My concern is that section 7 allows anyone who merely conveys the software to remove additional permissions beyond those of the stock GPL v3 from "any portion of" the covered work (see section 7, paragraph 2). This is not the same as encumbering a BSDL work with new code under a different license because modification of the code is not required to excersize this right.
My argument is that the notice of permission grant effectively abridges the granted rights in section 7. I.e. one cannot then just declare the BSD permission grant void just by virtue of the fact that you distribute the software. In short it functions as an additional restriction beyond the mere requirement to include the notice (i.e. it restricts the ability to remove permissions granted to the code as granted in section 7, paragraph 2). For this reason, I don't think it is safe to rely on 7(b) legal notice exceptions for a compatibility argument in part because the notice is in conflict with the rest of the license (and therefore might not be "reasonable").
The question is not answered by the SFLC in the above document.
Basically, does a notice of permission grant, i.e. "Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to anyone obtaining a copy of ths software and the accompanying documentation...." constitute a reasonable legal notice for the purpose of section 7b especially since it abridges the ability to excersize all rights under section 7?
If so, can I add arbitrary license exceptions and force notice of these even if the GPL v3 does not allow me to ensure that the license exception are guaranteed downstream under section 7.
My concern over a chilling effect is not sufficient to cause me to suggest that this ought to be the primary issue involved. I think that it is a legitimate policy quesiton in this case, though as you point out it does meet Constitutional requirements in this regard. This is more about the act of passing the law being a way to state that hatred of various groups is not acceptable in the locale. I.e. socially ostracizing ideas. This is fairly clearly stated as an intent by many proponants of hate crime legislation.
Again, this is not a basis for rejecting the legality of the laws, but rather a policy concern in their implementation. I don't think it would be appropriate for a court to strike them down on that basis because I don't think the courts should be deciding what "ideas" can be enshrined in law arbitrarily. The time and place to discuss these are in the forums relating to public policy. For the courts to do this, they would be setting themselves up as policy makers rather than protectors of the legal system.
In short, I think that this is a basis for opposing the passage of such laws, not a question of Constitutionality.
if I burn a cross on my own lawn, is that expressive speech? How is that different from burning a flag? Is there any reason why this should be categorically banned even, for example, when not connected to the KKK (the burning cross was originally a Hightland Scottish call to arms). However, this doesn't mean that it couldn't cause problems as relates to fire codes and the like.
Burning a cross on someone else's lawn without their consent, however, is a very different matter. In my book it could well be an assault of some form or another (IANAL, though). Similarly, if I say, to an African American, "Get out of town, nigger, or I'll come back with my shotgun!" then I have issued a threat for bodily harm. I don't think one could hide behind freedom of speech in either case even if, in another context, the expressive action or words might be protected.
As for hate crime legislation, I don't think it blurs this distinction. It *can* have a chilling effect on hate speech and thus deprive the public of a chance to rebutt and hence kill dangerous ideas. However, more troubling is the fact that hate crime legislation is fundamentally asymmetric-- i.e. some groups of people will always have more or less protection than others and hence equal protection under the law is compromosed. Instead I think we should be taking the above examples and generalizing them without regard to the targets. I.e. make an attempt to intimidate people via violent crime carry an extra penalty. Note that this could also be useful in certain cases against organized crime.
A crime is a crime. However, intent and motivation are factors. (For example, the difference between first and second degree murder has to do with thought processes that went on before the crime.) Just as premeditation can make a crime more severe, I see no reason why "crime as intimidation" can't carry an extra penalty. This changes it from a question of motivation by hate to a question of whether it was intended to send a message to other people.
Agreed, but I think they are both rooted in the question of what exactly we want to regulate in terms of hate crime legislation. Hate speech is actually Constitutionally protected in this country (in fact the governing precedent on free speech regulation is a hate speech case). I do think though that there is a (valid) concern that hate crime law may have a chilling effect on hate speech, but I wouldn't base m case against hate crime legislation against it.
Now, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Clinton-era, 1998) is a bad idea because it regulates purely expressive speech if that speech can be interpretted to be "expert advice" to terrorist groups. The Bush Adminitration tried to argue that providing a hyperlink to a Hamas web site constituted expert advice in at least one case.
