So far I've seen a lot of discussion about the need for a paper audit trail and a lot of people asking "What's the point?". I've got an idea that I think just might be the answer. (Warning: I'm probably a crackpot so please poke as many holes in this as you can)
It seems to me that the system people want is not electronic voting -- it's electronic vote *counting*. Computers are extremely good at counting large numbers so let's exploit that strength. But keeping data secure has so far proved difficult at best so let's not entrust that task to the computers.
The system I envision has paper ballots that are designed to be machine readable. Whether that means punching holes or filling in little bubbles or just printing neatly in the space provided makes no difference. The essential thing is that a computer needs to be able to scan the ballot quickly and accurately in order to count the vote.
At each polling booth is one or more electronic scanners that voters can feed their ballots into. The machine reads the ballot and displays what it's read to the voter. If it matches how they intended to vote then they can deposit the ballot into the ballot box, otherwise they go back and fix their ballot.
Now here's the essential point: the machines at the polling booths do absolutely no counting! The actual counting of the votes is handled after the ballots are collected and the polls are closed, by machines that have never been accessible to anyone but the proper voting officials. The polling booth machines serve only to validate that the ballot is correctly filled out and readable.
The system I've outlined is no different from a traditional election, except for the addition of a verification step so that voters can be reasonably assured that their ballots will be read correctly. (I'm not sure how often machines are used to count the ballots but surely that's been done before?)
The risks in such a system should be no greater than those in a traditional election. The machines that are at the most risk of being hacked (those at the polling stations) have absolutely no responsibility in the system. The machines that have real responsibility (the actual vote counters) can be locked away in a vault and isolated from the rest of the world. If you suspect fraud, the paper ballots will still exist and can be recounted. Use your own counting machine if you doubt the integrity of the "official" ballot counter, or if you're really paranoid, count them by hand.
The thing I like most about a system like this is that the paper ballot is always the official record. That seems important to me given the generally insecure nature of software these days.
What's to prevent the counterfeiters from creating a bogus product activation screen? They might even be able to sucker unsuspecting people into revealing important personal information.
Can we please keep these SCO stories in the Caldera category? I literal signed up for an account solely so that I could filter them out. Now you're disguising them as Linux stories!? Argh!!
Slashdot Mirror
It seems to me that the system people want is not electronic voting -- it's electronic vote *counting*. Computers are extremely good at counting large numbers so let's exploit that strength. But keeping data secure has so far proved difficult at best so let's not entrust that task to the computers.
The system I envision has paper ballots that are designed to be machine readable. Whether that means punching holes or filling in little bubbles or just printing neatly in the space provided makes no difference. The essential thing is that a computer needs to be able to scan the ballot quickly and accurately in order to count the vote.
At each polling booth is one or more electronic scanners that voters can feed their ballots into. The machine reads the ballot and displays what it's read to the voter. If it matches how they intended to vote then they can deposit the ballot into the ballot box, otherwise they go back and fix their ballot.
Now here's the essential point: the machines at the polling booths do absolutely no counting! The actual counting of the votes is handled after the ballots are collected and the polls are closed, by machines that have never been accessible to anyone but the proper voting officials. The polling booth machines serve only to validate that the ballot is correctly filled out and readable.
The system I've outlined is no different from a traditional election, except for the addition of a verification step so that voters can be reasonably assured that their ballots will be read correctly. (I'm not sure how often machines are used to count the ballots but surely that's been done before?)
The risks in such a system should be no greater than those in a traditional election. The machines that are at the most risk of being hacked (those at the polling stations) have absolutely no responsibility in the system. The machines that have real responsibility (the actual vote counters) can be locked away in a vault and isolated from the rest of the world. If you suspect fraud, the paper ballots will still exist and can be recounted. Use your own counting machine if you doubt the integrity of the "official" ballot counter, or if you're really paranoid, count them by hand.
The thing I like most about a system like this is that the paper ballot is always the official record. That seems important to me given the generally insecure nature of software these days.
It's obviously a conspiracy. The complete lack of evidence only proves just how effective this conspiracy is.
What's to prevent the counterfeiters from creating a bogus product activation screen? They might even be able to sucker unsuspecting people into revealing important personal information.
Can we please keep these SCO stories in the Caldera category? I literal signed up for an account solely so that I could filter them out. Now you're disguising them as Linux stories!? Argh!!