Technology security (unlike physical) is not a place to save a few buck by hiring a few minimum security wanna-be rent-a-drunks.
How is a company to know which they are hiring? Anybody can call themselves a security expert even if they don't have any real qualifications. There are a lot of people who know less than they think. Heck, how is a "security expert" supposed to know if they really are one? Sure there are certifications but how do you know that the material covered is selected by security experts and not just people out to make a quick buck selling certifications?
From what I have seen, in the tech industry most successful people start most of their jobs without knowing what they are doing, but have the ability to figure things out as they go. That doesn't work in security- just because you've made something work doesn't mean you've made it secure.
An important component is that no sysadmin at the company has any access to this processsing machine. Only technically inclined executives (i.e. CTO, CIO, COO) have root access to this machine, and if maintence must occur at this machine, the sysadmin is logged into it by the
executive, who then physically watches what the sysadmin is doing (and the executive knows
his/her shit, so there is no question of foul play).
I would suggest that this is bordering on overkill. There are lots of brick-and-mortar businesses that handle credit cards without needing precautions like those.
Attacks over the internet are serious because they are relatively anonymous. Credit card numbers stolen by employees are less of a concern because the pool of suspects is small and you know where they all live.
In this scenaro, if the website is completely compromised and all credit card numbers are stolen, they are completely useless to the cracker, as they cannot be decrypted without that private key.
Don't get complacent. As long as your system is working and those credit cards numbers are getting encrypted, you're okay. But if you're hacked that can change. Someone could capture credit card numbers as they enter the system- after they come out of the SSL-encrypted socket, but before they get encrypted by your application. A good rootkit could keep such a process hidden for a long time. Of course, this is a much more difficult attack than just dumping the contents of a database.
This is ideal practice, and should be implemented at all e-commerce sites.
Not quite ideal, but a major improvement over what most people are doing right now.
What might be even better would be a Java applet running on the client side doing the encryption there. That way the plaintext never even enters the server. The applet should be signed so that if someone breaks into the server they can't simply replace the applet with a trojan. But this assumes that the users would notice if the applet was not signed- a bad assumption.
More precisely, if you put a particle in a state of definite position, then
you will only get a spread-out probability distribution for momenta it might have, and vice versa.
Which is, of course, exactly why it is impossible to nail jello to a wall.
I'm disapointed in Matrox, I, and a couple other people I know, were considering buying a Matrox as an alternative to nVidia or 3dfx. It seems the G540 is closer to my TNT2 then to a GeForce2. Probally could beat up anything 3dfx has for under $400 though.
The G450 is not meant to be a high-performance card. I haven't seen benchmarks yet, but performance is expected to be worse than the G400 MAX. It is also expected to be less expensive than the G400 MAX. The G450 seems to be intended for OEMs who want an inexpensive card that is not a piece of crap. This card will probably be ideal for business use, where they don't care about gaming performance but they do care about resolution, refresh rate (Hz, not FPS), image quality, and possibly dual-head.
Personally, I'm trying to hold off until the G800 appears (not sure but I think in 2-3 months). That should have performance in the same ballpark as the GeForce 2. It'll probably be supported by XF86 4.0 very soon after release too (maybe even before:).
People get realy mad when
they buy a defective VCR or a car that after two day won't work. When those things happen they
usualy return the product and when personal security is involved (in the case of cars) they can
even sue the company that made the car.
The problem is, insecure products work just fine as far as the user can tell. In fact, insecure products often work "better" (easier to setup and use) than secure ones.
Also, security is something that can only be proven in the negative (with very few exceptions). So a company can boast about how seriously they take security even when they don't have a clue how to write secure code. After all, they don't know that they are not secure, right? When holes are found they fix them while continuing to boast about how seriously they take security. For most people, software companies' claims of security are all they have to go on.
The programmers responsible may not even know that they are doing anything wrong. I've spoken with some application developers who think security consists of "passwords and stuff" even after I've shown them how to exploit bugs in their own code. And these are people who've written security-sensitive apps for some large corporations.
DigiCash was founded in 1990 by cryptologist David Chaum (site apparently not updated in
recent years...) who owned the two (three?) major patents covering completely anonymized
digital cash. To my knowledge it still isn't certain whether it's possible to create a truly
anonymous digital money scheme without violating these patents.
