It should be noted that the link provided for info about the bombardier beetle points to creationist propoganda, containing many non-facts (such as that the two chemicals produced will EXPLODE without an inhibitor).
You will want to use an incredibly delicate touch-sensing technique called "charge transfer sensing"
You can get these sensors from qprox.com and they are very easy to make into useful circuits.
Essentially, the human body has a couple hundred picofards of capacitance. Using charge transfer techniques, a qprox chip can detect when this capacitance touches its input terminal.
Here is the beauty: you can connect its input pin to any condutor, making the entire conductor sensitive. So, you could make a faucet, a metal lamp base (ever wondered how the touch-on, touch-off lamps worked) or just a piece of copper tape into the sensor. When a person ever-so-slighly touches electrode, the qprox chip will flip a logical output high. You can then connect this output pin to anything... an LED, a buzzer, whatever...
I estimate $5 in parts and 100% reliability/performance.
If you go this route, let me know, I have written a couple papers on the evaluation of qprox chips and the mechanism of charge trasfer sensing for Sandia Nat'l Labs.
I'm no genetic expert, but from what I've read, what a "gene" is, is not precisely defined. All that there is are strings of base pairs, and while there may be a way to segment off certain areas of the string and say, "this substring serves this function... and therefore it is a gene", often that's not the case.
There are also different types of genes. Similar to data strings and instructions in computers, there's an analogy in the genetic world to genes that do things and genes that hold information.
I don't think that this purported claim that there are twice as many genes as previously though is significant until the researchers more properly define the genes and their functions.
I am a proud DOE employee and have been [suffered] through the rigormoraul of saftey classes and policy. While the Lab here is very concerned with safety, I was surprised at how reasonable and pragmatic they treated the issue. That is, they conceeded that 100% safe is not attainable, but, let's do our best by learning safe practices.
So, even the gub-ment, in all its presumed beauracracy, can admit that a 100% guarantee is unattainable.
I can't believe anyone out there with a slight understanding of what these com-pu-tor things are could think that a 100% guarantee of non-copywritten songs is possible.
Although the United States spends nearly $1 billion every year to help
Russia protect its vast storehouse of nuclear weapons materials from
theft or sale on the black
market, few Americans know how this aid helps strengthen America's own
nuclear safeguards.
Russian experts at the Kurchatov Institute, the renowned nuclear
research center in Moscow, recently found what appears to be a critical
deficiency in the internal
U.S. system for keeping track of all bomb-grade nuclear materials held
by the Energy Department -- enough material for tens of thousands of
nuclear bombs.
Kurchatov scientists discovered a fatal flaw in the Microsoft software
donated to them by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This same
software has been the
backbone of America's nuclear materials control system for years. The
Russians found that over time, as the computer program is used, some
files become invisible
and inaccessible to the nuclear accountants using the system, even
though the data still exist in netherworld of the database. Any insider
who understood the software
could exploit this flaw by tracking the "disappeared" files and then
physically diverting, for a profit, the materials themselves.
After investigating the problem for many months, the Russians came to
believe that it posed a grave danger and suspended further use of the
software in Russia's
accounting system. By their calculations, an enormous amount of Russia's
nuclear material -- the equivalent of many thousands of nuclear bombs --
would disappear
from their accounting records if Russia were to use the flawed U.S.
software program for 10 years.
Then, in early 2000, they did something they didn't have to do: They
warned the United States, believing that an analogous risk must exist in
the U.S. system.
Although neither Los Alamos nor the U.S. Department of Energy has
publicly acknowledged the possibility that innumerable files on American
nuclear materials might
have disappeared, the Russian warning caused shock waves at the highest
levels of the Energy Department.
Unlike the Russians, who did not throw away their manual records of
their nuclear stockpile -- the infamous shoe box and hand-receipt system
that U.S. assistance
was intended to supersede -- the United States has long since discarded
its old written records. To reconstruct a reliably accurate accounting
record, the Energy
Department may need to inspect all of America's nuclear materials -- a
huge task that could cost more than $1 billion and still might not
detect the diversion of some
material, should it have occurred.
