The study clearly omitted those two attacks, apparently because they wanted to bias their numbers. But they don't publish their data because they want to hide that.
Seeing their claimed methodology is worthless without seeing their raw data and how they tagged it. It is clear, though, that they were very biased in that part of their "study". They knew in advance what they wanted to find, and they probably tortured the data until it said what they wanted.
Overall death toll: 90 (mostly because of the high deathtoll in the Orlando nightclub shooting - which it is not certain was, in fact, an Islamic terror attack)
What the study claimed:
The total deaths associated with Islamist incidents were higher, however, reaching 90, largely due to the 2009 mass shooting at Fort Hood in Texas.
This tells us that they didn't count either the San Bernardino or the Orlando mass murders as Islamic attacks, and that you don't know what the dishonest study you cited says.
Your link to a left wing agitprop outlet might be remotely convincing if it linked to anything that supported its numbers.
It's also pathetic that you compare LRA to terrorist attacks, but not to the actually comparable group -- ISIS, which is in fact what this article is about. LRA does not kill as many people as you claim; its annual average is about 3000, basically as many as died on 9/11. On the other hand, ISIS has been killing about 10,000 people every year.
So your original description of what makes speech illegal was simply wrong.
I also suggest that if the law says -- as I think you are saying -- that it's okay to randomly insult and disparage a group, but illegal to be specific about why you don't like them, that's a really awful law.
Yes, that is really true. "In the Courtâ(TM)s opinion, although these statements did not directly recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial allegations." That's more along the lines of "all X are scum" than "all X should be driven from our land".
And thank you for asking questions that helped me better explain what I meant. This case shows a number of the ways that, as Dickens wrote, the law is an ass.
Unfortunately, I have not seen any coverage of what the defendant's letter to the court was about. That should have been a good opportunity to help deter some of the worse problems, and if the letter did point out the jurisdictional problems, more blame shifts to the court. While the court was just following rules, those rules have built-in flexibility meant to help avoid unjust outcomes. For example, I don't think the court was compelled to award monetary damages in a default judgment. (However, I'm not a lawyer, so I can't say that with much confidence.)
Yes, and claims like "X are all scum" have been prosecuted as incitement to hatred in other European countries. As just one example, Vegdeland and Others v. Sweden, where the ECHR unanimously upheld convictions for what amounted to "gays are all scum".
We ban fraud, but only make defamation a tort. (There are a few criminal defamation laws in various US states, but they are essentially dead letters. Given current precedent, they would almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional at the first challenge.)
How do you square your claim with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/..., which explains that basically any thing that could be called "hate speech" is illegal in Germany as long as it is done "in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace"? To me, that seems like it is about the vaguest possible threshold.
The monetary damages are an amount (although generally ridiculous) provided by law that had the purpose of compensating a copyright holder for the infringement. Such "ordinary" or "compensatory" damages are intended to put the plaintiff in the same position they would be in if their rights had been respected from the start.
Injunctions are intended to prevent, or at least deter, further infringement by the defendant. In this case, turning over the domains used for infringement stops them from being used to infringe those copyrights, and allows the copyright holder to direct readers to authorized ways to read the papers.
Default judgments like this one will never include special or exemplary damages, sometimes called punitive damages, which are awarded beyond ordinary damages specifically to reduce the chance of further infringement. Special damages are only awarded after a trial on the merits.
Injunctions and special damages are different in large part because injunctions directly prevent or impair further tortious actions, where special damages have only indirect effects, and are meant as a disincentive to offend further.
Also that the original quote was limited to falsely crying that there was a fire, meaning it was always about claims of objective fact rather than opinion or emotion. On top of that, the justice who wrote it later recanted and said it was a wrong argument in the first place.
You can contribute the scripts and configuration to run fuzzers. Presumably the developers know how to fix crashes, but they might not have the same level of expertise in setting up a fuzzer as the prospective contributor.
Civil disobedience doesn't mean much if you can't distinguish it from whining about the man keeping you down while you are breaking the law and fleeing justice.
