Oh come on, nobody's using that old stone circle computer technology any more. Half of the Machu Picchu site is missing, they've lost the Nazca Plain key server, Avesbury is completely trashed (half the stones there are uncalibrated replacements), and Stonehenge was originally just a backup ring in case the Avon flooded: I bet you couldn't get a millithaum per second out of it even on the equinox AND with a FULL team of chanters on hand.
Well, in that case, why do you have a problem with doing certs properly?
Because SSL certs are solving a different problem than SSH host keys, and for services that are simply looking for the solution that SSH host keys provide SSL certs are massive overkill.
When you're ssh-ing into your computer, how many precautions do you take?
Heh, I was at a Usenix conference back in the '90s when someone discovered that there was a backdoored Kerberos install on the computers in the terminal room. I know how this game is played.
I ssh from my own laptop. I am nervous about sshing from my own colo server. I have had a couple of unexpected key change messages and each time I contacted the person responsible for the server to verify that, yes, they had reinstalled the OS or accidentally trashed the key files.
I've seen administration scripts written with "expect" to automatically accept an unrecognized key.
I've seen websites with messages that say "if you get an invalid certificate message from this site, it's normal" too.
What use is encryption if you can't guarantee that there's not a man in the middle?
Unless your very first connection to the website and EVERY subsequent connection was intercepted by the SAME attacker, for every person in a position to detect the fraud, for the entire duration of the scam, simply verifying that the certificate is the same as the last time provides sufficient authentication to deter all but the most dedicated attacker.
So... sites where significant assets are involved would not use self-signed certificates, because the kind of resources required to set up and maintain this kind of deception are not impossible. But for most services on the Internet this kind of fraud would cost orders of magnitude more resources than could conceivably be recovered from the victim.
Where have I suggested that Paypal should use self-signed certs?
The point is that there's thousands of sites... no, hundreds of thousands... that are wide open for sniffing that would be using TLS if it was possible to set it up as easily as you can set up SSH. This possibly didn't used to be an issue but is getting more so as more and more businesses provide things like free wifi.
For these sites the same level of authentication as SSH, "this is the same server as you visited last time", is adequate to deter MITM attacks.
If you want to run an encrypted site without shelling out for a certificate, then fine - but its up to you to reassure visitors that you're not evil.
There's nothing stopping an evil company from getting a certificate. Consider Microsoft as an example. Or Verisign. Or Aristotle.
What you mean to say is "it's up to you to convince your visitors that you're who you say you are".
If all I'm saying is "I'm a video game web forum" then my visitors don't need anything more than "I'm using the same self-signed certificate I used the last time".
Technically, you're correct. Technically, "this is the same site you visited the last time" is a very weak form of "authentication". Thing is, this is all the "authentication" most services need.
Forcing people to implement both privacy and authentication in one package is half the problem with SSL. For most sites, it's more important to know that the site you're visiting is the same site you visited last time, than knowing that foo.example.com has a signed certificate approved by someone you never heard of. If these two functionalities were separated, so the browser just checked that a "non-certified" site's encryption key hadn't changed and let you through without comment if that was the case, then most sites using old or self-signed certificates would just use the encryption layer, and browsers COULD block access to sites with invalid certificates without causing people so much inconvenience they'd want to switch to a different browser that was less picky.
(yes, I know that this would probably be implemented using self-signed certificates, but it could be presented to the user as a "low security" site with an appropriate icon and at most a comment that "you haven't visited XXXX.example.com before, it is a low security site..." the first time you see it)
If it's using WinMo, Active Sync will be able to backup, right?
I went back to PalmOS after some bad experiences with Pocket PC, including the fact that ActiveSync does NOT make a useful backup of a PDA or phone.
* It doesn't back up applications. It does keep a copy of applications when you install them through ActiveSync, but not if you install them via a CAB file on the device. And that copy is only usable until you replace or reinstall your PC because it depends on a maze of twisty little registry keys.
* It doesn't back up application data that it didn't install. If your applications create data, they have to have software on your PC to back it up.
* It doesn't back up files you install yourself. Depending on how you install them, it may keep a copy of the file you installed, but don't expect it to keep any changes made on the device.
That's why by 2002 every Windows CE "partner" was including a little program to backup to flash card, because ActiveSync doesn't do it for you.
Is it really unethical to run a large archive of freeware/shareware? Can you really expect them to look at the ethics of every peice of software uploaded?
