physical attacks might be possible; but (by choosing an optoisolator and the location of the interface between the critical and noncritical side) can be made quite difficult.

    11. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If you've ever sat in an aircraft seat and seen the navigation display which shows your position, altitude and speed ... you can bet your ass there is some connectivity among the systems.

      And yet, last flight I was on, my seat-mate managed to pull up exactly that information using his GPS-equipped phone, no connectivity needed. I'm willing to bet those seat-back displays show ground speed (as determined from GPS), not airspeed (which would need an input from the flight instruments). Groundspeed is what the passengers care about anyway, it affects arrival time.

    12. Re:Hmmm .... by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      You're making unfounded assumptions. Before they started putting those GPS displays in the seats I used to take my hand held GPS as carryon. I had all the same information and my Garmin was certainly not connected to the aircraft systems.

      According to the slides somebody linked up above, the airplane avionics network is isolated from everything else (running a completely different protocol) except for a specific exception that Boeing got for some 777s, subject to a bunch of security requirements. If I were in charge of the FAA I wouldn't have granted that exception. So if you're paranoid, you might want to choose any other airliner instead of a 777.

    13. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Precisely my point! It is possible to design systems in such a way that they are intrinsically un-hackable. Uni-directional gateways are one simple approach to that. There's another less sinister reason for doing it this way--cost. While it may seem to the lay person who has never worked on a safety critical system that adding a gateway adds complexity and cost, the fact is that it reduces cost.

      Why? Any software that is connected to the aircraft bus must be certified through a grueling, time consuming and expensive process. By physically separating critical functionality, you can simplify the software that has to be certified. If the flight computers now just need to flash a little LED at 4800 baud, all you have to certify now is the code that flashes that LED, not the code that draws a map for the passengers. The computer that is now just responsible for passenger information can have software that is completely uncertified. All that map generation and other crap that is fed to the passenger computer can be a big pile of garbage and no one will care--there's no way it can crash the airplane. And you can rewrite/redeploy the code on the passenger side all day long without needing a certificate from the FAA.

      It is quite feasible to NEVER need to update the code that blinks the blinky light once it is tested and deployed. It's really just the concept of abstract data structures taken to an absurd level.

    14. Re:Hmmm .... by grimmjeeper · · Score: 3, Interesting

      As someone who has spent a great deal of his career in avionics design, both civilian and military, I fully agree.

      Avionics computers are not PCs running linux or windows. They don't have generic user level applications. They are custom designed, custom built hardware with very specifically chosen components to do the specific job at hand. The application software is pretty much entirely custom. As far as operating systems, many still run home grown schedulers that provide a bare minimum of services. Only in the last 15 years or so have they even started using off the shelf operating systems and so forth. Even then, it's usually something like VxWorks or Green Hills Integrity or some other RTOS like that. But they have to use versions of the operating systems that conform to ARINC 653. And while ethernet has started appearing on modern systems, it's use is highly specialized. They may put an IP stack on the box to facilitate getting packets from one box to another but the content of the packets are very highly specialized and they are carefully scrutinized before they are accepted and acted upon. Not to prevent hacking but to prevent "undefined behavior". Safety requirements mandate that they carefully inspect packets coming in and drop out of spec packets according to the rules established long before the first line of code got written. Not because they're trying to prevent hacking. It's because accepting unexpected and out-of-spec data can lead to problems that make the plane hit the ground. The anti-hacking capabilities are a side effect of that scrutiny.

      But even if you could get your packets into these specialized computers, how do you think you're going to hijack the box and spawn your malicious task that takes over? Like I said before, these computers aren't just PCs running Linux. They're custom built computers with an RTOS that very carefully and very deliberately partition the box to prevent tasks from corrupting each other or the operating system. And each task very specifically inspects every packet coming in before using the data so things like buffer overruns and what not simply won't work. So crafting the right kind of packet to allow you to insert your malicious code is more difficult by many orders of magnitude. Beyond that, you are extraordinarily unlikely to find a random port being open that gives you access to the OS core. That's a safety issue so it's checked before the computer can get FAA certification. The only ports available to be used are the ones that are needed and specified.

      Is it 100% provable that you can't hack into the systems? No. But it's so monumentally unlikely as to be effectively impossible. Are there some systems out there that had vulnerable code make it through certification? More than likely. But even so, the threshold for making it through FAA certification is high enough that even bad code that slips through is far less vulnerable than most everything out on the commercial market.

    15. Re:Hmmm .... by JThundley · · Score: 1

      You know that little screen they put in the back of the seats? Do you think they're stupid enough to cable that into the engine management?

      Yes, I'd believe it if someone told me that. The air travel industry doesn't exactly impress me with their tech or the way they handle it.

    16. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think they said the same thing about SCADA systems. Much SCADA was created/implemented before TCP/IP/Internet technology...so SCADA can't speak TCP/IP and be hacked right? Wrong. Valves, controlled by SCADA systems, were proven they can be manipulated. Avionics doesn't necessarily have to communicate via TCP/IP to be hacked (assuming hacked can also mean DOS'd and not just "owned"). If there is no airgap between the Avionic system(s) and Entertainment system(s), a path exists, and therefore, the potential is there.

    17. Re:Hmmm .... by grimmjeeper · · Score: 1

      I suppose if you can get into the network you can do some kind of DOS attack. But the ARINC 664/AFDX network standard that they use has a few things to guarantee bandwidth allocation. I'm a little fuzzy on this end of it but I do believe the spec was designed so that if a box goes stupid and starts flooding the network it won't be able to bring down everyone else with it. Again, more things designed in for the purpose of safety that by happenstance cause the system to resist the effect of certain types of hacking.

    18. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can strongly second this. With ARINC 664 in particular there is just no way to get on the network to hack anything to begin with. It may look like Ethernet but that does not make it anywhere near as vulnerable. Every packet is hard configured in 664. Your hacking device was never configured so even if you could connect it to a 664 switch (which is never wireless) the switch would throw away all your packets because you weren't configured to use that network time. And don't forget anything critical is replicated 2 - 6 times on the aircraft so if you want to go undetected you have to manage to gain physical access to ALL of the redundant systems at the exact same moment.

    19. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I spent about six years professionally maintaining real-time operating systems. I personally think you are *highly* over-rating the security of those systems. These operating systems are designed to provide timing guarantees; not for bullet proof security. If I shared some of the bugs I fixed you'd probably never want to trust your life to one of those things again.

    20. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I've been working with avionics for almost 5 years now and in particular I deal with information passed between the LRUs(computers that can be easily swapped out) on the plane. Example LRUs include the GPS system, traffic collision avoidance, inertial reference systems, etc. The systems in question for the passenger's information are likely GPS, AHRS and ADC. GPS is obvious so I won't cover that. AHRS stands for Attitude Heading reference System and gives you your position, velocity, and acceleration in the x, y, and z directions(among other things). ADC stands for Air Data Computer and that's the one that calculates the air speeds.

      Now, the important part is *not* that these flight critical systems need to be 100% separate from what passengers see. Getting information from the LRUs to the passengers can easily, with 100% safety, be done over ARINC 429. Simply put: the LRUs write to the 429 bus, they never read anything in, they never process what's on the bus. ARINC 429 is like UDP - when you write out information you don't care if it gets to the destination. There are no commands on ARINC 429, the only thing transmitted over 429 is data.

      The *only* thing you could do if you had access to the ARINC 429 bus is start spamming information in an attempt to drown out the LRUs. This would result in faulty/erroneous information showing up on the passenger screens, but the LRUs on the other side of the bus would not be reading the information in or using it. As far as the LRUs are concerned, they see someone using the bus, and wait for a period of time where the bus is free to continue sending their own information. In all likelihood, this ARINC 429 traffic would be centralized somewhere, and then piped to the passenger seat screens over H.264.

      It's provable that there is no method of 'hacking' the path from the passenger seats to the LRUs. The ARINC 429 bus acts as an air-gap since the LRUs won't read from it - they only write to it. If you start going into the 'what if...' scenarios you can probably cook up an attack vector and hack the plane. But at a bare minimum you'll need physical access(hard to do) and know all of the wiring(hard to know). Heck, even tapping into the physical wires would probably introduce enough resistance to wipe out the signals on them. It certainly would for ARINC 429, MIL STD 1553 and MIL STD 1773 busses(all of which are used commercially, even though 1553 and 1773 are 'military standards' - they just happen to be really useful and well defined...no reason to reinvent the wheel).

      Also, while I'm at it, I just want to clarify that the Ethernet on airplanes doesn't look like your Ethernet at home. They don't use RJ 45 connectors, the switches don't look like what you expect, and there are never any 'open' ports to plug into. So you would at least have to unplug something before you plugged in. Unplugging something would likely trigger systems in the cockpit...and you haven't even done anything at that point. The pilots would inform ATC, they'd redirect to the nearest airport for landing and everyone on the airplane would be escorted off individually. You wouldn't even have enough time to ram the plane into the ground, if that's what your goal was. At least in Boeing craft, pilots can always override the instrumentation. You could make landing difficult by zeroing out data or spamming bad data, but a pilot talking to ATC could still land the plane without instrumented landing systems. You'd go through all this trouble for the off-chance the landing goes badly and few people get injured or killed....doesn't seem likely.

    21. Re:Hmmm .... by grimmjeeper · · Score: 1

      I've spent over 20 years building and maintaining all kinds of real-time systems, both safety-critical and not. And were they talking about a generic non-safety-critical system, I would fully agree with you. A lot of real-time systems out there are built with the same carelessness as every other system out there. But the whole game changes when you have to build a system that is as close to error-proof as you can make it and you have to be able to prove it. The amount of planning, reviewing, documenting, and testing required to make a safety-critical real-time system pass certification is astronomical compared to what's done in a "normal" project. Partitioning, I/O validation and well defined error handling are the rule, not the exception in a safety-critical system. And you have to prove that you handle errors by performing extensive testing on the system. Orders of magnitude more testing than you find on a typical commercial system. This is done because lives are at stake. Literally.

    22. Re:Hmmm .... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I understand...to a degree what you both are saying. But in order for it to be _impossible_ from accessing via Wi-Fi, it has to be physically-separated from the Wi-Fi network. If it is, we're golden! If it isn't, the potential (path) still exists.

      As you may know, there are several types DOS attacks...and I'm not referring to "flood-type" DOS attacks which throttling bandwidth from an offending source could be mitigated. In TCP/IP networking, it may only take one specially-crafted packet to down a system or service running on a system (if that system or service was vulnerable to it).

      Now if you extend this to the ARINC 664 (which honestly I know _nothing_ about but the wikipedia link that was provided), IF the path exists (from my previous post), a specially-crafted-packet (or maybe even just a specially-crafted-signal in this case) on the wire may cause the system or service to fail. It does not matter that the 664 switch is not wireless. If the 664 switch is connected to a network that _also_ happens to be connected to a wireless network..._you _have_ your _path_ to the 664 switch.

      Hopefully, as you stated, the redundancy will make the system more resilient to failing under this type of DOS attack. But it may only take 2-6 shots of that _same_ packet/signal to still accomplish DOSing the 2 - 6 redundant systems.

      To avoid the whole potential-situation entirely, as others have stated, they need to physically segment (aka airgap) Avionics from publically-accessible systems (Wi-Fi).

  3. New concept by courteaudotbiz · · Score: 4, Funny

    Its a brand new concept called "crowd-piloting". The plane goes wherever its passengers feel to go. Very nice!

    1. Re:New concept by snookiex · · Score: 2

      And it totally redefines the concept of "cloud services".

      --
      Open Source Network Inventory for the masses! Kuwaiba
    2. Re:New concept by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Twitch plays 9/11"

  4. but seriously, no air gap by slashmydots · · Score: 1

    I mean to say there is a potential air gap with 2.4GHz and bluetooth and who knows what else if someone's laptop or smartphone was hacked remotely. But the cockpit door is RF shielded so that's the end of that.

    1. Re:but seriously, no air gap by cdrudge · · Score: 1

      But the cockpit door is RF shielded so that's the end of that.

      It's a good thing everything necessary for the successful operation of a plane is contained behind that cockpit door...

    2. Re:but seriously, no air gap by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2S-Cggs1jOo

      don 't need to get pass the cockpit door.

  5. Didn't read TFA by Drinking+Bleach · · Score: 0

    :)

    1. Re:Didn't read TFA by courteaudotbiz · · Score: 2

      Well, since no one RTFA, there are no more FA posted on /.

      Twice in 2 days. Good job /.

    2. Re:Didn't read TFA by courteaudotbiz · · Score: 1

      And for those caring for a fucking article, here is one on the subject.

    3. Re:Didn't read TFA by cozytom · · Score: 1

      This is the CNN piece that takes a warning the government prints and gets everyone all excited, "OMG, hackers will kill us all".

      Read it as a warning, what could happen if people aren't careful, but today with the aircraft that are flying, it won't happen.

  6. Are the two networks truly separated? by QuietLagoon · · Score: 1

    Do the two networks share a piece of networking equipment at any point on the plane? Is it just two subnets with a [buggy] firewall between them?

    1. Re:Are the two networks truly separated? by Just+Some+Guy · · Score: 1

      Exactly this. I'd like to think that there's an air gap (ahem) between the avionics and passenger networks, and that it's impossible to access the avionics system from the passenger compartment. I'd also like to think it doesn't rely on security through obscurity, like "we run our API server on port 81 instead of port 80, ha-HA!". Come on, Slashdot: we have to have at least one aerospace engineer in here, don't we?

      --
      Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
    2. Re:Are the two networks truly separated? by bobbied · · Score: 1

      Do the two networks share a piece of networking equipment at any point on the plane? Is it just two subnets with a [buggy] firewall between them?

      On the 787, the answers are NO, and NO. The aircraft has more than two subnets, but does have equipment that spans more than one subnet.... Don't know about the buggy firewalls though, but I assume the firewalls are not that buggy. This was all well understood before the FAA issued the type certification and the FAA required additional work by Boeing (beyond what the existing regulations required) before they would issue the certification. The GAO is nuts.

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    3. Re:Are the two networks truly separated? by Overzeetop · · Score: 2

      We do, but this aero doesn't do all that electrons stuff. I deal with the magic that makes thousands of pounds magically levitate; it's the EEs that magically make disembodied human voices come out of nowhere and blinky lights obey the commands of hidden daemons. ;-)

      --
      Is it just my observation, or are there way too many stupid people in the world?
  7. ICAO, RTCA and Avionics manufacturers are thinking by cozytom · · Score: 2

    This report is just a warning, then CNN gets it and asks broad questions "could someone do this??" and an expert who hasn't seen the architecture says, "sure, it could happen". He wants to say "but, in the real world, no!", of course the CNN anchor cut him off. It is possible that the pilots iPad may be connected to the passenger cabin WiFi if the pilot was connected earlier, but forgot to switch over. Connecting the iPad to the aircraft will only bring in power, nothing else. There is no way to control the autopilot from the iPad, no way to reroute the plane from the iPad.

    Most connected aircraft will have two routes to the ground, the cockpit and the IFE (passenger cabin). There are many documents about the thoughts that the manufacturers have. Firewalls are good, and may be used in some cases, but so far that is rare.

  8. TFA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I know no one reads TFA, but is there TFA? Or is this simply an anonymous submission referring to an anonymous cyber expert and pilot?

    1. Re:TFA by Immerman · · Score: 1

      It's the latest in Slashdot efficiency improvements - since almost nobody reads TFA anyway, a link is just a waste of electrons.

      --
      --- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
  9. Uhh by StikyPad · · Score: 4, Insightful

    If there's no air gap between the passengers and the engines on your flights, then I'll take another flight please.

    1. Re:Uhh by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      Oh man, you're never going to fly again once you realise that the cabin pressure is regulated by taking some of the air ingested by the engines from between the first 2 stages. You are literally breathing the same air as the engine.

  10. Think of the children! by Carewolf · · Score: 1

    I am sure in-flight Wi-Fi can be used by pedophiles to watch child porn! And by terrorists to plan terror attacks!!!

    OMG!! We must ban it

  11. Probable FA is from Forbes by OzPeter · · Score: 1
    --
    I am Slashdot. Are you Slashdot as well?
  12. all in the implementation by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    poorly implemented In-flight W-Fi, including wireless entertainment and internet-based cockpit communications, may allow hackers to gain remote access to avionics systems and take over navigation

    There fixed that for them.

    Running them on entirely separate IP-based networks would prevent it being a possibility. Coupled with secure software and firewalls for good measure, just in case.

    There's a risk if everything is on the same network, but there's absolutely no reason it would need to be.

    1. Re:all in the implementation by kheldan · · Score: 1

      Oh for fuck's sake.. it's very simple: Avionics need to be on a physically separate network from everything else, preferably encrypted. If there was 'air gap hacking' going on or even possible, wouldn't we have seen it long before now? Wouldn't an intelligent, capable, well-organized, well-thought-out terrorist (yes, Virginia, they do exist) have found a way to sneak the equipment necessary aboard a flight and implemented his hack, taken control of the plane?

      --
      Are YOU using the TOOL, or is the TOOL using YOU? Think about it!
    2. Re:all in the implementation by bobbied · · Score: 1

      poorly implemented In-flight W-Fi, including wireless entertainment and internet-based cockpit communications, may allow hackers to gain remote access to avionics systems and take over navigation

      There fixed that for them.

      Running them on entirely separate IP-based networks would prevent it being a possibility. Coupled with secure software and firewalls for good measure, just in case.

      There's a risk if everything is on the same network, but there's absolutely no reason it would need to be.

      You'd think Boeing doesn't know how to do networking or something. Come on, who thinks the network in a 787 looks anything like what you have a home?

      OF COURSE the flight controls are on separate NETWORKS from the in-flight entertainment systems. However, they do have equipment that is on multiple networks and I'm pretty sure there are places where separate networks may flow over the same physical connections.

      What you need for security is LOGICAL separation between these networks, NOT PHYSICAL separation. Where physical separation does make logical separation a given, logical is all you need for security.

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    3. Re:all in the implementation by tlhIngan · · Score: 2

      Oh for fuck's sake.. it's very simple: Avionics need to be on a physically separate network from everything else, preferably encrypted. If there was 'air gap hacking' going on or even possible, wouldn't we have seen it long before now? Wouldn't an intelligent, capable, well-organized, well-thought-out terrorist (yes, Virginia, they do exist) have found a way to sneak the equipment necessary aboard a flight and implemented his hack, taken control of the plane?

      Exactly.

      And yes, it's possible to "break through" the airgap - cellphones are known to cause EMI issues with certain equipment on certain planes (e.g., lose GPS lock, increase INS errors, cause drift in the heading indicators, etc).

      If you really wanted to cause problems, I'd go with a broadband transmitter that causes EMI in the airgapped control network more so than trying to hack it through in-flight WiFi.

    4. Re:all in the implementation by bobbied · · Score: 1

      If you can maintain logical network separation, you have all you need for security. Physical separation is NOT required if logical separation is maintained.

      For instance, Assuming my switches are properly implemented, I can maintain multiple VLans that flow over the same link and they are logically separate. One Vlan does not communicate with another Vlan. I have this very thing in my home, where I keep multiple logical networks. One Vlan that is my ISP's network segment (because where they enter my home is NOT where I wanted my router to live), one for my DMZ, and a couple for my equipment. All this is though my three managed switches which are trunked together. Doing this kind of thing on an aircraft would save weight (less wires and switches) power and a whole host of other benefits afforded you by being more free to put equipment where you wanted without much concern for how the wiring would need to change..

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    5. Re:all in the implementation by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Yes, but that's a big if. If you've got physical separation then there's no if, and there doesn't seem to be a reason why the avionics network should be connected to anything else, and it's usually not. Boeing apparently asked for an exception to that rule. It would be interesting to find out why.

    6. Re:all in the implementation by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      Oh for fuck's sake.. it's very simple: Avionics need to be on a physically separate network from everything else, preferably encrypted.

      Why should a private network waste time encrypting and decrypting stuff?

      If you've got a hacker accessing your avionics network, you have more serious issues than just whether the data is encrypted or not.

    7. Re:all in the implementation by bobbied · · Score: 1

      Physical separation does make a logical connection harder, but it still does not mean a logical connection is impossible. But my point that network security is about logical connections is still valid. You can have two networks that are not physically separated, that are not logically connected, and that's all you need for security. Yea it's harder when you don't have physical separation, but not impossible.

      The reason Boeing went for this was to reduce weight, power consumption and complexity. You can save a boat load of wiring if you can use the same ones for multiple networks. Wires are heavy, especially when you add in all the connectors, lacing and clamps required in an aircraft. So you use the minimum number of wire runs that gets you the required redundancy, bandwidth and latency, put everything going from point a to point b on the wires going that way and then keep the networks that go over the wires logically separate. It also reduces the complexity of the wiring, making it easer to install, maintain as well as allow more flexibility in the future for avionics changes.

      All of the reasons Boing would do this are related to the cost to purchase and operate the aircraft. Less weight = less fuel burn. Less power = Less fuel burn. Less complexity = easier to maintain = less maintenance costs PLUS lower NRE costs for new components you want to integrate in the future. Need data to flow between here and there for that new package? Configure the back planes like this, use these IP addresses and slap'm into the empty spot in the rack and you got data. Oh I see plenty of reasons for Boeing to do stuff like this... Not that any of this is really new, except for perhaps using TCP/IP as a transport protocol...

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    8. Re:all in the implementation by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      "The reason Boeing went for this was to reduce weight, power consumption and complexity."

      No, it's not. They most certainly are not running the entertainment system on the same wires as the avionics. The avionics system is a real-time network that is different at a very low level. The FAA exception allowed Boeing to connect the two networks at a single point, using a "network extension device."

    9. Re:all in the implementation by bobbied · · Score: 1

      "The reason Boeing went for this was to reduce weight, power consumption and complexity."

      No, it's not. They most certainly are not running the entertainment system on the same wires as the avionics. The avionics system is a real-time network that is different at a very low level. The FAA exception allowed Boeing to connect the two networks at a single point, using a "network extension device."

      Ok, replace "and" with "or" and read it again.. But EVERYTHING Boeing does fits into one of these areas in some way... Well that stuff with safety and regulations too.

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
  13. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Minupla · · Score: 1

    Mod this up - Seriously, if you're at all thinking this stuff might be possible read the paper for a good analysis of what is and isn't possible. (hint: your probably more at risk from signals outside of the plane then from someone inside it, and not all that much risk (for now) even then.)

    Min

    --
    On the whole, I find that I prefer Slashdot posts to twitter ones because I don't get limited to 140 chars before
  14. the internet tubes are the problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    No its really the internet tubes that cause drag and could cause the plane to stall. If this were true, how come the GAO is not feverishly contacting the FAA and asking why public in flight WiFi is piggy backing on aircraft avionics? I'm no expert on aircraft engineering, but this does not even sound remotely feasible.

  15. A Cloud Security Company by rodrigoandrade · · Score: 2

    Is warning me that $DEVICE that can kill hundreds of people if hacked is insecure.

    Oh, the horror!!!

  16. Sigh by ledow · · Score: 2

    At the very least, I'd expect a VLAN.

    In actuality, I'd expect disparate, unconnected systems possibly even running in separated VLANs and subnets with IPS on the avionics controls JUST IN CASE.

    Given that avionics are used to dealing with highly technological and highly critical systems, I think I could trust them to not mess it up. Especially if it in any way could even theoretically allow a possibility for an attacker to affect a flight path.

    Airport security, the guy loading my luggage, or the guest wifi in the lounge? Yeah, separate problem with trust in question. But on-board wifi? I'd be damned if you could send a single packet from the wifi to the avionics even in theory.

    1. Re:Sigh by bobbied · · Score: 1

      You are correct.. They maintain LOGICAL separation very well. Most people confuse the LOGICAL separation issue with PHYSICAL separation and think that you need to have the latter or you don't have the former. But even with physical separation, you don't have logical separation all the time.

      Security requires LOGICAL separation, but that does not require physical separation.

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    2. Re:Sigh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      The IP protocol is not deterministic and therefore is not used for avionics. The very few network topologies used are not used for flight critical inputs. ARINC 429 is the networked bus used, and that only for mission data, not flight safety critical data.

    3. Re:Sigh by HBI · · Score: 1

      Real airgapped networks have physical separation as well. Think Tempest.

      An aircraft has limitations in this regard, but I doubt seriously that the wifi systems on the plane are interconnected in any way with the avionics.

      --
      HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
    4. Re:Sigh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Mod parent up, he is exactly right.

      See ARINC 429 for more insight into it. (Since you can do IP over almost anything, including avian carriers, there's probably a way to do IP over ARINC 429, but AFAIK they don't, and it's not your standard Ethernet by a long shot.)

    5. Re:Sigh by bobbied · · Score: 1

      They have touch points physically... There are some things the WiFi systems just need to know that come from the flight control systems, or systems which are attached to systems which are attached to... (You get the idea)

      Where I seriously doubt there is a direct logical connection, where some hacker just needs to know the right IP address to adjust the auto pilot or something, there are physical data connections between the wifi network and the flight controls.

      --
      "File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
    6. Re:Sigh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are some things the WiFi systems just need to know that come from the flight control systems

      I'm struggling to think of what here...

    7. Re:Sigh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Me too. The entertainment system showing the position of the plane does not need to get the position from the high precision equipment in the cockpit. It could just as well get it from $10 GPS chip which still has better precision than the width of a pixel unless you zoom in far enough to see whether or not the plane is hitting the runway in the correct position.

  17. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by fahrbot-bot · · Score: 1

    Seriously, if you're at all thinking this stuff might be possible...

    Perhaps Jeff Goldblum can upload a virus that makes an animated skull and cross-bones appear on the pilot's view screen - "ar, ar, ar" - 'cause he did it in Independence Day - to an *alien* space ship. Why would human airships be any less secure? It's possible, just not very probable...

    --
    It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
  18. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by monkeyxpress · · Score: 2

    I think this is quite obvious to most engineers that have worked on safety critical systems. This whole issue is just about creating fear so some security consulting firms can make extra money. It is a tried and true method.

    Every time there is an energy crisis I see a new guy on TV who has 'invented' a water powered car and just needs some money to commercialise it. Every time. They all do the same thing, have some technobabble, accept a challenge to be black-box tested by a professor at a reputable university, who writes an overly technical report explaining why it is rubbish, and then they add 'tested by the University of XXX' to their prospective to elicit even more money. It is the same formula and it works every time.

  19. Encryption Fuck No by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Your understanding of avionics design is non-existant. First, avionics are designed rigorously, unlike damn near everything else. All input is validated. All software is validated. Each module running on a processor is segregated in software, and routine code and state validation checks are done to protect from code tampering. In fact, most systems do not dynamically allocate memory and memory allocation is disabled in firmware. The stack is protected from buffer overflows in a couple of ways, and the software is rigorously tested to certify it's behavior against bad inputs. Aditionally RTCA DO-178B/C specific design procedures that lead to robust design.

    TL;DR: Avioncs software is very well hardened.

    1. Re:Encryption Fuck No by kheldan · · Score: 1

      You sound like a sales rep trying to get your quota for the month.

      --
      Are YOU using the TOOL, or is the TOOL using YOU? Think about it!
  20. The Same Air by sexconker · · Score: 1

    If you're talking about passengers and engines breathing air, then any separation wouldn't be an air gap.
    The separation we have now is an aluminum and plastic gap. And it works.

  21. There is no microphone in an airplane by aepervius · · Score: 2

    No seriously, the radio is not connected to the computer system, the comptuer system is extremely conservative by many standard and is not connected to the in flight wifi. You cannot have an air-gap attack without a microphone or similar device.

    The gao report is a complete nonsense and was laughed out by all technical people involved in the computer system of airplane or in flight entertainment.
     
    "So, Mr cyber Expert and Pilot, other than saying "nuh uh", do you have anything to suggest there is no chance of this?"
      Aside complete network separation and absence of microphone ? Really guys sometimes there is absolutely NOTHING about threat reports.

    --
    C. Sagan : A demon haunted world:
    http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0345409469/
    visit randi.org
  22. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    Mod parent down. I attended the presentation in person. The presenter is full of shit.

    He based his presentation on flight simulators and utter conjecture. Flight simulators do not model the internal workings of an airplane, but rather the flight characteristics. You can't learn how the internals work without any reference to the internals. The guy made claims about things that just aren't true. He also spread a lot of FUD - "isn't it scary that landing times are on the Internet? What evil things could I do with that?!?" Idiot. Flight plans have to be public, because they're offering travel to the public. If you don't know when the plane lands, you can't schedule a ride from family. If they don't know when it lands, they can't schedule their pickup of you.

    The 'hacker' that presented that tripe doesn't know what he's talking about.

  23. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by BitZtream · · Score: 4, Interesting

    This story is just a slashvertisement.

    The story linked (now linked in the summary) is to a guy making silly ignorant statements about how the GAO is wrong but in such a vague way that I can safely say the guy making these silly comments is wrong. He's arrogantly implying that no aircraft can be hacked because they never make any mistakes and use separate systems and a special software device (thats not a firewall!) that acts as a firewall and doesn't let the two connected networks communicate with each other ...

    Also he seems to think that engines 'breath' air, and that the air inside the cabin of an airliner is not at all isolated from the air that goes into the engines.

    In short, the summary refers to an article written by someone that claims to be a security expert AND pilot while at the same time making incredibly stupidly inaccurate blanket statements that any useful security officer and certainly any pilot know are too broad and vague to be true or just flat out wrong.

    There most certainly IS a firewall between the passengers and the engines on commercial jet aircraft, otherwise the people would die at 30k feet. The fact that he claims to be a pilot and then claims there is no separation between the cabin and exterior is just scary.

    And claiming that this other special box ... that acts as a firewall ... but since they gave it another name, its not actually a firewall, so therefor its not possible to be hacked and bypassed.

    The reality of it is, what the GAO said IS TRUE. IT IS possible that 'hackers' MIGHT be able to cross the network boundaries if they are physically connected, anyone who claims this is not true knows absolutely nothing about IT security or security on complex systems in general. You work really hard to prevent it, and make certain design decisions to make it hard to cross that gap, but the instant they are connected, you've created the possibility. You can't honestly claim that your network is 100% secure and impeneratble which is what this guy is trying to claim ... about aircraft that he's never had anything to do with, never seen, knows nothing about the internal operation of ... just because he's a pilot doesn't make him suddenly privy to private information internal to Airbus or Boeing.

