No, you're wrong. You don't recognize the pattern that might have raised the alarm; you construct an imaginative story in retrospect that holds no meaning in real life. There are two explanations for this: firstly, that your story is a ball of pseudo-logical bullshit that sounds more important than it is; and secondly, that you *didn't* take notice of any of this stuff, therefor it was never going to get noticed.
They're both interesting explanations, and both important. Through studies of history, it's been recognized that journals of events and analysis of human behavior do not line up with scholastic history. Wars are the easiest target: journals of World War 2, the Liberian Revolution, and so on tell a tale of sudden surprise at a conflict out of nowhere, and of the war being over "any day now". Liberians up and left Liberia, moved into hotels to wait out the war for a week... and stayed there for 18 years, in a hotel, on extended vacation.
History tells us of mounting tensions, growing economic unrest, and a culmination of hostility that elevated in the preceding weeks, followed by a long and heavily-planned war; none of that shit ever happens. That's how it's told about Liberia, and that's not what happened: nobody expected the war to last more than a few days longer throughout its entire 20-year history. That's how it was told about World War 2, and that's not what happened: Germany had an idea for a sweeping victory which somehow strung out into a long campaign, and every week the allies believed they'd have the war won by the following week and would be dancing on Hitler's grave.
The very same people whose diaries told every day of the surprise and unexpectedness of the sudden war, the sudden invasion, the sudden change in government policies, and the dying down of conflict that should end the war in the next day or three immediately came out of the settling dust talking about the mounting tensions and obvious, visible indicators of the progress of the war since the weeks leading up to its inception and throughout its entire course. Everything that happened was visible, the whole way. The human mind concocts this imaginative fantasy about the past, and it's not *real*; it is a fairy tale.
Hindsight is not 20/20. Hindsight is functionally retarded.
My point is it was a valid question. Most of the answers haven't said anything specifically about this plane: yours talked about how it's heavy and would need to be in balance and whatnot, which doesn't indicate if this is a property of the plane or all planes. A lot of them are simply ridiculing the question as a dumb question--which I don't think it is, since commercial airliners have a history of occasionally hitting the water and coming away fine (a dead plane and living passengers is coming away just fine--runway skids do this a LOT) after losing power.
More information is useful. But now you're conjecturing that the pilot was AFK, and hadn't come back before the plane crashed, which isn't really a strong statement for why this plane specifically can't hit the water without instantly killing everyone. I mean, they'll all get flotation devices and die of hypothermia in the ocean anyway, but I'm more interested in why the plane necessarily hits the water and immediately shreds or compresses and kills everyone upon impact.
Yeah, that's all nice in theory, but it's also damn slow. What else is damn slow: anti-lock brakes in 1995-era GM cars. I had a Chevy Cavalier that would activate anti-lock brakes by removing all braking force for 1 full second, then engaging full braking and ABS.
When you learn to play guitar, you learn to keep your fingers just above the strings and make minimal movements. Why? Because lifting your fingers away and slamming them back down is slow. A car is the same way: lifting my foot off the accelerator and coming down onto the brake will add stopping distance, at highway speeds 3-5 meters of stopping distance, versus fast transfer. Heel pivot is common because moving the heel involves either friction or a complex and slow mechanical operation involving raising the heel from the floor, and holding the foot off the floor is fatiguing, and resting the weight of your leg on the accelerator is bad.
The foot is always over the brake when not on the accelerator. When the accelerator is needed, you're usually already on it: if somebody leaves a parking spot or a pedestrian enters the street in front of you, pounding the accelerator to take the open spot next to you is a likely course of action, and at the time your foot will probably be on the accelerator since the new hazard was unexpected. If your foot's on the brake, you probably have already dropped enough speed to brake effectively without collision, so the lane toss maneuver is unnecessary and much more hazardous than braking.
Some of the theory of driving is academic. Like using the handbrake to take off on a hill is impractical, especially in cars which use a foot parking brake with binary setting. Also in theory the parking brake is for parking; European cars apply a lot of braking force on the parking brake, but American cars apply little enough that the car can roll down a hill with full parking brake. Since American legislators are so afraid that people will use the handbrake for illegal maneuvers, you need to use the gears for parking--theoretically a secondary safety measure, but in America it's a primary parking system. This violates the engineering theory that a secondary (backup) system should not be relied upon as a primary system: if the primary system is known faulty, it needs to be fixed.