The importance of the goodwill and trust that had grown up between
American and Russian nuclear experts over years of working together in
this area is clear. When
the Russian scientists first discovered the computer flaw, the initial
reaction in some high-level Moscow circles was to suspect an American
Trojan horse, a bug
planted deliberately to undermine Russian security. After complaints by
their Russian counterparts, scientists at Los Alamos suggested that the
Russian scientists
instead use a later version of the same program. Kurchatov then
discovered the upgraded program not only contained the same bug (though
much less virulent) but
also had a critical security flaw that would allow easy access to the
sensitive nuclear database by hackers or unauthorized personnel.
But trust overrode suspicion. The Russians concluded that the glitches
were innocent errors, not devious traps. Thus, they feared the U.S.
database, unbeknown to
Americans, was not only prone to lose track of nuclear materials but was
also accessible to unauthorized users. Russia reported both problems to
Los Alamos, which
My friends and I have become reliant on our email-based journals to keep up to date on what's happening in each others' lives. Not only do we find out the "i did this today" stuff, but its a unique chance to hear what your friends feel about things on a more personal level. All of our logs are also stored in databases and have php web interfaces for easy searching. Overall, creating our logs were very important decisions in our lives that really make us more cognicent individuals...
Many theories exist that attempt to explain the reality underlying Quantum Theory. A few of the most popular are:
1. The Copenhagen Interpretation 2. Observer Created Reality 3. Consciousness Created Reality 4. Many Worlds Interpretation 5. Einstein's Ordinary-Object Reality
I would like to know exactly how you surmise the reality beneath Quantum Theory manifests itself. Do you have a hypothesis for the Quantum Measurement Problem or the Quantum Interpretation Problem?
Dr., I recently read a book that presented an overview of superstring theory and Roger Penrose's twistor theory. I am curious to know which theory is presently most popular amoung physicists, and which you subscribe to. Why?
A mathematician who beat theoretical physicists at their own game. His theory of what fundamental space time is quantized into(twistors: one dimentional objects, twisting in a 4 dimentional complex space-time) is WAAAAY more believable that super-string theory, an ad hoc theory that requires up to 26 dimentions, some of which just decide to "curl up" to leave us with our normal 4-D space-time.
Slashdot Mirror
But, considering the US uses 30,000,000 barrels of oil per day, that 10,000
accounts for a whopping 0.03%.
It should be noted that the link provided for info about the bombardier beetle points to creationist propoganda, containing many non-facts (such as that the two chemicals produced will EXPLODE without an inhibitor).
For a more factual account of the beetle, try, http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/bombardier.html.
You will want to use an incredibly delicate touch-sensing technique called "charge transfer sensing"
You can get these sensors from qprox.com and they are very easy to make into useful circuits.
Essentially, the human body has a couple hundred picofards of capacitance. Using charge transfer techniques, a qprox chip can detect when this capacitance touches its input terminal.
Here is the beauty: you can connect its input pin to any condutor, making the entire conductor sensitive. So, you could make a faucet, a metal lamp base (ever wondered how the touch-on, touch-off lamps worked) or just a piece of copper tape into the sensor. When a person ever-so-slighly touches electrode, the qprox chip will flip a logical output high. You can then connect this output pin to anything... an LED, a buzzer, whatever...
I estimate $5 in parts and 100% reliability/performance.
If you go this route, let me know, I have written a couple papers on the evaluation of qprox chips and the mechanism of charge trasfer sensing for Sandia Nat'l Labs.
I'm no genetic expert, but from what I've read, what a "gene" is, is not precisely defined. All that there is are strings of base pairs, and while there may be a way to segment off certain areas of the string and say, "this substring serves this function... and therefore it is a gene", often that's not the case.
There are also different types of genes. Similar to data strings and instructions in computers, there's an analogy in the genetic world to genes that do things and genes that hold information.
I don't think that this purported claim that there are twice as many genes as previously though is significant until the researchers more properly define the genes and their functions.
I am a proud DOE employee and have been [suffered] through the rigormoraul of saftey classes and policy. While the Lab here is very concerned with safety, I was surprised at how reasonable and pragmatic they treated the issue. That is, they conceeded that 100% safe is not attainable, but, let's do our best by learning safe practices.
So, even the gub-ment, in all its presumed beauracracy, can admit that a 100% guarantee is unattainable.
I can't believe anyone out there with a slight understanding of what these com-pu-tor things are could think that a 100% guarantee of non-copywritten songs is possible.
Nukes: A Lesson From Russia
By Bruce G. Blair
Although the United States spends nearly $1 billion every year to help
Russia protect its vast storehouse of nuclear weapons materials from
theft or sale on the black
market, few Americans know how this aid helps strengthen America's own
nuclear safeguards.