David Wagner has done some work on that. Sample code is available in lucre.
It appears to avoid Chaum's patents but I don't know if any patent lawyer has had a good look at it. Your "not certain whether it's possible" comment may stand even after reading this (if you haven't read it already).
I refuse to follow ads that simply say "Click Here!" My time is worth more than that.
"Click Here" really is bad form. A link is supposed to describe where it goes to. You should be able to rip out all of the links on your web page and list them, with the linked text, and have a handy list of links - just like Slashdot does. It only takes a few seconds worth of creativity to come up with a meaningful link.
Also, "click here" assumes that you're using a mouse. That may be true now, but it shouldn't have to be so. How do you suppose a voice interface to the web will work? Most likely, if you want to "click" on a link, you will say the underlined phrase. For example, when viewing this post with a voice-capable browser you should be able to simply say "Google" or "Crypto-Gram" or "Big Ball of Mud" and be taken to the appropriate place. It's better than having to say "'click here' number 8... no, the one in the seventh paragraph... not that one, go left, up, up, click!"
Really - the people who created hypertext actually did think of this stuff. HTML was supposed to be device-independant, not "optimized for a box on a desk running browser-of-the-week with an 800x600 screen on a 15" monitor and a default font size of 'tiny'".
first of all, why use RSA? just cause the us govt says you should? bah!
You should use RSA because it is a well-studied algorithm. When used properly it is secure.
secondly, while I'm not a crypto-scientist, wouldn't it be safer to use double-encryption? sure, the first layer might be computable in finite time.
Apparently you're not a crypto-scientist, if you've never heard of a "meet in the middle" attack (note: this is different from a "man in the middle" attack). Meet-in-the-middle is why people use 3DES instead of 2DES; 2DES is not really stronger than 57 bits even though the key size is 112 bits. 3DES is still subject to meet-in-the-middle; even though the key size is 168 bits it is "only" 112 bits strong (which is plenty strong).
With public-key algorithm like RSA it's even worse. Each key can be broken totally independantly no matter how many keys you use. "3RSA" would be a waste of time.
Just use a long RSA key. 1024 bits is enough, but computers are fast enough that you may as well use longer (2048 bits is plenty). The current state-of-the-art in factoring can break just over 512 bits. 1024 is a long way off unless you expect some massive breakthrough in quantum computers (the best quantum computers today are less useful than a pocket calculator).
I've often thought of changing pgp in small and subtle ways
NAI's key escrow function is a "small and subtle" change, and look what it's done. And NAI even has real "crypto-scientists".
Don't fuck around with crypto if you're not an expert. The experts get it wrong often enough; we don't need you screwing things up even more. We already have too many amateurs screwing things up.
(maybe some grind algorithm that uses a file that is present on my system and the destination system) and unless you had access to the ACTUAL source/binary that was used to en/de crypt, you'd have almost no hope in getting plaintext back.
This tells me you don't even understand what public key crypto is about.
I can't emphasize enough: Do not go "improving" crypto unless you already have a bunch of cryptanalytic experience.
This discovery means that EVERY key on public key servers is potentially broken.
The quickest "patch" would be for the key servers to discard any parts of the public key block that are outside of the self-signed portion. This would prevent people from using the key servers to distribute poisoned keys.
Of course, that requires trusting your key server, which you shouldn't have to do (that's what key signing is for). At least it would make exploitation harder. As it stands a script kiddie could probably exploit the problem.
I like Linux - None of the BSDs have the software base that Linux has, and it's a lot speedier.
Actually, all of the BSDs have the software base that Linux has, through the emulation layer.
As for Linux being "a lot speedier", I think you're either exaggerating or not making a fair comparison. Most performance differentials can be eliminated with a little config file editing.
Global Warming is in fact a secret Canadian undertaking - designed to make our vast expenses
of frozen wasteland habitable again.
You said it, brother!
But for a limited time, you too can take advantage of this unique situation to establish your financial security! Call 1-800-SUCKER and get a piece of our PRIME ARCTIC TUNDRA!!!
Don't miss out! Once the global warming hits these permafrost-cheap prices will start to thaw out!
