I think it's more of a theoretical vs practical kind of thing: copyleft gives users more theoretical rights (that they mostly can't use anyway, not being programmers...) should anyone actually write software, while BSD makes it easier to actually write that software in the first place.
But there isn't any precedent here. It basically says "the defendants didn't show up, so I'll assume everything the plaintiffs said is true and give them everything they asked for". There's no decision on whether there actually was any infringement, because that assertion was never contested. (Plus, I think only appeals courts set precedent?)
In that case, ESPN refuses service to anyone who isn't using a participating ISP. That is very different from them paying your ISP for preferential treatment, or your ISP demanding payment from the sites you visit.
The one dsl provider in middle-of-nowhere Iowa specifically disallowed porn. (Which was laughed at, and nothing came of it)
Never heard of it.
Mediacom throttled bittorrent, hid it, then denied it.
Don't know about Mediacom, but Comcast tried this and didn't stop until they got in a bit of trouble over it.
And by that, I mean that when the government offers a $5K rebate on something, whomever is selling that something raises the price by $5K.
...and then someone else who also sells it raises their price by only $4k and steals all the customers.
This is why college costs $35-50K/year now - there's so much cheap government money to pay for it that natural market forces have made it all but impossible to afford except for either the very wealthy or the very poor who qualify for the government money.
The one I went to looks like it's only risen to $30k (UIUC, out-of-state for the college of engineering). But this involves more than just student aid, there's also the changing cultural expectations where a bachelor degree is required for pretty much everything. And there are more non-traditional / online universities springing up (increasing competition that'll bring the price back down), and some seem to be becoming actually decent.
With everything moving to online (or sometimes fax), I'd think you could just get something notarized and scan it to get a digital copy of the notary seal that you could paste over your document image. Still, I suppose that is more work than just entering a couple numbers and would take more skill to automate.
Between public records and massive data breaches, virtually all "identity" information is effectively public knowledge. Any institution who treats possession of that information as proof of identity should be treated as guilty of gross negligence, and responsible for the consequences.
I assume you have a better idea, then? About the only thing I can think of is government-signed (and revokable, such as in case of theft/loss) physical tokens that can do public-key cryptography, which (1) is only recently somewhat feasible, and (2) might not be that great an idea given how intertwingled all the functions of the government are.
When the video of the US air-strike spread across the globe [...] they were doing exactly what they should: finding and publishing the truth,
So editing and editorializing the promoted version of the video to make very strong untrue implications (the group had no weapons, the air-strike people knew that was they said looked like a RPG was actually a tripod, etc) is "doing exactly what they should"?
Wikileaks is primarily an anti-establishment propaganda group, that has chosen to operate by means of (sometimes misrepresented) leaked information. The public benefit of the leaks is only incidental to their purpose. This can be seen by their very public actions.
Without any content protection whatsoever, they wouldn't be able to offer videos which say only "This rental is currently unavailable in your country", they'd have to actually provide the video to everyone.
But that is done entirely server-side and is completely independent of flash vs HTML5 vs animated GIF vs ascii-art. You just make the server look the client IP address up in a location database, and then decide whether to send was was requested or an error message.
I'm saying, what is the reason for this right? There's no right against incrimiation; anything or anyone other than what's locked in your own mind is allowed to incriminate you, why is there an exception? The police are allowed to forcibly dig through your stuff if they get a warrant, what is the reason behind making forcibly digging through your mind completely prohibited? Keep in mind here that your stuff can sort-of be an extension of your mind in some cases, such as if you keep a diary or a to-do list...
The interpretation there is that while one can be ordered to hand over the objects, one cannot be ordered to give up the password as that's tantamount to bearing witness against oneself.
Not that long ago, there were a few stories here about some guy named Boucher who was being required to unlock an encrypted drive on his laptop, because he had unlocked it for the customs people and therefore his unlocking it for the court would not provide any new information. Where if you're required to unlock something that you haven't been seen unlocking before, that provides new information that yes you really are able to unlock it (which of course means that the court didn't previously know that it was asking the right guy, which is a danger if the court is allowed to try to beat it out of you).
I suspect that they might not have a case without whatever is on the disks. Assuming that there's something on there that incriminates him. Which is why the 5th amendment protects the key.
I always thought the 5th was more about the process of forcibly extracting new data from your head being far too dangerous and error-prone, rather than it being some right to not be incriminated.
Too bad you guys fail at google searches or basic research using university sources.
