So far you've proven either that you suck at programming, or that you suck at cut and paste. But that is not a program that uses a goto. You could stick with your current proof, or if you try again you may remove all doubt.
While it is true that it would not be in his interest to admit if they are beat that does not imply that they are beat. And you would have to be an idiot to believe that they are. To pick up on three points from the video:
They employ several hundred PhDs and have a budget that would make any company or university in the sector weep.
They can read the literature and take ideas but don't have to reciprocate by publishing their work.
They are not handicapped by inconveniences like the law when it comes to experiments on traffic analysis.
Nice perspective. At school in the early 90s I was told that programming was a deprecated profession, soon to be made obsolete by a coming generation of fifth generation machines.
It never quite turned out that way, and although 60wpm isn't fast by a trained typists standards it does mean that I can type much faster than I can talk, or manipulate those new fangled mouse and icon type interfaces.
Strange thing is - when you really know how to type, in the sense that it becomes a motor skill like walking or driving, it is a surprisingly transparent form of communication / control. All of the replacements technologies seem to miss that directness and simplicity.
Sigh, just another attempt to turn some simple engineering problem into politics.
I happen to have some experience in this area and I can say for certain that if there are no creeps on the floor, any wave of drones is easy to kill. I would start by erecting a line of towers with simple pellet guns, upgrading the weak points to snipers as necessary. Squirt towers will provide a layer of depth to your defence, but ideally you want a fully upgraded bash tower to take out ground creeps quickly enough that your guns can focus on the drones.
If you'll excuse me, I feel the need for just one more try...
Thanks for the reply. It's quite a clear cut line and makes for an interesting read. You remind me of someone that I once knew who made air to surface missiles - very cool guy who loved his work. He had pictures "of his babies" on the wall of his apartment. They certainly were beautiful explosions.
Point to a single codec from the 80s that would offer a compression ratio comparable in any sense to a modern codec. It is not hard at all to imagine that codecs (not formats as you mistaken say) have progressed massively in two decades of constant vision research.
I work for a military contractor; I'm an Engineer.
ECHELON? Is that where the UKUSA searches for words like bomb, jihad, plutonium, assassinate, and anarchy?
That is a serious amount of cognitive dissonance going on. I can only hazard a guess: you're happy building weapons / surveillance systems, but not happy with the customer using them? You've got some serious compartmentalisation going on about the ethical consequences of building weapons vs surveillance systems. Not trolling, I'm genuinely curious what your story is.
I'd never heard of it until this thread intrigued me. OMG what kind of insanity is that? Rogue meets simcity. I'm itching to download that and play with it a bit, but I have a deadline bearing down on me that would be destroyed. That developer is the most ambitious game design genius I've seen, and I love the concentration on gameplay over graphics.
If you're going to use the check-list then at least fill it out right: (x) No one will be able to find the guy or collect the money ( ) Microsoft will not put up with it
Bill actually suggested this a couple of years ago.
There is no Slashdot consensus. Did you not realise when you posted a response saying the parent was wrong that you were invalidating your own argument? Did you not ever notice that almost every response to every post on Slashdot is someone violently disagreeing?
What absolute rubbish. I can't believe that you dragged your sorry ass over here from digg just to post that trash. [insert apple fanboy attack here].
It's a nice try, but you are trying to define a fact based on some copyrighted work. While meta-logic tricks might seem like a nice way around for a geek, for a lawyer they are simply a violation of copyright.
The nutters must have gotten a hold of that page. It's factually correct, well documented, and wrong, all at the same time.
Your error has been pointed out by the other two replies so I won't bother with that. But here is a question for you, when there is something that you don't agree with that, but it is well documented and factually correct, at what point do you start to consider that the error may be on your part?
No you are completely and utterly wrong. There is a very authoritative document from the Fed that explains how banks expand the money supply, but a simple starting point for you would be the wiki page on Fractional Reserve Banking.
Yes they can. What you seem to be missing (deliberately avoiding) is that a market is the state where you have competition between producers. If you only have one producer of a good then you have a monopoly, at which point if the producer can get away with it they will set prices as high as possible. This is not a failure of the "market" as you are implying. The failure is a complete lack of market to begin with.
The invisible hand is the ability of consumers to freely choose among producers, and the ability of producers to compete through price decreases. In this situation the market "works" by eliminating overpriced producers.