Under my reading of Brandenburg v. Ohio (IANAL), expressive speech can only be criminalized when it is intended and likely to cause imminant lawless action. Saying that "We must someday overthrow the US government" for example does not qualify, unless it is accompanied by concrete steps to accomplish this, for example, by raising and training an army. Similar saying "Bush is evil and someone should assassinate him" would not be a crime by itself unless it was a part of an attempt to imminantly accomplish this.
In the US we enjoy probably unparalleled protections of Free Speech. Phrases like "Kill the niggers" and "Send the Jews back to Israel" are Constitutionally protected even when made by an individual in an organization which seeks to eventually accomplish these aims (see Brandenburg, majority opinion, footnote 1-- note that this case was about a speech at a KKK march). What would not be legal would be to say this and at the same time hand out weapons in preparation to go out and murder a bunch of Affrican Americans, Jews, etc. Similarly I don't see how burning a cross on your own lawn could get you in any more trouble than fire code violations (doing it on someone else's lawn would be another matter).
However, I cannot think of any other country which draws such a strong line protecting free speech. Interestingly, one of the cases I point to in terms of *why* hate speech laws are a problem is that of the Weimar republic. It is fairly well documented that when the National Socialist party was censored, they enjoyed some of their strongest growth. In essence chilling hate speech only removes it from the public eye and hence denies the public the right of rebuttal. Thus can such dangerous ideas spread their poison.
The judicial branch has done an admirable job of upholding its role throughout this whole so-called "war on terror." Cases such as Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan have generally represented a court attempting to find some level of applicability in the judicial models of the past for the current approach (I actually agree with the Scalia/Stevens dissent in Hamdi, but if you read the Souter/Ginsberg concurring opinion, you can see how difficult these issues were for the Justices).
Under the Roberts court, things haven't been worse either (not including Hamdan in that reference because Roberts recused himself from that case, having been on the appellate board). I would note that what has been published about the role of the FISC and the warrantless wiretapping indicates that they are doing their job too and remarkably restraining executive power.
In short the court has done as good a job as possible in its limited role. We are still a nation of laws, despite the attempts by some people to undermine that.
IANAL, but from the cases I have read, search warrant challenges are almost a routine part of criminal defense. Since the search warrants are a matter of judicial record, you can always ask where the information came from that lead to charges.
Sure. However there is a pretty clear trend downward since WWII.
My two big issues with CLinton has to do with mismanaging the Israeli/Palestinian peace process (arguably he was duped by Ehud Barak), and the fact that he signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty acto fo 1998. The latter has been used to attempt to undermine political free speech (for example in support of Hamas) and create a chilling effect in that area.
Again, Bush is inept. His attempt last week at metaphore (regarding Nelson Mandela) highlights the fact that he isnt fit to represent us in any way. His administration has also been behind an attempt to unermine our liberty with renewed vigor. However, we should recognize that these things did not start with Bush and have been warned about by such presidents as Washington and Eisenhower.
Washington warned about overgrown military establishments being a threat to republican liberty in his farewell speech. There should be no question that our military now fits that description. Similarly, Eisenhower warned that the new world that existed after WWII required a military-industrial complex which could threaten American democratic institutions if unchecked.
At this moment I do not believe that it is possible to "take our country back." We can only hope to transform its progress down this path into something else that is constructive and try to preserve the democratic and legal principles which our great republic is founded on.
The court did *not* allow the unconstitutional suspension of Habeas Corpus during the Civil War. Congress excersized its Constitutional authority to properly suspend it when the courts looked like they were going to rule against Lincoln (which they later did). Congress later suspended Habeas a second time in insurrection immediately following the Civil War as is their right under the Constitution. These were legal because they were done in accordance with the Constitution, Article 1.
Similarly, several clauses of the Constitution (including the 4th amendment) are written in such a way as to demand a reading in context with the times. For example, what is unreasonable in a time of peace (regarding search and siezure) might not be unreasonable in a time of war. THis doesn't mean that the parameters have changed so much as the balance expressed in the Constitution represents factors outside the document itself. (Words like "unreasonable," "cruel," or "unusual" do not seem to represent a static state at the framing of the Constitution but rather general principles of balance.)