You're the one filling the thread with extraordinary claims, you go find some proof (and I mean real proof, not some "I have proof but I won't show it to anyone" bullshit).
I recall hearing that some research found that we can notice a single pixel change in an image at 6 feet, even with a ridiculously high resolution.
If that's for example lighting up a single pixel in a dark area, it's not terribly surprising. If it's swapping two neighboring pixels (even across a sharp full-bright area vs full-dark area boundary), then yeah it's a bit more impressive.
So you have a screen where 1px matches the minimum line width that you can see, and pick a suitably small font so that the legs of an 'm' are 1px apart (should be the smallest readable font). And it looks like shit because one of the spaces is slightly wider than the other so one leg is halfway between two rows of pixels and looks blurry or colored, or because the distance between the legs of an 'n' or heads of a 'u' isn't an exact multiple and those end up at a half-pixel and get blurred/colored.
Can I get something where the minimum distinguishable line width is 2px or 3px, so non-bitmap fonts can actually look decent at minimum should-be-readable size?
It should also be noted that this kills performance
By something like 1-5% if I remember correctly, which only matters in benchmarks and dicksize contests.
and may also require read-modify-writes
Um, yeah... that's only possible if you haven't and don't read anything on that same cache line, and even then mightn't happen based on what assumptions your cache makes or might be no different than non-ECC is your cache is only able to talk to your memory in units of a full cache line anyway.
I'm not sure why you'd want ECC ram in a desktop, unless it's some sort business critical machine that you're willing to spend 5 or 6 times what a normal desktop costs. For day to day use, ECC is overkill.
My desktop has 8GB of ECC in it. This cost I think $40 more than non-ECC, and meant I got an Althon II x4 instead of a Core i5. That "5 or 6 times what a normal desktop costs" is either bullshit or Intel-onlyism (which is just another kind of bullshit).
About a third of all machines in the fleet experience at least one memory error per year, and the average number of correctable errors per year is over 22,000," the report states.
But also 93% of those with errors, have multiple errors. This permits a bit of number crunching, to conclude that 3% have single random errors in a year and 30% probably have bad ram or other hardware issues.
as well as indicating that the soft error rate can be much higher than previously thought.
I'm not sure it really does; true they had enormous average (mean) error rates, but it sounded like this was misleading due to an incredibly skewed distribution. Going by the number of servers with zero errors, one error, and multiple errors over a year, and the failures-vs-age data, I came to the conclusion that there's about a 1/5 chance that you'll see one random single-bit error over a typical lifetime (I think I used 5-6 years), but also a similar chance that part of your ram will go bad after a couple years and give you a sudden flood of errors. It would have been very nice if they'd counted servers with 0,1,2,3,...10-20, 20-50,... etc errors/year (preferably with a pretty graph), instead of only breaking it into zero, one, many.
If you don't care whether the records for your domain(s) are secure, then no.
If you do want to take advantage of the new functionality, then you need to serve some extra records and give some extra data to your registrar (I think it's just the public half of your key). I imagine the exact steps to do this would vary based on who your registrar is and which DNS server you're running.
As an end-user, is there some way for me to tell if a domain has been authenticated along the whole chain by DNSSEC?
Yes, that's actually the entire point. Your computer ("stub resolver", the library all your programs use to do DNS queries) can either (1) not care, in which case you're really no safer than with regular DNS; (2) ask your ISPs resolver whether the records were signed, in which case you're slightly safer but not very much; or (3) demand that your ISPs resolver send it all the signatures along with the actual result, in which case you're about as safe as can be (someone would have to break/steal the keys used to sign the records, in order to cause trouble).
What you as the person using the computer see, is of course dependent on the particular programs you use and what they do with the extra information that's available. Probably most don't do anything with it yet.:(
No, I believe entrapment is when they convince you to commit an actual crime (which they then proceed to arrest you for). This was entirely after-the-fact.
Slashdot Mirror
Sure, but having to figure out your business plan up front brings licensing considerations back around to before you start.
I think it's more of a theoretical vs practical kind of thing: copyleft gives users more theoretical rights (that they mostly can't use anyway, not being programmers...) should anyone actually write software, while BSD makes it easier to actually write that software in the first place.
But there isn't any precedent here. It basically says "the defendants didn't show up, so I'll assume everything the plaintiffs said is true and give them everything they asked for". There's no decision on whether there actually was any infringement, because that assertion was never contested. (Plus, I think only appeals courts set precedent?)
