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Australian PLAID Crypto, ISO Conspiracies, and German Tanks

New submitter Gaglia writes: PLAID, the Australian 'unbreakable' smart card identification protocol has been recently analyzed in this scientific paper (disclaimer: I am one of the authors, and this is a personal statement.)

Technically, the protocol is a disaster. In addition to many questionable design choices, we found ways for tracing user identities and recover card access capabilities. The attacks are efficient (few seconds on 'home' hardware in some cases), and involve funny techniques such as RSA moduli fingerprinting and... German tanks. See this entry on Matt Green's crypto blog for a pleasant-to-read explanation.

But the story behind PLAID's standardization is possibly even more disturbing. PLAID was pushed into ISO with a so-called "fast track" procedure. Technical loopholes made it possible to cut off from any discussion the ISO groups responsible for crypto and security analysis. Concerns from tech-savvy experts in the other national panels were dismissed or ignored. We contacted ISO and CERT Australia before going public with our paper, but all we got was a questionable and somewhat irate response (PDF) by PLAID's project editor (our reply here). Despite every possible evidence of bad design, PLAID is now approved as ISO standard, and is coming to you very soon inside security products which will advertise non-existing privacy capabilities.

The detailed story of PLAID in the paper is worth a read, and casts many doubts on the efficacy of the most important standardizing body in the world. It is interesting to see how a "cryptography" product can be approved at ISO without undergoing any real security scrutiny.

On a related note, the enthusiastic comments to PLAID's design made by a few readers in the old Slashdot story reminds us as a cautionary tale that you need cryptographers to assess the security of cryptography. Quoting Bruce Schneier: amateurs produce amateur cryptography.

62 comments

  1. PLAID must be fast! by greenwow · · Score: 5, Funny

    Even faster than LUDICROUS.

    1. Re:PLAID must be fast! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uhh, why was this moderated down? The mods haven't see Spaceballs?

    2. Re:PLAID must be fast! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uhh, why was this moderated down? The mods haven't see Spaceballs?

      The mods are experts in balls, how dare you imply otherwise.

    3. Re:PLAID must be fast! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Apparently they've seen it, and didn't like it. That's sad. This used to be a tech site.

    4. Re:PLAID must be fast! by Carewolf · · Score: 2

      Uhh, why was this moderated down? The mods haven't see Spaceballs?

      Somebody switched the mods to blow.

    5. Re:PLAID must be fast! by chilenexus · · Score: 3, Funny

      They're Assholes, sir.

  2. ISO corruption by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The detailed story of PLAID in the paper is worth a read, and casts many doubts on the efficacy of the most important standardizing body in the world. It is interesting to see how a "cryptography" product can be approved at ISO without undergoing any real security scrutiny.

    Not really surprising given the Microsoft OOXML standard controversy a few years ago. I suppose the ISO could always have been susceptible to influence peddling in the past, but the OOXML thing was the first time I, and a lot of others, became aware of it.

    1. Re:ISO corruption by arglebargle_xiv · · Score: 2

      Like OOXML, it is a good example of how politics can override the standards process. In the case of PLAID, they needed something that complied to an international standard. They already had their own homebrew system, so they got that made an international standard, a case of the tail wagging the dog.

      ISO 24727 (aka '747, due to its elephantine size) is another example of this, and in the same general area as LUDICROUS... uhh, PLAID. The whole thing is, and I'm not making this up, over six thousand pages long. Guess how much independent review that one got?

      The practice isn't limited to ISO though, you can buy yourself IETF standards just as easily. What you do is, if you're a government organisation that needs a standard (and it seems to be almost exclusively government bodies that do this), you pay a standards consluttant to write you one and shepherd it through the process of becoming an RFC. Then once it's published you can point to it and say "Look, we comply with this industry standard".

  3. ISO is still useful by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

    Now we know that anything with PLAID insecurity (ISO/IEC 25185-1) should be automatically removed from consideration. I suspect as many new products will come out with this as there will be with MD5 and SHA-1 over the next few years. It's a dead standard before it was even published.

    --
    The cesspool just got a check and balance.
    1. Re:ISO is still useful by ronan7853 · · Score: 2

      I would be surprised if there are any products out there using PLAID, given that it is still flagged as "under development". If it's been shot down at this stage, then no harm has been done, and basically the standards process is functioning as it should.