Interestingly, the issue here is one of the issuance of search warrants. In typical war-time martial law (where habeas is temporarily suspended by Congress), this would not be an issue. However, since this is not a temporary war-time measure, since we are not faced with an invasion or insurrection (required for the suspension of habeas), and since this is clearly a question of the ability of Congress to let the Executive trample over the basic measures which prevents a dictatorship from arising in our great republic.
The concern I have over hate crime legislation is that I think that it is somewhat inconsistant with the idea of equal protection under the law. Because different groups often have different organizing factors, there will exist some groups who derive additional protections beyond what is granted to others. I believe that this sort of thing thus undermines one of the most basic pillars of just law.
Primary examples might include groups where ethnicity and religion are tightly connected (for example some Native Americans wishing to return to their roots, Jews, Hindus -- who are overwhelmingly of a couple of limited ethnicities, Yoruba practitioners, and the like). Laws which protect a group against one set of attacking motivations may become intractibly entangled with other ones. Similarly, if these are narrowly interpreted, it allows groups to be deprived of the protections they are supposedly offered.
Similarly there are religious groups which tend to be geared at homosexuals. If religious hate crimes are enforced differently than ones on sexual orientation, this causes protections to be either stronger or weaker than for others.
In short, I think that the appropriate response is not to add hate crime legislation but rather have an additional charge of terrorism for people who seek to intimidate other lawful groups through such crimes. This would be obviously limited to actions and/or speech intended and likely to cause imminant lawless action. But let us leave protected criteria out of it because this sort of thing effectively undermines a basic principle of the rule of law.
The GPL v2 aims to include an implied patent license. Even if this is not the case, downstream distributors cannot distribute software under the GPLv2 if people are making patent claims they might enforce in ways unacceptible to that license. If a patent license is issued under the GPL v3 only on a GPL v2+ application, it becomes effectively GPL v3 only since those are the terms it can be distributed under.
It *would* give a patent holder an ability to go after people who violated the GPL v3 but not the GPL v2.
There is one case I could think of where a non-copyright holder could effectively convert the license from GPL v2 to GPL v3. This case involves a patent holder granting a patent license in accordance with the GPL v3 but not the GPL v2. The patent holder could then enforce the GPL v3 as a patent license.
One of the problems you could also run into (IANAL) is that 7(b) "reasonable" legal notices are not defined. It is arguable that the requirement to contain a permission grant in a license which also requires that the permissions can be arbitrarily revoked outside of the copyright license, might not be "reasonable" for the purpose of the license. Ie. the purpose of the legal notice is to essentially add restrictions as to the excersize of the permission to remove additional permissions according to section 7.
The question, as I see it, is whether the later version bit means:
You may distribute this code under the terms of GPLv2, or you may distribute it under the terms of GPLv2+n or:
You may distribute this code under the terms of (GPLv2 or GPLv2+n) Or does it mean (as I maintain):
You may distribute this code as allowed by either the GPL v2 or the the GPL v2+n (at your option)?
If it's the former, then there is no problem. You simply exercise your right to distribute it under the terms of GPLv3. Does this mean "Distribute as permitted by the GPL v3?" or "Changing the license to the GPL v3, forcing all downstream recipients to ignore the author's permission grant?"
I think that the Roberts court has done an admirable job of tackling real legal issues and helping to make the law consistant, just, and effective. For example, they have addressed:
1) Can religions use otherwise illegal drugs in their ceremonies? Yes (interestingly, as a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law). See UVD v. Gonzalez.
2) What constitutes a patent being "obvious?" An obvious innovation is now defined in a way which is meaningful and can be meaningfully used as a defense.
Now if we can only get a few more questions answered such as:
Are exclusive copyright licenses divisible? (9th circuit says no) Under what circumstances can a non-exclusive copyright permission (such as the BSDL) grant given to all third parties be changed (i.e. in the Atheros incident)?