You made the contention that additional traffic is added to prevent traffic analysis. That simply is not true in any of the typical military encryption setups. Not for networks, radio coms, or any other communication methods I work with.
I can believe this, and my initial claim that you didn't know what you were talking about was clearly wrong. But, just because the systems that you have worked with are not designed to resist traffic analysis does not mean that no there are no such systems.
A couple of examples (the idea of link encryption to defeat traffic analysis is textbook stuff, but sadly none of the authors that I checked actually included references). The application that sprang to mind originally is Xor-Trees designed to resist traffic analysis and provide data secrecy for command and control links. A weaker example that tries to prevent analysis without full utilisation of the link is the randomised approach in FreeNet.
Another example that I can't find a citation for is some VPN products max out the link constantly to avoid traffic analysis. My own background used to be the telecoms world, so I'm using a slightly difference meaning of link level to you. In that world you do actually encrypt the circuit, either padding with random values, or relying on a cipher that doesn't reveal the presence of an empty stream (e.g AES in CBC).
You've said two things that are the opposite of each other. You've claimed:
The entire communications circuit betweem sites is encrypted if the connected networks or systems are classified.
Which is entirely correct. But you've also claimed:
Again, its not done becauses bandwidth costs money and it isn't needed.
When you encrypt a circuit (as opposed to the traffic on it) then the circuit is in constant use, and uses constant bandwidth. You cannot encrypt a circuit at the link-level, and save bandwidth. It is an contradiction. So you were correct in one of your claims, but when you claimed the opposite as well, you were wrong.
You also claimed that a perfect cipher would require twice the effort to break after two applications. This seemed to be the thrust of your main point. Do you still think that is valid?
You seem to confuse several basic notions in cryptography. Firstly what you are describing as an XOR cipher includes one-time-pads (you haven't mentioned if the key is as big as the input or not), which are certainly not "bad" in any sense.
With a perfect cipher there should be no information leaked into the ciphertext, or as Shannon put it there should be no advantage in knowing the ciphertext. So all perfect ciphers have the property that if you use them multiple times under multiple keys then the effort to break them remains constant.
When you say the difficulty of decrypting is roughly proportional to the length of the key, you of course mean that the difficulty of decrypting is roughly proportional to the size of the key-space, or O(2^n) where n is the length of the key.
While the AC makes the point that there are alternative solutions that other people prefer, I think your first answer was bang on the money for the actual question posed.
Slashdot Mirror
So far you've proven either that you suck at programming, or that you suck at cut and paste. But that is not a program that uses a goto. You could stick with your current proof, or if you try again you may remove all doubt.
Perhaps, but at least you don't eat quiche.
It used to be fashionable to introduce children to Logo long before that age.
While it is true that it would not be in his interest to admit if they are beat that does not imply that they are beat. And you would have to be an idiot to believe that they are. To pick up on three points from the video:
Nice perspective. At school in the early 90s I was told that programming was a deprecated profession, soon to be made obsolete by a coming generation of fifth generation machines.
It never quite turned out that way, and although 60wpm isn't fast by a trained typists standards it does mean that I can type much faster than I can talk, or manipulate those new fangled mouse and icon type interfaces.
Strange thing is - when you really know how to type, in the sense that it becomes a motor skill like walking or driving, it is a surprisingly transparent form of communication / control. All of the replacements technologies seem to miss that directness and simplicity.
That is beautiful. If you don't use it as a sig (seeing as you don't have one set) then I'll definitely be stealing it to use as mine.
I thought I was being bad by sucking the old hands back in for just one more game... but going for the new blood. That is evil.
Sigh, just another attempt to turn some simple engineering problem into politics.
I happen to have some experience in this area and I can say for certain that if there are no creeps on the floor, any wave of drones is easy to kill. I would start by erecting a line of towers with simple pellet guns, upgrading the weak points to snipers as necessary. Squirt towers will provide a layer of depth to your defence, but ideally you want a fully upgraded bash tower to take out ground creeps quickly enough that your guns can focus on the drones.
If you'll excuse me, I feel the need for just one more try...
Thanks for the reply. It's quite a clear cut line and makes for an interesting read. You remind me of someone that I once knew who made air to surface missiles - very cool guy who loved his work. He had pictures "of his babies" on the wall of his apartment. They certainly were beautiful explosions.
A clue?
