Most people seem to be assuming that there was no or almost no damage done by the Y2K bug. It should be noted that most places that had problems probably put a lot of effort into covering them up, just like most places do with security issues. No company would want to admit to not having fixed their problems, and so we'll never really know the extent of the damage.
This method of copy protection seems useless. Although it may stop poeple from dumping mp3's the old fashioned way (until someone out there does a little hacking) what is to stop anyone from taking the audio out off of a cd player and throwing it into the audio input of the computer and ripping that way? I don't see how they could stop this? Is there anything? If there isn't then this is a very wasteful attempt at creating copy protection. It seems like if it is possible to play the CD then it is possible to rip it with no exceptions. It's not like a VHS tape where they could play with the AFG and screw it up. I don't see what they could do with an audio line to keep it from being recorded and still allow it to be playable. Anyone know?
This is all a bit silly. Everyone is proposing all these complicated ways of fixing the problem. Even Carmack suggested a closed source solution. The real solution that works perfectly and has no problem being open source is to rewrite the bad areas of the server so that it will check and make sure the client isn't trying to do anything it can't do. There is no reason this can't be done. If the protocol is badly written then the proper solution is for it to be rewritten so that it could work securely. It seems like the best thing to do would be to keep this all open sourced, and the best way of doing that is to properly write a secure server/protocol. This method seems like it should keep everyone happy. It's not much more difficult than all the ideas being proposed, and it keeps it all open source. This is not the big problem everyone is making it seem to be. If the program is well written then it will be secure.
Most people seem to be assuming that there was no or almost no damage done by the Y2K bug. It should be noted that most places that had problems probably put a lot of effort into covering them up, just like most places do with security issues. No company would want to admit to not having fixed their problems, and so we'll never really know the extent of the damage.
This method of copy protection seems useless. Although it may stop poeple from dumping mp3's the old fashioned way (until someone out there does a little hacking) what is to stop anyone from taking the audio out off of a cd player and throwing it into the audio input of the computer and ripping that way? I don't see how they could stop this? Is there anything? If there isn't then this is a very wasteful attempt at creating copy protection. It seems like if it is possible to play the CD then it is possible to rip it with no exceptions. It's not like a VHS tape where they could play with the AFG and screw it up. I don't see what they could do with an audio line to keep it from being recorded and still allow it to be playable. Anyone know?
This is all a bit silly. Everyone is proposing all these complicated ways of fixing the problem. Even Carmack suggested a closed source solution. The real solution that works perfectly and has no problem being open source is to rewrite the bad areas of the server so that it will check and make sure the client isn't trying to do anything it can't do. There is no reason this can't be done. If the protocol is badly written then the proper solution is for it to be rewritten so that it could work securely.
It seems like the best thing to do would be to keep this all open sourced, and the best way of doing that is to properly write a secure server/protocol. This method seems like it should keep everyone happy. It's not much more difficult than all the ideas being proposed, and it keeps it all open source. This is not the big problem everyone is making it seem to be. If the program is well written then it will be secure.