Pretty much. I drive a car with a manual transmission; we don't get giant brake pedals, so I'm stomping on this tiny little square which my foot can easily slip from. It has, and has found the accelerator...which is usually non-functional because I'm out of gear.
So yeah. His massive foot should have been able to find the massive brake pedal. It's the big, long, wide one. If you're hanging on the edge of the brake, you could slip off the edge and floor it. I've done it.
But they're only shipping packets. It's more like NetFlix is driving eighteen million motorcycles and doesn't want to be charged five times as much per motorcycle; in fact, they should pay less due to bulk rate discount.
Firstly, they can only charge those who peer to them. NetFlix using a Tier 3 provider would resell AT&T, who would charge the Tier 3 provider for bandwidth, which would essentially charge NetFlix for bandwidth. If NetFlix picks another Tier 1 or Tier 3 who resells a different Tier 1, AT&T can no longer charge NetFlix; they're stuck with their peering deals between Tier 1 providers.
Secondly, not being allowed to charge NetFlix for bandwidth passing through another Tier 1 peering arrangement means they need to compete on a market with all players--they can't make a move against NetFlix due to their negotiating position (inexperience, high amounts of capital and less inclination to squeeze out a favorable deal, business criticality, etc.), rather they must deal directly with all of their Level 1 peers and all of their Level 3 resellers and direct clients. If they make up a cost schedule that NetFlix will submit to but Google will not, then Google will argue down the cost schedule and they will bill NetFlix less; if they refuse to budge, Google will move to another Tier 1; and if they try to shift the costs onto a stratified consumption model and increase the cost at the lower usage levels, their lower usage clients will move to a Tier 1 without big players who charges less.
In the end, they don't want a level playing field. The providers want a playing field where they can extract maximum profits from the weak, particularly the rich and weak.
Yes but the implication was that a plane landing in the water would disintegrate, i.e. that we know what happened to the plane. The two ways to know what happened are A) to find it, and B) to know what happens to pretty much all planes when they hit water.
I don't know why anyone would find that disturbing.
In Tres Roeder's "A Sixth Sense for Project Management," he shows a diagram of communications. This diagram shows information versus time.
In the beginning, information is unknown; then the information changes, back and forth. For example: a dollar estimate may be $3,000 for a project, then $85,000 when we realize we need to excavate cabling tunnels for a line, then $6,000 when we realize we can run this across our existing tunnel and have a new fiber optic pulled for $3,000, then $7,000 when we realize we're going to also need a new transceiver, then $4000 when we find out some of the other equipment is unnecessary, then $14,000 when we realize the scope of labor required is twice as big.
Finally, once we have enough information, that figure stays. Perhaps at $14,000. We also realize we've got the correct figure because we have a full analysis of scope and work required--or at least, the figure won't change until we've done a bunch of work and realized, deep into the project, that we missed something. In any case, it is now not likely to change simply because our information base is hot.
During the initial planning phase, communication should reflect this: the understanding of the situation--the lack of precision--and what is being done to pin that down is to be communicated; conclusive statements should not be communicated because the current understanding of the situation is inconclusive. Once the situation has reached a point of conclusion, then you communicate these conclusions.
What is disturbing about the Malaysian government here is they have been repeatedly saying, "We have no idea what's happening and there's a ton of information out there we're missing; but this is what happened." Then, five hours later, "Oh we found more debris, we think this happened instead." Then the next day, "Oh there was some satellite telemetry information we weren't done analyzing, but it's provided additional information, so we think the plane may have gone this way..."
In other words: They have piles of information they know they're missing, piles of information they have a plan for finding (i.e. "ongoing investigation"), and huge and visible gaps they know exist and expect to fill. They should not be communicating any conclusions at this time.
At high speeds, wouldn't an air plane potentially skip across the surface without completely wrecking? Also, couldn't the plane slow down enough to lose altitude before losing altitude, hitting the water not quite as hard, at an angle that perhaps didn't immediately decelerate to zero or shred the plane? That's happened most of the time planes ditched in the water.
If smoke exhumes from 85 out of 100 houses due to burning firewood, then smoke exhuming from houses is not signal. If a house is on fire, and smoke is escaping from it, a glance at the skyline showing smoke rising from a house is not signal.
