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marsipan's activity in the archive.
I experienced some bad crashes under Leopard in my first week after upgrade, including: keyboard hangs http://discussions.apple.com/thread.jspa?messageID=5787571 & crazy jumping pointer http://discussions.apple.com/thread.jspa?messageID=5869864 but after the 10.5.1 update & a good old-fashioned PRAM reset, it's been stable for at least a week! uptime 21:30 up 8 days, 4:49, 3 users, load averages: 0.16 0.22 0.24
What would the oil-making nanobots be made of, and where would the energy come from to power the manufacturing of such technology?Yeah, get ready to power down.
Ray's probably right, but we have to make it past the collapse from a crumbling petrol society first!
"Root is disabled by default" Yes, the built-in root (uid 0) account in OS X is disabled. But, this exploit *replaces* that local uid 0 with one from a malicious remote directory service. So, the Apple root-account default is circumvented.
"In most cases, the Mac will need to be booted into the malicious environment to be exploitable by this flaw. (The netinfod process must be restarted to cause the malicious server to be inserted into the authentication source list.)" This definitely makes the exploit less likely...
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I experienced some bad crashes under Leopard in my first week after upgrade, including: keyboard hangs http://discussions.apple.com/thread.jspa?messageID=5787571 & crazy jumping pointer http://discussions.apple.com/thread.jspa?messageID=5869864 but after the 10.5.1 update & a good old-fashioned PRAM reset, it's been stable for at least a week! uptime 21:30 up 8 days, 4:49, 3 users, load averages: 0.16 0.22 0.24
What would the oil-making nanobots be made of, and where would the energy come from to power the manufacturing of such technology?
Yeah, get ready to power down.
Ray's probably right, but we have to make it past the collapse from a crumbling petrol society first!
"Root is disabled by default"
Yes, the built-in root (uid 0) account in OS X is disabled.
But, this exploit *replaces* that local uid 0 with one from a malicious remote directory service.
So, the Apple root-account default is circumvented.
"In most cases, the Mac will need to be booted into the malicious environment to be exploitable by this flaw. (The netinfod process must be restarted to cause the malicious server to be inserted into the authentication source list.)"
This definitely makes the exploit less likely...