First, you have no authority to force downstream users to use the work under the GPLv3 only until you add copyrighted elements of your own to it. Secondly, I also don't think that it would be acceptible to represent the software as being licensed by the *author* under a different license than it has.
If you intend to change it (i.e. are starting a fork), I see no reason why it would be worth fighting over exactly where the line is to be drawn. But here you are only talking about distributing it (i.e. verbatim), and this would seem to be clearly over the line.
This is a *big* problem I have with the GPLv3 in that it requires that all meaningful dependencies outside the operating system are under licenses which allow this sort of "relicensing" by parties who have no copyright claims to the code.
Although LedgerSMB is under the GPL v2+, we depend on a lot of BSDL libraries, and since I don't believe that one can effectively remove the BSDL permissions grant from BSDL code without adding copyrights of one's own... All I can say is, have fun porting to another RDBMS.
Sure, the license is a 2-way binding contract (otherwise arguments of requiring specific performance in GPL violation cases would be obviously nonsense). However, the licensor is not obligated under that contract to avoid using his code under other licenses. He/she is merely obligated to allow people to use the GPL'd releases under that license.
Look at SugarCRM for example. They have a free/ open source version. And they have more advanced closed source versions. They can't decide one day that the GPl doesn't apply to the GPL'd version. They can, however, continue to use their own GPL'd code in their own proprietary versions.
I think the question is one which is actually fairly simple: if the author releases under GPL v2 or later, when is it acceptable to change the license of the work to GPL v3 or later?
We both agree that either license may be "used." The question is which licenses must be passed on, and when.
Obviously changing it without even intending to add copyrighted elements seems to pose problems. Obviously misrepresenting what permissions the author had granted to the work would seem to pose problems. If one wanted to be *really* hard-nosed (like Theo), one could insist that the changes in license occur after substantive additions, but this seems like a difficult line to draw and not something worth fighting over.
Hence I would probably simply ask for an acknowledgement that the work was based on my work which was released under the license I said it was released under. I might ask for other things too, such as mention of the version number forked from, etc. But if people refused, I probably wouldn't fight about it too much. After all, building a project is a lot of work and it is more important to do this rather than fight about forks which in all liklihood won't last a year.
The BSD license intends that the permission grant follow the software. I have no problem with that.
I *do* have the problem with the idea that technical documentation should be forcibly coupled with political propaganda. This is a different issue entirely.
In my (somewhat limited) contact with other FOSS developers, I have heard from GPL supporters and detractors. Nobody in my immediate social circle of developers likes the GPL v3 though.
Basically the author is allowing people to use and distribute the software under either license.
Think of it this way: The BSD License addresses all downstream users and provides permission to all those who receive the source code. You can't just change the license because only the copyright holder has that right. You *can* take the code and integate it with code under other licenses. Same holds with GPL v2 or later.
Now, if someone took my GPL v2 or later programs and released them under the GPL v3 without forking them, I would consider that a problem. If they forked them (and indicated that they were splitting off), that would probably ask them to be more clear and state that the original version was GPL v2 or later but I probably wouldn't push the issue too much beyond that.
Regardless, I'm not sure even the original copyright holder can remove rights granted by the GPL, given that software licenses are contracts. Is there any reason the original copyright holder can't take the code and use it in a closed source application?
I.e. you can't revoke the license for a given release. You *can* take your own code and do whatever you want with it since you can't violate your own copyright.
And the antitivoization provisions are entirely ineffective. All they say is that one cannot interfere with the running of a GPL v3 binary in any way. It does *not* mean the system as a whole has to do anything meaningful once that is installed. This can be accomplished by merely aggregating GPL v3 components with those which talk to the more interesting parts of the system and then forcing the upgrade as a unit. The GPL v3 components can be added but then cannot do anything interesting since there are other components of the system missing on the other ends of pipes.
This sort of scenario could also be used to implement robust DRM in such a way that replacing open source components would not compromise the system any more than sniffing traffic in an SSL session would give you credit cards. (RMS is factually wrong about the inability to lock users out of content in systems containing GPL v3 components.)