Prime arctic tundra - Because there's one born every minute!
Q: Why does my robot go berzerk and kill all of my customers while playing classical music?
A: Your Telerobot(TM) is experiencing a TLC deficiency. Wait for Telerobot(TM) to run out of ammunition and then give it the love and attention it deserves.
If the problem persists, consider purchasing our new TeleMaid(TM) to facilitate cleanup so you can get back to business sooner.
Internet security needs to improve -- and fast. We've been relying on the same RSA technology
for far too long, and it's in technology like an armored guard that security becomes essential.
Actually, the problem is more like, we don't rely on RSA technology often enough.
As long as the people you're trying to keep out don't have a quantum computer, RSA is plenty strong. Really.
The problem is, a huge proportion of internet systems don't use strong encryption at all. Even worse, most break-ins are the result of stupid things that encryption can't solve. Like buffer overflows, forgetting to validate user input before using it in a system() call or SQL query, allowing incoming emails to pass exploit code to insecure "helper" applications, sysadmins and/or software installers leaving important files and directories set world writable, leaving default passwords in place, and other bogosities.
It shoots something like 4,500 20mm rounds per minute. Even if it went nuts, you wouldn't have to wait long for it to run out of ammo, it only carries 1,500 rounds.
Yeah, but if it went nuts (a big "if" I hope) 1500 rounds can do a lot of damage.
Apparently, neither do the protestors! I know what the Million Man March was about, and what the Million Mom March was about, and even what the ragtag Operation rescue bunches on the street corners are about, but near as I can figure the protestors just want to protest for the sake of protesting.
I think they're protesting the two halves of the Corporatist party. But I don't know- I wasn't there, and as one of the previous posters pointed out, the media isn't letting us know what it's about.
Case in point: Emmett's story about how he provoked a cop and got arrested. Not once in his
account did he mention why he was protesting or what he was protesting about. Yesterday at
LWCE he was bragging to people how he got arrested, but he still didn't state why he was
protesting.
There are always people who will jump on the bandwagon without knowing what's going on. Don't judge all of the protesters solely based on Emmett's actions.
Heck, how many Linux users out there don't "get" Free software? That doesn't lessen Free software in any way.
How long before these become mandatory? They'll start implanting them at birth.
They will stay totally voluntary. You won't have to get one, and if you do, you won't have to share your tracking number with anyone outside the issuing agency. Just like social security numbers.:-/
If Freenet is completely anonymous, then there won't be any real way to block spammers, is there?
I suppose it could be made pseudonymous, like slashdot. If you want the +2 bonus you need to establish a reputation.
Pseudonymous communication is possible in an otherwise anonymous network through digital signatures. For example, if all slashdot posts were Anonymous Coward, someone could come along and create a client-side thing to automatically GPG sign posts and verify GPG signatures, hilighting posts from known-good GPG keys.
This sort of thing has been discussed on the cypherpunks sewer^H^H^H^H^Hmailing list for years.
The fact that he ignored that the police regularly forget is his fault. Obviously, the police should
have respected his rights, but they didn't and he knew that they weren't going to,
Have things really sunk to that level?
If so, kudos to the protester for standing up to them and forcing them to show their true colors, instead of caving in fear of a merely implied bogus arrest like the rest of us would have.
[...]
and the abuse of civil rights, i.e., pepper spray on non-violent people
A lot of people don't know this, but the police standard for using pepper spray is not "violence" or "resistance", but merely "non-compliance". That is, if they tell you to do something, and you don't, they can blast you with the shit. The fact that you are "peaceful" doesn't matter.
This came to the forefront with a videotape of a (greenpeace?) protest in California, where peaceful protesters had their eyelids held open and pepperspray applied directly to their eyeballs with cotton swabs.
What really sucks is that the police are always championing new gadgets as allowing them to use less force. I.e., "We should be allowed to use the Arwen gun / pepperspray / tazer so that we won't have to shoot armed suspects". Sometimes new weapons are used like that, but usually it works the other way: the police are allowed to use more force when they would otherwise have had to resolve the situation through other means (waiting people out, or the looks-bad-on-tv billyclub).