That depends on the nature if the archive and where they're operating. For example if they're being sued in the US and they're simply operating as an ISP and providing hosting for whatever random software some yobbo uploads, then they're protected by the safe harbour provisions of the DMCA. Now, I can't read the ZDnet China page... but if it's similar to other ZDnet sites then they're operating more like a computer magazine than an ISP and are responsible for the software they choose to share.
So what you're basically saying here, is that Microsoft is not purposefully evil, but rather incompetent (like many shops) at documenting their source code and software behavior ?
What I'm saying is that this is not evidence of *Samba* being incompetent.
However.
You can't rule out both.
I have in the past said that I wouldn't mind Microsoft being the "Evil Empire" if only they were a *competent* Evil Empire.
I think you mean "this is a sterling example of how poorly documented and understood, even within Microsoft, Windows behavior is".
Microsoft had to dig into Windows kernel source to figure out why Windows didn't like what Samba was doing. How the hell was the Samba team supposed to figure it out from specs?
This is why the OOXML spec is six and a half thousand pages long and even then parts of it still read, simply, "do what Excel does here".
Unfortunately not, the people being sued are not the repressive governemnt but a mere download site distributing what they beleived was legit freeware.
They would sue the Chinese government if they thought they had a chance, but they can't, so they have to work through a patsy who was unethical enough to think that redistributing repressive software was a good idea.
The standard did not get created because PGP was a "hack", it was created because of the legal issues surrounding PGP and Phil Zimmerman. Those issues should have been addressed explicitly, instead of creating a standard that depends on an expensive infrastructure that keeps it from being adopted by hoi polloi.
Slashdot Mirror
Everyone knows the world will end in 2012.
Oh come on, nobody's using that old stone circle computer technology any more. Half of the Machu Picchu site is missing, they've lost the Nazca Plain key server, Avesbury is completely trashed (half the stones there are uncalibrated replacements), and Stonehenge was originally just a backup ring in case the Avon flooded: I bet you couldn't get a millithaum per second out of it even on the equinox AND with a FULL team of chanters on hand.
Well, in that case, why do you have a problem with doing certs properly?
Because SSL certs are solving a different problem than SSH host keys, and for services that are simply looking for the solution that SSH host keys provide SSL certs are massive overkill.
When you're ssh-ing into your computer, how many precautions do you take?
Heh, I was at a Usenix conference back in the '90s when someone discovered that there was a backdoored Kerberos install on the computers in the terminal room. I know how this game is played.
I ssh from my own laptop. I am nervous about sshing from my own colo server. I have had a couple of unexpected key change messages and each time I contacted the person responsible for the server to verify that, yes, they had reinstalled the OS or accidentally trashed the key files.
I've seen administration scripts written with "expect" to automatically accept an unrecognized key.
I've seen websites with messages that say "if you get an invalid certificate message from this site, it's normal" too.
What use is encryption if you can't guarantee that there's not a man in the middle?
Unless your very first connection to the website and EVERY subsequent connection was intercepted by the SAME attacker, for every person in a position to detect the fraud, for the entire duration of the scam, simply verifying that the certificate is the same as the last time provides sufficient authentication to deter all but the most dedicated attacker.
So... sites where significant assets are involved would not use self-signed certificates, because the kind of resources required to set up and maintain this kind of deception are not impossible. But for most services on the Internet this kind of fraud would cost orders of magnitude more resources than could conceivably be recovered from the victim.
Where have I suggested that Paypal should use self-signed certs?
The point is that there's thousands of sites... no, hundreds of thousands... that are wide open for sniffing that would be using TLS if it was possible to set it up as easily as you can set up SSH. This possibly didn't used to be an issue but is getting more so as more and more businesses provide things like free wifi.
For these sites the same level of authentication as SSH, "this is the same server as you visited last time", is adequate to deter MITM attacks.
So you are saying you shouldn't change the public/private key for for 20 something years?
If all you're securing is a session to a web forum where there are no assets at risk, sure.
It's more security than not using TLS at all.
If you want to run an encrypted site without shelling out for a certificate, then fine - but its up to you to reassure visitors that you're not evil.
There's nothing stopping an evil company from getting a certificate. Consider Microsoft as an example. Or Verisign. Or Aristotle.
What you mean to say is "it's up to you to convince your visitors that you're who you say you are".
If all I'm saying is "I'm a video game web forum" then my visitors don't need anything more than "I'm using the same self-signed certificate I used the last time".
Technically, you're correct. Technically, "this is the same site you visited the last time" is a very weak form of "authentication". Thing is, this is all the "authentication" most services need.
