As I understand it, this is already being done for television and FM radio. A receiver in each major market is all that is required. Either subaudible watermarks or audio fingerprinting would work in this way.
"It is, however, illegal to DISTRIBUTE such rips to other people, whether they own the material in question or not. "
If they already own it, it should not be considered distribution.
BTW, where do you draw the line in this list, and why?:
1) I rip my own track and play it on my player.
2) I rip the the track, upload it to my private ftp space, and play it from work.
3) An identical track is ripped in advance, placed in my private ftp space, played from work.
In all cases, I have paid for the track. Why is this a problem?
Several people have complained that their comments didn't get posted with the others. It is likely that an error was made during submission. Your comments had to be in one of a few formats, with full name and contact info, and then sent to TWO email addresses. If you did it right, you would have gotten a receipt by email.
BTW, if you sent it to "1201@loc.gov", that address is no longer valid.
From Time Warner:
(on prevention of fair use)
Quite apart from the irrelevance of that contention to this inquiry, it
is without basis.
(on player control)
Although it is not clear that this assertion has any relevance to the
issue at hand, it might be well to say a few words about it.
(on licensing terms)
I am not aware of any such restrictions imposed by Time Warner but, be
that as it may, we are once again faced with an assertion that is
irrelevant to the issue in this inquiry.
From AFMA:
(on previous comments)
The numerical majority of submissions concentrate their fire on the
anti-circumvention and copyright management provisions contained in
chapter 12 of Title 17, as added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), and make only passing reference -- or none at all - to section
109.
From ASCAP:
(on previous comments)
Numerous comments, however, directly or indirectly reach beyond sections
109 and 117 to other sections of the copyright law that are not
presently under consideration. Such commentators are inappropriately
using this proceeding as a forum to advocate legislative positions that
would benefit their particular industry.
(on expansion to cover internet performance)
DiMA's argument that the section 110(7) retailer exemption to the right
of performance can and should be extended to online music retailer music
businesses marketing and selling copyrighted music is not only
inappropriate in this proceeding, but also has no merit.
From BMI:
(on streaming content)
Section 117 has nothing to do with the broadcasting of music and any
attendant reproduction rights issues, and there is no indication in
Section 104 of the DMCA that Congress intended that this inquiry should
involve music or broadcasting-related issues on the internet.
(on record store exemption)
DiMA innapropriately exceeded the scope of the DMCA inquiry by
suggessting that Section 110(7) of the Act must be amended to "clarify"
that it applies to online music "stores" (DiMA comments at 21), and the
Copyright Office should not consider this proposal for a new exemption
to the public performing right in this proceeding.
From SIIA:
(on previous comments)
The first point we would like to address relates to the scope of the
section 104 study and the fact that many (if not most) of the statements
made in the comments filed by those who propose expanding section 109
and/or section 117 of the Copyright Act fall outside the scope.
(more)
In addition, the comments submitted by the Library Associations also
raise issues that fall within
the scope of the section 1201(a)(1) rulemaking 4 and other issues, such
as the general licensing
practices of copyright owners, that have no bearing on this study. We
urge the Copyright Office and NTIA to ignore those comments that do not
expressly address section 109 or section 117.
(on fair use)
Reference to the fair use doctrine and its applicability is noticeably
absent from many of the comments of those who propose expansion of
sections 109 and/or 117.
(on licensing)
Although,
as stated above, SIIA believes that these issues should not be
considered in the section 104 study, because many of these comments are
incorrect and misleading, we feel it necessary to clarify and correct
these comments.
From Digital Commerce:
(on previous comments)
In this context, DCC is concerned that the comments submitted by DFC,
the Libraries and Ms. Lyons as a part of this proceeding go to issues
far beyond the scope of the study mandated by Congress.
(more)
As finally enacted, the scope of the study was limited to apply only to
sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act. Congress neither desired nor
mandated that other issues be studied.
(still more)
The comments submitted by the three commentators mentioned above
clearly do not fall within the scope of the section 104 study, and DCC
maintains that this is not the proper venue in which to raise these
comments. For this reason, DCC respectfully requests that the Copyright
Office and NTIA disregard these comments.
(even more)
Unfortunately, comments submitted by DFC, the Libraries and Ms. Lyons in
the course of this study are far outside the scope of the congressional
mandate given to the Copyright Office and NTIA. For that reason alone,
DCC would urge that they be ignored.
From Elsevier:
(on previous comments)
Second, many of the comments--in particular those of the library groups--
brought forth arguments simply irrelevant to the task before the
Copyright Office and the NTIA.
(on Library comments)
Other library comments, in addition to being irrelevant, can only be
politely characterized as incomplete.
From NMPA:
(on digital transmission)
In short, the scope or definition of "temporary RAM buffer copies" has
never been at issue in a DPD proceeding, and the webcaster submission
described above is certainly not germane to the current study involving
section 117.
(on public performance)
DiMA's attempt to draw section 110(7) into the scope of this study is
one such effort; it should be rejected.
Further to the 'where will it all end?' example:
I am a hotdog vendor, and I make a very good hotdog. In fact, I consider it an art. I (and all my friends in the biz) have these hotdogs for sale, wrapped in plastic (my 'protection measure'). When you buy my hotdog, you have to use licensed scissors to open the package. My buddy sells those.....
Slashdot Mirror
Yes, Motorola's CPX and MXP, Force Centellis, Radisys CP80, all are Intel-based platforms that are NEBS compliant.
As I understand it, this is already being done for television and FM radio. A receiver in each major market is all that is required. Either subaudible watermarks or audio fingerprinting would work in this way.
"It is, however, illegal to DISTRIBUTE such rips to other people, whether they own the material in question or not. "
If they already own it, it should not be considered distribution.
BTW, where do you draw the line in this list, and why?:
1) I rip my own track and play it on my player.
2) I rip the the track, upload it to my private ftp space, and play it from work.
3) An identical track is ripped in advance, placed in my private ftp space, played from work.
In all cases, I have paid for the track. Why is this a problem?
Several people have complained that their comments didn't get posted with the others. It is likely that an error was made during submission. Your comments had to be in one of a few formats, with full name and contact info, and then sent to TWO email addresses. If you did it right, you would have gotten a receipt by email.
BTW, if you sent it to "1201@loc.gov", that address is no longer valid.
Full instructions were at this address.
From Time Warner:
(on prevention of fair use)
Quite apart from the irrelevance of that contention to this inquiry, it is without basis.
(on player control)
Although it is not clear that this assertion has any relevance to the issue at hand, it might be well to say a few words about it.
(on licensing terms)
I am not aware of any such restrictions imposed by Time Warner but, be that as it may, we are once again faced with an assertion that is irrelevant to the issue in this inquiry.
From AFMA:
(on previous comments)
The numerical majority of submissions concentrate their fire on the anti-circumvention and copyright management provisions contained in chapter 12 of Title 17, as added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and make only passing reference -- or none at all - to section 109.
From ASCAP:
(on previous comments)
Numerous comments, however, directly or indirectly reach beyond sections 109 and 117 to other sections of the copyright law that are not presently under consideration. Such commentators are inappropriately using this proceeding as a forum to advocate legislative positions that would benefit their particular industry.
(on expansion to cover internet performance)
DiMA's argument that the section 110(7) retailer exemption to the right of performance can and should be extended to online music retailer music businesses marketing and selling copyrighted music is not only inappropriate in this proceeding, but also has no merit.
From BMI:
(on streaming content)
Section 117 has nothing to do with the broadcasting of music and any attendant reproduction rights issues, and there is no indication in Section 104 of the DMCA that Congress intended that this inquiry should involve music or broadcasting-related issues on the internet.
(on record store exemption)
DiMA innapropriately exceeded the scope of the DMCA inquiry by suggessting that Section 110(7) of the Act must be amended to "clarify" that it applies to online music "stores" (DiMA comments at 21), and the Copyright Office should not consider this proposal for a new exemption to the public performing right in this proceeding.
From SIIA:
(on previous comments)
The first point we would like to address relates to the scope of the section 104 study and the fact that many (if not most) of the statements made in the comments filed by those who propose expanding section 109 and/or section 117 of the Copyright Act fall outside the scope.
(more) In addition, the comments submitted by the Library Associations also raise issues that fall within the scope of the section 1201(a)(1) rulemaking 4 and other issues, such as the general licensing practices of copyright owners, that have no bearing on this study. We urge the Copyright Office and NTIA to ignore those comments that do not expressly address section 109 or section 117.
(on fair use)
Reference to the fair use doctrine and its applicability is noticeably absent from many of the comments of those who propose expansion of sections 109 and/or 117.
(on licensing)
Although, as stated above, SIIA believes that these issues should not be considered in the section 104 study, because many of these comments are incorrect and misleading, we feel it necessary to clarify and correct these comments.
From Digital Commerce:
(on previous comments)
In this context, DCC is concerned that the comments submitted by DFC, the Libraries and Ms. Lyons as a part of this proceeding go to issues far beyond the scope of the study mandated by Congress.
(more)
As finally enacted, the scope of the study was limited to apply only to sections 109 and 117 of the Copyright Act. Congress neither desired nor mandated that other issues be studied.
(still more)
The comments submitted by the three commentators mentioned above clearly do not fall within the scope of the section 104 study, and DCC maintains that this is not the proper venue in which to raise these comments. For this reason, DCC respectfully requests that the Copyright Office and NTIA disregard these comments.
(even more)
Unfortunately, comments submitted by DFC, the Libraries and Ms. Lyons in the course of this study are far outside the scope of the congressional mandate given to the Copyright Office and NTIA. For that reason alone, DCC would urge that they be ignored.
From Elsevier:
(on previous comments)
Second, many of the comments--in particular those of the library groups-- brought forth arguments simply irrelevant to the task before the Copyright Office and the NTIA.
(on Library comments)
Other library comments, in addition to being irrelevant, can only be politely characterized as incomplete.
From NMPA:
(on digital transmission)
In short, the scope or definition of "temporary RAM buffer copies" has never been at issue in a DPD proceeding, and the webcaster submission described above is certainly not germane to the current study involving section 117.
(on public performance)
DiMA's attempt to draw section 110(7) into the scope of this study is one such effort; it should be rejected.
I have a compilation of argumented links here. Over 20 search engines so far.
The article is still there, but no link from the front page or the technology page. Here's the link.
Further to the 'where will it all end?' example: I am a hotdog vendor, and I make a very good hotdog. In fact, I consider it an art. I (and all my friends in the biz) have these hotdogs for sale, wrapped in plastic (my 'protection measure'). When you buy my hotdog, you have to use licensed scissors to open the package. My buddy sells those.....