      --
      This sig consists of eleven words, twenty syllables, and sixty-one letters.
    2. Re:ISO is still useful by Gr8Apes · · Score: 1

      It should have been shot down. However, my point was that it's already dead. No one would create a product with this standard, as it is meaningless. Imagine the negative PR about your product if you implemented this standard for anything other than a government product, and even then.

      --
      The cesspool just got a check and balance.
  4. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by hawguy · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Australians have been selling their freedom for security for years. Socialized society, insane gun control, and their crypto attitude is just horrible.

    With a firearm related homicide rate 1/30th that of the USA (and firearm related deaths due to all causes about 1/12th that of the USA), maybe their gun control isn't so insane.

  5. ISO Meeting by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

    ISO JTC1/SC27 is meeting right now in Jaipur India. I'm one of the US delegates, but screw ups leading to no visa meant I didn't go.

    I imagine they might be having some discussions in the corridors about this.

    --
    I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    1. Re:ISO Meeting by Infiniti2000 · · Score: 2

      They should have put it on the calendar then.

    2. Re:ISO Meeting by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      That would have been nice wouldn't it? I had to get the details from an email and then it may have ended up on the INCITES web site (the US delegation web site).

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    3. Re:ISO Meeting by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      Here's the invitation from the people who hosted.. http://59.177.182.156/sc27/ind...

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
  6. Response to criticism by myrdos2 · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Here's the meat of the "questionable and somewhat irate" response:

    The following are factual and editorial errors in the document:

    1. Abstract – States that for AS 5185-2010 "we show that the privacy properties of PLAID are significantly weaker than claimed" but in fact the report shows that the privacy properties of PLAID are unbroken by the attack and in fact unbreakable by the attack. The report actually shows that the "ID Leakage" properties of the protocol (as defined in AS 5185-2010) could be better implemented in the 2010 version of the reference implementation by implementing the fake "ShillKey" better - see further discussion in section 6.2.

    2. Abstract – states that it will be ...." reporting a number of undesirable cryptographic features of the protocol" This is however unargued and not actualised. The reference appears to logically means section 5.3 of the Unpicking PLAID paper however, as shown in section 7 of this discussion these are either not claims of the protocol or are not shown to be weaknesses by any argument presented by the Researchers - see further discussion in section 7.

    3. History in Introduction is not 100% correct – the Public Consultation process included additional workshops and stages – see section 4 "History" above

    4. P3, Last paragraph, the words "added for privacy reasons" is incorrect, the ShillKey was added to delay and distract an atacker, privacy was never an issue and is not stated as a design requirement.

    5. P4, last paragraph, P5 first paragraph – Not clear what point is being made – OPACITY is a completely different protocol based on Eliptic Curve technology. Last sentence seems to mix this Paper on PLAID up with a completely seperate report on OPACITY.

    6. P3 2nd last paragraph the Researchers state "Even though the encryption key in RSA is usually public, in PLAID it is kept secret to enhance privacy". This is an incorrect representation of PLAID, the reason for both keys being kept secret is in fact to prevent any leakage to an attacker of the AES diversification seed in order to enhance security. Note that PLAID is not a PKI, and the use of public and private key concepts is not relevant, ALL keys are secured in (preferably) hardware crypto devices.

    I'm no crypto expert - can anyone explain to me why these points aren't valid? Especially points 1 and 4.

    1. Re:Response to criticism by suutar · · Score: 4, Informative

      1 and 4 together make me think that the author is saying that shill is completely irrelevant to privacy and the rest of plaid is just as private as advertised. The problem is that while shill may have been intended as a bolt-on to distract and slow attackers, it apparently also can be used to do the tracking that the rest of plaid was designed to avoid. The author claims that's not a problem because it wasn't designed to be private, but the end effect seems to be that the card is more trackable than intended. A better implementation of the shillkey could help with this, but is not required by the standard nor implemented by the reference, so how many commodity hardware makers are going to bother?

    2. Re:Response to criticism by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Part of the argument the PLAID designers are making boils down to "well it's theoretically possible to implement it securely even if the standard doesn't warn you about that risk, nobody does it right, and even the reference implementation got it wrong".