Self-signed certificates can be regenerated automatically, or simply set to have a renewal date after the world ends in 2038.
Forcing people to implement both privacy and authentication in one package is half the problem with SSL. For most sites, it's more important to know that the site you're visiting is the same site you visited last time, than knowing that foo.example.com has a signed certificate approved by someone you never heard of. If these two functionalities were separated, so the browser just checked that a "non-certified" site's encryption key hadn't changed and let you through without comment if that was the case, then most sites using old or self-signed certificates would just use the encryption layer, and browsers COULD block access to sites with invalid certificates without causing people so much inconvenience they'd want to switch to a different browser that was less picky.
(yes, I know that this would probably be implemented using self-signed certificates, but it could be presented to the user as a "low security" site with an appropriate icon and at most a comment that "you haven't visited XXXX.example.com before, it is a low security site..." the first time you see it)
If it's using WinMo, Active Sync will be able to backup, right?
I went back to PalmOS after some bad experiences with Pocket PC, including the fact that ActiveSync does NOT make a useful backup of a PDA or phone.
* It doesn't back up applications. It does keep a copy of applications when you install them through ActiveSync, but not if you install them via a CAB file on the device. And that copy is only usable until you replace or reinstall your PC because it depends on a maze of twisty little registry keys.
* It doesn't back up application data that it didn't install. If your applications create data, they have to have software on your PC to back it up.
* It doesn't back up files you install yourself. Depending on how you install them, it may keep a copy of the file you installed, but don't expect it to keep any changes made on the device.
That's why by 2002 every Windows CE "partner" was including a little program to backup to flash card, because ActiveSync doesn't do it for you.
Nice catch, good eye.
Surely they didn't upgrade the SAN and the offsite backup at the same time?
Surely they had an offsite backup?
Right?
Yesterday,
All those backups seemed a waste of pay.
Now my database has gone away.
Oh I believe in yesterday.
Suddenly,
There's not half the files there used to be,
And there's a milestone hanging over me
The system crashed so suddenly.
I pushed something wrong
What it was I could not say.
Now all my data's gone and I long for yesterday-ay-ay-ay.
Yesterday,
Need for backup seemed so far away.
Seemed my data were all here to stay,
Now I believe in yesterday.
Anonymous
A better question is... do they run AMANDA?
Based on this story, probably not.
Is it really unethical to run a large archive of freeware/shareware? Can you really expect them to look at the ethics of every peice of software uploaded?
That depends on the nature if the archive and where they're operating. For example if they're being sued in the US and they're simply operating as an ISP and providing hosting for whatever random software some yobbo uploads, then they're protected by the safe harbour provisions of the DMCA. Now, I can't read the ZDnet China page... but if it's similar to other ZDnet sites then they're operating more like a computer magazine than an ISP and are responsible for the software they choose to share.
So what you're basically saying here, is that Microsoft is not purposefully evil, but rather incompetent (like many shops) at documenting their source code and software behavior ?
What I'm saying is that this is not evidence of *Samba* being incompetent.
However.
You can't rule out both.
I have in the past said that I wouldn't mind Microsoft being the "Evil Empire" if only they were a *competent* Evil Empire.
I think you mean "this is a sterling example of how poorly documented and understood, even within Microsoft, Windows behavior is".
Microsoft had to dig into Windows kernel source to figure out why Windows didn't like what Samba was doing. How the hell was the Samba team supposed to figure it out from specs?
This is why the OOXML spec is six and a half thousand pages long and even then parts of it still read, simply, "do what Excel does here".
Unfortunately not, the people being sued are not the repressive governemnt but a mere download site distributing what they beleived was legit freeware.
They would sue the Chinese government if they thought they had a chance, but they can't, so they have to work through a patsy who was unethical enough to think that redistributing repressive software was a good idea.
A battle between a repressive government and a company that makes repressive software? So there's basically no downside?
I believe the only way forward is for browsers to change the model: associate a certificate SKI with a web site on first visit, warn if that changes.
You mean like ssh does? Yes, I've been arguing for this for years. But there's no money to be made there, so it won't happen.
Well, no, servers don't need audio. o_O
So if I connected my server's entropy generator to a black hole I'd never have to type a page full of gibberish to generate my SSH key pair again!
A dashing rogue, and I don't even swing that way.
The standard did not get created because PGP was a "hack", it was created because of the legal issues surrounding PGP and Phil Zimmerman. Those issues should have been addressed explicitly, instead of creating a standard that depends on an expensive infrastructure that keeps it from being adopted by hoi polloi.