We already hacked Diebold's system in my HBO documentary "Hacking Democracy". Unfortunately one of the events that followed our 'Hursti Hack' was the (former) Secretary of State for California re-certified Diebold's touchscreens and they were used in the mid term elections with major security flaws wide open for abuse.
I co-produced/directed the HBO documentary "Hacking Democracy" and in the film our Finnish security expert Harri Hursti hacks both the Diebold 'AccuVote' Optical Scan system (using a memory card) and also the Diebold GEMS central tabulator. This hack was done on camera and, by the way, can be seen on the just released DVD . See http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/
The question about fixing these systems intrigues and disturbs me because the security flaw that Harri discovered involves interpreted code in the Optical Scan machines and I believe that flaw has not been fixed by Diebold (Harri discovered it and carried out the hack in December 2005) In addition in 2005 Harri also uncovered a devastating flaw in Diebold's touchscreen machines, which Dr. Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins described as "the nuclear bomb for e-voting systems". And, guess what, that mother of security holes is also still completely unsecured.
So where's the fix?
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We already hacked Diebold's system in my HBO documentary "Hacking Democracy". Unfortunately one of the events that followed our 'Hursti Hack' was the (former) Secretary of State for California re-certified Diebold's touchscreens and they were used in the mid term elections with major security flaws wide open for abuse.
I co-produced/directed the HBO documentary "Hacking Democracy" and in the film our Finnish security expert Harri Hursti hacks both the Diebold 'AccuVote' Optical Scan system (using a memory card) and also the Diebold GEMS central tabulator. This hack was done on camera and, by the way, can be seen on the just released DVD . See http://www.hackingdemocracy.com/ The question about fixing these systems intrigues and disturbs me because the security flaw that Harri discovered involves interpreted code in the Optical Scan machines and I believe that flaw has not been fixed by Diebold (Harri discovered it and carried out the hack in December 2005) In addition in 2005 Harri also uncovered a devastating flaw in Diebold's touchscreen machines, which Dr. Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins described as "the nuclear bomb for e-voting systems". And, guess what, that mother of security holes is also still completely unsecured. So where's the fix?