      For examples of how well that works out in real life, see:

      * WiFi WPS pins - just search the web for "WiFi WPS pin attack" - most WiFi routers were vulnerable
      * DNS source port randomisation - http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113 - most DNS resolvers were vulnerable
      * PKCS#1 signature validation - https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html - most browsers were vulnerable
      * Many others

    3. Re:Response to criticism by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Your question is legit, but I'll try to explain why these points are invalid (as far as I get it, i'm just a PhD crypto student)

      First of all one has to understand that cryptography is a very paranoid thing: you always have to assume the worst case scenario. But most of the work is actually to figure out *what* the worst-case scenario is. This is called "defining a security model", and it is something non--cryptographers are VERY bad at doing.

      For example, in this plaid scenario, consider this security model:

      "the adversary must not be able, by decrypting the traffic, to read the username of the cardholder"

      Now, *IF* this is your security model, then plaid is (probably, but one should prove it) "secure". Unfortunately, this security model is very weak, because doesn't take into account other ways of identifying the user. This is the original mistake the authors of plaid did, and the paper's authors show why with their attack.

      But then there are a lot of other flaws. About your list:

      1) "but in fact the report shows that the privacy properties of PLAID are unbroken by the attack and in fact unbreakable by the attack" -> this is false, there is no way the authors of the paper can "show" this. This is basic logical fallacy: if I tell you "this attack breaks property A", this does not imply "this attack cannot break property B".

      2) not sure what they want to say, but I think it refers to the fact that some of the consideration in the paper do not (directly) lead to additional attacks. This is another logical fallacy and a blasphemy in crypto: if you design a protocol, it is YOUR duty to show it secure, not other people's duty to prove it insecure. The authors of the paper point out at design issues that have been known to be problematic in other circumstances. This, in a serious academic crypto discussion, should probably be already enough reason for rejectal.

      3) no idea

      4) Having a look at the referenced material in the paper, it seems that privacy was meant to be the MAIN selling point of plaid. The designer of plaid here say "ah, yes, but we never meant the shill key to leak user information". Which translates to "ah, yes, we never wanted to design an insecure protocol (but we did)"

      5) no idea

      6) this sounds like b***shit and a desperate mirror-climbing. If it is "not relevant", then why they don't just use AES? The point is that the designers did not realize that having different public keys for every user (even if these are just the shill keys) leaks information. Stomping your feet yelling "BUT THIS IS UNFAIR" does not solve the situation I think...

      Also, nobody mentioned so far the SECOND attack in the paper, the "keyset fingerprinting". I found it much easier to understand and, I think, even more devastating.

    4. Re:Response to criticism by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Excellent summary, that's my interpretation after skimming both the response to the paper and the paper authors' response to the response.

    5. Re:Response to criticism by plover · · Score: 2

      I think the most dangerous aspect is that this protocol has no way to revoke keys. That means "break once, profit everywhere."

      If one terminal is successfully compromised and its private key is lost, every card with a lost key is subject to the compromise of all traffic, past, present, and future. That means if you are using it to guard an access door to a venereal disease clinic in some small town in the outback, it may contain the private key granting access to a central building guarding all national health data. Now you have to protect each and every reader as if it's made out of pure gold, even if it is only guarding Crocodile Dundee's urine samples.

      Cryptographic protocol development needs to be an iterative process, because flaws are so difficult to find, yet can have devastating impact. The ISO is stuck in the old world of civil engineering, where "if it works today, it's good enough for tomorrow." That fails utterly for security engineering.

      --
      John
    6. Re:Response to criticism by Gaglia · · Score: 1

      Author of submission here. All correct, moreover:

      3) As we state in our response:

      "While the analyses by Watanabe [Wat13] and Sakurada [Sak13] in some sense confirm authentication
      and key secrecy properties of PLAID under the assumption of idealized cryptographic primitives, we—as
      already discussed in our paper—disagree with considering them as “cryptographic proofs” as the project
      editor’s report does. In particular, these analyses do not consider privacy aspects."

      5) We never meant to compare PLAID and OPACITY. As it is good practice in academic works, we are required to cite every relevant other work which has anything to do with PLAID. In this case, we mention that someone has given a look at PLAID and compared it with OPACITY, another smart-card protocol, but notice that we do not say anything about comparing the two. The fact that some of the authors of "Unpicking PLAID" are also authors of another paper analyzing OPACITY is a mere coincidence. I do not understand this complaint by the PLAID Project Editor... It is like if you write a paper about post-quantum cryptography, cite a work where people compare the hardware speed of some post-quantum scheme with that of some RSA scheme, and then someone complains that you cited a work talking about RSA which is not post-quantum...

