The RIAA's anti-swap activities are breeding a smarter and more resourceful brand of file-sharing software faster than venerial diseases adapt to antibiotics.
Right now the masses might be using FastTrack or gnutella, but the tide is sure to shift as soon as these networks are crippled or shut down.
The future of P2P clearly involves strong encryption, and is also likely to employ some "invite-only" attributes. That future software is here today; all that is lacking is the user base.
Trying to "filter out" or "regulate" file sharing is akin to trying to "filter out" or "regulate" voice over IP. Or, if you prefer, like trying to deliver content to me for my viewing while simultaneously attempting to prevent me from duplicating it - flatly impossible.
So I ask the "inventors" of this media-analyzing software, can you make my encryption transparent? Can you "peer" inside my tunnelled session and identify the content by artist and title?
This will turn out exactly the way every other bogus "piracy prevention" fiasco has.
1) Company releases "copy protection" product which flatly falls on its face (that is it purports to accomplish the impossible).
2) Company sues pre-existing services and products for "patent violation" (after all, these pre-existing products clearly violate the new patent if they are able to "circumvent" the system, right?)
3) Some service gets shut down, ten others replace it.
I can't believe China is actually going to pay
for their software, to begin with. Historically,
I think they've made more off of American I.P.
than Americans have.
It's kind of telling that they're moving to
Linux shortly after they received the Windows
source code from Microsoft (and launched major
vulnerability-based attacks against Taiwan).
They must have seen some really scary stuff
in there.
Anyone care to venture where all these newly-
discovered Windows vulnerabilities are being
unearthed?
It's just a campus CCTV channel with network-controlled programming. My school has been doing this for years, I'm confident that many schools have this configuration.
If they hadn't hyped this up as some kind of RIAA work-around, it'd still be running.
Also, when you're a campus radio or television station, you shouldn't have to buy your music. You should receive it in the mail for free, and for the purpose of broadcasting.
Formal methods in programming, not waves of debugging, are required to prove that this software is correct.
We don't let junior programmers develop software for our space shuttle by trial and error. I submit that the code in these voting machines is just as important as the code on the space shuttle.
Further, our government needs to step in and take cryptographic checksums on the disks and ROMS of these devices during certification, and to then recheck them on election day.
The government is way, way behind the curve here. Most computer enthusiasts won't even install unsigned programs on their home computers.
Finally, let's eliminate the possibility of sabotage by tech-savvy voters. Ditch the smart-cards and go with physical buttons/switches on the outside of the machine as well as printed paper logs.
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The RIAA's anti-swap activities are breeding a smarter and more resourceful brand of file-sharing software faster than venerial diseases adapt to antibiotics.
Right now the masses might be using FastTrack or gnutella, but the tide is sure to shift as soon as these networks are crippled or shut down.
The future of P2P clearly involves strong encryption, and is also likely to employ some "invite-only" attributes. That future software is here today; all that is lacking is the user base.
Trying to "filter out" or "regulate" file sharing is akin to trying to "filter out" or "regulate" voice over IP. Or, if you prefer, like trying to deliver content to me for my viewing while simultaneously attempting to prevent me from duplicating it - flatly impossible.
So I ask the "inventors" of this media-analyzing software, can you make my encryption transparent? Can you "peer" inside my tunnelled session and identify the content by artist and title?
This will turn out exactly the way every other bogus "piracy prevention" fiasco has.
1) Company releases "copy protection" product which flatly falls on its face (that is it purports to accomplish the impossible).
2) Company sues pre-existing services and products for "patent violation" (after all, these pre-existing products clearly violate the new patent if they are able to "circumvent" the system, right?)
3) Some service gets shut down, ten others replace it.
I can't believe China is actually going to pay for their software, to begin with. Historically, I think they've made more off of American I.P. than Americans have. It's kind of telling that they're moving to Linux shortly after they received the Windows source code from Microsoft (and launched major vulnerability-based attacks against Taiwan). They must have seen some really scary stuff in there. Anyone care to venture where all these newly- discovered Windows vulnerabilities are being unearthed?
>MIT: We're clever engineers, we've found a legal
>way to distribute that saves tons of money!
I hope their software engineers didn't work too
hard on this one. I mean, you can do this with
just the line printer daemon (lpd).
It's just a campus CCTV channel with network-controlled programming. My school has been doing this for years, I'm confident that many schools have this configuration.
If they hadn't hyped this up as some kind of RIAA work-around, it'd still be running.
Also, when you're a campus radio or television station, you shouldn't have to buy your music. You should receive it in the mail for free, and for the purpose of broadcasting.
Formal methods in programming, not waves of debugging, are required to prove that this software is correct.
We don't let junior programmers develop software for our space shuttle by trial and error. I submit that the code in these voting machines is just as important as the code on the space shuttle.
Further, our government needs to step in and take cryptographic checksums on the disks and ROMS of these devices during certification, and to then recheck them on election day.
The government is way, way behind the curve here.
Most computer enthusiasts won't even install unsigned programs on their home computers.
Finally, let's eliminate the possibility of sabotage by tech-savvy voters. Ditch the smart-cards and go with physical buttons/switches on the outside of the machine as well as printed paper logs.
Does anyone know how or if the 'crossbar'
technology that they speak of relates to
the 'crossbar' phone-switching technology
of the pre-ESS era?