What we don't have is the documentation, the compiler used, the checksum of the binary used during the election,... Nor do we have the proof that this was the code really in use.
In Belgium some citizen had to fight in court to get the source code of the election program beeing published.
In 1991 nobody except private company had the code.
In 1999 official expert asked for the state to own the code and suggest publishing it.
In 2000 they published partial code and documentation with most important security part removed.
In May 2003 they published full code (but no doc) of new system (AES added).
We have no way to check if that code was really in use. Because they use the same floppy disk to boot the system and to save the result, we have no way to make sure what was on the floppy at the begining of the election day. This is explained here but only in french.
But having the code is not enough... actually Richard Stallman had something to
say about Free Software not being enough.
Now if you are Belgian and unhappy about the status of our election system, you can join or contact PourEVA.
I personally believe that if we want to reduce the repetitive task of counting the ballot, we could use optical scanning (and make test manual recount). But we should never put a computer between our vote and the expression of our vote. Paper and Pen rules.
RMS say software can not be trusted for election... and having that software Free Software is not enough.
You are saying that human making the recount could try to change the result of the election.
I say that when computer change the result of the election, there is no way to proof it, and computer can change the vote always in the same direction.
When some human try to change the result in one direction, other human try in the other direction. So the effect of one set of human can be compensated by the other set. In Belgium, when count (and recount) are done, there are witness from each party and you are not suppose to stay alone with a balot.
There is no way I could accept having to trust a small set of expert to tell me that the program is OK and secure. I prefere to trust many "randomly" choosen citizen that do the dirty work of counting for democracy.
Actually the issue is not the counting, but the casting of the vote. If we let human in control of expressing their vote by using paper and pen. But we use computer for counting the vote (that can and must be recount by human) using optical scanner, then we have best of both world.
I don't trust computer, I know too much about them.
If GIF was a W3C standard and is not royalty free, then should they remove that from the standard and make every web page that use them non compliant...
Then next month they can put it back into the standard... ???
A paper trail won't stop fraud. In fact, it offers any number of ballot-destruction exploits. Open software and certified, well-tested systems will stop fraud.
Open Source or Free Software is not enough to garantee fair/honest election.
I have a quote from Richard Stallman on that topic:
Free software is not enough to ensure that elections are carried out properly.
The software used in and for government should always be free software; the government should always have the freedom to run it, study its source code, change it to suit government needs, and distribute copies to others either unchanged or modified. That way, software owners will not have power over the government's computers. But that is not enough to ensure that computerized elections are fair and honest.
It is easy for a programmer to change a program so that it tells the user "You voted for Mr Smith" but actually record a vote for Mr Brown. Unfortunately, free software does not prevent this. There is no known way to prevent this.
With free voting software, a government election committee can study the source code. If the program has been published, anyone can study the source code. But there is no way to be sure that the program actually running when you cast your vote is the same program that you and the election committee studied. Someone could have installed a fiddled version an hour before the election and replaced it with the authorized version an hour after it ended.
To assure honest elections, we need physical ballots that can be used for a recount.
Slashdot Mirror
Check the code for yourself
In 1991 nobody except private company had the code.
In 1999 official expert asked for the state to own the code and suggest publishing it.
In 2000 they published partial code and documentation with most important security part removed.
In May 2003 they published full code (but no doc) of new system (AES added).
Feel free to download analyse and report problem to us
We have no way to check if that code was really in use. Because they use the same floppy disk to boot the system and to save the result, we have no way to make sure what was on the floppy at the begining of the election day. This is explained here but only in french.
But having the code is not enough... actually Richard Stallman had something to say about Free Software not being enough.
Now if you are Belgian and unhappy about the status of our election system, you can join or contact PourEVA.
I personally believe that if we want to reduce the repetitive task of counting the ballot, we could use optical scanning (and make test manual recount). But we should never put a computer between our vote and the expression of our vote. Paper and Pen rules.
RMS say software can not be trusted for election... and having that software Free Software is not enough.
You are saying that human making the recount could try to change the result of the election.
I say that when computer change the result of the election, there is no way to proof it, and computer can change the vote always in the same direction.
When some human try to change the result in one direction, other human try in the other direction. So the effect of one set of human can be compensated by the other set. In Belgium, when count (and recount) are done, there are witness from each party and you are not suppose to stay alone with a balot.
There is no way I could accept having to trust a small set of expert to tell me that the program is OK and secure. I prefere to trust many "randomly" choosen citizen that do the dirty work of counting for democracy.
Actually the issue is not the counting, but the casting of the vote. If we let human in control of expressing their vote by using paper and pen. But we use computer for counting the vote (that can and must be recount by human) using optical scanner, then we have best of both world.
I don't trust computer, I know too much about them.
David Glaude
http://www.poureva.be/
What about backward compatibility of that rule?
.gif
If GIF was a W3C standard and is not royalty free, then should they remove that from the standard and make every web page that use them non compliant...
Then next month they can put it back into the standard... ???
---
burn all
Open Source or Free Software is not enough to garantee fair/honest election.
I have a quote from Richard Stallman on that topic: