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LAPD Hacked An iPhone 5s Before The FBI Hacked San Bernardino Terrorist's iPhone 5c (latimes.com)
According to recently released court papers, Los Angeles police investigators found a way to break into a locked iPhone 5s belonging to April Jace, the slain wife of "The Shield" actor Michael Jace. The detectives were able to bypass the security at around the same time period the FBI was demanding Apple unlock the iPhone 5c belonging to San Bernardino terrorist Syed Rizwan Farook. LAPD detective Connie Zych wrote on March 18, the department found a "forensic cellphone expert" who could "override the locked iPhone function," according to the search warrant. There's no mention of how the LAPD broke into the iPhone or what OS the iPhone was running (Note: iOS 8, which features improved encryption and security features, came out months after the killing). The information stored on the iPhone should help in the criminal case against Jace's husband, who is charged with the May 19, 2014, killing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
I just looked it up because of this article, that was nearly a full 2 years ago. I imagine several significant holes in iOS have likely been patched by now.
Apple are seemingly getting close to having an airtight phone, assuming you have it locked of course with a reasonable pass / pin. This seems like a good thing for the consumer.
Obligatory Zoolander: https://www.youtube.com/watch?...
IOS 8 was released Sept of 2014. Or four months after the killing.
The phone would have been running iOS 7at best.
Let's have a big headline and dupe idiots into thinking it was hard.
i thought once I was found, but it was only a dream.
They probably just asked inmates to help out: they have experience and time.
Table-ized A.I.
Lapd has enormous budget, saw a documentary which said they had people stationed internationally. Mission creep on overdrive.
"belonging to San Bernardino terrorist Syed Rizwan Farook". No, it belonged to the county of San Bernardino.
There is a reason FBI chose this huge terrorism case out of their huge load. They politicized everything in order to establish a precedent.
Aliens? No. Don't be ridiculous. They were made by Dilbert. They are the Dupeys.
It really doesn't mean squat any longer, so stop derping about "hacking" already.
I'm not sure how you're jumping to the conclusion of "airtight phone." Nobody even knows how the most recent one was hacked, including the FBI if that's to be believed.
It certainly is hard enough to crack that the letter agencies have to shell out millions to shady "consultants" to do their dirty work, on the other hand...that's good for everyone _else_ at least.
It was probably locked with a fingerprint.
Time makes more converts than reason
Are you saying Apple's programmers are now able to create a computer program as complex as an operating system with no bugs and no flaws whatsoever?
This is a good point in general, however the kind of security we're talking about here is restricted to the "login screen", not the general purpose OS. That's a much smaller attack surface. Once you've logged in, and are running third-party code on the device, you're much more likely to be able to break something.
It's reasonable to say that GP's claim of them "getting reasonably close to having an airtight phone, assuming you have it locked" is accurate. There will always be workarounds (decapping the chips, forcing the owner to reveal the passcode, etc.) but short of a screw-up on Apple's side, the practical options for bypassing the lock screen via a hack are getting more and more limited.
the 5c was haxked with a hacked bootloader. everybody knows how.
Yes, iOS 7 was vulnerable to a very simple hardware hack:
(1) Hook up your own battery emulator to replace the battery
(2) Try a passcode, if it fails, cut power before the phone has a chance to write down the failure attempt
(3) Profit (seriously, these hack-boxes were like $50k each while they worked)
The solution on the phone side is reordering the events -- first execute failedAttempts++ and make sure it's synced to persistent storage, then evaluate the passcode and, if it's good, write failedAttempts=0 and unlock the phone. Not too complicated but counterintuitive to declare each attempt a failure beforehand and the undo your work later.
Oh, and syncing it one of those simple things that are notoriously difficult to nail down in practice. fsync is perennially misunderstood as ensuring data is written to persistent storage, it actually only means it's moved out to the device (cf F_FULLFSYNC). Linux spent a while on write barriers, but then settled on different IO ordering semantics.
