This crash merely shows yet again that a badly trained pilot - and many of them are - will crash the aircraft as soon as something unexpected happens.
Your post merely shows that you are an idiot. The pilots were properly trained, however the MCAS and means of disabling it are undocumented, and Boeing claimed that pilots did not need to be retrained for this version of the 737.
probably just current 737MAX signed contracts will outset the penalties, direct and indirect of this scandal.
Aircraft purchase contracts come with generous cancellation provisions, otherwise carriers will delay them until the last possible instant. I think a flurry of 737 cancellations is imminent, coinciding with a modest uptick in 320 orders.
The pilots on the Lion Air flight kept on manually adjusting the trim (correctly diagnosing the problem as an auto-trim issue) but didn't cut off the auto-trim system.
Perhaps because the MCAS and means of disabling it is undocumented.
designing a new airframe leads to new, unknown failure modes
So does modifying an existing airframe, proved by example. Other things being equal, I would rather take my chances with a properly engineered new airframe than a clumsily retrofitted obsolete airframe.
This was supposed to prevent accidents resulting from this
Actually no, the intent of the MCAS was to make the 737 Max fly exactly like a 737 NG in stall conditions, so that Boeing could avoid certifying a new airframe.
The most appalling detail in this whole tragedy is that Boeing felt they could take their sweet time fixing it and not issue advisories, even after their criminal negligence already killed one planeload of people.
I saw a video elsewhere that said that there was an easy way to disable the sensor, but when the pilot only has a few seconds to respond and he is busy trying to keep the plane in the air...
I have seen multiple reports that state that the means of disabling the MCAS was not documented in the flight manual, in fact the existence of the MCAS was not documented at all. This was apparently to maintain the fiction that the 737 Max handled similarly to the 737 NG, to avoid the need for a new certificate or pilot training.
And it should never be difficult to return the plane to manual control. And manual control circuitry and controllers should be physically separate from the flight control system. And the airframe should be inherently stable and forgiving, unlike the 737 Max which has the engines in the wrong place because of its stubby landing gear.
at high angles of attack (or when it thinks the angle of attack is high) it pushes the nose down
And apparently ignores conflicting data from gyros, airspeed indicator and GPS. Which makes it seem like a grade school programming exercise that would be graded as a fail.
to prevent a deep stall which would otherwise be a serious risk on this variant of the 737 due to the placement of its engines.
To be precise, the Max stalls sooner and more aggressively because the engine nacelles generate lift on a long lever arm that is offset from the wings' center of lift. But the stall characteristics are not the real problem, pilots could have simply been trained to be aware of and handle them, but then Boeing would have had to admit that the Max needs to be certified and pilots need to be retrained. If their control system had actually been reliable they might have gotten away with it.
OP is right, the auto pilot has distinct navigation and other well defined functions that do not include adjusting the airframe's aerodynamic characteristics. IOW, the autopilot is a subset of the control system.
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This crash merely shows yet again that a badly trained pilot - and many of them are - will crash the aircraft as soon as something unexpected happens.
Your post merely shows that you are an idiot. The pilots were properly trained, however the MCAS and means of disabling it are undocumented, and Boeing claimed that pilots did not need to be retrained for this version of the 737.
You're speaking emotionally from a recent tragic incident.
*Two* recent tragic *accidents*.
Humans make mistakes, giving them full control is not the answer.
WTF. When the pilot wants full control then the pilot should get it.
You wonder why their design automation system didn't catch it. Maybe it did and the red flag was buried.
And Boeing was losing orders to 320neo so they wanted a new product on the market fast.
probably just current 737MAX signed contracts will outset the penalties, direct and indirect of this scandal.
Aircraft purchase contracts come with generous cancellation provisions, otherwise carriers will delay them until the last possible instant. I think a flurry of 737 cancellations is imminent, coinciding with a modest uptick in 320 orders.
"Because of the change in the engine configuration it is an aircraft that handles differently."
No, it doesn't. That's exactly the point of MCAS.
It was a stupid idea that doesn't work. The M in MCAS should stand for "Murder".
In short, the 737 is a flying museum. Just end it already.
I don't think the reason for the 737's ground clearance is really passenger boarding
Correct. The reason is, Boeing didn't want to redesign the landing gear.
The pilots on the Lion Air flight kept on manually adjusting the trim (correctly diagnosing the problem as an auto-trim issue) but didn't cut off the auto-trim system.
Perhaps because the MCAS and means of disabling it is undocumented.
designing a new airframe leads to new, unknown failure modes
So does modifying an existing airframe, proved by example. Other things being equal, I would rather take my chances with a properly engineered new airframe than a clumsily retrofitted obsolete airframe.
There's a switch
An undocumented switch.
overall, airliner travel remains the safest mode of transportation by far
And you can improve your odds further by avoiding flying in a 737, which has five times the accident rate of the Airbus 320.
Disengaging the autopilot does not disengage the MCAS, in fact it engages it.
This was supposed to prevent accidents resulting from this
Actually no, the intent of the MCAS was to make the 737 Max fly exactly like a 737 NG in stall conditions, so that Boeing could avoid certifying a new airframe.
I think the aircraft is quite flyable
I on the other hand, think that 737 Max is a terrible hack of a design kludge with dangerous, inherently unstable stall characteristics.
The biggest cost to Boeing will be cancelled 737 orders.
Nvidia drivers are a royal pain on Linux compared to AMD, which play nicely with OS updates. Everybody seems to know this except you.
The most appalling detail in this whole tragedy is that Boeing felt they could take their sweet time fixing it and not issue advisories, even after their criminal negligence already killed one planeload of people.
I saw a video elsewhere that said that there was an easy way to disable the sensor, but when the pilot only has a few seconds to respond and he is busy trying to keep the plane in the air...
I have seen multiple reports that state that the means of disabling the MCAS was not documented in the flight manual, in fact the existence of the MCAS was not documented at all. This was apparently to maintain the fiction that the 737 Max handled similarly to the 737 NG, to avoid the need for a new certificate or pilot training.
And it should never be difficult to return the plane to manual control. And manual control circuitry and controllers should be physically separate from the flight control system. And the airframe should be inherently stable and forgiving, unlike the 737 Max which has the engines in the wrong place because of its stubby landing gear.
I don't see how the executive suite avoids culpability.
Yet another reason to take a pass on 2080. And 2060 doesn't even need another reason.
Then there is this. Probably, Radeon VII is the ideal platform because memory bandwidth is everything.
at high angles of attack (or when it thinks the angle of attack is high) it pushes the nose down
And apparently ignores conflicting data from gyros, airspeed indicator and GPS. Which makes it seem like a grade school programming exercise that would be graded as a fail.
to prevent a deep stall which would otherwise be a serious risk on this variant of the 737 due to the placement of its engines.
To be precise, the Max stalls sooner and more aggressively because the engine nacelles generate lift on a long lever arm that is offset from the wings' center of lift. But the stall characteristics are not the real problem, pilots could have simply been trained to be aware of and handle them, but then Boeing would have had to admit that the Max needs to be certified and pilots need to be retrained. If their control system had actually been reliable they might have gotten away with it.
Auto pilot has nothing to do with this.
Except in the 737 MAX it kind of does.
OP is right, the auto pilot has distinct navigation and other well defined functions that do not include adjusting the airframe's aerodynamic characteristics. IOW, the autopilot is a subset of the control system.
Quit reanimating the undead 737 airframe, introduce a new type, and train pilots to fly that.