  7. Unbreakable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In crypto, "unbreakabe" is a codeword for "amateur scam".

    1. Re:Unbreakable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not quite. I can give you NOPE, my cipher that is entirely unbreakable by anyone.

      //input: plaintext //return: unbreakable cipher

      char* encrypt(char* plaintext)
      {
            return "nope.";
      }

      Keyword anyone.

  8. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What's their beaten-to-death-with-a-stick homicide rate? Hardly surprising that gun homicides went down if guns are banned. The question is whether all homicides went down, or just shifted to homicide victims tending to be smaller and weaker than homicide perpetrators.

    On a related note, how are the rape and robbery statistics?

  9. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by BadDreamer · · Score: 5, Informative

    Australia is at about 1 homicide per 100,000 inhabitants per year. The rate has been steadily declining since 1990. In the US it's at around 4.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year.

    Robberies are at around half the rate of what they are in the US. Sexual assault is about equivalent, though it used to be higher before the new gun legislation.

  10. Shocking by ThatsNotPudding · · Score: 2

    This is so unlike the trustworthy NSA and their rock-solid, shenanigan-free encryption wares.

  11. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by hawguy · · Score: 3, Informative

    Here, now you know how to fish.

    Australia's robbery rate is about half (55%) that of the US, overall murder rate is about 1/4.

            http://www.nationmaster.com/co...

    And I'll just throw this out there, last night in my town, someone not only managed to shoot himself in the foot, but the same bullet seriously injured a 9 year old neighbor:

            http://abc7news.com/news/san-j...

  12. Switching to protocol "POPCORN" by daboochmeister · · Score: 1

    Entertainment value set to 2048 bits.

    --
    "Ahh! I see you're in that indeterminate Schrodinger state where - oh, uh ... never mind." Dave Bucci
  13. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by interval1066 · · Score: 0

    Well, I suppose you're going to see some differences between countries with a total population of 25 Million to one with well over 350 million, but hey, its your point. You run with it.

    --
    Python: 'And then suddenly you have a language which says "we're all stuck with whatever the whiniest coder wants".'
  14. amateur hour at the crypto factory.... by xeno · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It's irrelevant to the core logic of the issue, but misspellings and grammar errors are a pretty good indicator of the quality of a piece of work.
    A "mute" item would be "(1) refraining from making sound or (2) silent" -- one that does not make an actual audible sound.
    A "moot" item is one that is "(1) of no importance or (2) merely hypothetical."
    There are many other errors that seem to indicate this whole document was whipped up in a hurry by a pissed off individual without review, but the high-school-level error "mute point" sticks out like a sore thumb.

    Seeing this kind of minor but highly-visible mistake in the headings and TOC of a formal document... does not lend credibility to the whole.

    --
    I think not...(*poof*)
    1. Re:amateur hour at the crypto factory.... by Gaglia · · Score: 1

      Author of submission here. I agree with you xeno, but this is just my personal view and does not necessarily reflect the one of all the people involved. In our paper we used "moot" when intended, and "mute" when quoting from the PLAID editor's report, as it is the usual good practice. But, disclaimer: as a non-native English speaker, I cannot be sure whether "mute" could also be used in some Australian slang with the intended meaning. Thanks for pointing that out!

    2. Re:amateur hour at the crypto factory.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The American use of the word 'moot' is different to the rest of the world.

    3. Re:amateur hour at the crypto factory.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I cannot be sure whether "mute" could also be used in some Australian slang with the intended meaning

      Aussie here, "mute" means either "silent" or "I failed english".

  15. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    With a firearm related homicide rate 1/30th that of the USA (and firearm related deaths due to all causes about 1/12th that of the USA), maybe their gun control isn't so insane.

    Who cares how people are being murdered? Do victims or family and friends of victims give two shits about your arbitrary selectors or do they care about not being murdered?

    If the yearly gun murder rate went down by 1000 and the yearly knife murder rate went up by 1000 to compensate for lack of guns your policies have in fact solved nothing even though cherry picked statistics would fool all who wanted to believe in a much different outcome.

    I have no insights into Australian politics or crime statistics or what the optimal policy is or should be. I only know that propagating selection bias is unlikely to help anyone. I also know this is way off topic so I'm posting as AC to keep it under the radar.

  16. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by hawguy · · Score: 1

    With a firearm related homicide rate 1/30th that of the USA (and firearm related deaths due to all causes about 1/12th that of the USA), maybe their gun control isn't so insane.