I'm pretty sure "2 weeks" is an old in-joke. IIRC (and I probably don't), at one point,
Quakeworld, or something, was supposed to ship in 2 weeks and kept getting pushed back.
I don't think it's an "in"-joke at all. I remember "about two weeks" being the time estimate for a whole bunch of software projects, even pre-quake (remember those days?).
"It'll be ready in two weeks" really just means "it'll be ready when it's ready".
I suspect there is something about software engineering, that everything appears to be solvable within two weeks but during those two weeks new things pop up.
Compare that to the following: You're a home NT user. Same scenario, only the bug wasn't reported. One super criminal has it... and maybe the Fortune 500 company is now screwed (which is why they need 24/7 sysadmins on a patchable OS), but there are no script kiddies around to attack you.
More likely:
You're a home NT user. Same scenario, only the bug wasn't reported. One fourteen year old who's spent half his life in a debugger has it. The entire internet is now screwed, because the kid released a worm that spread through those legions of "mainstream" MS boxen like wildfire. A bunch of Unix geeks spend a few hours developing filters to protect the world's MS boxen and post the filters to Bugtraq, reducing the load on the network enough that everyone can get back to their pr0n. A few days later MS releases a hotfix that does who-knows-what and may or may not work right on your machine. A few days after that it's discovered that the hotfix re-enables a vulnerable activex control, and another worm is released, but doesn't go anywhere because not many people installed the hotfix anyway...
I don't see how this can work. Every time I log on to my ISP I'm assigned a different IP address and I'm willing to bet that they don't keep a log of these.
They do. I'm sure there are some exceptions, but not many.
That's how they identify people violating their acceptable use policy (spammers, script kiddies, etc).
They are able to track undesirables without the help "itrace" because practically all non-DDoS activity requires legitimate source addresses on the packets in order to complete the TCP three-way handshake.
Slashdot Mirror
This could be used by people trapped behind the Great Firewall of China to access "subversive" material.
How is a company to know which they are hiring? Anybody can call themselves a security expert even if they don't have any real qualifications. There are a lot of people who know less than they think. Heck, how is a "security expert" supposed to know if they really are one? Sure there are certifications but how do you know that the material covered is selected by security experts and not just people out to make a quick buck selling certifications?
From what I have seen, in the tech industry most successful people start most of their jobs without knowing what they are doing, but have the ability to figure things out as they go. That doesn't work in security- just because you've made something work doesn't mean you've made it secure.
I would suggest that this is bordering on overkill. There are lots of brick-and-mortar businesses that handle credit cards without needing precautions like those.
Attacks over the internet are serious because they are relatively anonymous. Credit card numbers stolen by employees are less of a concern because the pool of suspects is small and you know where they all live.
Don't get complacent. As long as your system is working and those credit cards numbers are getting encrypted, you're okay. But if you're hacked that can change. Someone could capture credit card numbers as they enter the system- after they come out of the SSL-encrypted socket, but before they get encrypted by your application. A good rootkit could keep such a process hidden for a long time. Of course, this is a much more difficult attack than just dumping the contents of a database.
Not quite ideal, but a major improvement over what most people are doing right now.
What might be even better would be a Java applet running on the client side doing the encryption there. That way the plaintext never even enters the server. The applet should be signed so that if someone breaks into the server they can't simply replace the applet with a trojan. But this assumes that the users would notice if the applet was not signed- a bad assumption.
Which is, of course, exactly why it is impossible to nail jello to a wall.
The G450 is not meant to be a high-performance card. I haven't seen benchmarks yet, but performance is expected to be worse than the G400 MAX. It is also expected to be less expensive than the G400 MAX. The G450 seems to be intended for OEMs who want an inexpensive card that is not a piece of crap. This card will probably be ideal for business use, where they don't care about gaming performance but they do care about resolution, refresh rate (Hz, not FPS), image quality, and possibly dual-head.
Personally, I'm trying to hold off until the G800 appears (not sure but I think in 2-3 months). That should have performance in the same ballpark as the GeForce 2. It'll probably be supported by XF86 4.0 very soon after release too (maybe even before :).
The problem is, insecure products work just fine as far as the user can tell. In fact, insecure products often work "better" (easier to setup and use) than secure ones.
