Both of the "Unix Network Programming" books
by Richard W Stevens. The original is the more
useful to me, but it is out of print.
<p>
"The C Programming Language," Second Edition by
Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie.
<p>
I'm a graphics geek, so I have the "Graphics Gems"
series, as well as the Foley and Van Dam "Computer Graphics: Principles and Practice," though I condemn them every chance I get for their matrix order.
<p>
Second edition or later of Bjarne Stoustrop's C++ book is good to have around, no matter how much you hate it (the language, not the book.)
<p>
An absolute MUST: Andrew Tannenbaum's Operating Systems book. Drop the anti-Tannenbaum politics for a moment and read the book. I've had to teach out of it and it beats the living hell out of every other OS book I've dealt with.
<p>
The Richard W Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated books are also on my shelf and a must for anyone who wants to really understand the core of the Internet Protocol. Not enough coverage of IP6, in my opinion, but the way things are going I'm not betting on it seeing much use in the next decade.
<p>
I'd avoid the whole latest-and-greatest craze as well, simply because as a library, you can't afford to keep up with it. You end up spending $50-$75 on a book that won't be used in a year. The books I've listed above all get used a number of times a month at work and are all well into their first decade of life if not their second.
The hubble REPAIR mission cost more than the last 3 mars missions combined. If you want to start placing blame, talk to your congressman about NASAs dwindling budget.
Anyway, The world blew it when they advanced the pawn to force the white rook to take. Had the other pawn been pushed, the world would now have GK in check and have tempo. As it is, GK will soon have another queen and we're dead. Game over.
I am farily convinced that GK just wasn't taking this game seriously early on. Everyone just has their hearts so committed to patting themselves on the back that they fail to see this.
Don't overlook, either that this game was 5 advisors against GK, everyone just voted for the advisor that they believed the most.
The article claims to be the first of its kind, despite the fact that I had a discussion with a guy 3 years ago whose company was doing _exactly_ this same thing.
The theory is that if a machine is in promiscuous mode, certain IP communications are not responded to. (Sending an ICMP error to the machine and seeing if you get a reply is one such test.)
So if your protocol stacks still respond normally, these tests don't work.
The problem is that 1) after my conversation 3 years ago, I managed to modify a public domain IP implementation that would sniff and not interrupt normal processing of packets, and 2) even if intruders are nice enough to use garbage stack implementations that respond like this, what if they are running a machine you don't know is there, and no protocol stack? No way to query the machine, no way to know it is sniffing.
The point is that this company is grandstanding on a couple well-known behaviours of promiscuous machines. Don't believe them. They'll not improve your security.
Slashdot Mirror
Both of the "Unix Network Programming" books
by Richard W Stevens. The original is the more
useful to me, but it is out of print.
<p>
"The C Programming Language," Second Edition by
Brian Kernighan and Dennis Ritchie.
<p>
I'm a graphics geek, so I have the "Graphics Gems"
series, as well as the Foley and Van Dam "Computer Graphics: Principles and Practice," though I condemn them every chance I get for their matrix order.
<p>
Second edition or later of Bjarne Stoustrop's C++ book is good to have around, no matter how much you hate it (the language, not the book.)
<p>
An absolute MUST: Andrew Tannenbaum's Operating Systems book. Drop the anti-Tannenbaum politics for a moment and read the book. I've had to teach out of it and it beats the living hell out of every other OS book I've dealt with.
<p>
The Richard W Stevens TCP/IP Illustrated books are also on my shelf and a must for anyone who wants to really understand the core of the Internet Protocol. Not enough coverage of IP6, in my opinion, but the way things are going I'm not betting on it seeing much use in the next decade.
<p>
I'd avoid the whole latest-and-greatest craze as well, simply because as a library, you can't afford to keep up with it. You end up spending $50-$75 on a book that won't be used in a year. The books I've listed above all get used a number of times a month at work and are all well into their first decade of life if not their second.
3 mars missions combined. If you want to start placing blame, talk to your congressman about NASAs dwindling budget.
(Hubble cost so far: > $4Billion)
If anyone out there has a good copy of this, I have the means to rip and encode it as a quicktime.
Contact me if you want it done.
Anyway, The world blew it when they advanced the
pawn to force the white rook to take. Had the
other pawn been pushed, the world would now have
GK in check and have tempo. As it is, GK will
soon have another queen and we're dead. Game
over.
I am farily convinced that GK just wasn't taking
this game seriously early on. Everyone just has
their hearts so committed to patting themselves
on the back that they fail to see this.
Don't overlook, either that this game was 5 advisors against GK, everyone just voted for the advisor that they believed the most.
The article claims to be the first of its kind,
despite the fact that I had a discussion with
a guy 3 years ago whose company was doing
_exactly_ this same thing.
The theory is that if a machine is in promiscuous
mode, certain IP communications are not responded to. (Sending an ICMP error to the machine and seeing if you get a reply is one such test.)
So if your protocol stacks still respond normally, these tests don't work.
The problem is that 1) after my conversation 3
years ago, I managed to modify a public domain IP implementation that would sniff and not interrupt normal processing of packets, and 2) even if intruders are nice enough to use garbage stack implementations that respond like this, what if they are running a machine you don't know is there, and no protocol stack? No way to query the machine, no way to know it is sniffing.
The point is that this company is grandstanding on a couple well-known behaviours of promiscuous machines. Don't believe them. They'll not improve your security.
...excuse me, sir. There appears to be a worm
in my apple.