If, however, you adjust the angle on your scanner so as to get tops of houses--and use more, staggered scanners--and find that smoke is coming from the WINDOWS of this house, THAT is signal. It's different.
So if the "warnings" about these two jackasses were similar to "warnings" from thousands of other no-shows, nothing really distinguishing, then those "warnings" were just noise. The PETN bomber (non-threat: PETN doesn't explode without a complex detonator) was, in hind sight, so obvious for two reasons: he didn't stow a coat on his trip to Chicago and he had talked to men who were wearing suits ("well-dressed men") during a lay-over in an air port. That's right: not bringing a coat and talking to anyone who is better dressed than you are indicates you are a terrorist.
I've talked to a lot of well-dressed men. They mingle. And as for not bringing a coat: he was flying one way from Amsterdam, potentially didn't have a coat or had his possessions shipped separately, and if he was not in possession of a coat he could have bought one at Chicago instead of buying one locally and paying air fare to ship it. These are just noise.
It is the same with so-called "warnings" about terrorist attacks: if they're the same warnings we hear eighty billion times a year that never pan out, something was different about "this time". What is different is, by definition, not the same: if three hundred thousand individuals threaten to blow up Washington, DC and ONE actually attempts it, the fact that he THREATENED to do so is not an indicator that he's going to blow up Washington, DC. It's an indicator that he has a loud mouth. You need other evidence to draw attention to this one particularly; and if you can't effectively investigate all of them, you're better off investigating very few of them, or none, unless you have other indicators that can come up in very quick and light investigation. Without seeing those additional indicators, what you have is just noise.
I think all the money laundering laws should come off the books. For example: having to report any transaction over $10k or any "suspicious" transaction like $9.99k transactions or two $5k transactions. Having to declare cash. And so on.
Depends. Bitcoin seems to operate on the idea that the early adopters could mine tons of bitcoins, then sell them to later adopters. Constant inflation is built-in: it becomes more expensive to mine bitcoins over time, and there is a theoretical limit. So early adopters can sell to later adopters, who can sell to later adopters.
Guard the flag... from the other team. 2fort5, coop against other people.
The problem with coop games is you need strategy and organization or it's just boring. One person can assess all the stuff going on around him and learn to react efficiently; but if you need 4 people, you need it to be easy enough for 4 people to just blast their way through. If they're all together, they need to communicate--which is really fucking slow--and if they're separate and doing all the challenging things, they can come together and pretty much roll through any opposition. If it's challenging enough for coop, you lock out the single players.
Victor Harris translated Miyomoto Musashi's book of five rings. I tend to prefer his translation over Thomas Cleary's, although you would benefit from reading both. To be quite honest, you would benefit most from learning Japanese, becoming familiar with the cultural basis of Japanese thought, and reading the original Japanese with these nuances in mind; but that is unreasonable and passes diminishing returns unless you have another reason for learning Japanese (there is a huge wealth of knowledge available in the language, so there's that).
In an early chapter, Musashi starts talking about warriors and soldiers and generals, and then quickly veers off into a discussion of carpentry.
Musashi tells us that wood is useful in carpentry. He tells us that good, high-quality wood is important for finishing, for the outer construction of columns, for doors, wall paneling, and the like. He also tells us that the sturdier wood of lesser aesthetic appeal should be used particularly for the threshold, which must retain its aesthetic appeal and must weather much usage without wear or damage. Ugly, unsightly wood may be used discretely to form the inner bulk of columns and framing and joists when it provides strength fit to hold up the building.
Musashi also covers a related concept: Carpenters themselves. He explains that a skilled carpenter knows to select wood and lay a floor properly and to assure that it is level and truly planed, rather than finished in sections. He also explains that an extremely skilled carpenter can carve decoration, furniture, doors, and so on; while the less skilled may still lay joists, and the least skilled of all may be employed to cut shims and wedges.
Musashi also covers that a foreman must have experience and skill in all of these things so that he can properly judge the skills of the carpenters and put them to good use. The implication is that a foreman must recognize that a skilled carpenter is taking too much time laying joists, and that a lesser skilled carpenter should perform that function so that the job can proceed more efficiently and come out with greater quality. An unskilled carpenter can cut wedges and shims, freeing up several hours of work and allowing a smooth, continuous workflow for the entire team. When the skill of a carpenter increases, he can be employed on other jobs, and the most skilled may even aid the foreman in managing the job at hand.
