"Most amusingly, however, nearly a quarter of the 1,000 patient respondents said they don't even trust themselves with access to their own electronic health records."
These are the smart ones.
I feel compelled to point out that while BackTrack is a great distro, it's primary goal isn't really being secure from outside intruders. It is designed for auditing and testing other systems.
I'm sure with a reasonable effort you could lock it down to be relatively secure, but you're looking at the wrong tool for the task. Hell, it runs everything as root by default.
You don't change the system, you change to the system, so you are recommending a increasingly larger compromise of his personal principals in order to validate your own sense of "pragmatic" choices.
While I can't argue that NSA hasn't been able to decode DES from an early point, it's not all doom and gloom.
From the same Wikipedia page are several sources confirming that Lucifer, as initially conceived by IBM, was vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis, and the NSA's modifications, back in 1974, significantly strengthened the subsequent DES algorithm. This wasn't confirmed until 1990. Before we dismiss any government involvement out of hand, lets consider all sides.
Relevant passage from Wikipedia:
Some of the suspicions about hidden weaknesses in the S-boxes were allayed in 1990, with the independent discovery and open publication by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir of differential cryptanalysis, a general method for breaking block ciphers. The S-boxes of DES were much more resistant to the attack than if they had been chosen at random, strongly suggesting that IBM knew about the technique back in the 1970s. This was indeed the case — in 1994, Don Coppersmith published some of the original design criteria for the S-boxes. According to Steven Levy, IBM Watson researchers discovered differential cryptanalytic attacks in 1974 and were asked by the NSA to keep the technique secret.
When the google migrations took place, the address was migrated, but no emails are imported into google's system. There are no back-mailed passwords. There are no private emails. There is an empty inbox, with the wrong name at the top.
You could reset passwords if you knew of an online service that the email was tied to, but this is a temporary educational account, that must students recognize as non-permanent and unsuitable for password recovery purposes.
You could send nasty emails to other people, which could be fun, but limited in scope.
So yes, there is a nice lil screwup here, it's not the doom-and-gloom, all your stuffs are mine now.
"Fortunately, I had a Geo Metro" The first, and last, time that someone has said that...
"Most amusingly, however, nearly a quarter of the 1,000 patient respondents said they don't even trust themselves with access to their own electronic health records." These are the smart ones.
I feel compelled to point out that while BackTrack is a great distro, it's primary goal isn't really being secure from outside intruders. It is designed for auditing and testing other systems. I'm sure with a reasonable effort you could lock it down to be relatively secure, but you're looking at the wrong tool for the task. Hell, it runs everything as root by default.
You don't change the system, you change to the system, so you are recommending a increasingly larger compromise of his personal principals in order to validate your own sense of "pragmatic" choices.
Ah, I see where you're going with that...
You are the Devil.
Oh, wait...
Hey, I'm an asshole in Omaha, Nebraska, you insensitive clod!
Threatening to harm a child isn't just entrapment, that's beginning to look more like duress.
While I can't argue that NSA hasn't been able to decode DES from an early point, it's not all doom and gloom. From the same Wikipedia page are several sources confirming that Lucifer, as initially conceived by IBM, was vulnerable to differential cryptanalysis, and the NSA's modifications, back in 1974, significantly strengthened the subsequent DES algorithm. This wasn't confirmed until 1990. Before we dismiss any government involvement out of hand, lets consider all sides. Relevant passage from Wikipedia: Some of the suspicions about hidden weaknesses in the S-boxes were allayed in 1990, with the independent discovery and open publication by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir of differential cryptanalysis, a general method for breaking block ciphers. The S-boxes of DES were much more resistant to the attack than if they had been chosen at random, strongly suggesting that IBM knew about the technique back in the 1970s. This was indeed the case — in 1994, Don Coppersmith published some of the original design criteria for the S-boxes. According to Steven Levy, IBM Watson researchers discovered differential cryptanalytic attacks in 1974 and were asked by the NSA to keep the technique secret.
When the google migrations took place, the address was migrated, but no emails are imported into google's system. There are no back-mailed passwords. There are no private emails. There is an empty inbox, with the wrong name at the top. You could reset passwords if you knew of an online service that the email was tied to, but this is a temporary educational account, that must students recognize as non-permanent and unsuitable for password recovery purposes. You could send nasty emails to other people, which could be fun, but limited in scope. So yes, there is a nice lil screwup here, it's not the doom-and-gloom, all your stuffs are mine now.