Enough LEGO bashing. The proliferation of special peices is annoying, but that is limited mostly to the basic sets.
LEGO Technic beats the crap out of anything else, fisher-technik, erector, or capsela (can't believe this is even in the running). Technic has more and better pieces that are easier to put together, and won't cut up your hands and tire you out.
The problem with shooting down a high, extremely fast moving aircraft is not in the math. It's the fact that the aircraft can maneuver, albeit only a little bit at those speeds. A missile such as the standard has a limited amount of oomph; its engine only burns for a relatively small part of its flight time, after which it coasts. Since the missile has to fly a very aggressive intercept course to even catch the damn plane, just a slight course change after the missile has burnt out will likely leave the missile floating helpless in the air miles away from the target.
Heh. Now I wish I had taken better notes in Rabin's class. When I saw his presentation of this it was less than totally clear. I do get the feeling that this is not a practical system, but some objections that keep floating around here can be answered effectively. One thing to understand is that the thrust of this algorithm is towards making messages secure from breaking some time after they are transmitted. This is where all the unprovably secure (RSA, etc.) systems fail.
First of all, as many have commented (but to no avail as we still keep hearing the same old objections) this is a provable system within certain bounds. Of course if your system is compromised then the adversary will be able to read your messages. Duh. He'll also be able to blackmail you with all the porn on your hard disk. And of course if the gov't uses only a pseudo-random stream then they will be able to read it, etc... None of these are showstoppers that Rabin would be interested in.
Secondly, the security of the start signal should be able to be assured through smart protocols. Assuming that neither computer at the end of the transmission is compromised, it is obvious that secure transmission of the start signal can be made simply by sending the next start signal on the tail of the last message (unbreakably encrypted). Basically bootstrapping it. Of course, if one of the computers is compromised, then you will have to re-start the communication somehow. If you want a totally secure way to restart, then you get on a plane and pass on the new start signal in person on a piece paper that will self-distruct in 5 seconds. You can argue about the probability of your computer being compromised, but Rabin is not at fault in assuming a secure way to transfer this information.
Better still, even if he compromises your machine at some time, the adversary (even if he was following your communication) will not later be able to decipher what was said. The random bits making up the pad will be gone, so he must follow along concurrently.
As for the storage requirements, this is certainly only a practical concern. Rabin has shown that the unbreakability of the encryption holds up even of the adversary has an arbitrary function for storing some of the random bits (unfortunately I must have fallen asleep when he started to prove it). So since the adversary has to store all the bits, it does not seem that difficult to come up with a method spitting out random numbers that would soon exhaust the memory capability of Earth.
So maybe you won't be seeing this in your cel phones anytime soon, but if you want to make a message that you know will never be dug up, it is comforting that using this method, in only a year, month, or minute your message will be, under any inspection at all, just so many random bits.
Well if nothing else Katz is certainly good at stirring up controversy.
Honestly, though, what is the target audience for this kind of unreasoned, starry-eyed tripe? As a gamer who spends well over 49 minutes a day, I know it isn't me. By the tone of the other posts here, it doesn't seem to be slashdot readers either.
Does anyone else find it scary that the people who might find this kind of writing interesting/insightful are just the kind of people who are least qualified to criticize it?
Slashdot Mirror
Enough LEGO bashing. The proliferation of special peices is annoying, but that is limited mostly to the basic sets.
LEGO Technic beats the crap out of anything else, fisher-technik, erector, or capsela (can't believe this is even in the running). Technic has more and better pieces that are easier to put together, and won't cut up your hands and tire you out.
And of course Technic isused for the semi-famous MIT Autonomous Robot Design Competition.
The problem with shooting down a high, extremely fast moving aircraft is not in the math. It's the fact that the aircraft can maneuver, albeit only a little bit at those speeds. A missile such as the standard has a limited amount of oomph; its engine only burns for a relatively small part of its flight time, after which it coasts. Since the missile has to fly a very aggressive intercept course to even catch the damn plane, just a slight course change after the missile has burnt out will likely leave the missile floating helpless in the air miles away from the target.
First of all, as many have commented (but to no avail as we still keep hearing the same old objections) this is a provable system within certain bounds. Of course if your system is compromised then the adversary will be able to read your messages. Duh. He'll also be able to blackmail you with all the porn on your hard disk. And of course if the gov't uses only a pseudo-random stream then they will be able to read it, etc... None of these are showstoppers that Rabin would be interested in.
Secondly, the security of the start signal should be able to be assured through smart protocols. Assuming that neither computer at the end of the transmission is compromised, it is obvious that secure transmission of the start signal can be made simply by sending the next start signal on the tail of the last message (unbreakably encrypted). Basically bootstrapping it. Of course, if one of the computers is compromised, then you will have to re-start the communication somehow. If you want a totally secure way to restart, then you get on a plane and pass on the new start signal in person on a piece paper that will self-distruct in 5 seconds. You can argue about the probability of your computer being compromised, but Rabin is not at fault in assuming a secure way to transfer this information.
Better still, even if he compromises your machine at some time, the adversary (even if he was following your communication) will not later be able to decipher what was said. The random bits making up the pad will be gone, so he must follow along concurrently.
As for the storage requirements, this is certainly only a practical concern. Rabin has shown that the unbreakability of the encryption holds up even of the adversary has an arbitrary function for storing some of the random bits (unfortunately I must have fallen asleep when he started to prove it). So since the adversary has to store all the bits, it does not seem that difficult to come up with a method spitting out random numbers that would soon exhaust the memory capability of Earth.
So maybe you won't be seeing this in your cel phones anytime soon, but if you want to make a message that you know will never be dug up, it is comforting that using this method, in only a year, month, or minute your message will be, under any inspection at all, just so many random bits.
F
Honestly, though, what is the target audience for this kind of unreasoned, starry-eyed tripe? As a gamer who spends well over 49 minutes a day, I know it isn't me. By the tone of the other posts here, it doesn't seem to be slashdot readers either.
Does anyone else find it scary that the people who might find this kind of writing interesting/insightful are just the kind of people who are least qualified to criticize it?