I am a researcher for www.votingmachinesprocon.org, a site dedicated to presenting the Pros and Cons of electronic voting machines. The standard response by manufacturers and election administrators to your December 2005 attack on the central tabulator of an electronic voting system, where you successfully changed vote totals leaving no logs, has been that the conditions were unrealistic, you were given unfettered access, and election administration procedures would prevent such an attack from happening. How do you respond to those claims? Could a programmer or a devious election worker have the access necessary to carry out your attack? Is it realistically possible for security to be improved to the point that the machines could be trusted?
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I am a researcher for www.votingmachinesprocon.org, a site dedicated to presenting the Pros and Cons of electronic voting machines. The standard response by manufacturers and election administrators to your December 2005 attack on the central tabulator of an electronic voting system, where you successfully changed vote totals leaving no logs, has been that the conditions were unrealistic, you were given unfettered access, and election administration procedures would prevent such an attack from happening. How do you respond to those claims? Could a programmer or a devious election worker have the access necessary to carry out your attack? Is it realistically possible for security to be improved to the point that the machines could be trusted?