Serious Flaws In iMessage Crypto Allow For Message Decryption (onthewire.io)
Reader Trailrunner7 writes: New research from a team at Johns Hopkins University shows that there are serious problems with the way Apple implemented encryption on its iMessage system, leaving it open to retrospective decryption attacks that can reveal the contents of all of a victim's past iMessage texts. The iMessage system, like much of what Apple does, is opaque and its inner workings have not been made available to outsiders. One of the key things that is known about the system is that messages are encrypted from end to end and Apple has said that it does not have the ability to decrypt users' messages. The researchers at JHU, led by Matthew Green, a professor of computer science at the school, reverse engineered the iMessage protocol and discovered that Apple made some mistakes in its encryption implementation that could allow an attacker who has access to encrypted messages to decrypt them.The team discovered that Apple doesn't rotate encryption keys at regular intervals (most encryption protocols such as OTR and Signal do). This means that the same attack can be used on iMessage historical data, which is often backed up inside iCloud. Apple was notified of the issue as early as November 2015 and it rolled out a patch for the iMessage protocol in iOS 9.3 and OS X 10.11.4.
Force or String?
dammit.
Sincerely,
Your friendly neighborhood (illegally spying domestically) government spooks.
Shouldn't the headline more accurately read "Serious Flaws In iMessage Crypto Used To Allow For Message Decryption, But Don't Anymore"? Or am I missing something?
DaveyJJ
I'm quite surprised the iMessage team would go to the effort of implementing end-to-end encryption without being familiar with the basics like perfect forward secrecy.
No offense moderators, but this was submitted over the weekend, and was red and orange all the time. The other article was better explained, not like this 6-paragraph story with a misleading headline. https://slashdot.org/submission/6211741/cryptography-experts-say-apple-needs-to-replace-imessage-encryption /.
Nice work moderating
"like much of what Apple does, is opaque and its inner workings have not been made available to outsiders"
I always found my coding to be more secure when my door is locked.
Maybe it is not a 'mistake' but rather an obfuscated backdoor?
This is embarrassing.
So if I understand this correctly, this simply means that *if* an attacker can brute-force a key and decrypt messages between two individuals, then they can also go back and decrypt past messages further back than the author of this article thinks they should be able to? If that's the case, then if an entity has the processing power and skill to brute force the key in the first place, the fact that they have to be bothered to do it again X number of times isn't exactly reassuring. If they want to access your messages bad enough to spend the computational resources and they can brute force them at all, having to do it several more times to access historical data is pretty trivial.
Better known as 318230.
Maybe if THE FBI could have got into the San Bernardino iPhone this would not be a problem?
What is next? Maybe Windows Anniversary 10 has a bitlocker update to protect your data from Russians?
So how many of those iMessage flaws are because they need to allow for backwards compatibility between newer and older devices? And how many can they fix before they start breaking older devices?
(I'm sure the moment they do, everyone will cry out for iPhone 4 (circa 2010) users who can no longer use iMessage that Apple is forcing them to upgrade their phones. Or whatever the oldest phone that can run iMessage is. Then the class action lawsuits get filed...).
Most self-respect commenters would proof-read their comments for idiotic typos and bad grammar anyway.
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Sent from my iPhone
Y'all better let your drug dealers... errr... I mean "unlicensed pharmacists" know about this as soon as possible.... ;-)
Read the paper.
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_garman.pdf
Quote "Overall, our determination is that while iMessage’s end-to-end encryption protocol is an improvement over systems that use encryption on network traffic only (e.g., Google Hangouts), messages sent through iMessage may not be secure against sophisticated adversaries."
The attacker requires stolen TLS certificates or by gaining access to Apple's servers.
Serious? No. All systems are flawed in someway and are breakable to that extent.
Comment removed based on user account deletion