    Who cares how people are being murdered? Do victims or family and friends of victims give two shits about your arbitrary selectors or do they care about not being murdered?

    If the yearly gun murder rate went down by 1000 and the yearly knife murder rate went up by 1000 to compensate for lack of guns your policies have in fact solved nothing even though cherry picked statistics would fool all who wanted to believe in a much different outcome.

    I have no insights into Australian politics or crime statistics or what the optimal policy is or should be. I only know that propagating selection bias is unlikely to help anyone. I also know this is way off topic so I'm posting as AC to keep it under the radar.

    The overall muder rate in Australia is about 1/4 that of the USA, so apparently taking away the guns doesn't make killers kill their victims with knives (which is a lot harder to do -- much easier to shoot someone from across the room than get within arms reach so you can stab them, giving the victim a chance to fight back.)

  17. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Violent crime has more than doubled in Australia since their gun control in a time when the rest of the world (including the us) is seeing a decline in violent crime.

  18. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Well, wrong. A bigger country has more murders, but no need to have a higher murder rate.

  19. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Australia is at about 1 homicide per 100,000 inhabitants per year. The rate has been steadily declining since 1990. In the US it's at around 4.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants per year.

    Robberies are at around half the rate of what they are in the US. Sexual assault is about equivalent, though it used to be higher before the new gun legislation.

    The rates of all violent crime have been steadily declining since the early 1990s in the US as well, even though gun ownership has been increasing. Violent crime in the US is due to localized cultural problems and is not uniformly distributed across the country (or even across an individual state or city). The numbers per inhabitant may be higher, but few American inhabitants are ever really exposed to violent crime. We have a relatively small subset of the population that are continually killing each other and make up the bulk of those numbers.

    If you're not involved in quasi-gang related activity in a large urban area, your chances of being murdered are not that high. I lived in the "murder capital of the US" for several decades and I've not known a single person who's been murdered or even knows anyone who has been murdered.

  20. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Incorrect. It has gone down.

    What has increased is imbeciles harping on the interweb echo chamber about some shit they've read in 'the media'. A media that will report and hype anything and everything that seems even remotely 'shocking'.

    "Man hit and killed by meteorite!" would remain a headline for two weeks because they can't find anything else to report about. Then some dipshits see this and think it's going to happen to them and start a "Sky is falling" panic, and start taking out shares in the underground bunker industry.

  21. Evolving protocol more than ten years old by Stonefish · · Score: 2

    Hi, as someone who also worked for a company which was working for Centrelink at the time (Not involved in PLAID) I have to admit that I admire the development of PLAID because the commercial products available were rubbish and "Security agencies" such as NSA and DSD were not helpful in this regard. A significant gap in the way that smart-cards which were being used for access control such as building security worked was found and an attempt was made to re-mediate this.
    Protocols evolve over time to either become better or reveal the fact that they are fundamentally flawed. SSL was not written by cryptographic experts it was created by Netscape and it has evolved over time to secure a significant percentage of Internet transactions. PLAID exists because all of the available security products in this space were fundamentally broken and PLAID was an attempted to fix this problem. During the time since this protocol was created I've watch the various debacles with a number of propriety commercial smart card products used in public transport. I would hope that PLAID will evolve over time with the assistance of interested parties to be an open protocol which provides a solution in this problem space.
    One criticism of this appears to be that a department which spends billions of dollars on ICT infrastructure should engage in the development of a product when there is an identified gap identified in the market. The spend in total was in the hundred thousand dollars so in reality the project was done on a shoestring is it's not surprising that there are flaws.

    1. Re:Evolving protocol more than ten years old by david_bonn · · Score: 1

      SSL isn't a good example of a protocol done right by amateurs.

      The fact that SSL didn't generate a barrage of FUD from certain three-letter agencies is the surest sign that SSL sucks butt.

      Ref: https://weakdh.org/imperfect-f...

      (oh, and I find it hilarious that the above is in an https link).

