Thank you Conan and Anne for inserting some knowledge into what has become a bit of a myth about the superiority of the heliocentric model. I would only add that in the end Copernicus was also forced to add epicycles into his model in order to achieve the level of accuracy that Ptolemy had. The Copernican model, in truth, was simpler at the cost of accuracy -- hardly a good model for science, really.
I'm not sure why people think they can pull good lessons from bad history.
On the point of ethics vs. religion, it should be pointed out that the religious concerns are usually underpinned by ethical ones. Most religious people don't actually believe that something is good simply because whatever God says is good is by definition so. Rather, they believe that what is good (what we all believe is good, actually -- it's a universal judgment that, philosophically, we should all eventually be able to come to agreement on) really is so, and because God is good, he will also see things this way.
For 'religious folk', then, the problem isn't what 'is' good, but rather why we should do good. I think there does tend to be a tendency among religous people to see themselves as being better at being good than non-religious folk, because they don't see what can be motivating the non-religious to behave differently. This, I should add, I think is a misunderstanding.
On the other hand, there is a strong tendency among non-religious folk to assume that the religious don't have intellectual underpinnings for what they believe, and so there is a general leap to project irrational opinions to them -- for instance, that they are anti-science or anti-progress, rather than simply having an ethical opposition to certain research. This is also a misunderstanding that prevents any actual engagement.
I don't know if this particular method for gathering stem-cells will ultimately be effective or feasible, but from what I know of the main ethical concerns of various religious denominations, this is a good thing. The only Christian denomination that might still be opposed to it are the Jehova's Witnesses, who believe that harvesting human organs is analogous to canibalism.
For those ethically concerned with embryonic stem-cell research, the problem is that we destroy human life in order to save human life. There is even the recognition that we in fact do this in other cases. However, if it can be avoided, then an alternative course is best. And because there are alternatives, such as adult stem-cell research and possibly this new technique, we ought to pursue those instead.
One common objection to this position tends to be that alternative potential therapies will never be as good as therapies based on embryonic stem-cell research, so it is "as if" there really were no alternative. Because this is an extremely speculative position, it tends not to be all that persuasive.
So far, most of the arguments claiming that "the religious right" won't accept this new form of research seem simply to be trying to make a reductio ad absurdum argument that if the ethical position opposed to embryonic stem-cell research accepts this new harvesting method, they must therefore accept embryonic stem-cell research also because they are the same thing.
It's a good strategy for proponents of embryonic stem-cell research, and I really don't begrudge anyone for throwing it out there. But I don't think it really works in this case. As a factual matter, opponents of embryonic stem-cell research do see conception as a non-arbitrary point differentiation between non-living and living. If you accept at least that this is a core ethical axiom for opponents of stem-cell research (since they themselves repeatedly claim that this is so) it should be clear that this new method for harvesting stem-cells does, in fact, serve as a viable alternative to embryonic stem-cell harvesting for them.
This, I think, is a good thing, since it provides something that people on both sides of the issue can support. And on this rests the issue of whether it is better to drag out debate, and basically do nothing, over research we disagree on, or rather to go forward with research, starting today, on things the nation does agree on.
Do we fight to be right, or do we get things done?
While I'm very sympathetic to the idea that only experts should speak about certain matters, I'm a bit concerned about how a general demand for this will chill public discourse.
A famous bishop once asked why we go to a chemist to find out about chemistry, but anybody thinks they know enough to talk about spiritual matters. The argument he was putting forth was that spirituality really is a matter requiring much study (especially if one equates it with a sort of wisdom) and so should be discussed by dilletantes, as most of us are.
We might add to this the question of whether the majority of us are qualified to discuss or make decisions about ethical matters. Again, there are specialists for these things, and ethics has been an esoteric field of study at least since Aristotle.
And what about politics and foreign affairs? Why do we all feel that we are particularly qualified to have opinions about these matters that everyone should hear? An obvious response is that our politicians aren't all that bright and this gives us the right and the obligation -- but, hey, there are lots of dopey scientists, too. They are still the goto people on matters that fall under their expertise.
While I think that the common man and the non-expert can often get important matters in ethics, politics, and science wrong, no one gains without the public discourse about these things. By talking more, rather than less, I think we all gain a better understanding of science, despite the inaccuracies, which will be corrected along the way.
>>The abusive boss has been well documented in movies 'Nine to Five'),
Nine to Five? That's one lie my boss never told me.
So what ever happened to the Nine to Five day?
The technology isn't there yet. There are other companies working toward the same goal of media fingerprinting for much longer than YouTube has. For a sufficiently long media clip, it can be done. There serious problem, though, is with smaller clips. 30 seconds just isn't enough material, currently, to get a good match. Add to that the fact that the original clips get resampled and distorted and overdubbed.
YouTube may be getting a break from media companies simply "because" it is so easy to make the argument that this was never feasible in the first place.
Brunuscle,
This was Roger Penrose's argument, no? Penrose goes a little further and states that the smallest elements of the brain actually are below the threshold at which quantum laws start having an effect. Thus quantum effects can have a real affect on our brains. In this way, free-will and determinism can exist side-by-side in a Cartesian manner, and Penrose even provides the mechanism for how this can occur.
To explain the phenomena that the Economist cites, such as tumors causing violent behavior, we could use the analogy of a damaged vehicle that behaves in ways contrary to the driver's intent. The driver doesn't lack free-will just because the vehicle refuses to respond correctly, or even drives off into the highway median.
I'm not sure if this is completely satisfying, since it puts off, in a sense, the question of what free-will is. But it does provide an explanation of how free-will is possible without contradicting deterministic natural laws.
It's not like he wasn't aware of it, since free will has been a philosophical problem for quite a while. Why are you insisting it is a pseudo-problem when Wittgenstein never did? He surely had the opportunity.
It's not like I'm interpreting Wittgenstein as never having said that free will is a pseudo-problem (that was mighty slick of you;)). He in fact _never_ said it.
You can, of course, throw any term (and in this case, any philosopher) you like at a problem, but I think it is quite legitimate to ask if doing so is valid.
Wittgenstein himself never simply stated that such-and-such was a pseudo-problem and that we should believe him because he's Wittgenstein.
I don't think there is any greater reason to hold your position reasonable when all you are doing is saying that such-and-such is a pseudo-problem because you may have _read_ Wittgenstein.
If you are going to have enough respect for W's thought to cite him as an authority, perhaps it would be good to also hold him in enough esteem not to put words in his mouth and then use him to support your personal opinions when he, in fact, never did.
SP,
I don't think it is really proper for you to invoke Wittgenstein in this case since Wittgenstein doesn't claim that free-will is a pseudo-problem. Moreover, he was generally hostile toward physicalist causation, as the kind cited in this article as an argument against free-will, which makes it doubly presumptuous to cite Wittgenstein here.
You can, of course, attempt to resolve this problem and show that it is a pseudo-problem, as W. often did.
What you cannot really do is say that W. believes there are pseudo-problems, therefore this is a pseudo-problem. That's simply name-dropping, and assuming that other people don't know enough about Wittgenstein to call you on it.
Slashdot Mirror
Thank you Conan and Anne for inserting some knowledge into what has become a bit of a myth about the superiority of the heliocentric model. I would only add that in the end Copernicus was also forced to add epicycles into his model in order to achieve the level of accuracy that Ptolemy had. The Copernican model, in truth, was simpler at the cost of accuracy -- hardly a good model for science, really. I'm not sure why people think they can pull good lessons from bad history.
On the point of ethics vs. religion, it should be pointed out that the religious concerns are usually underpinned by ethical ones. Most religious people don't actually believe that something is good simply because whatever God says is good is by definition so. Rather, they believe that what is good (what we all believe is good, actually -- it's a universal judgment that, philosophically, we should all eventually be able to come to agreement on) really is so, and because God is good, he will also see things this way. For 'religious folk', then, the problem isn't what 'is' good, but rather why we should do good. I think there does tend to be a tendency among religous people to see themselves as being better at being good than non-religious folk, because they don't see what can be motivating the non-religious to behave differently. This, I should add, I think is a misunderstanding. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency among non-religious folk to assume that the religious don't have intellectual underpinnings for what they believe, and so there is a general leap to project irrational opinions to them -- for instance, that they are anti-science or anti-progress, rather than simply having an ethical opposition to certain research. This is also a misunderstanding that prevents any actual engagement. I don't know if this particular method for gathering stem-cells will ultimately be effective or feasible, but from what I know of the main ethical concerns of various religious denominations, this is a good thing. The only Christian denomination that might still be opposed to it are the Jehova's Witnesses, who believe that harvesting human organs is analogous to canibalism. For those ethically concerned with embryonic stem-cell research, the problem is that we destroy human life in order to save human life. There is even the recognition that we in fact do this in other cases. However, if it can be avoided, then an alternative course is best. And because there are alternatives, such as adult stem-cell research and possibly this new technique, we ought to pursue those instead. One common objection to this position tends to be that alternative potential therapies will never be as good as therapies based on embryonic stem-cell research, so it is "as if" there really were no alternative. Because this is an extremely speculative position, it tends not to be all that persuasive. So far, most of the arguments claiming that "the religious right" won't accept this new form of research seem simply to be trying to make a reductio ad absurdum argument that if the ethical position opposed to embryonic stem-cell research accepts this new harvesting method, they must therefore accept embryonic stem-cell research also because they are the same thing. It's a good strategy for proponents of embryonic stem-cell research, and I really don't begrudge anyone for throwing it out there. But I don't think it really works in this case. As a factual matter, opponents of embryonic stem-cell research do see conception as a non-arbitrary point differentiation between non-living and living. If you accept at least that this is a core ethical axiom for opponents of stem-cell research (since they themselves repeatedly claim that this is so) it should be clear that this new method for harvesting stem-cells does, in fact, serve as a viable alternative to embryonic stem-cell harvesting for them. This, I think, is a good thing, since it provides something that people on both sides of the issue can support. And on this rests the issue of whether it is better to drag out debate, and basically do nothing, over research we disagree on, or rather to go forward with research, starting today, on things the nation does agree on. Do we fight to be right, or do we get things done?
