The Snowden revelations show that the UK snoop on its own citizens without any barrier. The RIP Act can be used to compel handing over of pass phrases with threat of 2 year prison sentence for failure to comply.
Short of legislating against the use of crypto or allowing 'in camera' use of surveillance material its hard to imagine a what other powers the state are after.
Mainstreaming reporting started in the last few days. The issue has been reported consistently for nearly a year. I and many other impact users have reported faults in stores, reported via Apple Product Feedback in forums and written to Tim Cook to complain. Not only do they ignore the issues reported on the forum but they also delete posts with links to online forums, news stories and petitions. Nice work Apple.....
Apple do little on the issue and offer you a (paid for) repair service to fix this systemic fault. The repair being a replacement board that many users report fails again anyway.
Bruce Schneier http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/black-budget-what-exactly-are-the-nsas-cryptanalytic-capabilities/ stated that "Breakthroughs in factoring have occurred regularly over the past several decades, allowing us to break ever-larger public keys. Much of the public-key cryptography we use today involves elliptic curves, something that is even more ripe for mathematical breakthroughs. It is not unreasonable to assume that the NSA has some techniques in this area that we in the academic world do not. Certainly the fact that the NSA is pushing elliptic-curve cryptography is some indication that it can break them more easily."
I'd not rush from DH to ECC but would strongly recommend a move to 2048-bit or above keys
And have just realised that I haven't posted to Slashdot for many years...And yet somehow my.sig is still relevant. NSA may have dropped their plans for mandatory Escrow 15 years ago after the quote was made...but they didn't change the fundamental goal: to read everything.
On sites with this level of security, thumbdrives, floppies etc are prohibited items. All staff that access SECRET material will be DV cleared and acutely aware that breaching Operating Procedures will result in instant dismisal and possible prosecution under the OSA.
Seriously, in normal business having lapse security is usual. In facilities that contain SECRET or greater material, the IT & business staff are generally anal about securing data and IT systems. USB ports disabled or removed, all hard drives locked in aproved cabinets over night, edge based routing and network authentication etc etc suplemented by random searches etc.
Based upon work at a few highly secure sites, I am very confident that "business systems" networks don't knowingly contain protectively marked data, but I can imagine it happens accidentally from time to time. But in terabyte after terabyte of data on a non-classified network, it's going to be unlikely that a trojan just so happens to leak the protectively marked material.
I really had a lot of respect at how seriously DV people (the top clearance in UK) took protection of classified material. Even secretaries etc knew the rules.
Sorry, are you saying 1) someone gets and e-mail, transfers it to the SECRET network and then someone runs a trojan or 2) that the unclassified network will contain SECRET data copied either accidentally or maliciously by users
If 1) then my comment stands - the data has no way to get out from the air-gapped SECRET network
If 2), then this would be surprising. Most government employees that have sufficient clearance and have been granted access to SECRET material on a need to know basis are pretty well informed about the required Operating Procedures
The program then needs to magically send data back out from the classified network to the internet, somehow. These networks (certainly all networks containing SECRET data and above) are physically disconnected from other networks and the internet, so I don't understand how this would occur....
According to UK Government operational and configuration guidelines for classified system (primarily JSP440), any system containing CONFIDENTIAL or data with high protective marking just won't be connected to the internet so therefore won't get the mails and therefore won't be able to leak to the internet?
So how the hell would these PC leak SECRET data at all?
Cryptographic hashes usually output hashes much smaller than 2048-bits. MD5 is just 128-bits, SHA-{0|1} is 160-bits. The largest hash in any kind of real world use is SHA-512.
Seriously, I was worried about having a "*@samsimpson.co[m|.uk]" e-mail catch-all and getting tons and tons of spam. In reality (after 4 or so years) I always get mails to my externally used addresses (sam@ & delme@). I never get mails to any other address in my domain.
Having a catchall address is nice because it allows you to register at websites with sitename@domainname.com and still get the mail (and notice instantly if they sell on your details).
Well, out of 2000 comments posted in this story and the corresponding story last night you'll be glad to here that "ring0.tar.gz" appeared 0 times, so I'm not really sure who to talk to....
.
Do a p2p search for "windows_2000_source_code.zip" or "Windows.2000.Source.Code.zip" son....