Those missing components can be required to be digitally signed with an encrpytion key to ensure they haven't been tampered with.
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My concern is that section 7 allows anyone who merely conveys the software to remove additional permissions beyond those of the stock GPL v3 from "any portion of" the covered work (see section 7, paragraph 2). This is not the same as encumbering a BSDL work with new code under a different license because modification of the code is not required to excersize this right.
My argument is that the notice of permission grant effectively abridges the granted rights in section 7. I.e. one cannot then just declare the BSD permission grant void just by virtue of the fact that you distribute the software. In short it functions as an additional restriction beyond the mere requirement to include the notice (i.e. it restricts the ability to remove permissions granted to the code as granted in section 7, paragraph 2). For this reason, I don't think it is safe to rely on 7(b) legal notice exceptions for a compatibility argument in part because the notice is in conflict with the rest of the license (and therefore might not be "reasonable").
The question is not answered by the SFLC in the above document.
Basically, does a notice of permission grant, i.e. "Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to anyone obtaining a copy of ths software and the accompanying documentation...." constitute a reasonable legal notice for the purpose of section 7b especially since it abridges the ability to excersize all rights under section 7?
If so, can I add arbitrary license exceptions and force notice of these even if the GPL v3 does not allow me to ensure that the license exception are guaranteed downstream under section 7.
My concern over a chilling effect is not sufficient to cause me to suggest that this ought to be the primary issue involved. I think that it is a legitimate policy quesiton in this case, though as you point out it does meet Constitutional requirements in this regard. This is more about the act of passing the law being a way to state that hatred of various groups is not acceptable in the locale. I.e. socially ostracizing ideas. This is fairly clearly stated as an intent by many proponants of hate crime legislation.
Again, this is not a basis for rejecting the legality of the laws, but rather a policy concern in their implementation. I don't think it would be appropriate for a court to strike them down on that basis because I don't think the courts should be deciding what "ideas" can be enshrined in law arbitrarily. The time and place to discuss these are in the forums relating to public policy. For the courts to do this, they would be setting themselves up as policy makers rather than protectors of the legal system.
In short, I think that this is a basis for opposing the passage of such laws, not a question of Constitutionality.
if I burn a cross on my own lawn, is that expressive speech? How is that different from burning a flag? Is there any reason why this should be categorically banned even, for example, when not connected to the KKK (the burning cross was originally a Hightland Scottish call to arms). However, this doesn't mean that it couldn't cause problems as relates to fire codes and the like.
Burning a cross on someone else's lawn without their consent, however, is a very different matter. In my book it could well be an assault of some form or another (IANAL, though). Similarly, if I say, to an African American, "Get out of town, nigger, or I'll come back with my shotgun!" then I have issued a threat for bodily harm. I don't think one could hide behind freedom of speech in either case even if, in another context, the expressive action or words might be protected.
As for hate crime legislation, I don't think it blurs this distinction. It *can* have a chilling effect on hate speech and thus deprive the public of a chance to rebutt and hence kill dangerous ideas. However, more troubling is the fact that hate crime legislation is fundamentally asymmetric-- i.e. some groups of people will always have more or less protection than others and hence equal protection under the law is compromosed. Instead I think we should be taking the above examples and generalizing them without regard to the targets. I.e. make an attempt to intimidate people via violent crime carry an extra penalty. Note that this could also be useful in certain cases against organized crime.
A crime is a crime. However, intent and motivation are factors. (For example, the difference between first and second degree murder has to do with thought processes that went on before the crime.) Just as premeditation can make a crime more severe, I see no reason why "crime as intimidation" can't carry an extra penalty. This changes it from a question of motivation by hate to a question of whether it was intended to send a message to other people.
Agreed, but I think they are both rooted in the question of what exactly we want to regulate in terms of hate crime legislation. Hate speech is actually Constitutionally protected in this country (in fact the governing precedent on free speech regulation is a hate speech case). I do think though that there is a (valid) concern that hate crime law may have a chilling effect on hate speech, but I wouldn't base m case against hate crime legislation against it.