Yes, iOS 7 was vulnerable to a very simple hardware hack:
(1) Hook up your own battery emulator to replace the battery
(2) Try a passcode, if it fails, cut power before the phone has a chance to write down the failure attempt
(3) Profit (seriously, these hack-boxes were like $50k each while they worked)
The solution on the phone side is reordering the events -- first execute failedAttempts++ and make sure it's synced to persistent storage, then evaluate the passcode and, if it's good, write failedAttempts=0 and unlock the phone. Not too complicated but counterintuitive to declare each attempt a failure beforehand and the undo your work later.
Oh, and syncing it one of those simple things that are notoriously difficult to nail down in practice. fsync is perennially misunderstood as ensuring data is written to persistent storage, it actually only means it's moved out to the device (cf F_FULLFSYNC). Linux spent a while on write barriers, but then settled on different IO ordering semantics.
My understanding as a total encryption and technical newbie (compared to most of slashdot) is the 5c is a weaker, simpler phone, the 5s with it's thumbscanner has some kind of hardware encryption key (or some such?) between each component, so replacing a component to fake thumb prints or something like that isn't possible.
I'm not sure EXACTLY how the c was hacked to be honest but TLDR, my understanding is the s is vastly more secure, going forward obviously for newer models too.
I see downsides to it, definitely - when it comes to death in the family kind of stuff but honestly, I don't want people with access to my stuff without my approval, ever.
No, there are easier hacks in iOS7 - there have been many lock screen hacks that let you in without consuming attempts on your passcode.
Just google for iOS7 lock screen bypasses and there's an ugly list of 3-4 different bugs. I believe even iOS 8 has similar lockscreen bypasses. Heck, even iOS9 had one using Siri until Apple fixed it server-side.
Illegal unless you're one of the good guys.
Requiem for the American Dream
He confessed on the phone, then signed a confession in police custody.
Why do they need help against that? Are they stupid or just plain dumb?
but short of a screw-up on Apple's side, the practical options for bypassing the lock screen via a hack are getting more and more limited.
There's no way you can know that and it's just historically untrue. This is a complex proprietary system, so it's already less secure than mature industry standards. Also, this system relies on an obfuscated process to allow the user to encrypt data with a weak pin. So you have fundamentally weak security (pin code), on an unproven closed system, relying on security through obscurity principles - I would not assume an iPhone is ever more secure than any volume secured with simple software encryption and a good password. In fact, if Apple really wanted you to secure your device they'd, let you disable all their binary garbage, install dm-crypt, and do it yourself. Apple has never been about choice, or user safety though. Hint: forced encryption incentivises cloud backups.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
except the fbi, unless of course they had an alterior motive for not being able to do so? nah an honest federal dept. wouldnt do that !
I think critically, so I own a Samsung and this doesn't apply to me yet - but indications are it soon will. Google has been encrypting their phones by default for a couple generation's and are warning OEMs they might require it for Android branding soon. As a society we need to stop the trend towards this nonsense.
There's nothing on my phone worth encrypting. If there was, I'd encrypt it. However there's lots on my phone that I'd never want to lose. I do backups, but I don't get to it every day, every week, or even every month. I would like the option to be able to emergency recover my data (impossible if it's encrypted) vs. keeping some non-existent nefarious agency from seeing a video of my son take his first steps.
This is like Levis putting an unbreakable lock on my wallet. If anyone tampers with it, or if I forget the password, the contents are virtually incinerated. I'm either asked to dutifully keep a copy of everything myself, or virtually store a copy of all my personal documents at Levis warehouse - both unfavorable options to simply selling me a wallet without a lock.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
So I'm sure you have a few links that both back up your remark as well as providing a more complete explanation, right?
Let's see them.
This is a complex proprietary system, so it's already less secure than mature industry standards
There's no causation between these two things.
Also, this system relies on an obfuscated process to allow the user to encrypt data with a weak pin.
iOS absolutely lets you chose a strong password, and in fact, encourages you to do so.
on an unproven closed system, relying on security through obscurity principles
No... on AES encryption, which is a well known, well proven, open encryption scheme.
I would not assume an iPhone is ever more secure than any volume secured with simple software encryption and a good password.