I think not - the files include (for example) the source to calc.exe, the source to all of the OpenGL screensavers, the source to many of the GINA modules, the code for all of the common controls etc.
In fact, I'm yet to see any "ring 0" kernel code or device drivers.
I agree with your point about new worms though - it should be nice and easy for crackers to find the millions of buffer overruns now....
"but it isn't an excuse for having shipped defective software in the first place."
.
Oh, come on! I'm a big advocate of Linux etc (see e.g. here), but let's not pretent that Microsoft is the only vendor to ship software that's a) out of the box broken b) implemented poorly and with no respect to normal security practices.
ok, well we both kind of agree that the idea of booting windows to destroy the volume header doesn't add any/much security against a serious adversary, which was the point I was trying to make....
The comment about the "plausible denial" setup being useless because an intelligent adversary would always take a mirror copy first: That does not affect the plausible denial aspect.
I assume you're referring to my comment - which wasn't that plausible deniability was not possible because of mirror copies, my exact comment was:
From the paper: "A truly paranoid setup would leave the computer con-figured to boot the Windows system by default, and locate the GBDE data in such a way that it would be destroyed by the act of doing so."
It's likely this wouldn't work - the first thing a half-competent adversary would do is image all disks in a system before booting....It's forensic 101.
E.g. having windows "break" a GBDE volume if it's booted just isn't feasible if you consider your adversary to be skilled.
Slashdot Mirror
...Interdiction is where it's at: https://www.techdirt.com/artic...
Or maybe use IPSec / SSH with DH Group 19 - that's not looking too clever either: https://weakdh.org/imperfect-f...
All in all, if your threat model includes the NSA then reviewing 30m LOC may seem like a good place to start but in practice.....
The Snowden revelations show that the UK snoop on its own citizens without any barrier. The RIP Act can be used to compel handing over of pass phrases with threat of 2 year prison sentence for failure to comply. Short of legislating against the use of crypto or allowing 'in camera' use of surveillance material its hard to imagine a what other powers the state are after.
Amen brother. More info here for those interested.
As always, Glenn Greenwald has thought provoking narrative.
Join the Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/groups/2011mbp/
Keep up to date with the news articles: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Eb-f4R0rWNfK5gPPw4O38bCJZUh5zLTjxj3qSKtqXkA/edit
Mail Tim Cook and express your frustration, politely: tcook[at]apple.com
Sign the petition: https://www.change.org/en-AU/petitions/timothy-d-cook-replace-or-fix-all-early-2011-macbook-pro-with-graphics-failure
Mainstreaming reporting started in the last few days. The issue has been reported consistently for nearly a year. I and many other impact users have reported faults in stores, reported via Apple Product Feedback in forums and written to Tim Cook to complain. Not only do they ignore the issues reported on the forum but they also delete posts with links to online forums, news stories and petitions. Nice work Apple.....
Apple do little on the issue and offer you a (paid for) repair service to fix this systemic fault. The repair being a replacement board that many users report fails again anyway.
Bruce Schneier http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/black-budget-what-exactly-are-the-nsas-cryptanalytic-capabilities/ stated that "Breakthroughs in factoring have occurred regularly over the past several decades, allowing us to break ever-larger public keys. Much of the public-key cryptography we use today involves elliptic curves, something that is even more ripe for mathematical breakthroughs. It is not unreasonable to assume that the NSA has some techniques in this area that we in the academic world do not. Certainly the fact that the NSA is pushing elliptic-curve cryptography is some indication that it can break them more easily."
I'd not rush from DH to ECC but would strongly recommend a move to 2048-bit or above keys
And have just realised that I haven't posted to Slashdot for many years...And yet somehow my .sig is still relevant. NSA may have dropped their plans for mandatory Escrow 15 years ago after the quote was made...but they didn't change the fundamental goal: to read everything.
https://secure1.globalexpense.com/ExpensesNet/login.aspx - painful as I have to use it every month for work related expenses
On sites with this level of security, thumbdrives, floppies etc are prohibited items. All staff that access SECRET material will be DV cleared and acutely aware that breaching Operating Procedures will result in instant dismisal and possible prosecution under the OSA.