You don't need a fancy warrant to open mail when a simple letter-opener will do.
While I'm very sympathetic to the idea that only experts should speak about certain matters, I'm a bit concerned about how a general demand for this will chill public discourse. A famous bishop once asked why we go to a chemist to find out about chemistry, but anybody thinks they know enough to talk about spiritual matters. The argument he was putting forth was that spirituality really is a matter requiring much study (especially if one equates it with a sort of wisdom) and so should be discussed by dilletantes, as most of us are. We might add to this the question of whether the majority of us are qualified to discuss or make decisions about ethical matters. Again, there are specialists for these things, and ethics has been an esoteric field of study at least since Aristotle. And what about politics and foreign affairs? Why do we all feel that we are particularly qualified to have opinions about these matters that everyone should hear? An obvious response is that our politicians aren't all that bright and this gives us the right and the obligation -- but, hey, there are lots of dopey scientists, too. They are still the goto people on matters that fall under their expertise. While I think that the common man and the non-expert can often get important matters in ethics, politics, and science wrong, no one gains without the public discourse about these things. By talking more, rather than less, I think we all gain a better understanding of science, despite the inaccuracies, which will be corrected along the way.
>>The abusive boss has been well documented in movies 'Nine to Five'), Nine to Five? That's one lie my boss never told me. So what ever happened to the Nine to Five day?
The technology isn't there yet. There are other companies working toward the same goal of media fingerprinting for much longer than YouTube has. For a sufficiently long media clip, it can be done. There serious problem, though, is with smaller clips. 30 seconds just isn't enough material, currently, to get a good match. Add to that the fact that the original clips get resampled and distorted and overdubbed. YouTube may be getting a break from media companies simply "because" it is so easy to make the argument that this was never feasible in the first place.
Brunuscle, This was Roger Penrose's argument, no? Penrose goes a little further and states that the smallest elements of the brain actually are below the threshold at which quantum laws start having an effect. Thus quantum effects can have a real affect on our brains. In this way, free-will and determinism can exist side-by-side in a Cartesian manner, and Penrose even provides the mechanism for how this can occur. To explain the phenomena that the Economist cites, such as tumors causing violent behavior, we could use the analogy of a damaged vehicle that behaves in ways contrary to the driver's intent. The driver doesn't lack free-will just because the vehicle refuses to respond correctly, or even drives off into the highway median. I'm not sure if this is completely satisfying, since it puts off, in a sense, the question of what free-will is. But it does provide an explanation of how free-will is possible without contradicting deterministic natural laws.
It's not like he wasn't aware of it, since free will has been a philosophical problem for quite a while. Why are you insisting it is a pseudo-problem when Wittgenstein never did? He surely had the opportunity. It's not like I'm interpreting Wittgenstein as never having said that free will is a pseudo-problem (that was mighty slick of you ;)). He in fact _never_ said it.
You can, of course, throw any term (and in this case, any philosopher) you like at a problem, but I think it is quite legitimate to ask if doing so is valid.
Wittgenstein himself never simply stated that such-and-such was a pseudo-problem and that we should believe him because he's Wittgenstein.
I don't think there is any greater reason to hold your position reasonable when all you are doing is saying that such-and-such is a pseudo-problem because you may have _read_ Wittgenstein.
If you are going to have enough respect for W's thought to cite him as an authority, perhaps it would be good to also hold him in enough esteem not to put words in his mouth and then use him to support your personal opinions when he, in fact, never did.
SP, I don't think it is really proper for you to invoke Wittgenstein in this case since Wittgenstein doesn't claim that free-will is a pseudo-problem. Moreover, he was generally hostile toward physicalist causation, as the kind cited in this article as an argument against free-will, which makes it doubly presumptuous to cite Wittgenstein here. You can, of course, attempt to resolve this problem and show that it is a pseudo-problem, as W. often did. What you cannot really do is say that W. believes there are pseudo-problems, therefore this is a pseudo-problem. That's simply name-dropping, and assuming that other people don't know enough about Wittgenstein to call you on it.