Now, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Clinton-era, 1998) is a bad idea because it regulates purely expressive speech if that speech can be interpretted to be "expert advice" to terrorist groups. The Bush Adminitration tried to argue that providing a hyperlink to a Hamas web site constituted expert advice in at least one case.
Under my reading of Brandenburg v. Ohio (IANAL), expressive speech can only be criminalized when it is intended and likely to cause imminant lawless action. Saying that "We must someday overthrow the US government" for example does not qualify, unless it is accompanied by concrete steps to accomplish this, for example, by raising and training an army. Similar saying "Bush is evil and someone should assassinate him" would not be a crime by itself unless it was a part of an attempt to imminantly accomplish this.
In the US we enjoy probably unparalleled protections of Free Speech. Phrases like "Kill the niggers" and "Send the Jews back to Israel" are Constitutionally protected even when made by an individual in an organization which seeks to eventually accomplish these aims (see Brandenburg, majority opinion, footnote 1-- note that this case was about a speech at a KKK march). What would not be legal would be to say this and at the same time hand out weapons in preparation to go out and murder a bunch of Affrican Americans, Jews, etc. Similarly I don't see how burning a cross on your own lawn could get you in any more trouble than fire code violations (doing it on someone else's lawn would be another matter).
However, I cannot think of any other country which draws such a strong line protecting free speech. Interestingly, one of the cases I point to in terms of *why* hate speech laws are a problem is that of the Weimar republic. It is fairly well documented that when the National Socialist party was censored, they enjoyed some of their strongest growth. In essence chilling hate speech only removes it from the public eye and hence denies the public the right of rebuttal. Thus can such dangerous ideas spread their poison.
The judicial branch has done an admirable job of upholding its role throughout this whole so-called "war on terror." Cases such as Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan have generally represented a court attempting to find some level of applicability in the judicial models of the past for the current approach (I actually agree with the Scalia/Stevens dissent in Hamdi, but if you read the Souter/Ginsberg concurring opinion, you can see how difficult these issues were for the Justices).
Under the Roberts court, things haven't been worse either (not including Hamdan in that reference because Roberts recused himself from that case, having been on the appellate board). I would note that what has been published about the role of the FISC and the warrantless wiretapping indicates that they are doing their job too and remarkably restraining executive power.
In short the court has done as good a job as possible in its limited role. We are still a nation of laws, despite the attempts by some people to undermine that.
Not necessarily.
IANAL, but from the cases I have read, search warrant challenges are almost a routine part of criminal defense. Since the search warrants are a matter of judicial record, you can always ask where the information came from that lead to charges.
Sure. However there is a pretty clear trend downward since WWII.
My two big issues with CLinton has to do with mismanaging the Israeli/Palestinian peace process (arguably he was duped by Ehud Barak), and the fact that he signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty acto fo 1998. The latter has been used to attempt to undermine political free speech (for example in support of Hamas) and create a chilling effect in that area.
Again, Bush is inept. His attempt last week at metaphore (regarding Nelson Mandela) highlights the fact that he isnt fit to represent us in any way. His administration has also been behind an attempt to unermine our liberty with renewed vigor. However, we should recognize that these things did not start with Bush and have been warned about by such presidents as Washington and Eisenhower.
Washington warned about overgrown military establishments being a threat to republican liberty in his farewell speech. There should be no question that our military now fits that description. Similarly, Eisenhower warned that the new world that existed after WWII required a military-industrial complex which could threaten American democratic institutions if unchecked.
At this moment I do not believe that it is possible to "take our country back." We can only hope to transform its progress down this path into something else that is constructive and try to preserve the democratic and legal principles which our great republic is founded on.
The court did *not* allow the unconstitutional suspension of Habeas Corpus during the Civil War. Congress excersized its Constitutional authority to properly suspend it when the courts looked like they were going to rule against Lincoln (which they later did). Congress later suspended Habeas a second time in insurrection immediately following the Civil War as is their right under the Constitution. These were legal because they were done in accordance with the Constitution, Article 1.