So you see, it is valuable to train people. It is valuable to find an entrant who can perform the basic jobs and free up the time of skilled labor, and to improve the entrant so that he will become a valuable skilled laborer in the future. This provides immediate return and great flexibility. Even the completely unskilled can perform menial tasks and give a high return by freeing up existing skilled labor from these tasks; if these unskilled laborers fail to grow, they can readily be replaced with new laborers who can. By investing in laborers in this way, the occasional dead stick remains an asset, and the harm done by hiring an ultimately unsustainable employee is minimized.
If you could hire more skilled workers, already trained, you may be able to get a better return on your investment. The problem is you take on risk as you do this: they may look and sound impressive and turn out to be dead sticks, in which case there is a large associated cost. The above behavior mitigates much of this risk, allowing you to sink in less cost and get less return, but retain much of that return if it doesn't pan out. It also allows you to hire necessary work force based on predicted growth without shelling out for high-cost, highly-skilled workers before you need them, and without pinning yourself into a position where you have an urgent need you cannot readily fill without incurring more risk.
Everyone wants to get ahead. I think it makes more business sense to grow and survive than to try to perpetuate a mad dash for the head of the market. You can be a rich CEO with $100
It does. If my company spends $2000 to send me to training, they have a right to retain me until that debt is satisfied.
Unfortunately, you get employment agreements stipulating 2 years of retention or pay the costs back. After 1.5 years, I should only need to pay 25% of the cost.
10 sigma distribution of capability would be like... one of these guys appears every 30 million years. If we had ONE of those guys, he would be a super villain. He would likely build Braniac.
Slashdot Mirror
No, you're wrong. You don't recognize the pattern that might have raised the alarm; you construct an imaginative story in retrospect that holds no meaning in real life. There are two explanations for this: firstly, that your story is a ball of pseudo-logical bullshit that sounds more important than it is; and secondly, that you *didn't* take notice of any of this stuff, therefor it was never going to get noticed.
They're both interesting explanations, and both important. Through studies of history, it's been recognized that journals of events and analysis of human behavior do not line up with scholastic history. Wars are the easiest target: journals of World War 2, the Liberian Revolution, and so on tell a tale of sudden surprise at a conflict out of nowhere, and of the war being over "any day now". Liberians up and left Liberia, moved into hotels to wait out the war for a week... and stayed there for 18 years, in a hotel, on extended vacation.
History tells us of mounting tensions, growing economic unrest, and a culmination of hostility that elevated in the preceding weeks, followed by a long and heavily-planned war; none of that shit ever happens. That's how it's told about Liberia, and that's not what happened: nobody expected the war to last more than a few days longer throughout its entire 20-year history. That's how it was told about World War 2, and that's not what happened: Germany had an idea for a sweeping victory which somehow strung out into a long campaign, and every week the allies believed they'd have the war won by the following week and would be dancing on Hitler's grave.
The very same people whose diaries told every day of the surprise and unexpectedness of the sudden war, the sudden invasion, the sudden change in government policies, and the dying down of conflict that should end the war in the next day or three immediately came out of the settling dust talking about the mounting tensions and obvious, visible indicators of the progress of the war since the weeks leading up to its inception and throughout its entire course. Everything that happened was visible, the whole way. The human mind concocts this imaginative fantasy about the past, and it's not *real*; it is a fairy tale.
Hindsight is not 20/20. Hindsight is functionally retarded.
My point is it was a valid question. Most of the answers haven't said anything specifically about this plane: yours talked about how it's heavy and would need to be in balance and whatnot, which doesn't indicate if this is a property of the plane or all planes. A lot of them are simply ridiculing the question as a dumb question--which I don't think it is, since commercial airliners have a history of occasionally hitting the water and coming away fine (a dead plane and living passengers is coming away just fine--runway skids do this a LOT) after losing power.
More information is useful. But now you're conjecturing that the pilot was AFK, and hadn't come back before the plane crashed, which isn't really a strong statement for why this plane specifically can't hit the water without instantly killing everyone. I mean, they'll all get flotation devices and die of hypothermia in the ocean anyway, but I'm more interested in why the plane necessarily hits the water and immediately shreds or compresses and kills everyone upon impact.