Point to a single codec from the 80s that would offer a compression ratio comparable in any sense to a modern codec. It is not hard at all to imagine that codecs (not formats as you mistaken say) have progressed massively in two decades of constant vision research.
That is a serious amount of cognitive dissonance going on. I can only hazard a guess: you're happy building weapons / surveillance systems, but not happy with the customer using them? You've got some serious compartmentalisation going on about the ethical consequences of building weapons vs surveillance systems. Not trolling, I'm genuinely curious what your story is.
I'd never heard of it until this thread intrigued me. OMG what kind of insanity is that? Rogue meets simcity. I'm itching to download that and play with it a bit, but I have a deadline bearing down on me that would be destroyed. That developer is the most ambitious game design genius I've seen, and I love the concentration on gameplay over graphics.
If you're going to use the check-list then at least fill it out right:
(x) No one will be able to find the guy or collect the money
( ) Microsoft will not put up with it
Bill actually suggested this a couple of years ago.
What absolute rubbish. I can't believe that you dragged your sorry ass over here from digg just to post that trash. [insert apple fanboy attack here].
It's a nice try, but you are trying to define a fact based on some copyrighted work. While meta-logic tricks might seem like a nice way around for a geek, for a lawyer they are simply a violation of copyright.
Your error has been pointed out by the other two replies so I won't bother with that. But here is a question for you, when there is something that you don't agree with that, but it is well documented and factually correct, at what point do you start to consider that the error may be on your part?
No you are completely and utterly wrong. There is a very authoritative document from the Fed that explains how banks expand the money supply, but a simple starting point for you would be the wiki page on Fractional Reserve Banking.
Yes they can. What you seem to be missing (deliberately avoiding) is that a market is the state where you have competition between producers. If you only have one producer of a good then you have a monopoly, at which point if the producer can get away with it they will set prices as high as possible. This is not a failure of the "market" as you are implying. The failure is a complete lack of market to begin with.
The invisible hand is the ability of consumers to freely choose among producers, and the ability of producers to compete through price decreases. In this situation the market "works" by eliminating overpriced producers.
Canadian.
I can believe this, and my initial claim that you didn't know what you were talking about was clearly wrong. But, just because the systems that you have worked with are not designed to resist traffic analysis does not mean that no there are no such systems.
A couple of examples (the idea of link encryption to defeat traffic analysis is textbook stuff, but sadly none of the authors that I checked actually included references). The application that sprang to mind originally is Xor-Trees designed to resist traffic analysis and provide data secrecy for command and control links. A weaker example that tries to prevent analysis without full utilisation of the link is the randomised approach in FreeNet.
Another example that I can't find a citation for is some VPN products max out the link constantly to avoid traffic analysis. My own background used to be the telecoms world, so I'm using a slightly difference meaning of link level to you. In that world you do actually encrypt the circuit, either padding with random values, or relying on a cipher that doesn't reveal the presence of an empty stream (e.g AES in CBC).
You've said two things that are the opposite of each other. You've claimed:
Which is entirely correct. But you've also claimed:
When you encrypt a circuit (as opposed to the traffic on it) then the circuit is in constant use, and uses constant bandwidth. You cannot encrypt a circuit at the link-level, and save bandwidth. It is an contradiction. So you were correct in one of your claims, but when you claimed the opposite as well, you were wrong.
You also claimed that a perfect cipher would require twice the effort to break after two applications. This seemed to be the thrust of your main point. Do you still think that is valid?
You seem to confuse several basic notions in cryptography. Firstly what you are describing as an XOR cipher includes one-time-pads (you haven't mentioned if the key is as big as the input or not), which are certainly not "bad" in any sense.
With a perfect cipher there should be no information leaked into the ciphertext, or as Shannon put it there should be no advantage in knowing the ciphertext. So all perfect ciphers have the property that if you use them multiple times under multiple keys then the effort to break them remains constant.
When you say the difficulty of decrypting is roughly proportional to the length of the key, you of course mean that the difficulty of decrypting is roughly proportional to the size of the key-space, or O(2^n) where n is the length of the key.
Why have you bothered to argue a point that you clearly know nothing about?
Link level encryption. In order to defeat Traffic Analysis it is necessary to fill the channel.
While the AC makes the point that there are alternative solutions that other people prefer, I think your first answer was bang on the money for the actual question posed.