Also, security is something that can only be proven in the negative (with very few exceptions). So a company can boast about how seriously they take security even when they don't have a clue how to write secure code. After all, they don't know that they are not secure, right? When holes are found they fix them while continuing to boast about how seriously they take security. For most people, software companies' claims of security are all they have to go on.
The programmers responsible may not even know that they are doing anything wrong. I've spoken with some application developers who think security consists of "passwords and stuff" even after I've shown them how to exploit bugs in their own code. And these are people who've written security-sensitive apps for some large corporations.
David Wagner has done some work on that. Sample code is available in lucre.
It appears to avoid Chaum's patents but I don't know if any patent lawyer has had a good look at it. Your "not certain whether it's possible" comment may stand even after reading this (if you haven't read it already).
"Click Here" really is bad form. A link is supposed to describe where it goes to. You should be able to rip out all of the links on your web page and list them, with the linked text, and have a handy list of links - just like Slashdot does. It only takes a few seconds worth of creativity to come up with a meaningful link.
Also, "click here" assumes that you're using a mouse. That may be true now, but it shouldn't have to be so. How do you suppose a voice interface to the web will work? Most likely, if you want to "click" on a link, you will say the underlined phrase. For example, when viewing this post with a voice-capable browser you should be able to simply say "Google" or "Crypto-Gram" or "Big Ball of Mud" and be taken to the appropriate place. It's better than having to say "'click here' number 8... no, the one in the seventh paragraph... not that one, go left, up, up, click!"
Really - the people who created hypertext actually did think of this stuff. HTML was supposed to be device-independant, not "optimized for a box on a desk running browser-of-the-week with an 800x600 screen on a 15" monitor and a default font size of 'tiny'".
</RANT>
You should use RSA because it is a well-studied algorithm. When used properly it is secure.
Apparently you're not a crypto-scientist, if you've never heard of a "meet in the middle" attack (note: this is different from a "man in the middle" attack). Meet-in-the-middle is why people use 3DES instead of 2DES; 2DES is not really stronger than 57 bits even though the key size is 112 bits. 3DES is still subject to meet-in-the-middle; even though the key size is 168 bits it is "only" 112 bits strong (which is plenty strong).
With public-key algorithm like RSA it's even worse. Each key can be broken totally independantly no matter how many keys you use. "3RSA" would be a waste of time.
Just use a long RSA key. 1024 bits is enough, but computers are fast enough that you may as well use longer (2048 bits is plenty). The current state-of-the-art in factoring can break just over 512 bits. 1024 is a long way off unless you expect some massive breakthrough in quantum computers (the best quantum computers today are less useful than a pocket calculator).
NAI's key escrow function is a "small and subtle" change, and look what it's done. And NAI even has real "crypto-scientists".
Don't fuck around with crypto if you're not an expert. The experts get it wrong often enough; we don't need you screwing things up even more. We already have too many amateurs screwing things up.
This tells me you don't even understand what public key crypto is about.
I can't emphasize enough: Do not go "improving" crypto unless you already have a bunch of cryptanalytic experience.
The quickest "patch" would be for the key servers to discard any parts of the public key block that are outside of the self-signed portion. This would prevent people from using the key servers to distribute poisoned keys.
Of course, that requires trusting your key server, which you shouldn't have to do (that's what key signing is for). At least it would make exploitation harder. As it stands a script kiddie could probably exploit the problem.
Actually, all of the BSDs have the software base that Linux has, through the emulation layer.
As for Linux being "a lot speedier", I think you're either exaggerating or not making a fair comparison. Most performance differentials can be eliminated with a little config file editing.
You said it, brother!
But for a limited time, you too can take advantage of this unique situation to establish your financial security! Call 1-800-SUCKER and get a piece of our PRIME ARCTIC TUNDRA!!!
Don't miss out! Once the global warming hits these permafrost-cheap prices will start to thaw out!
Prime arctic tundra - Because there's one born every minute!
Telerobot FAQ 12.7.14:
Q: Why does my robot go berzerk and kill all of my customers while playing classical music?
A: Your Telerobot(TM) is experiencing a TLC deficiency. Wait for Telerobot(TM) to run out of ammunition and then give it the love and attention it deserves.
