Dragonblood Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Wi-Fi WPA3 Standard (zdnet.com)
Two security researchers disclosed details this week about a group of vulnerabilities collectively referred to as Dragonblood that impact the Wi-Fi Alliance's recently launched WPA3 Wi-Fi security and authentication standard. From a report: If ever exploited, the vulnerabilities would allow an attacker within the range of a victim's network to recover the Wi-Fi password and infiltrate the target's network. In total, five vulnerabilities are part of the Dragonblood ensemble -- a denial of service attack, two downgrade attacks, and two side-channel information leaks.
While the denial of service attack is somewhat unimportant as it only leads to crashing WPA3-compatible access points, the other four are the ones that can be used to recover user passwords. Both the two downgrade attacks and two side-channel leaks exploit design flaws in the WPA3 standard's Dragonfly key exchange -- the mechanism through which clients authenticate on a WPA3 router or access point. In a downgrade attack, Wi-Fi WPA3-capable networks can be coerced in using an older and more insecure password exchange systems, which can allow attackers to retrieve the network passwords using older flaws.
While the denial of service attack is somewhat unimportant as it only leads to crashing WPA3-compatible access points, the other four are the ones that can be used to recover user passwords. Both the two downgrade attacks and two side-channel leaks exploit design flaws in the WPA3 standard's Dragonfly key exchange -- the mechanism through which clients authenticate on a WPA3 router or access point. In a downgrade attack, Wi-Fi WPA3-capable networks can be coerced in using an older and more insecure password exchange systems, which can allow attackers to retrieve the network passwords using older flaws.
Let me guess ... one of the members insisted on a stupid feature that the marketing department wanted which utterly broke security.
It seems like as we try to build in new things the time until we find out how flawed the system is keeps dropping.
All software seems to be shit these days, especially where security is concerned.
Is the wireless networking functionality of GNU/systemd/Linux vulnerable? If it is, is there any way that I can protect my systems from these vulnerabilities? Do I need to go back to wired networking only?
This is what happens when you don't open source your crypto, dipshits.
In other news, all of the problems for secure wireless have basically been solved. How to exchange an ephemeral key, how to encrypt a block of bytes, how to initialize an IV, all of it. Quit trying to implement QUIC or whatever-other Google-sponsored fucking backdoor adware shit Hitachi fucking wants. Do the right thing and be done with this bullshit.
Someone more familiar with cryptography, could you please explain why WPA3 didn't use known-good key exchange methods implemented and tested in modern protocols and instead appears to chose its own method that was found to be vulnerable?
The downgrade attacks should be fairly easy to solve in new devices (or with an update if possible), but the side channel attacks are a bitch. Probably going to need a WPA4 to solve those
WiFi security is a fucking joke, first WEP was trivially broken, and now the latest standard also has huge flaws.
We already know how to secure IP data over an unsecure channel, it's called IPSEC and has been standardized and studied it detail for decades. There's no excuse to keep developing broken standards.
With some improvements to the user experience it could be just as easy as a WiFi password to deploy for securing your network. APs should firewall off any non-encapsulated traffic except for initial handshakes. Connection managers should let you just enter to passphrase (Pre-Shared Key) for consumer setups, and voila your data is secure.
Imagine Charlie Sheen hacking you.
It'd either be really great or really bad.
If WPA3 is a brand new protocol, why are downgrade attacks possible? Isn't the point of a new standard to ditch the old and broken?
How does a 0 day protocol have a 0 day downgrade attack?
So, the fact that is has "backwards compatibility" with older protocols makes it vulnerable to the flaws of the older protocols.
Wow. What a revelation. I'm glad you are here to tell us these things Chewy.
They should withdraw the release of WPA3 and do a big do-over AND THIS TIME TEST IT before releasing it again.
wpa_supplicant recently got patches for CVE-2019-9494, 9495, 9496, and 9497 through 9499.
They don't apply to the Debian 9 "stretch" package of wpa_supplicant because the fixes "heavily depends on the code added after wpa 2.4 release, so porting it is not practical." The maintainer recommends using a strong password until someone finishes a stretch-backports package.
This requires new hardware.
Coincidentally, WiFi hardware sales up 20% for quarter.
It's almost as if it's a play on the Dragonfly Key Exchange name that's being targetted.
All you need is a pinch of Dragonsbane plus a Druidic ceremony and your problem with Dragonsblood will be but a memory.