Yeah, that's all nice in theory, but it's also damn slow. What else is damn slow: anti-lock brakes in 1995-era GM cars. I had a Chevy Cavalier that would activate anti-lock brakes by removing all braking force for 1 full second, then engaging full braking and ABS.
When you learn to play guitar, you learn to keep your fingers just above the strings and make minimal movements. Why? Because lifting your fingers away and slamming them back down is slow. A car is the same way: lifting my foot off the accelerator and coming down onto the brake will add stopping distance, at highway speeds 3-5 meters of stopping distance, versus fast transfer. Heel pivot is common because moving the heel involves either friction or a complex and slow mechanical operation involving raising the heel from the floor, and holding the foot off the floor is fatiguing, and resting the weight of your leg on the accelerator is bad.
The foot is always over the brake when not on the accelerator. When the accelerator is needed, you're usually already on it: if somebody leaves a parking spot or a pedestrian enters the street in front of you, pounding the accelerator to take the open spot next to you is a likely course of action, and at the time your foot will probably be on the accelerator since the new hazard was unexpected. If your foot's on the brake, you probably have already dropped enough speed to brake effectively without collision, so the lane toss maneuver is unnecessary and much more hazardous than braking.
Some of the theory of driving is academic. Like using the handbrake to take off on a hill is impractical, especially in cars which use a foot parking brake with binary setting. Also in theory the parking brake is for parking; European cars apply a lot of braking force on the parking brake, but American cars apply little enough that the car can roll down a hill with full parking brake. Since American legislators are so afraid that people will use the handbrake for illegal maneuvers, you need to use the gears for parking--theoretically a secondary safety measure, but in America it's a primary parking system. This violates the engineering theory that a secondary (backup) system should not be relied upon as a primary system: if the primary system is known faulty, it needs to be fixed.
Pretty much. I drive a car with a manual transmission; we don't get giant brake pedals, so I'm stomping on this tiny little square which my foot can easily slip from. It has, and has found the accelerator...which is usually non-functional because I'm out of gear.
So yeah. His massive foot should have been able to find the massive brake pedal. It's the big, long, wide one. If you're hanging on the edge of the brake, you could slip off the edge and floor it. I've done it.
A plane running out of fuel doesn't drop like a rock. Some of them can glide. Some have had full engine failure and landed safely in the Hudson River.
But they're only shipping packets. It's more like NetFlix is driving eighteen million motorcycles and doesn't want to be charged five times as much per motorcycle; in fact, they should pay less due to bulk rate discount.
Their large problems are as thus:
Firstly, they can only charge those who peer to them. NetFlix using a Tier 3 provider would resell AT&T, who would charge the Tier 3 provider for bandwidth, which would essentially charge NetFlix for bandwidth. If NetFlix picks another Tier 1 or Tier 3 who resells a different Tier 1, AT&T can no longer charge NetFlix; they're stuck with their peering deals between Tier 1 providers.
Secondly, not being allowed to charge NetFlix for bandwidth passing through another Tier 1 peering arrangement means they need to compete on a market with all players--they can't make a move against NetFlix due to their negotiating position (inexperience, high amounts of capital and less inclination to squeeze out a favorable deal, business criticality, etc.), rather they must deal directly with all of their Level 1 peers and all of their Level 3 resellers and direct clients. If they make up a cost schedule that NetFlix will submit to but Google will not, then Google will argue down the cost schedule and they will bill NetFlix less; if they refuse to budge, Google will move to another Tier 1; and if they try to shift the costs onto a stratified consumption model and increase the cost at the lower usage levels, their lower usage clients will move to a Tier 1 without big players who charges less.
In the end, they don't want a level playing field. The providers want a playing field where they can extract maximum profits from the weak, particularly the rich and weak.
Yes but the implication was that a plane landing in the water would disintegrate, i.e. that we know what happened to the plane. The two ways to know what happened are A) to find it, and B) to know what happens to pretty much all planes when they hit water.
I don't know why anyone would find that disturbing.
In Tres Roeder's "A Sixth Sense for Project Management," he shows a diagram of communications. This diagram shows information versus time.
In the beginning, information is unknown; then the information changes, back and forth. For example: a dollar estimate may be $3,000 for a project, then $85,000 when we realize we need to excavate cabling tunnels for a line, then $6,000 when we realize we can run this across our existing tunnel and have a new fiber optic pulled for $3,000, then $7,000 when we realize we're going to also need a new transceiver, then $4000 when we find out some of the other equipment is unnecessary, then $14,000 when we realize the scope of labor required is twice as big.