If the problem persists, consider purchasing our new TeleMaid(TM) to facilitate cleanup so you can get back to business sooner.
Actually, the problem is more like, we don't rely on RSA technology often enough .
As long as the people you're trying to keep out don't have a quantum computer, RSA is plenty strong. Really.
The problem is, a huge proportion of internet systems don't use strong encryption at all. Even worse, most break-ins are the result of stupid things that encryption can't solve. Like buffer overflows, forgetting to validate user input before using it in a system() call or SQL query, allowing incoming emails to pass exploit code to insecure "helper" applications, sysadmins and/or software installers leaving important files and directories set world writable, leaving default passwords in place, and other bogosities.
Yeah, but if it went nuts (a big "if" I hope) 1500 rounds can do a lot of damage.
s/run out of ammo/kill hundreds of people/
I think they're protesting the two halves of the Corporatist party. But I don't know- I wasn't there, and as one of the previous posters pointed out, the media isn't letting us know what it's about.
There are always people who will jump on the bandwagon without knowing what's going on. Don't judge all of the protesters solely based on Emmett's actions.
Heck, how many Linux users out there don't "get" Free software? That doesn't lessen Free software in any way.
The hard drive manufacturers must really love you. Imagine: A compression codec that increases the file size!
Of course the free software community would counter with a ".ogg.gz" format, and Windows users would have their ".zip"...
They will stay totally voluntary. You won't have to get one, and if you do, you won't have to share your tracking number with anyone outside the issuing agency. Just like social security numbers. :-/
I suppose it could be made pseudonymous, like slashdot. If you want the +2 bonus you need to establish a reputation.
Pseudonymous communication is possible in an otherwise anonymous network through digital signatures. For example, if all slashdot posts were Anonymous Coward, someone could come along and create a client-side thing to automatically GPG sign posts and verify GPG signatures, hilighting posts from known-good GPG keys.
This sort of thing has been discussed on the cypherpunks sewer^H^H^H^H^Hmailing list for years.
Have things really sunk to that level?
If so, kudos to the protester for standing up to them and forcing them to show their true colors, instead of caving in fear of a merely implied bogus arrest like the rest of us would have.
A lot of people don't know this, but the police standard for using pepper spray is not "violence" or "resistance", but merely "non-compliance". That is, if they tell you to do something, and you don't, they can blast you with the shit. The fact that you are "peaceful" doesn't matter.
This came to the forefront with a videotape of a (greenpeace?) protest in California, where peaceful protesters had their eyelids held open and pepperspray applied directly to their eyeballs with cotton swabs.
What really sucks is that the police are always championing new gadgets as allowing them to use less force. I.e., "We should be allowed to use the Arwen gun / pepperspray / tazer so that we won't have to shoot armed suspects". Sometimes new weapons are used like that, but usually it works the other way: the police are allowed to use more force when they would otherwise have had to resolve the situation through other means (waiting people out, or the looks-bad-on-tv billyclub).
I don't think it's an "in"-joke at all. I remember "about two weeks" being the time estimate for a whole bunch of software projects, even pre-quake (remember those days?).
"It'll be ready in two weeks" really just means "it'll be ready when it's ready".
I suspect there is something about software engineering, that everything appears to be solvable within two weeks but during those two weeks new things pop up.
More likely:
You're a home NT user. Same scenario, only the bug wasn't reported. One fourteen year old who's spent half his life in a debugger has it. The entire internet is now screwed, because the kid released a worm that spread through those legions of "mainstream" MS boxen like wildfire. A bunch of Unix geeks spend a few hours developing filters to protect the world's MS boxen and post the filters to Bugtraq, reducing the load on the network enough that everyone can get back to their pr0n. A few days later MS releases a hotfix that does who-knows-what and may or may not work right on your machine. A few days after that it's discovered that the hotfix re-enables a vulnerable activex control, and another worm is released, but doesn't go anywhere because not many people installed the hotfix anyway...
They do. I'm sure there are some exceptions, but not many.
That's how they identify people violating their acceptable use policy (spammers, script kiddies, etc).
They are able to track undesirables without the help "itrace" because practically all non-DDoS activity requires legitimate source addresses on the packets in order to complete the TCP three-way handshake.
Relax, man. It's not your article. :)