ESPN360 brokered deals directly with ISPs.
In that case, ESPN refuses service to anyone who isn't using a participating ISP. That is very different from them paying your ISP for preferential treatment, or your ISP demanding payment from the sites you visit.
The one dsl provider in middle-of-nowhere Iowa specifically disallowed porn. (Which was laughed at, and nothing came of it)
Never heard of it.
Mediacom throttled bittorrent, hid it, then denied it.
Don't know about Mediacom, but Comcast tried this and didn't stop until they got in a bit of trouble over it.
And by that, I mean that when the government offers a $5K rebate on something, whomever is selling that something raises the price by $5K.
...and then someone else who also sells it raises their price by only $4k and steals all the customers.
This is why college costs $35-50K/year now - there's so much cheap government money to pay for it that natural market forces have made it all but impossible to afford except for either the very wealthy or the very poor who qualify for the government money.
The one I went to looks like it's only risen to $30k (UIUC, out-of-state for the college of engineering). But this involves more than just student aid, there's also the changing cultural expectations where a bachelor degree is required for pretty much everything. And there are more non-traditional / online universities springing up (increasing competition that'll bring the price back down), and some seem to be becoming actually decent.
and it's mind-boggling that they don't show up in C++0x (other than the half-useless auto_ptr we've always had).
I thought shared_ptr (from boost) was being added to the standard library?
With everything moving to online (or sometimes fax), I'd think you could just get something notarized and scan it to get a digital copy of the notary seal that you could paste over your document image. Still, I suppose that is more work than just entering a couple numbers and would take more skill to automate.
Between public records and massive data breaches, virtually all "identity" information is effectively public knowledge. Any institution who treats possession of that information as proof of identity should be treated as guilty of gross negligence, and responsible for the consequences.
I assume you have a better idea, then? About the only thing I can think of is government-signed (and revokable, such as in case of theft/loss) physical tokens that can do public-key cryptography, which (1) is only recently somewhat feasible, and (2) might not be that great an idea given how intertwingled all the functions of the government are.
When the video of the US air-strike spread across the globe [...] they were doing exactly what they should: finding and publishing the truth,
So editing and editorializing the promoted version of the video to make very strong untrue implications (the group had no weapons, the air-strike people knew that was they said looked like a RPG was actually a tripod, etc) is "doing exactly what they should"?
Wikileaks is primarily an anti-establishment propaganda group, that has chosen to operate by means of (sometimes misrepresented) leaked information. The public benefit of the leaks is only incidental to their purpose. This can be seen by their very public actions.
Without any content protection whatsoever, they wouldn't be able to offer videos which say only "This rental is currently unavailable in your country", they'd have to actually provide the video to everyone.
But that is done entirely server-side and is completely independent of flash vs HTML5 vs animated GIF vs ascii-art. You just make the server look the client IP address up in a location database, and then decide whether to send was was requested or an error message.
Wrong, it's the right against self incrimination.
I'm saying, what is the reason for this right? There's no right against incrimiation; anything or anyone other than what's locked in your own mind is allowed to incriminate you, why is there an exception? The police are allowed to forcibly dig through your stuff if they get a warrant, what is the reason behind making forcibly digging through your mind completely prohibited? Keep in mind here that your stuff can sort-of be an extension of your mind in some cases, such as if you keep a diary or a to-do list...
The interpretation there is that while one can be ordered to hand over the objects, one cannot be ordered to give up the password as that's tantamount to bearing witness against oneself.
Not that long ago, there were a few stories here about some guy named Boucher who was being required to unlock an encrypted drive on his laptop, because he had unlocked it for the customs people and therefore his unlocking it for the court would not provide any new information. Where if you're required to unlock something that you haven't been seen unlocking before, that provides new information that yes you really are able to unlock it (which of course means that the court didn't previously know that it was asking the right guy, which is a danger if the court is allowed to try to beat it out of you).
I suspect that they might not have a case without whatever is on the disks. Assuming that there's something on there that incriminates him. Which is why the 5th amendment protects the key.
I always thought the 5th was more about the process of forcibly extracting new data from your head being far too dangerous and error-prone, rather than it being some right to not be incriminated.
Too bad you guys fail at google searches or basic research using university sources.
You're the one filling the thread with extraordinary claims, you go find some proof (and I mean real proof, not some "I have proof but I won't show it to anyone" bullshit).
Except I still hold the medical records of those tests when I was 5 years old, preparing to enter Elementary school.