Cry me a river for the academics who have to choose between publishing in the right existing places, creating their own right places, or getting jobs in the real world.
The whole point of civil disobedience is actually that it is unjust for the law to prohibit a thing, not that the punishment is unfair, and a key part is that you are willing to face the penalties for breaking the law in order to demonstrate how unjust it is.
In this case, there is no punishment, because it was not a criminal case. There are damages and injunctions, and so far the defendant has avoided almost all of those. That unwillingness to face the consequences makes it hard to call it civil disobedience, much less to argue that it was morally justified civil disobedience.
There are an increasing number of open-access journals and other repositories, and that is a good thing, but nobody has yet solved the problem of figuring out which contributions are well-done and/or significant to others in the field. Traditional (subscriber-paid) journals do an imperfect job at that, but at least they have reasonably clear and strong incentives to make that a priority, and were not so obviously susceptible to influence from narrow social networks.
Lack of jurisdiction is a defense that is incredibly easy to waive under the US legal system. Courts tend not to go along with it if a defendant goes through discovery and a lot of motions, and only then decide to argue a lack of jurisdiction. Allowing that would make it easier for the defendant to game the court system. As a result, it is easier to have a default judgment vacated for lack of jurisdiction if you never communicate with the court than if you communicate for some purposes (that do not include challenging jurisdiction) and then stop communicating with it.
Sure, but unless Elsevier (or their counsel) was incompetent, they alleged sufficient facts to establish this court's jurisdiction over the case and the defendant. If there is nothing obviously wrong with those claims, then unless the defendant challenges the court's jurisdiction in a timely fashion, the court will take those claims as true.
Enforcing the judgment is another question, of course, and I hope that Elsevier fails to collect the monetary damages.
The authors had the choice of publishing through these journals or not. They made their choice; they assigned their copyrights to the journals. Nobody held a gun to their heads and told them that either their signature or their brains would appear on the copyright assignment papers.
The study clearly omitted those two attacks, apparently because they wanted to bias their numbers. But they don't publish their data because they want to hide that.
You ignorantly cited an intentionally biased study that didn't say what you claimed it said. Don't talk to me about who is blind to reality.
Seeing their claimed methodology is worthless without seeing their raw data and how they tagged it. It is clear, though, that they were very biased in that part of their "study". They knew in advance what they wanted to find, and they probably tortured the data until it said what they wanted.
What you claimed:
What the study claimed:
This tells us that they didn't count either the San Bernardino or the Orlando mass murders as Islamic attacks, and that you don't know what the dishonest study you cited says.
So you're not going to try to link to the study or even defend it, either. Figures.
Your link to a left wing agitprop outlet might be remotely convincing if it linked to anything that supported its numbers.
It's also pathetic that you compare LRA to terrorist attacks, but not to the actually comparable group -- ISIS, which is in fact what this article is about. LRA does not kill as many people as you claim; its annual average is about 3000, basically as many as died on 9/11. On the other hand, ISIS has been killing about 10,000 people every year.
Your arguments are deeply dishonest.
So your original description of what makes speech illegal was simply wrong.
I also suggest that if the law says -- as I think you are saying -- that it's okay to randomly insult and disparage a group, but illegal to be specific about why you don't like them, that's a really awful law.
Yes, that is really true. "In the Courtâ(TM)s opinion, although these statements did not directly recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial allegations." That's more along the lines of "all X are scum" than "all X should be driven from our land".
Changing the owner that is listed in one federal database doesn't actually transfer ownership of the assets in question.
And thank you for asking questions that helped me better explain what I meant. This case shows a number of the ways that, as Dickens wrote, the law is an ass.
Unfortunately, I have not seen any coverage of what the defendant's letter to the court was about. That should have been a good opportunity to help deter some of the worse problems, and if the letter did point out the jurisdictional problems, more blame shifts to the court. While the court was just following rules, those rules have built-in flexibility meant to help avoid unjust outcomes. For example, I don't think the court was compelled to award monetary damages in a default judgment. (However, I'm not a lawyer, so I can't say that with much confidence.)
