No More Security Fixes For Older OpenSSL Branches (csoonline.com)
itwbennett writes: The OpenSSL Software Foundation has released new patches for the popular open-source cryptographic library, but for two of its older branches, OpenSSL 1.0.0t and 0.9.8zh, they will likely be the last security updates because support for these these two branches will end on Dec. 31. Previous research has shown that many companies using in-house built software keep poor records of which library versions their developers used in which of their applications. 'This makes it very likely that some systems and applications with OpenSSL 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 will never be updated, leaving them exposed to any critical vulnerabilities found in the library in the future,' writes Lucian Constantin.
If you're going to break the fucking library by declaring it insecure trash for life, break the library. Make it crash hard when it's used. The problem software will percolate up to the users' attention.
https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-t...
So one bug was in code deemed dodgy in external peer-review and the other was in code not really needed. Right.
Maintain it yourself
Truth is, everyone on those versions has had plenty of warning and should have moved off years ago. The changes needed to use the newer versions are minimal and anyone complaining can afford the effort.
Doesn't OpenWRT only use those branches?
software terrorism. Microsoft wouldn't do this. Apple wouldn't do this (on purpose). Is anyone else tired of dodging agendas of the freedom fighters?
Distros that still use older versions (like Ubuntu LTS) can backport patches by themselves. Shouldn't be much of a problem. Ah, the beauty of free software. :)
1.0.0 which is no longer being updated, was replaced by 1.0.1 in December of 1998. In other words, if you want to be secure, use a version from 1998 or later.
That seems pretty reasonable to me.
If you're talking about OpenSSL then you're off by a decade. 1.0.0 was released in 2010.
Your assertion is false.
The 1.0.1 branch from 1998 will still get patches. Openssl versions earlier than 1998 will not. So it's precisely the same as if Microsoft said they're only going to release patches for Windows98 and above, and stop supporting Windows 95. I'm pretty sure they've done exactly that. And both companies dropped support for much newer versions as well. ONLY open source would still be releasing patches for an 18-year old version of the software.
You're correct, I read something wrong. 1.0.1, which is supported, is from March 2012.
> OpenSSL wasn't even around in 1998.
Here's the OpenSSL changelog, including changes in 1998 releases such as 0.9.8g. The 0.9.x.y branch lasted a long time.
https://www.openssl.org/news/c...
As you said , 1.0.1 wasn't released until 2012.
That's why Microsoft has so much abandonware and so many defunct branches of software. Same with Apple. Difference is, anyone can revive those OpenSSL branches, whereas Microsoft destroys source code that could be subject to future lawsuits.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
Fips-140, cross platform (windows + linux), and lots and lots
of crypto and PKI certificate utilities built in makes it pretty appealing.
Difference is, anyone can revive those OpenSSL branches, whereas Microsoft destroys source code that could be subject to future lawsuits.
The world is truly a darker place because some amateur hacks can't resurrect Windows 3.11 for Workgroups.
It resulted in lawsuits, such as DRDOS, being extended over decades, and many potentially exciting businesses being driven into bankruptcy.
To this day, it results in WINE incompatibilities where none should exist. This is a genuine problem.
Far as Windows 3.11 is concerned, lots of systems you really don't want failing (such as control systems for hydroelectric dams and nuclear reactors) use ancient versions of operating systems (NT 3.x, for example) because it's too dangerous to reimplement the control software. The consequences of an error are too great and modern operating systems are too complex to be made reliable enough.
These systems rely on legacy hardware, much of which is no longer made. They rely on no novel fault conditions arising. Because they're increasingly on the public internet, this cannot possibly be guaranteed. Without maintenance, without the prospect of anyone even knowing how to handle error conditions, these are ticking time bombs.
So, yes, the world is less safe and less satisfactory because of abandoned lines for which no source exists and for which workarounds are more dangerous than just allowing a catastrophic failure to arise.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
The key phrase in all of that may be:
> starting with 1.0.0 all 1.0.x releases have been binary compatible.
Meaning that the current version 1.0.2 is an exact drop-in replacement for the 2010 version 1.0.0 - no wrapper is needed. For software from before 1.0.0 (2010), it will need to be recompiled.
What's next? Fixing reported bugs?