If you grab Kazaa lite you can avoid BDE, but if not its still there, I believe. I'm told its actually in their license agreement...its just that nobody ever bothers to read those.
I was also led to believe that this was hard drive space they used, and not CPU cycles.
I must step back and look at this from another point of view. What, precisely is the original purpose of this? Certainly I'm all for it -- the concept is incredibly cool -- but it somehow doesn't seem like something to replace IRC with. Frankly, nickname wars should be stopped with the nickserv/chanserv. You can't have the nickname blah? Try blah-, or ` or _ or whatever suits you. Get over it, or go to another network. Its not that big a deal.
It seems to me that these clients will require a bit more power to them, and the protocol will as well. The encryption will make packets larger, and thus easier to use in a war style. Because I have been exposed to the not-so-nice part of IRC, it occurs to me to consider the possibilities here. Though anti-flood features can easily be implimented into the client, this is not the end of the possibilities.
Another possibility to be considerred in the line of security is ip publicity. They seem to indicate that hostmasks will be available, which thus allows people to get at the ip address and use them for DoS attacks. Of course a masking procedure utilizing wildcards could be implimented as many smaller IRC servers have done. This provokes the possibility of multiple people on the same ISP from the same area with the same nickname showing up. These public keys are most likely obnoxious-to-remember alpha-numeric codes. Who wants that? Then again, if the client has a decent friends list, that, too, can be rectified.
The next question I have regards forgery and trust. The server admins, who I will call opers for my convenience, will now have more reason to trust peoples' claims against others regarding abuse because there are now so few ways to perform abuse, and so much added security. But how easy will it be for someone to forge records of someone performing some sort of abuse? It seems to me that all of the information necessary will be provided in the/whois query for the purpose of identification. Will legitimate users be able to use opers as an effective means of cutting back on the inevitable abuse, or will it be too easy to forge offenses and thus make opers far too skeptical to help out in many ways?
That's all I'll type for now, but these are certainly (in my opinion) issues for consideration.
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If you grab Kazaa lite you can avoid BDE, but if not its still there, I believe. I'm told its actually in their license agreement...its just that nobody ever bothers to read those. I was also led to believe that this was hard drive space they used, and not CPU cycles.
I must step back and look at this from another point of view. What, precisely is the original purpose of this? Certainly I'm all for it -- the concept is incredibly cool -- but it somehow doesn't seem like something to replace IRC with. Frankly, nickname wars should be stopped with the nickserv/chanserv. You can't have the nickname blah? Try blah-, or ` or _ or whatever suits you. Get over it, or go to another network. Its not that big a deal. It seems to me that these clients will require a bit more power to them, and the protocol will as well. The encryption will make packets larger, and thus easier to use in a war style. Because I have been exposed to the not-so-nice part of IRC, it occurs to me to consider the possibilities here. Though anti-flood features can easily be implimented into the client, this is not the end of the possibilities. Another possibility to be considerred in the line of security is ip publicity. They seem to indicate that hostmasks will be available, which thus allows people to get at the ip address and use them for DoS attacks. Of course a masking procedure utilizing wildcards could be implimented as many smaller IRC servers have done. This provokes the possibility of multiple people on the same ISP from the same area with the same nickname showing up. These public keys are most likely obnoxious-to-remember alpha-numeric codes. Who wants that? Then again, if the client has a decent friends list, that, too, can be rectified. The next question I have regards forgery and trust. The server admins, who I will call opers for my convenience, will now have more reason to trust peoples' claims against others regarding abuse because there are now so few ways to perform abuse, and so much added security. But how easy will it be for someone to forge records of someone performing some sort of abuse? It seems to me that all of the information necessary will be provided in the /whois query for the purpose of identification. Will legitimate users be able to use opers as an effective means of cutting back on the inevitable abuse, or will it be too easy to forge offenses and thus make opers far too skeptical to help out in many ways?
That's all I'll type for now, but these are certainly (in my opinion) issues for consideration.