Russian experts at the Kurchatov Institute, the renowned nuclear
research center in Moscow, recently found what appears to be a critical
deficiency in the internal
U.S. system for keeping track of all bomb-grade nuclear materials held
by the Energy Department -- enough material for tens of thousands of
nuclear bombs.
Kurchatov scientists discovered a fatal flaw in the Microsoft software
donated to them by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This same
software has been the
backbone of America's nuclear materials control system for years. The
Russians found that over time, as the computer program is used, some
files become invisible
and inaccessible to the nuclear accountants using the system, even
though the data still exist in netherworld of the database. Any insider
who understood the software
could exploit this flaw by tracking the "disappeared" files and then
physically diverting, for a profit, the materials themselves.
After investigating the problem for many months, the Russians came to
believe that it posed a grave danger and suspended further use of the
software in Russia's
accounting system. By their calculations, an enormous amount of Russia's
nuclear material -- the equivalent of many thousands of nuclear bombs --
would disappear
from their accounting records if Russia were to use the flawed U.S.
software program for 10 years.
Then, in early 2000, they did something they didn't have to do: They
warned the United States, believing that an analogous risk must exist in
the U.S. system.
Although neither Los Alamos nor the U.S. Department of Energy has
publicly acknowledged the possibility that innumerable files on American
nuclear materials might
have disappeared, the Russian warning caused shock waves at the highest
levels of the Energy Department.
Unlike the Russians, who did not throw away their manual records of
their nuclear stockpile -- the infamous shoe box and hand-receipt system
that U.S. assistance
was intended to supersede -- the United States has long since discarded
its old written records. To reconstruct a reliably accurate accounting
record, the Energy
Department may need to inspect all of America's nuclear materials -- a
huge task that could cost more than $1 billion and still might not
detect the diversion of some
material, should it have occurred.
The importance of the goodwill and trust that had grown up between
American and Russian nuclear experts over years of working together in
this area is clear. When
the Russian scientists first discovered the computer flaw, the initial
reaction in some high-level Moscow circles was to suspect an American
Trojan horse, a bug
planted deliberately to undermine Russian security. After complaints by
their Russian counterparts, scientists at Los Alamos suggested that the
Russian scientists
instead use a later version of the same program. Kurchatov then
discovered the upgraded program not only contained the same bug (though
much less virulent) but
also had a critical security flaw that would allow easy access to the
sensitive nuclear database by hackers or unauthorized personnel.
But trust overrode suspicion. The Russians concluded that the glitches
were innocent errors, not devious traps. Thus, they feared the U.S.
database, unbeknown to
Americans, was not only prone to lose track of nuclear materials but was
also accessible to unauthorized users. Russia reported both problems to
Los Alamos, which
My friends and I have become reliant on our email-based journals to keep up to date on what's happening in each others' lives. Not only do we find out the "i did this today" stuff, but its a unique chance to hear what your friends feel about things on a more personal level. All of our logs are also stored in databases and have php web interfaces for easy searching. Overall, creating our logs were very important decisions in our lives that really make us more cognicent individuals...
Dr.,
Many theories exist that attempt to explain the reality underlying Quantum Theory. A few of the most popular are:
1. The Copenhagen Interpretation
2. Observer Created Reality
3. Consciousness Created Reality
4. Many Worlds Interpretation
5. Einstein's Ordinary-Object Reality
I would like to know exactly how you surmise the reality beneath Quantum Theory manifests itself. Do you have a hypothesis for the Quantum Measurement Problem or the Quantum Interpretation Problem?
thank you,
kevin
Dr., I recently read a book that presented an overview of superstring theory and Roger Penrose's twistor theory. I am curious to know which theory is presently most popular amoung physicists, and which you subscribe to. Why?
thank you,
kevin
could someone give a terse overview of what Wavlet compression is? I'm curious as to how it succeeds in producing such high compression rates.
Roger Penrose:
A mathematician who beat theoretical physicists at their own game. His theory of what fundamental space time is quantized into(twistors: one dimentional objects, twisting in a 4 dimentional complex space-time) is WAAAAY more believable that super-string theory, an ad hoc theory that requires up to 26 dimentions, some of which just decide to "curl up" to leave us with our normal 4-D space-time.