Seriously, in normal business having lapse security is usual. In facilities that contain SECRET or greater material, the IT & business staff are generally anal about securing data and IT systems. USB ports disabled or removed, all hard drives locked in aproved cabinets over night, edge based routing and network authentication etc etc suplemented by random searches etc.
Based upon work at a few highly secure sites, I am very confident that "business systems" networks don't knowingly contain protectively marked data, but I can imagine it happens accidentally from time to time. But in terabyte after terabyte of data on a non-classified network, it's going to be unlikely that a trojan just so happens to leak the protectively marked material.
I really had a lot of respect at how seriously DV people (the top clearance in UK) took protection of classified material. Even secretaries etc knew the rules.
Sorry, are you saying 1) someone gets and e-mail, transfers it to the SECRET network and then someone runs a trojan or 2) that the unclassified network will contain SECRET data copied either accidentally or maliciously by users
If 1) then my comment stands - the data has no way to get out from the air-gapped SECRET network
If 2), then this would be surprising. Most government employees that have sufficient clearance and have been granted access to SECRET material on a need to know basis are pretty well informed about the required Operating Procedures
The program then needs to magically send data back out from the classified network to the internet, somehow. These networks (certainly all networks containing SECRET data and above) are physically disconnected from other networks and the internet, so I don't understand how this would occur....
According to UK Government operational and configuration guidelines for classified system (primarily JSP440), any system containing CONFIDENTIAL or data with high protective marking just won't be connected to the internet so therefore won't get the mails and therefore won't be able to leak to the internet?
So how the hell would these PC leak SECRET data at all?
Cryptographic hashes usually output hashes much smaller than 2048-bits. MD5 is just 128-bits, SHA-{0|1} is 160-bits. The largest hash in any kind of real world use is SHA-512.
That sounds like more hardwork than simply registering with a sites as e.g. "amazonuk@domainname.com", but whatever floats your boat, I guess!
Seriously, I was worried about having a "*@samsimpson.co[m|.uk]" e-mail catch-all and getting tons and tons of spam. In reality (after 4 or so years) I always get mails to my externally used addresses (sam@ & delme@). I never get mails to any other address in my domain.
Having a catchall address is nice because it allows you to register at websites with sitename@domainname.com and still get the mail (and notice instantly if they sell on your details).
Well, out of 2000 comments posted in this story and the corresponding story last night you'll be glad to here that "ring0.tar.gz" appeared 0 times, so I'm not really sure who to talk to....
.Do a p2p search for "windows_2000_source_code.zip" or "Windows.2000.Source.Code.zip" son....
I think the files are called "ring 0"
I think not - the files include (for example) the source to calc.exe, the source to all of the OpenGL screensavers, the source to many of the GINA modules, the code for all of the common controls etc.
In fact, I'm yet to see any "ring 0" kernel code or device drivers.
I agree with your point about new worms though - it should be nice and easy for crackers to find the millions of buffer overruns now....
What's taters, precious, eh, what's taters?
"but it isn't an excuse for having shipped defective software in the first place."
.Oh, come on! I'm a big advocate of Linux etc (see e.g. here), but let's not pretent that Microsoft is the only vendor to ship software that's a) out of the box broken b) implemented poorly and with no respect to normal security practices.
Or simply use UPTOMP.EXE - distributed with the NTv4 Resource Kit....
With access to a backup of the container, you might be able to abuse this fact.
Yes - totally. As a minimum the adversary can tell what blocks have change between a backup and a more recent version of the container.
ok, well we both kind of agree that the idea of booting windows to destroy the volume header doesn't add any/much security against a serious adversary, which was the point I was trying to make....
Hi Poul,
The comment about the "plausible denial" setup being useless because an intelligent adversary would always take a mirror copy first: That does not affect the plausible denial aspect.
I assume you're referring to my comment - which wasn't that plausible deniability was not possible because of mirror copies, my exact comment was:
From the paper: "A truly paranoid setup would leave the computer con-figured to boot the Windows system by default, and locate the GBDE data in such a way that it would be destroyed by the act of doing so."
It's likely this wouldn't work - the first thing a half-competent adversary would do is image all disks in a system before booting....It's forensic 101.
E.g. having windows "break" a GBDE volume if it's booted just isn't feasible if you consider your adversary to be skilled.
See Shauns post, here.