You mean... extremely secure. AES encrypted data on a volume is as far as we currently know, impossible to access without extracting the key from the user.
In fact, if Apple really wanted you to secure your device they'd, let you disable all their binary garbage, install dm-crypt, and do it yourself
Why would they do that? That would introduce far more steps into the process of making data secure, and therefore make 99% of users less secure.
No what is being said is that not every bug is a defect that can lead to third-parties being able to decrypt the phone. You're right that there may be more exploits out there. However, both the severity of the defects and the ease with which they can be exploited have been going asymptotically to zero so it's reasonable to believe that we may be at least getting very close to zero. I
Are you saying Apple's programmers are now able to create a computer program as complex as an operating system with no bugs and no flaws whatsoever?
Are Apple's programmers aliens from another planet with superior intelligence? Is this why Apple's new HQ looks like a "spaceship"?
Shhh! Don't tell anyone...
This is a complex proprietary system, so it's already less secure than mature industry standards.
Oh, you mean like those "Mature industry standards" ssl and ssh?
Yes I do. Now this will be the last response I'll give to someone that has chosen the name "macs4all" when talking about the inherent weakness of proprietary systems.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
Yes I do. Now this will be the last response I'll give to someone that has chosen the name "macs4all" when talking about the inherent weakness of proprietary systems.
Promise?
Yes, but those only get you access to Class C and D files. You need the actual passcode to unlock the Class A and Class B files, because the encryption key for those is actually derived from the passcode itself.
So you need to be able to make 1000 attempts on the passcode, and to do that, you need to be able to revert the counter of failed attempts.
so replacing a component to fake thumb prints or something like that isn't possible.
I think you'll find that it is possible to use a fake thumb print to fool the sensor, I'm not sure why you'd go to the trouble of replacing the sensor when the sensor just transmits the print and doesn't authenticate it.
There are a dew distinct aspects to this (IMO):
- There's a fundamental difference between "police can hack into iPhones" and "Apple puts a backdoor into iPhones so that iPhones are trivially hackable by anyone with the key", because Apple's role in the process matters. If Apple's job is to make iPhones secure, the police (and criminals) can of course still hack phones, but any vulnerabilities are treated as bugs to be fixed, and the iPhone gets more and more secure over time. If the police can force Apple to put a backdoor into the iPhone, then when the key is leaked (which always happens, when you give a key to thousands of police departments and other agencies, their contractors and vendors, etc., just as happened with DVDs) then anyone who can get the key can hack any iPhone, rendering it fundamentally insecure, and because it's required by a law, Apple cannot make the iPhone more secure, forever.
- The iPhone will never be 100% secure, because there's no such thing as 100% secure - the goal of security measures is to increase the cost/time of a successful attack, but infinite money/time can always ultimately succeed. For example, AES 256 is quite secure, but that just means that brute forcing a key would take enough time and harder (e.g. https://www.reddit.com/r/theyd...) that it's not worth it - you'd have to be a government to have the resources to do so, and very few secrets are worth spending a building full of supercomputers to hack. Every so often new techniques or technologies emerge that can change the equation (quantum computing...) but the same is true of physical locks - if you can photograph a key you can 3D print a duplicate. So it's always been a game of "cat and mouse" between lock-makers and lock-breakers.
- Because encryption is software, which can't be controlled globally, any laws restricting encryption only limits what can be embedded in systems from US manufacturers. But it won't have any control over anyone with internet access, since the rest of the planet can (and does) produce uncompromised security systems with no backdoors, which anyone on the planet can download and use (including good open source, free tools). So any law against secure systems won't help against real criminals, because presumably they'll either avoid digital communications (i.e. what real terrorists do now) or use true end-to-end encryption, but it'll certainly make it easier to eliminate privacy for the rest of us. Compare, for example, how the data collected by the government's massive surveillance of phone calls and emails hasn't helped against terrorists at all, but has been used for other purposes, such as to allow a government agent to spy on his wife to see if she was cheating on him.
Enable 3D printed prosthetics!