We need a way to enforce a plain (i.e. table) and standardized EULA disclosure that resides at the top of every EULA. The table should include standardized key words that define the major pieces of the EULA, like spyware, copying, distribution, etc. This should be modeled after the "truth in lending" laws that require every credit / loan application to include a standardized table listing the terms of the loan / credit. Then the lawyers can include all their mumbo jumbo below the table to cover all the corner cases in EULA court judgments.
The first thing I do when I receive a credit card or load application is to flip it over and read the mandatory disclosure table. 2 or 3 seconds and I know right away if I'm being offered a good deal or taken for a ride. Why should EULAs be any harder?
Where to apply termination charges
on
SBC's VoIP End Run
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· Score: 2, Interesting
Termination chargges are not all bad, but to try to apply them to VoIP is insane for all the reasons other posters submited.
Termination charges are good for collecting taxes like the universal service fund. That tax ensures that people in rural areas, where it is much more expensive to deliver service, are subsdidized. IMHO, not all that bad of an idea if done within reason.
But the "right" way to charge termination fees is on the "data" pipe that is used to deliver content. NOT on the services on that data pipe. As for SBC wanting to get reimbursed for the cost of calls that they terminate to SBC subscribers..... Doesn't SBC already charge their subscribers a monthly fee? Do they really need to collect money on both ends?
SBC is just "protecting" their outdated network
on
SBC's VoIP End Run
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· Score: 4, Interesting
While companies like Qwest (Old US-West) are embracing the technology. Qwest's CEO has been vocal about their plans to compete head-to-head against the startup VoIP companies. To put their money where their mouth is, Qwest explicitly agreed to let any VoIP service terminate traffic in the Qwest local markets without paying termination charges. Just the exact opposite of SBC...... Why the 180 degree polar opposite decision by two of the largest telephone companies in the country? IMHO, Qwest is embracing VoIP themselves while SBC is late to the game, again. SBC seems to come up dead last in any data or telephone technology. What else to do but try to slow down all the competitors.
I agree. The current regulatory environment makes it more and more important to have abuse monitoring and enforcement of the strict transmission rules. However, I only see regulations loosening up with no effort to extend monitoring and enforcement. This trend is likely to result in serious problems from the consumer's perspective.
I live in an area that is already targeted by wide area WiFi and other technologies. I occasionally experience 1 or 2 hours where I cannot receive broadcast TV, FM radio, or even weather alert radio broadcasts. During the event I cannot receive broadcasts at my home or FM radio in my car within a mile or so. I strongly suspect that it is a wireless operator in my local area but proving it will take some serious effort on my part. I always notice when the event begins because my wireless mouse stops working.
The "mapping" from Representative to issue/bill would be subjective leaving a lot of room for the person maintaining the data to inject political slant.
Today it is almost impossible to discern from the end user license agreement exactly how the software will track me or how my personal information will be used.
At one time loans and credit accounts were the scourge of the common person with no patients for reading long verbose contracts. Many a person was mislead into loan terms that would make you puke today. Then along came the "truth in lending" laws that require a standardized disclosure section for all loans, credit cards, etc. Now when I get a credit card application in the mail, all I have to do is flip it over and look for this well organized table. It lists my interest rate, payment terms, fees, penalties, etc. No guessing; I know in 5 seconds exactly what I'm getting myself into.
We need the same plain, simple disclosure for all software that will install on the computer displayed when installed; a requirement that all installed software show up in the package management system as installed (i.e. control panel); and a method to query that plain, simple disclosure any time we want through the package management system.
Without this, all those laws will do is force tracking companies to further obscure the EULA and "trick" us into giving consent. Anyone want to help draft a disclosure table and its contents?
What many fail to realize is that there is no security in the existing PSTN. I've sat in a central office and watched as technicians patched in a T-Bird (common piece of test equipment) to listen to random conversations just for fun. Tell me again where there is security? To listen to your conversations a person must physically place a piece of test equipment in the network somewhere between you and the other party. Notice that I did not indicate what type of call I was talking about (i.e. PSTN or VoIP) That is because it works exactly the same way, only with a different piece of test equipment. Why do we feel we need encryption for VoIP calls when we have never (in general) needed encryption for PSTN calls?
2.2M wire tap orders does not mean someone listened to the audio from 2.2M phone lines. When a telephone carrier receives a CALEA wire tap order, the order can request one or all of trap, trace, and intercept. Only intercept involves audio content. The others involve just the call detail records (in real time or as a report). I work with local exchange carriers that have indicated to me that the number of intercept orders is an extremely small fraction of the total wire tap activity. I'm not saying intercept orders are insignificant as they relate to our rights, rather that the magnitude is not what it seems.
Realize that CALEA involves trap/trace/intercept at each endpoint. With the current lack of VoIP regulation, Packet8, Vonage, etc. may not be required to provide CALEA and there is no way to determine "which" caller to trap at the "... provider's PSTN trunks...". So the only option is really Carnivore or a CALEA order against the person being called. This is the reason for forcing regulation on the VoIP based providers.