Finally, once we have enough information, that figure stays. Perhaps at $14,000. We also realize we've got the correct figure because we have a full analysis of scope and work required--or at least, the figure won't change until we've done a bunch of work and realized, deep into the project, that we missed something. In any case, it is now not likely to change simply because our information base is hot.
During the initial planning phase, communication should reflect this: the understanding of the situation--the lack of precision--and what is being done to pin that down is to be communicated; conclusive statements should not be communicated because the current understanding of the situation is inconclusive. Once the situation has reached a point of conclusion, then you communicate these conclusions.
What is disturbing about the Malaysian government here is they have been repeatedly saying, "We have no idea what's happening and there's a ton of information out there we're missing; but this is what happened." Then, five hours later, "Oh we found more debris, we think this happened instead." Then the next day, "Oh there was some satellite telemetry information we weren't done analyzing, but it's provided additional information, so we think the plane may have gone this way..."
In other words: They have piles of information they know they're missing, piles of information they have a plan for finding (i.e. "ongoing investigation"), and huge and visible gaps they know exist and expect to fill. They should not be communicating any conclusions at this time.
At high speeds, wouldn't an air plane potentially skip across the surface without completely wrecking? Also, couldn't the plane slow down enough to lose altitude before losing altitude, hitting the water not quite as hard, at an angle that perhaps didn't immediately decelerate to zero or shred the plane? That's happened most of the time planes ditched in the water.
Not necessarily.
If smoke exhumes from 85 out of 100 houses due to burning firewood, then smoke exhuming from houses is not signal. If a house is on fire, and smoke is escaping from it, a glance at the skyline showing smoke rising from a house is not signal.
If, however, you adjust the angle on your scanner so as to get tops of houses--and use more, staggered scanners--and find that smoke is coming from the WINDOWS of this house, THAT is signal. It's different.
So if the "warnings" about these two jackasses were similar to "warnings" from thousands of other no-shows, nothing really distinguishing, then those "warnings" were just noise. The PETN bomber (non-threat: PETN doesn't explode without a complex detonator) was, in hind sight, so obvious for two reasons: he didn't stow a coat on his trip to Chicago and he had talked to men who were wearing suits ("well-dressed men") during a lay-over in an air port. That's right: not bringing a coat and talking to anyone who is better dressed than you are indicates you are a terrorist.
I've talked to a lot of well-dressed men. They mingle. And as for not bringing a coat: he was flying one way from Amsterdam, potentially didn't have a coat or had his possessions shipped separately, and if he was not in possession of a coat he could have bought one at Chicago instead of buying one locally and paying air fare to ship it. These are just noise.
It is the same with so-called "warnings" about terrorist attacks: if they're the same warnings we hear eighty billion times a year that never pan out, something was different about "this time". What is different is, by definition, not the same: if three hundred thousand individuals threaten to blow up Washington, DC and ONE actually attempts it, the fact that he THREATENED to do so is not an indicator that he's going to blow up Washington, DC. It's an indicator that he has a loud mouth. You need other evidence to draw attention to this one particularly; and if you can't effectively investigate all of them, you're better off investigating very few of them, or none, unless you have other indicators that can come up in very quick and light investigation. Without seeing those additional indicators, what you have is just noise.
General deterrents don't exist. If they did, the death penalty would be a deterrent.
What warnings? Did they look similar to thousands of other warnings about others that never panned out into anything? If so, then it was just noise.
So this is how bitcoin goes out. Not with a whimper, but with a bang as poorly run brokerages short the living hell out of an inflating asset.
I think all the money laundering laws should come off the books. For example: having to report any transaction over $10k or any "suspicious" transaction like $9.99k transactions or two $5k transactions. Having to declare cash. And so on.
Depends. Bitcoin seems to operate on the idea that the early adopters could mine tons of bitcoins, then sell them to later adopters. Constant inflation is built-in: it becomes more expensive to mine bitcoins over time, and there is a theoretical limit. So early adopters can sell to later adopters, who can sell to later adopters.
It has. Long ago.
Guard the flag... from the other team. 2fort5, coop against other people.