    Once again, I repeat, this is nothing but a shitty slashvertisement. They probably paid timothy to post it to the front page, which explains why it was done in such a hurry the first time and didn't even have a fucking link in it.

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
  24. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Lumpy · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It's the same for all the hype over car systems. EVERY SINGLE EXAMPLE they have to install hardware to get access to the data interface.

    So yes Terrorists can take over the airplane from their cellphones if the flight crew let them into the maintenance areas and help them install several specialized devices that give them access.

    The terrorists need to make appointments so they can make sure that avionics technicians are on hand to help them

    --
    Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
  25. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    We also have been running out of IPV4 space for over a decade now. we will run out any day now.....

  26. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Lumpy · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Hackers have a better chance of deorbiting a satellite and hitting the aircraft while it is in flight than they do taking it over from the in flight wifi.

    --
    Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
  27. How it all works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Informative

    1. My First Ever Post, please go easy
    2. I'm an aircraft engineer with about 12 years in the industry with experience of small and large jets, with both the big orange airline in Europe and the "other" british long haul carrier based at Heathrow.

    The WiFi system on board arrives at the plane via a dedicated satellite reciever designed for the specific task of internet connectivity. From there it plugs into the In Flight Entertainment system and the signal is projected via specially designed wifi routers that allow passengers to connect. At no point do the IFE system and the Avionics systems inter-connect physically. Furthermore, the IFE computers are actually stored under each row of seats and drive that row's IFE. Ever kicked that steel box under the end row? Thats the IFE controller for your row.

    The avionics systems are connected using an ARINC 429 system - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARINC_429. This is similar to a home network, but extremely specialised and focused on the job at hand. You cannot hack the IFE system and "get" into the Avionics. Yes, "Air Gap" hacking has been proven. Thats on computers that are next to eachother, not sat 100+' away through aluminium floor supports and all the other cabin interior. Who ever wrote the subject article has clearly never looked at the technicalities of what he is suggesting.

    Thanks

    1. Re:How it all works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I work on this stuff for a living as well. One of my current projects is a WIFI access point for in-cockpit use. It will be connected to iPads and other devices for use by the flight crew. I can't/won't get into any further details, but even it isn't connected to anything critical.

      I work with ARINC 429 on a daily basis and write drivers for these devices. Not everything is 429 though and lots of stuff is AFDX or just plain ethernet. We load firmware and collect data on aircraft LRUs all the time.

      Believe me, we have insane conversations about security. It's almost mind boggling the paranoia of some the people in the airline industry, sadly, they often win the argument (usually, these are the types that don't do this for a living). There's going to insane measures and there's implementing real, practical things... like air gapped critical infrastructure (which we do).

      Aircraft WILL become more connected in the future. But not anytime soon. This industry moves slowly and in the current atmosphere, cautiously.

    2. Re:How it all works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As a passenger I'm on the side of the paranoid guys. Sorry.

    3. Re:How it all works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No, really, they are paranoid and don't understand security from a technology standpoint. They are incapable of making correct decisions and constantly want to implement meaningless and often breakage causing solutions to non-existent threats (here's looking at you Airbus and your french ninjas). You seriously have meetings where the most paranoid person wins simply because they are insane and have some influence.

      I've been doing this stuff for over twenty years, I used to hack things in my younger days. I've done everything from IT to embedded systems and understand the fundamentals of secure development, encryption, networking, etc like the back of my hand. It's what I DO. People hire me because I'm a security expert with a broad knowledge of systems at all layers.

      If you really, really want your full body cavity search before boarding a flight these are the guys to talk to. Think what would happen if the TSA were designing aircraft systems, the thing wouldn't even be capable of flying.

    4. Re: How it all works by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Agreed, not everything is 429. I should have mentioned that. First post. And I'm a line/hangar engineer. And mechanical not avionic. I just don't see the WiFi, making planes any less safe than hacking the satellite phone or getting into the ACARS transponder.

  28. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by durrr · · Score: 1

    I didn't know jet engines were this unsafe. I'm only flying turboprop henceforth.

  29. The sky, by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It's FALLING!!

  30. be more worried by Virtucon · · Score: 1

    about coordinated attacks leveraging onboard wifi.

    --
    Harrison's Postulate - "For every action there is an equal and opposite criticism"
  31. I am envisioning Adama by EdwardFurlong · · Score: 1

    I will not have networked computers on this ship!

  32. IP Networks, No by mrlinux11 · · Score: 1

    These are not IP networks they are Ethernet networks which means they are susceptible to ARP Spoofing attacks and other Ethernet tricks

  33. The problem by koan · · Score: 1

    Is how do you explain this to the sheep without coming across as condescending.... see what I did there?

    --
    "If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
  34. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

    Flight plans have to be public, because they're offering travel to the public. If you don't know when the plane lands, you can't schedule a ride from family.

    While the two kinds of data are similar, they are not identical.

    The flight schedule has to be online for the reasons you gave. But the flight schedule is not the flight plan, and the times can differ by a significant amount. Every time you've arrived or left early or late, you're comparing your watch to the scheduled time. The flight plan will be much more accurate and be based on existing conditions.

    For example, the "book" time for a United flight from PDX (Portland OR) to ORD (Orchard, I mean O'Hare Chicago) is 3 hours 55 minutes. Depending on the position of the jetstream and other winds aloft, the flight can take as little as 3 hours 20 minutes. The flight plan will take into account the jetstream; the schedule does not.

  35. in theory they separate but.... by billyswong · · Score: 1

    But the engineers checking airplane safety aren't computer netwrok security experts. I really worry that the systems interconnected somewhere or shared some components they assumed safe. Automobiles got them mingled already.

  36. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Minupla · · Score: 3, Informative

    Fortunately pilots are less likely to do it to themselves then drivers are :).

    http://jalopnik.com/progressiv...

    Min

    --
    On the whole, I find that I prefer Slashdot posts to twitter ones because I don't get limited to 140 chars before
  37. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Minupla · · Score: 1

    Yep, it's possible. There's a couple of places listed in the talk that a skilled enough attacker could maybe make inroads, but the probability is limited by the fact that the networks speak VASTLY different networking protocols. Jeff *might* be able to infect the network bridge on a couple of specific airplane models.

    Of course, if it's Bruce Schneier, just let him into the cockpit and give him the flight yoke, it'll be slower :)

    Min

    --
    On the whole, I find that I prefer Slashdot posts to twitter ones because I don't get limited to 140 chars before
  38. CSI:CYBER - by KingPin27 · · Score: 1

    This is next weeks episode of CSI:CYBER - they're looking for opinions to see if they can improve realism. Or maybe its a story board for Scorpion. Either way - mildly entertaining. ;P

    --
    "i lost my dignity on a slippery wiener"
  39. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You are correct (same AC as before). I erred when i said 'flight plan'. That should have read 'flight times'.

  40. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Unless they have a malicious actor that bridges the two networks during a maintenance operation. That was the GAO's issue -- yea, they're essentially air-gapped, but in the same server cabinet. A 1' piece of ethernet cabling bridging them and now you have a pretty good chance. There's a good reason why DOD requires 1m+ separation between air-gapped systems and ridiculously clear labeling and instructions, and different cables colors. Because before they were doing that, there was a high preponderance of just such stupidity. The only way they solved it was by adding a huge airgap between all cabling and connectors, which I don't believe is done on planes.

    Now not to say that this isn't easy or that there aren't other protections -- but the point that if those networks somehow get bridged, then in some instances you could potentially have wireless access to Command and Control of the plane is likely a true statement.

  41. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by omnichad · · Score: 1

    Human airships would be more secure. They don't have the ability to recompile untrusted PowerPC code.

  42. haxx0rz on a plaen! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    As soon as people start talking about what "hackers" might or might not do you really can stop reading.

  43. This all misses the point by PuckSR · · Score: 1

    The GAO report is actually about the cybersecurity of the FAA. The comment about security on the airplane actually starts out by explicitly pointing out that this isn't a problem right now. It MIGHT become one in the future and they aren't satisfied with how the FAA would deal with hybrid system in modern planes. This entire blogpost is a bullshit response to a rather good report.

    The GAO simply wants the FAA to increase their cybersecurity. I don't think that is a big problem.

  44. The 777 is unique in its vulnerability by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Informative

    The 777 is unique in its vulnerability to precisely what you mention. The avionics bay access hatch is conveniently next to the toilet but behind a corner. An anonymous youtube poster who claims to be a pilot recorded a video when flying as a passenger to draw attention to this in the wake of MH370 and showed how he during a flight could get in and out of the avionics bay through that hatch with nobody noticing. Most people on board were sleeping and those who saw him, presumably thought he was just going to the toilet. The first thing to address this problem which no other plane has would be to put a fucking lock on that hatch and keep the key in the cockpit. Currently, two people with nefarious intentions can do anything to a 777 that can be done with access to the avionics and the right know-how. One just has to "stand in line" to the toilet and the other can fiddle undisturbed with all aircraft electronics. Thus I consider precisely such a "hijacking" one of the more plausible scenarios in the case of MH370. And the issue has still not been addressed.

    The video was first linked to on pprune but might be unlisted and the thread is long so I can't find it but will post again, if I do find it.

    1. Re:The 777 is unique in its vulnerability by Forever+Wondering · · Score: 1

      This avionics bay access hatch vulnerability was recently reported on CNN [ironically, prior to the GermanWings disaster]

      --
      Like a good neighbor, fsck is there ...
    2. Re:The 777 is unique in its vulnerability by dave420 · · Score: 1

      There is nothing remotely ironic about that... Is that you, Alanis?

    3. Re:The 777 is unique in its vulnerability by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Only a moron would go down there to install something. just rip out wires.

    4. Re:The 777 is unique in its vulnerability by Forever+Wondering · · Score: 1

      I'm not Alanis.

      Perhaps, ironic was an unfortunate choice of words, but I didn't mean it in terms of sarcastic/sardonic. There is an alternate definition:

      happening in the opposite way to what is expected, and typically causing wry amusement because of this.
      "it was ironic that now that everybody had plenty of money for food, they couldn't obtain it because everything was rationed"

      (e.g. paradoxical, incongruous)

      Shortly after 9/11 when they were first proposing armoring the cockpit doors, I remember thinking: "But, what if you have [a legitimate need] to get in there?". Hence, the irony for me. If the locked out pilot had access through such a maintenance port, he might have been able to override the suicidal co-pilot.

      After GermanWings, there are new proposals:
      (1) Europe adopting the U.S. policy of two crew members in the cockpit at all times [even if one is a flight attendant].
      (2) Aircraft flight systems will [forcibly] take over flying the plane if they detect something [egregiously] unsafe--not merely warn the pilot.
      (3) Allow a ground based pilot crew to take over flying the aircraft remotely (like a drone aircraft) if something is unsafe.
      (4) Not allowing [as is presently allowed] a single person to disable the cockpit door unlock codes/keys.

      Remedies (2) and (3) aren't limited to just a suicidal pilot. Hypoxia may overcome both pilot/co-pilot before they have a chance to switch to oxygen.

      But, if people are screaming "beware of hackers" now, just imagine the hoopla surrounding implementation of (3). Although remote drone piloting is used by military drones, there have been some [unconfirmed] reports of nefarious people being able to take over drones.

      --
      Like a good neighbor, fsck is there ...
  45. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Ksevio · · Score: 1

    True - ISP level NAT is getting more and more common with some switching customers to IPv6 only and providing a NAT bridge to sites that need IPv4

  46. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by AK+Marc · · Score: 1

    a special software device (thats not a firewall!) that acts as a firewall

    A firewall is a special software device. There are lots of Linux firewalls out there and other purely software firewalls. Aside from protecting against electrical attacks, there is little that can be done to a software firewall that will be different from what can be done to a software firewall. I remember cracking open a Cisco PIX and seeing a bog-standard Intel wireless card plugged into the motherboard that was running an Intel Pentium CPU. But that relatively-standard PC is called a "hardware firewall" by most (and by "most" I mean "all", except for those who would lie to try to prove a point on Slashdot).