:-)
Similarly, several clauses of the Constitution (including the 4th amendment) are written in such a way as to demand a reading in context with the times. For example, what is unreasonable in a time of peace (regarding search and siezure) might not be unreasonable in a time of war. THis doesn't mean that the parameters have changed so much as the balance expressed in the Constitution represents factors outside the document itself. (Words like "unreasonable," "cruel," or "unusual" do not seem to represent a static state at the framing of the Constitution but rather general principles of balance.)
Interestingly, the issue here is one of the issuance of search warrants. In typical war-time martial law (where habeas is temporarily suspended by Congress), this would not be an issue. However, since this is not a temporary war-time measure, since we are not faced with an invasion or insurrection (required for the suspension of habeas), and since this is clearly a question of the ability of Congress to let the Executive trample over the basic measures which prevents a dictatorship from arising in our great republic.
Kudos to this court.
The concern I have over hate crime legislation is that I think that it is somewhat inconsistant with the idea of equal protection under the law. Because different groups often have different organizing factors, there will exist some groups who derive additional protections beyond what is granted to others. I believe that this sort of thing thus undermines one of the most basic pillars of just law.
Primary examples might include groups where ethnicity and religion are tightly connected (for example some Native Americans wishing to return to their roots, Jews, Hindus -- who are overwhelmingly of a couple of limited ethnicities, Yoruba practitioners, and the like). Laws which protect a group against one set of attacking motivations may become intractibly entangled with other ones. Similarly, if these are narrowly interpreted, it allows groups to be deprived of the protections they are supposedly offered.
Similarly there are religious groups which tend to be geared at homosexuals. If religious hate crimes are enforced differently than ones on sexual orientation, this causes protections to be either stronger or weaker than for others.
In short, I think that the appropriate response is not to add hate crime legislation but rather have an additional charge of terrorism for people who seek to intimidate other lawful groups through such crimes. This would be obviously limited to actions and/or speech intended and likely to cause imminant lawless action. But let us leave protected criteria out of it because this sort of thing effectively undermines a basic principle of the rule of law.
The GPL v2 aims to include an implied patent license. Even if this is not the case, downstream distributors cannot distribute software under the GPLv2 if people are making patent claims they might enforce in ways unacceptible to that license. If a patent license is issued under the GPL v3 only on a GPL v2+ application, it becomes effectively GPL v3 only since those are the terms it can be distributed under.
It *would* give a patent holder an ability to go after people who violated the GPL v3 but not the GPL v2.
There is one case I could think of where a non-copyright holder could effectively convert the license from GPL v2 to GPL v3. This case involves a patent holder granting a patent license in accordance with the GPL v3 but not the GPL v2. The patent holder could then enforce the GPL v3 as a patent license.
One of the problems you could also run into (IANAL) is that 7(b) "reasonable" legal notices are not defined. It is arguable that the requirement to contain a permission grant in a license which also requires that the permissions can be arbitrarily revoked outside of the copyright license, might not be "reasonable" for the purpose of the license. Ie. the purpose of the legal notice is to essentially add restrictions as to the excersize of the permission to remove additional permissions according to section 7.
There goes my patent for using a gas turbine to power a ducted fan for the purpose of generating thrust for aircraft.
But is 065535 (octal) prime? What about 0x65535?
You may distribute this code as allowed by either the GPL v2 or the the GPL v2+n (at your option)? If it's the former, then there is no problem. You simply exercise your right to distribute it under the terms of GPLv3. Does this mean "Distribute as permitted by the GPL v3?" or "Changing the license to the GPL v3, forcing all downstream recipients to ignore the author's permission grant?"
IANAL, etc.
I think that the Roberts court has done an admirable job of tackling real legal issues and helping to make the law consistant, just, and effective. For example, they have addressed:
1) Can religions use otherwise illegal drugs in their ceremonies? Yes (interestingly, as a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law). See UVD v. Gonzalez.
2) What constitutes a patent being "obvious?" An obvious innovation is now defined in a way which is meaningful and can be meaningfully used as a defense.
Now if we can only get a few more questions answered such as:
Are exclusive copyright licenses divisible? (9th circuit says no)
Under what circumstances can a non-exclusive copyright permission (such as the BSDL) grant given to all third parties be changed (i.e. in the Atheros incident)?