The problem with coop games is you need strategy and organization or it's just boring. One person can assess all the stuff going on around him and learn to react efficiently; but if you need 4 people, you need it to be easy enough for 4 people to just blast their way through. If they're all together, they need to communicate--which is really fucking slow--and if they're separate and doing all the challenging things, they can come together and pretty much roll through any opposition. If it's challenging enough for coop, you lock out the single players.
Coop is boring.
There were several Gamecube games that used the Gameboy Advance as multi-player screens. This is old hat.
Victor Harris translated Miyomoto Musashi's book of five rings. I tend to prefer his translation over Thomas Cleary's, although you would benefit from reading both. To be quite honest, you would benefit most from learning Japanese, becoming familiar with the cultural basis of Japanese thought, and reading the original Japanese with these nuances in mind; but that is unreasonable and passes diminishing returns unless you have another reason for learning Japanese (there is a huge wealth of knowledge available in the language, so there's that).
In an early chapter, Musashi starts talking about warriors and soldiers and generals, and then quickly veers off into a discussion of carpentry.
Musashi tells us that wood is useful in carpentry. He tells us that good, high-quality wood is important for finishing, for the outer construction of columns, for doors, wall paneling, and the like. He also tells us that the sturdier wood of lesser aesthetic appeal should be used particularly for the threshold, which must retain its aesthetic appeal and must weather much usage without wear or damage. Ugly, unsightly wood may be used discretely to form the inner bulk of columns and framing and joists when it provides strength fit to hold up the building.
Musashi also covers a related concept: Carpenters themselves. He explains that a skilled carpenter knows to select wood and lay a floor properly and to assure that it is level and truly planed, rather than finished in sections. He also explains that an extremely skilled carpenter can carve decoration, furniture, doors, and so on; while the less skilled may still lay joists, and the least skilled of all may be employed to cut shims and wedges.
Musashi also covers that a foreman must have experience and skill in all of these things so that he can properly judge the skills of the carpenters and put them to good use. The implication is that a foreman must recognize that a skilled carpenter is taking too much time laying joists, and that a lesser skilled carpenter should perform that function so that the job can proceed more efficiently and come out with greater quality. An unskilled carpenter can cut wedges and shims, freeing up several hours of work and allowing a smooth, continuous workflow for the entire team. When the skill of a carpenter increases, he can be employed on other jobs, and the most skilled may even aid the foreman in managing the job at hand.
So you see, it is valuable to train people. It is valuable to find an entrant who can perform the basic jobs and free up the time of skilled labor, and to improve the entrant so that he will become a valuable skilled laborer in the future. This provides immediate return and great flexibility. Even the completely unskilled can perform menial tasks and give a high return by freeing up existing skilled labor from these tasks; if these unskilled laborers fail to grow, they can readily be replaced with new laborers who can. By investing in laborers in this way, the occasional dead stick remains an asset, and the harm done by hiring an ultimately unsustainable employee is minimized.
If you could hire more skilled workers, already trained, you may be able to get a better return on your investment. The problem is you take on risk as you do this: they may look and sound impressive and turn out to be dead sticks, in which case there is a large associated cost. The above behavior mitigates much of this risk, allowing you to sink in less cost and get less return, but retain much of that return if it doesn't pan out. It also allows you to hire necessary work force based on predicted growth without shelling out for high-cost, highly-skilled workers before you need them, and without pinning yourself into a position where you have an urgent need you cannot readily fill without incurring more risk.
Everyone wants to get ahead. I think it makes more business sense to grow and survive than to try to perpetuate a mad dash for the head of the market. You can be a rich CEO with $100
So, the earth is too hot. It absorbs energy, and then radiates it away. It reaches an equilibrium so it maintains a cyclical average temperature.
So you want to capture the radiating energy and release it on the earth?
Do you see a problem here?
I don't think training is the panacea you're implying.
Two people you should become familiar with: Victor Harris and Miyomoto Musashi.
It does. If my company spends $2000 to send me to training, they have a right to retain me until that debt is satisfied.
Unfortunately, you get employment agreements stipulating 2 years of retention or pay the costs back. After 1.5 years, I should only need to pay 25% of the cost.
10 sigma distribution of capability would be like... one of these guys appears every 30 million years. If we had ONE of those guys, he would be a super villain. He would likely build Braniac.