Could the feedback loop be closed so that the "service" would corelate an attack and then update the firewall filters on each host? Clearly there are trust issues to overcome, but for the sake of this discussion, let's assume the trust issue can be solved.
Slashdot Mirror
The first thing I do when I receive a credit card or load application is to flip it over and read the mandatory disclosure table. 2 or 3 seconds and I know right away if I'm being offered a good deal or taken for a ride. Why should EULAs be any harder?
Termination chargges are not all bad, but to try to apply them to VoIP is insane for all the reasons other posters submited.
Termination charges are good for collecting taxes like the universal service fund. That tax ensures that people in rural areas, where it is much more expensive to deliver service, are subsdidized. IMHO, not all that bad of an idea if done within reason.
But the "right" way to charge termination fees is on the "data" pipe that is used to deliver content. NOT on the services on that data pipe. As for SBC wanting to get reimbursed for the cost of calls that they terminate to SBC subscribers..... Doesn't SBC already charge their subscribers a monthly fee? Do they really need to collect money on both ends?
While companies like Qwest (Old US-West) are embracing the technology. Qwest's CEO has been vocal about their plans to compete head-to-head against the startup VoIP companies. To put their money where their mouth is, Qwest explicitly agreed to let any VoIP service terminate traffic in the Qwest local markets without paying termination charges. Just the exact opposite of SBC...... Why the 180 degree polar opposite decision by two of the largest telephone companies in the country? IMHO, Qwest is embracing VoIP themselves while SBC is late to the game, again. SBC seems to come up dead last in any data or telephone technology. What else to do but try to slow down all the competitors.
I agree. The current regulatory environment makes it more and more important to have abuse monitoring and enforcement of the strict transmission rules. However, I only see regulations loosening up with no effort to extend monitoring and enforcement. This trend is likely to result in serious problems from the consumer's perspective.
I live in an area that is already targeted by wide area WiFi and other technologies. I occasionally experience 1 or 2 hours where I cannot receive broadcast TV, FM radio, or even weather alert radio broadcasts. During the event I cannot receive broadcasts at my home or FM radio in my car within a mile or so. I strongly suspect that it is a wireless operator in my local area but proving it will take some serious effort on my part. I always notice when the event begins because my wireless mouse stops working.
The "mapping" from Representative to issue/bill would be subjective leaving a lot of room for the person maintaining the data to inject political slant.
At one time loans and credit accounts were the scourge of the common person with no patients for reading long verbose contracts. Many a person was mislead into loan terms that would make you puke today. Then along came the "truth in lending" laws that require a standardized disclosure section for all loans, credit cards, etc. Now when I get a credit card application in the mail, all I have to do is flip it over and look for this well organized table. It lists my interest rate, payment terms, fees, penalties, etc. No guessing; I know in 5 seconds exactly what I'm getting myself into.
We need the same plain, simple disclosure for all software that will install on the computer displayed when installed; a requirement that all installed software show up in the package management system as installed (i.e. control panel); and a method to query that plain, simple disclosure any time we want through the package management system.
Without this, all those laws will do is force tracking companies to further obscure the EULA and "trick" us into giving consent. Anyone want to help draft a disclosure table and its contents?
What many fail to realize is that there is no security in the existing PSTN. I've sat in a central office and watched as technicians patched in a T-Bird (common piece of test equipment) to listen to random conversations just for fun. Tell me again where there is security? To listen to your conversations a person must physically place a piece of test equipment in the network somewhere between you and the other party. Notice that I did not indicate what type of call I was talking about (i.e. PSTN or VoIP) That is because it works exactly the same way, only with a different piece of test equipment. Why do we feel we need encryption for VoIP calls when we have never (in general) needed encryption for PSTN calls?
2.2M wire tap orders does not mean someone listened to the audio from 2.2M phone lines. When a telephone carrier receives a CALEA wire tap order, the order can request one or all of trap, trace, and intercept. Only intercept involves audio content. The others involve just the call detail records (in real time or as a report). I work with local exchange carriers that have indicated to me that the number of intercept orders is an extremely small fraction of the total wire tap activity. I'm not saying intercept orders are insignificant as they relate to our rights, rather that the magnitude is not what it seems.
Realize that CALEA involves trap/trace/intercept at each endpoint. With the current lack of VoIP regulation, Packet8, Vonage, etc. may not be required to provide CALEA and there is no way to determine "which" caller to trap at the "... provider's PSTN trunks ...". So the only option is really Carnivore or a CALEA order against the person being called. This is the reason for forcing regulation on the VoIP based providers.
Could the feedback loop be closed so that the "service" would corelate an attack and then update the firewall filters on each host? Clearly there are trust issues to overcome, but for the sake of this discussion, let's assume the trust issue can be solved.