    Also he seems to think that engines 'breath' air, and that the air inside the cabin of an airliner is not at all isolated from the air that goes into the engines.

    "Breathe" The process to take in and expel air.

    How is that not what an engine does? And he never said the air in the cabin was not isolated from the engines, but that stating to physically close networks that run over similar protocols are inherently connectable is silly, as silly as saying that a human can hack an engine while strapped into a seat because both the human and the engine take in and expel air.

    The reality of it is, what the GAO said IS TRUE.

    Yes, the useless GAO report says that "no security is 100%". There is no assessment of risk, recommended changes, or other useful statements being reported from the GAO report. Just FUD.

  47. Due diligence required by sgt_doom · · Score: 1

    Until one understands all the ARINC systems aboard, both the Boeing 777 and Airbus, and the satellites (including the Inmarsat satellites), and the avionics systems at control towers are ARTCCs and earth ground stations and VSATS, and the Microsemi FPGAs installed, and the Freescale chips, etc., and the report on the backdoored Actel/Microsemi chips, etc., this nebulous talk is all soooooo much bullcrap from the yahoos. With hardware trojans and hardware malware pre-installed, especially in any or all of the 1,000Microsemi FPGAs onboard a Boeing 777, plus other ARINC items, one cannot begin to fathom just how easy it is for the guilty parties to hack this and other avionics systems, and all others with such chips, etc.

  48. Find the slides for his talk by Jdodge99 · · Score: 1

    You saw an article with simplistic pull quotes -- don't assume that's all there is.

    Airliners avionics are comparatively stone age. This is not all bad. The connection between the two is one way - out.

    Could someone be contemplating a linux based glass panel display that you can e-mail your flight plan to? Yes. Do private pilots often rely upon ipads for display even in IFR conditions -- probably yes. Can those instruments (both the theoretical and the actual) be compromised? Yes.

    Are airliners flying that way? I highly doubt it.
    Private pilots use ipads or android tablets because they are orders of magnitued cheaper, and have much better user interfaces. A Garmin GTN750 (GPS with map and waypoint database with Comm and Nav radios) is about $20,000 installed - a G500 Glass panel (Attitude inticator, altimeter, navigation display, maps, etc) is about the same ($20k installed) A tablet $500 and an Ilevil AHRS ($1000) + ADS-B receiver ($600) duplicate many / most of those functions, and add a few (No comm/nav radios and guidance - but you get traffic and weather on your device) We're allowed to use these toys, but not RELY upon them. Most commercial pilots are doing milk runs, and are largely following ATC instructions rather than finding their own way. ATC talk to the planes via analog radio transmissions -- My fear for "hijacking" would be based upon taking out a controller's radio antenna and hopping on a radio to give bogus directions. That could be deadly -- and ADB-in receivers could give them info about what to do.
    I think a warning to keep things segmented as much as they are is warranted, the scare that they will p0wn the flightdeck is not really believable.

  49. Re:Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In the car, "hardware" could be the car radio, which likely speaks both bluetooth and canbus. Don't expect car radios to have a lot of security.

    It may not have been done yet, but it's only a question of time.

  50. Every story like this is frustratingly dishonest by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I have been in the aerospace business for many years and have designed avionics (both hardware and software) systems that are used on manned aircraft and also on unmanned military platforms (different systems, of course). There is ZERO chance that ANY of these wild-eyed lunatic claims by "researchers" are EVER true. First, the critical systems are NOT even linked to systems the passengers are accessing. Second, no software unrelated to the flight software is allowed on the cockpit systems (so there ARE no "backdoors", etc). Third, you will not be permitted to even deply the avionics software until you have PROVEN, LINE-BY-LINE that the code allows no buffer overruns or other sloppy garbage that permits common exploits on consumer systems. Hell, you even have to prove full traceability between the source code and the binaries. You cannot get the hardware approved for installation into the aircraft withou full reviews that would expose any hardware exploitation path (the reviews are not for that ppurpose, but they expose any weakness in the architecture and hardware and any unnecessary stuff that should not be there. These claims always play on the ignorance of the masses, as well as everybody's personal experiences with flakey consumer-grade hardware or software in which there is no regulation or oversignt and developer sloppiness fuelled by Mountain Dew-fuelled all-nighters, colliding with management-orderred ship-by dates are commonplace.

    It's hard enough to get the necessary hardware and software approved; NOBODY in the business is going to put extra hardware or software in place that permits an attack vector (not because they are fending off hackers but because it's too expensive and time consuming to get each bit of circuit and each line of code reviewd and approved). I call COMPLETE AND UTTER BULL on ANY claims of explaitable avionics.... this stuff is almost always pumped out by professors and "security experts" who are cashing-in on their claims by convincing gullible stupid paranoid people that they need more research grants or that THEY have the expensive "fixes" for these fake would-be problems.

  51. Internal workings vs. flight characteristics by trumpetplayer · · Score: 1

    > Flight simulators do not model the internal workings of an airplane, but rather the flight characteristics.

    Do you know that for a fact? I am not familiar at all with flight simulators, but I am familiar with car and motorcycle simulation software such as computer games. The reason I am asking you this is because some of these do emulate the internal workings of the cars, to the point that, after a race, you can generate the exact telemetry log file that the real thing would generate, in the very same format used by major race ECU manufacturers such as Motec. I know for a fact that this feature is being used by professional race teams at present day. The guy in charge for the telemetry system in a bike team told me this became a common feature in specific software some time in the '90s.

    Like I said, I do not know about flight simulators, but I would presume they do a bit of both (flight characteristics / internal workings), and I would be surprised if they are significantly behind car and motorcycle simulators in terms of technology.

    1. Re:Internal workings vs. flight characteristics by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First, yes, I know this for a fact, because I was sitting next to a person who designs the systems in airplanes, and she indicated that every 'fact' the guy had came from simulators and that they were false.

    2. Re:Internal workings vs. flight characteristics by trumpetplayer · · Score: 1

      Fair enough, thanks for replying :-)

  52. Re: Kind of a dup, but here's a link that explains by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Awe shit. Didn't think of Jeff Goldblum. Now I won't be able to fly ever again without Valium.