So you can talk all the nonsense that you wish, but there are those of us with far above-average capabilities.
Flickr and imgur are over that way --> , and I assume you have a camera or scanner?
Hey, I wouldn't be R&D head of a multinational company, considering I only have a GED, if I couldn't back up what I say with proof
...such as a link to your company bio?
Too scared someone else like me will show up in the thread and smack you with proof?
I see no "proof", just bare assertions.
I recall hearing that some research found that we can notice a single pixel change in an image at 6 feet, even with a ridiculously high resolution.
If that's for example lighting up a single pixel in a dark area, it's not terribly surprising. If it's swapping two neighboring pixels (even across a sharp full-bright area vs full-dark area boundary), then yeah it's a bit more impressive.
So you have a screen where 1px matches the minimum line width that you can see, and pick a suitably small font so that the legs of an 'm' are 1px apart (should be the smallest readable font). And it looks like shit because one of the spaces is slightly wider than the other so one leg is halfway between two rows of pixels and looks blurry or colored, or because the distance between the legs of an 'n' or heads of a 'u' isn't an exact multiple and those end up at a half-pixel and get blurred/colored.
Can I get something where the minimum distinguishable line width is 2px or 3px, so non-bitmap fonts can actually look decent at minimum should-be-readable size?
You'll also need a consumer-level motherboard with ECC support. Which are not common, which means you'll be stuck with a server-grade motherboard
Or, you know, go AMD. Because they don't limit ECC to only server parts.
It should also be noted that this kills performance
By something like 1-5% if I remember correctly, which only matters in benchmarks and dicksize contests.
and may also require read-modify-writes
Um, yeah... that's only possible if you haven't and don't read anything on that same cache line, and even then mightn't happen based on what assumptions your cache makes or might be no different than non-ECC is your cache is only able to talk to your memory in units of a full cache line anyway.
I'm not sure why you'd want ECC ram in a desktop, unless it's some sort business critical machine that you're willing to spend 5 or 6 times what a normal desktop costs. For day to day use, ECC is overkill.
My desktop has 8GB of ECC in it. This cost I think $40 more than non-ECC, and meant I got an Althon II x4 instead of a Core i5. That "5 or 6 times what a normal desktop costs" is either bullshit or Intel-onlyism (which is just another kind of bullshit).
About a third of all machines in the fleet experience at least one memory error per year, and the average number of correctable errors per year is over 22,000," the report states.
But also 93% of those with errors, have multiple errors. This permits a bit of number crunching, to conclude that 3% have single random errors in a year and 30% probably have bad ram or other hardware issues.
as well as indicating that the soft error rate can be much higher than previously thought.
I'm not sure it really does; true they had enormous average (mean) error rates, but it sounded like this was misleading due to an incredibly skewed distribution. Going by the number of servers with zero errors, one error, and multiple errors over a year, and the failures-vs-age data, I came to the conclusion that there's about a 1/5 chance that you'll see one random single-bit error over a typical lifetime (I think I used 5-6 years), but also a similar chance that part of your ram will go bad after a couple years and give you a sudden flood of errors. It would have been very nice if they'd counted servers with 0,1,2,3,...10-20, 20-50, ... etc errors/year (preferably with a pretty graph), instead of only breaking it into zero, one, many.
That all sounds very interesting, do you have a link for where to read more on it?
If you don't care whether the records for your domain(s) are secure, then no.
If you do want to take advantage of the new functionality, then you need to serve some extra records and give some extra data to your registrar (I think it's just the public half of your key). I imagine the exact steps to do this would vary based on who your registrar is and which DNS server you're running.
As an end-user, is there some way for me to tell if a domain has been authenticated along the whole chain by DNSSEC?
Yes, that's actually the entire point. Your computer ("stub resolver", the library all your programs use to do DNS queries) can either (1) not care, in which case you're really no safer than with regular DNS; (2) ask your ISPs resolver whether the records were signed, in which case you're slightly safer but not very much; or (3) demand that your ISPs resolver send it all the signatures along with the actual result, in which case you're about as safe as can be (someone would have to break/steal the keys used to sign the records, in order to cause trouble).
What you as the person using the computer see, is of course dependent on the particular programs you use and what they do with the extra information that's available. Probably most don't do anything with it yet. :(
No, I believe entrapment is when they convince you to commit an actual crime (which they then proceed to arrest you for). This was entirely after-the-fact.