If it's impossible for the election authority to cheat the system... why do you even need this receipt?
Without the receipts (and some fraction of voters checking them), it is possible for the election authority to cheat undetectably, because the receipts might be the only evidence that the authority cheated.
I haven't seen that. But if so, why not address that issue instead of going off and arguing an argument that has nothing to do with the initial problem?
See Was the 2004 Election Stolen?
I submit that we ought to address these problems by adopting Punchscan and publishing voter rolls.
Publishing voter rolls with plain paper ballots is not sufficient, because ballots could still be altered or substituted.
This is known to have happened in the past, and most of the time that it happens we probably never find out.
Punchscan makes it impossible to do this without being detected.
I agree that it is possible to make plain paper ballots sufficiently secure, but it would be very expensive to do so, and we would never be able to tell how much security is enough.
Punchscan is a much better solution.
"A thing long expected takes the form of the unexpected when at last it comes." -- Mark Twain
This is not snake oil. Punchscan is supported by the non-profit Center for Governmental Studies. It is an open system that has been reviewed by a lot of experts. This fact doesn't prove Punchscan's value, but it does make it worthy of careful consideration.
Your receipt does NOT show how you voted, but it DOES prove that your vote counted as you cast it. "Impossible," you say? Then why not explain how anyone (including the election authority or someone who hacks its computers) can cheat the system without being detected?
If paper is the answer, then why did every recount in the 2000 Florida election produce a different tally? And why do many experts believe that Ohio was stolen in 2004 primarily by stuffing of paper ballots?
[My background: I am a verification engineer for NVIDIA who has been following Punchscan since the NSF's Voting Systems Workshop in June.]
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Without the receipts (and some fraction of voters checking them), it is possible for the election authority to cheat undetectably, because the receipts might be the only evidence that the authority cheated.
See Was the 2004 Election Stolen? I submit that we ought to address these problems by adopting Punchscan and publishing voter rolls.
Publishing voter rolls with plain paper ballots is not sufficient, because ballots could still be altered or substituted. This is known to have happened in the past, and most of the time that it happens we probably never find out. Punchscan makes it impossible to do this without being detected.
I agree that it is possible to make plain paper ballots sufficiently secure, but it would be very expensive to do so, and we would never be able to tell how much security is enough. Punchscan is a much better solution.
This is not snake oil. Punchscan is supported by the non-profit Center for Governmental Studies. It is an open system that has been reviewed by a lot of experts. This fact doesn't prove Punchscan's value, but it does make it worthy of careful consideration.
Your receipt does NOT show how you voted, but it DOES prove that your vote counted as you cast it. "Impossible," you say? Then why not explain how anyone (including the election authority or someone who hacks its computers) can cheat the system without being detected?
But before doing so, you should probably review this: security video
And you also need to understand some cryptography concepts, such as these: one time pad commitment scheme zero knowledge proof
If paper is the answer, then why did every recount in the 2000 Florida election produce a different tally? And why do many experts believe that Ohio was stolen in 2004 primarily by stuffing of paper ballots?
[My background: I am a verification engineer for NVIDIA who has been following Punchscan since the NSF's Voting Systems Workshop in June.]