Yes, and claims like "X are all scum" have been prosecuted as incitement to hatred in other European countries. As just one example, Vegdeland and Others v. Sweden, where the ECHR unanimously upheld convictions for what amounted to "gays are all scum".
We ban fraud, but only make defamation a tort. (There are a few criminal defamation laws in various US states, but they are essentially dead letters. Given current precedent, they would almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional at the first challenge.)
How do you square your claim with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/..., which explains that basically any thing that could be called "hate speech" is illegal in Germany as long as it is done "in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace"? To me, that seems like it is about the vaguest possible threshold.
Legally, no, there was no punishment here.
The monetary damages are an amount (although generally ridiculous) provided by law that had the purpose of compensating a copyright holder for the infringement. Such "ordinary" or "compensatory" damages are intended to put the plaintiff in the same position they would be in if their rights had been respected from the start.
Injunctions are intended to prevent, or at least deter, further infringement by the defendant. In this case, turning over the domains used for infringement stops them from being used to infringe those copyrights, and allows the copyright holder to direct readers to authorized ways to read the papers.
Default judgments like this one will never include special or exemplary damages, sometimes called punitive damages, which are awarded beyond ordinary damages specifically to reduce the chance of further infringement. Special damages are only awarded after a trial on the merits.
Injunctions and special damages are different in large part because injunctions directly prevent or impair further tortious actions, where special damages have only indirect effects, and are meant as a disincentive to offend further.
It's not a conviction. This was a civil case, not a criminal one.
Since when has it been okay to be an authoritarian government in order to prevent your government from becoming authoritarian?
Also that the original quote was limited to falsely crying that there was a fire, meaning it was always about claims of objective fact rather than opinion or emotion. On top of that, the justice who wrote it later recanted and said it was a wrong argument in the first place.
You can contribute the scripts and configuration to run fuzzers. Presumably the developers know how to fix crashes, but they might not have the same level of expertise in setting up a fuzzer as the prospective contributor.
[citation needed]
Civil disobedience doesn't mean much if you can't distinguish it from whining about the man keeping you down while you are breaking the law and fleeing justice.
Cry me a river for the academics who have to choose between publishing in the right existing places, creating their own right places, or getting jobs in the real world.
The whole point of civil disobedience is actually that it is unjust for the law to prohibit a thing, not that the punishment is unfair, and a key part is that you are willing to face the penalties for breaking the law in order to demonstrate how unjust it is.
In this case, there is no punishment, because it was not a criminal case. There are damages and injunctions, and so far the defendant has avoided almost all of those. That unwillingness to face the consequences makes it hard to call it civil disobedience, much less to argue that it was morally justified civil disobedience.
There are an increasing number of open-access journals and other repositories, and that is a good thing, but nobody has yet solved the problem of figuring out which contributions are well-done and/or significant to others in the field. Traditional (subscriber-paid) journals do an imperfect job at that, but at least they have reasonably clear and strong incentives to make that a priority, and were not so obviously susceptible to influence from narrow social networks.
Lack of jurisdiction is a defense that is incredibly easy to waive under the US legal system. Courts tend not to go along with it if a defendant goes through discovery and a lot of motions, and only then decide to argue a lack of jurisdiction. Allowing that would make it easier for the defendant to game the court system. As a result, it is easier to have a default judgment vacated for lack of jurisdiction if you never communicate with the court than if you communicate for some purposes (that do not include challenging jurisdiction) and then stop communicating with it.
Sure, but unless Elsevier (or their counsel) was incompetent, they alleged sufficient facts to establish this court's jurisdiction over the case and the defendant. If there is nothing obviously wrong with those claims, then unless the defendant challenges the court's jurisdiction in a timely fashion, the court will take those claims as true.
Enforcing the judgment is another question, of course, and I hope that Elsevier fails to collect the monetary damages.
The authors had the choice of publishing through these journals or not. They made their choice; they assigned their copyrights to the journals. Nobody held a gun to their heads and told them that either their signature or their brains would appear on the copyright assignment papers.
That's not how default judgments work.