First, you have no authority to force downstream users to use the work under the GPLv3 only until you add copyrighted elements of your own to it. Secondly, I also don't think that it would be acceptible to represent the software as being licensed by the *author* under a different license than it has.
If you intend to change it (i.e. are starting a fork), I see no reason why it would be worth fighting over exactly where the line is to be drawn. But here you are only talking about distributing it (i.e. verbatim), and this would seem to be clearly over the line.
This is a *big* problem I have with the GPLv3 in that it requires that all meaningful dependencies outside the operating system are under licenses which allow this sort of "relicensing" by parties who have no copyright claims to the code.
Although LedgerSMB is under the GPL v2+, we depend on a lot of BSDL libraries, and since I don't believe that one can effectively remove the BSDL permissions grant from BSDL code without adding copyrights of one's own... All I can say is, have fun porting to another RDBMS.
Sure, the license is a 2-way binding contract (otherwise arguments of requiring specific performance in GPL violation cases would be obviously nonsense). However, the licensor is not obligated under that contract to avoid using his code under other licenses. He/she is merely obligated to allow people to use the GPL'd releases under that license.
Look at SugarCRM for example. They have a free/ open source version. And they have more advanced closed source versions. They can't decide one day that the GPl doesn't apply to the GPL'd version. They can, however, continue to use their own GPL'd code in their own proprietary versions.
IANAL, etc.
I think the question is one which is actually fairly simple: if the author releases under GPL v2 or later, when is it acceptable to change the license of the work to GPL v3 or later?
We both agree that either license may be "used." The question is which licenses must be passed on, and when.
Obviously changing it without even intending to add copyrighted elements seems to pose problems. Obviously misrepresenting what permissions the author had granted to the work would seem to pose problems. If one wanted to be *really* hard-nosed (like Theo), one could insist that the changes in license occur after substantive additions, but this seems like a difficult line to draw and not something worth fighting over.
Hence I would probably simply ask for an acknowledgement that the work was based on my work which was released under the license I said it was released under. I might ask for other things too, such as mention of the version number forked from, etc. But if people refused, I probably wouldn't fight about it too much. After all, building a project is a lot of work and it is more important to do this rather than fight about forks which in all liklihood won't last a year.
It is a question of intent.
The BSD license intends that the permission grant follow the software. I have no problem with that.
I *do* have the problem with the idea that technical documentation should be forcibly coupled with political propaganda. This is a different issue entirely.
In my (somewhat limited) contact with other FOSS developers, I have heard from GPL supporters and detractors. Nobody in my immediate social circle of developers likes the GPL v3 though.
IANAL, but I don't think that is what it means.
Basically the author is allowing people to use and distribute the software under either license.
Think of it this way: The BSD License addresses all downstream users and provides permission to all those who receive the source code. You can't just change the license because only the copyright holder has that right. You *can* take the code and integate it with code under other licenses. Same holds with GPL v2 or later.
Now, if someone took my GPL v2 or later programs and released them under the GPL v3 without forking them, I would consider that a problem. If they forked them (and indicated that they were splitting off), that would probably ask them to be more clear and state that the original version was GPL v2 or later but I probably wouldn't push the issue too much beyond that.
I.e. you can't revoke the license for a given release. You *can* take your own code and do whatever you want with it since you can't violate your own copyright.
And the antitivoization provisions are entirely ineffective. All they say is that one cannot interfere with the running of a GPL v3 binary in any way. It does *not* mean the system as a whole has to do anything meaningful once that is installed. This can be accomplished by merely aggregating GPL v3 components with those which talk to the more interesting parts of the system and then forcing the upgrade as a unit. The GPL v3 components can be added but then cannot do anything interesting since there are other components of the system missing on the other ends of pipes.
This sort of scenario could also be used to implement robust DRM in such a way that replacing open source components would not compromise the system any more than sniffing traffic in an SSL session would give you credit cards. (RMS is factually wrong about the inability to lock users out of content in systems containing GPL v3 components.)
Those missing components can be required to be digitally signed with an encrpytion key to ensure they haven't been tampered with.