    2. Re:Evolving protocol more than ten years old by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      re "such as NSA and DSD were not helpful in this regard"
      The main mission in Australia is to look after US, UK collect it all shared sites running 24/7 out in Asia, Pacific and a huge list of 'other' nations.
      Staff that are left over from that task are working on Australian only services to duplicate the above so if the US or UK ever shut Australia out again, Australia still has its own full access to every network in the region. With full real time translation, plain text under Australian command structures.
      After that the staff have to ensure communications networks between sites sensitive to mil/gov remain secure on commercial dual use networks. A lot of effort in emerging domestic quantum encryption given the given the contractors now working on complex upgrades around Australia.
      re "not surprising that there are flaws"
      Finally down the list was other crypto work that would not upset the NSA or GCHQ and be of export interest to other nations.
      Australia creating good, low cost encryption standards that worked and exporting it would have been quickly questioned by other 5 eye nations.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  22. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hardly surprising that gun homicides went down if guns are banned.

    Right and that is a good thing. For all the talk of needing guns in the US we all know that's bullshit, you get felt up by at the airport whenever you want to fly, your government is one of the most oppressive, privacy-invading ones in the world and still you think you have power because you have a gun? LOL! No the result is you just kill eachother, 294 mass shootings in 274 days...how many times did you have the balls to rise up against your oppressive government? NONE! Your government is one step away from sodomizing your ass and you would take it and still be telling us its ok because you have guns so you have power and you're gullible enough to believe that.

    The point of it is to rise up against an oppressive government so off you go. But you wont because you just have guns to make you feel tough, the end result is your government pounding your bitch ass even more and you never doing anything about it.

  23. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by losfromla · · Score: 1

    Hilarious! But also very sad because it's quite true.

    --
    Only I can judge you.
  24. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Jack+Griffin · · Score: 1

    If by 'lost' you mean 'won' then yes you are right.
    4 cities in the top 10 worldwide for liveability. Maybe your definition of winning needs to be reconsidered?

  25. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yeah he is right. I absolutely hate knowing that if I ever lose my job I am able to be fully supported at any time, I also hate that I never have to worry about the cost of hospital related events. It is also horrifying living here with our strong unions that have managed to make every job have a rate of pay that ensures I can afford to live comfortably, taking 4 weeks off a year and even be paid when I'm sick! Man don't get me started on being paid to go to uni, not having to pay any of the costs back until I earn over $50k a year... We really need to be more like the USA here, it is a great aussie shame.

  26. ISO Standards are a political joke by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I lost all respect for ISO standards when Microsoft was successful in getting their Excel spreadsheet 'standard' approved, over the strenuous objections of the technical committees, by essentially lobbying (bribing?) enough ministers in enough european governments.
    At that point it became obvious that ISO was for sale.
    pgmer6809

  27. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    " last night in my town, someone not only managed to shoot himself in the foot, but the same bullet seriously injured a 9 year old neighbor:"

    I told the lazy sum-bitch it was a damn fool stupid way to cut his toenails, next time he'll lesten and use a shotgun like us reg'lar folks...

  28. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Go back to sucking Koch cock, will you?

  29. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Oh, well, the Economist said so, so there, I guess.

    Hint: "Best cities" lists are always highly politicized. You really shouldn't put too much stock in them.

  30. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by dbIII · · Score: 1

    maybe their gun control isn't so insane

    The insane and ex-cons with a violent record have trouble getting guns - so insane gun control :)

  31. Errata Corrige by Gaglia · · Score: 1

    I'm the author of the original submission. There was a mistake in the story, as we never contacted AusCERT, but CERT Australia instead. The similarity of the names was a bit unfortunate. I apologize for this error. Could some moderator please edit the submission? Thank you!

  32. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

    Or maybe it was the murder rate in USA that went down for unrelated reasons so the relations between USA and other countries changed.

    --
    "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
  33. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    And the mass murder rate was?
    Tell me again how many times this year someone in the USA killed multiple victims at once vs someone in Australia?

  34. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Or maybe it was the murder rate in USA that went down for unrelated reasons so the relations between USA and other countries changed.

    Go do some research, the US ranks with 3rd world countries in all aspect of gun violence and death. Get per capita numbers. Raw data, we lose 30K+ people a year to guns, roughly half are suicides, most of the rest accidents. Death rates by guns are rising in the US, should pass deaths by car accidents this year. Violent crime is down, overall deaths by guns is not.

  35. Re:Australians lost a long time ago by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

    I know. You probably misunderstood what I have written.
    The murder rate in the states is so high that if it goes down, the relationship to other countries will change far stronger than when the murder rate goes down in a more civilised place.

    --
    "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
  36. Re: Australians lost a long time ago by easyTree · · Score: 1

    Nice :D