The article asks us to suppose that it takes one minute to decode the 'START' message, and that the amount of data which is streamed during that minute is too great to store in memory or on disk. But, an attacker still wants to be able to decrypt the encrypted message using the streamed OTP.
SOLUTION:
The attacker places a satellite in HEO about 5,000,000 miles from Earth (for sake of argument), and beams the OTP transmission to this satellite upon receipt. The satellite then beams the signal back, so the attacker can access the OTP signal with a one-minute delay. Or, the attacker can place 5 satellites in HEO about 1,000,000 miles from Earth, and zig-zag the signal among them. Or, the one satellite could multiplex! Alternatively, the attacker can run the signal through 10,000,000 miles of fiber-optic cable. Of course, this is all assuming that no analog or digital delay could be made to handle the extremely dense signal with fidelity...
MORAL:
Although implementing any one of these ideas would be expensive, it would be worth it to the attacker, because he could then decrypt any message from anyone who had been gulled into thinking that this scheme was foolproof.
Slashdot Mirror
The article asks us to suppose that it takes one minute to decode the 'START' message, and that the amount of data which is streamed during that minute is too great to store in memory or on disk. But, an attacker still wants to be able to decrypt the encrypted message using the streamed OTP.
SOLUTION:The attacker places a satellite in HEO about 5,000,000 miles from Earth (for sake of argument), and beams the OTP transmission to this satellite upon receipt. The satellite then beams the signal back, so the attacker can access the OTP signal with a one-minute delay. Or, the attacker can place 5 satellites in HEO about 1,000,000 miles from Earth, and zig-zag the signal among them. Or, the one satellite could multiplex! Alternatively, the attacker can run the signal through 10,000,000 miles of fiber-optic cable. Of course, this is all assuming that no analog or digital delay could be made to handle the extremely dense signal with fidelity...
MORAL:Although implementing any one of these ideas would be expensive, it would be worth it to the attacker, because he could then decrypt any message from anyone who had been gulled into thinking that this scheme was foolproof.