here, the claim for relief involves the disclosure of a trade secret. A studio, while a licensee of CSS, probably isn't the real party in interest. Courts usually don't like when you use proxy plaintiffs to get around nagging problems of jurisdictional issues. This problem is solved easily enough, find another tort claim.
The majority toys with the tenuous logic of DVD CCA that because releasing CSS hurts the film industry, and a large majority of the film industry is centered in CA, Pavlovich expressly aimed at CA, and the harm was suffered there. (DVD CCA relies on Calder in the opinion, right?) That's a little difficult for me to swallow. Pavlovich wanted to develop CSS code so you could play DVDs on *nix. Maybe pavlovich was expressly aiming at Microsoft's Windows. He could argue that opening another playback device would have helped DVD sales, and his actions were harmful to microsoft. or sony.
not true: you can settle disputes involving federal laws in state courts. only in cases where congress has explicitly stated that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (antitrust, patent, civil rights, etc) can you NOT litigate in state courts.
even if you filed in federal court, a federal district court will use the substantive law of the state that it is in. Therefore, there is a possibility that you'd get a different result in a federal court in CA versus a federal district court in KS.
Nor is this a lawyers' mistake--this case was settled 4-3 (meaning, this was realllly close). The DVD CCA attorneys relied on precedent that by itself was solid. they relied on it a little too heavily, which is why the majority opinion found room to maneuver around it. However, they did not defend against another case that established a seperate test for Personal jurisdiction case on the internet.
This might just be a procedural issue, but it is an important decision nonetheless. The supreme court is already scheduled to review a case relying on Zippo, the personal jurisdictional test that the majority cites in their opinion
You may litigate almost any dispute in a state court, provided that it isn't a dispute where Congress has explicitly stated that a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. (e.g., Patent cases, Civil Rights, Antitrust).
To sue in a state court, you must have personal jurisdiction (the question decided by the surpreme crout) and venue (as MacAndrew has mentionned here).
If you sue in a federal court, you additionally have to further prove either subject matter jurisdiction (based on parties being in different states and the amount in controversy >75kUS$) or federal question jurisdiction (where Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction).
the amount in controversy rule isn't a factor here, since courts usually give a plaintiff broad discretion in claiming amounts. The burden would be on the defendant to legally prove (!) that the amount was less than 75kUS$.
Reasons for the split between State courts and Federal courts are concepts of federalism---normally, only states have police powers; and judicial efficiency.
Venue and Personal Jurisdiction are two different things, but if you sue, your choice of where to sue must conform to the tests for establishing each. Venue is governed by rules of civil procedure, whereas personal jurisdiction tests have evolved under a concept of "minimum contacts"--you must have purposefully tried to have a substantial connection with a state before you can get your ass dragged into a court there. Even with this split in test, it is odd how they interact--which leads to the confusion that you see here.
On the Choice of Law provision in contracts:
Here, when you sign a contract that says you will litigate any disputes arising out of the contract in a certain state, this ONLY affects venue considerations. Even if binding in the contract, this provision is not sufficient to bring someone into court in a certain state. (translation: signing a provision in a contract to litigate somewhere will not force you to litigate in Guam by itself).
MacAndrew is referring to the fact that a court may strike a contract provision if it unconscionable, or a contract of cohersion...I approach from a sharp procedural perspective.
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About the movie studios:
here, the claim for relief involves the disclosure of a trade secret. A studio, while a licensee of CSS, probably isn't the real party in interest. Courts usually don't like when you use proxy plaintiffs to get around nagging problems of jurisdictional issues. This problem is solved easily enough, find another tort claim.
The majority toys with the tenuous logic of DVD CCA that because releasing CSS hurts the film industry, and a large majority of the film industry is centered in CA, Pavlovich expressly aimed at CA, and the harm was suffered there. (DVD CCA relies on Calder in the opinion, right?) That's a little difficult for me to swallow. Pavlovich wanted to develop CSS code so you could play DVDs on *nix. Maybe pavlovich was expressly aiming at Microsoft's Windows. He could argue that opening another playback device would have helped DVD sales, and his actions were harmful to microsoft. or sony.
I believe it's a toss-up w/r/t movie studios...
not true: you can settle disputes involving federal laws in state courts. only in cases where congress has explicitly stated that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (antitrust, patent, civil rights, etc) can you NOT litigate in state courts.
even if you filed in federal court, a federal district court will use the substantive law of the state that it is in. Therefore, there is a possibility that you'd get a different result in a federal court in CA versus a federal district court in KS.
Nor is this a lawyers' mistake--this case was settled 4-3 (meaning, this was realllly close). The DVD CCA attorneys relied on precedent that by itself was solid. they relied on it a little too heavily, which is why the majority opinion found room to maneuver around it. However, they did not defend against another case that established a seperate test for Personal jurisdiction case on the internet.
This might just be a procedural issue, but it is an important decision nonetheless. The supreme court is already scheduled to review a case relying on Zippo, the personal jurisdictional test that the majority cites in their opinion
You may litigate almost any dispute in a state court, provided that it isn't a dispute where Congress has explicitly stated that a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. (e.g., Patent cases, Civil Rights, Antitrust). To sue in a state court, you must have personal jurisdiction (the question decided by the surpreme crout) and venue (as MacAndrew has mentionned here). If you sue in a federal court, you additionally have to further prove either subject matter jurisdiction (based on parties being in different states and the amount in controversy >75kUS$) or federal question jurisdiction (where Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction). the amount in controversy rule isn't a factor here, since courts usually give a plaintiff broad discretion in claiming amounts. The burden would be on the defendant to legally prove (!) that the amount was less than 75kUS$. Reasons for the split between State courts and Federal courts are concepts of federalism---normally, only states have police powers; and judicial efficiency. Venue and Personal Jurisdiction are two different things, but if you sue, your choice of where to sue must conform to the tests for establishing each. Venue is governed by rules of civil procedure, whereas personal jurisdiction tests have evolved under a concept of "minimum contacts"--you must have purposefully tried to have a substantial connection with a state before you can get your ass dragged into a court there. Even with this split in test, it is odd how they interact--which leads to the confusion that you see here. On the Choice of Law provision in contracts: Here, when you sign a contract that says you will litigate any disputes arising out of the contract in a certain state, this ONLY affects venue considerations. Even if binding in the contract, this provision is not sufficient to bring someone into court in a certain state. (translation: signing a provision in a contract to litigate somewhere will not force you to litigate in Guam by itself). MacAndrew is referring to the fact that a court may strike a contract provision if it unconscionable, or a contract of cohersion...I approach from a sharp procedural perspective.