FUD? This is what the passport's issuing authority says:
"Can I see what is on the chip? The data held on the chip can only be viewed by specialised readers. There are specialised readers (eReaders) available at each of the 7 IPS regional offices....
"Is the Biometric Passport secure? The new biometric passport has many new security features including a chip. The new design will be harder to forge, the new security features will show if the passport is genuine or that it has been tampered with and the facial biometrics on the chip will help link the passport holder to the document. The data on the chip (your photo and personal information as printed on page 31 of the passport) will be protected against skimming (and "eavesdropping") by an advanced digital encryption technique."
We now know that this is not true, or is overstating the case.
I'd like to agree with you about this, but I can't.
IT disasters (and we are talking very large sums of money) will be one of the two sad legacies of this government. Hard to say whether it's down to outright corruption, or down to an amazing level of gullibility when tempted with promises of 'miraculous' technological solutions.
We are likely to see the whole thing repeated with ID cards and the National Identity Register.
This government is radically less competent and / or trustworthy than its predecessors. As an electorate, we're going to have to try to learn from this. The warning signs are, perhaps, easy to miss. 'A good day to bury bad news', for example. In future, any government that indulges that sort of thing, for even a moment, should be out on its ear at the next election. Collectively, we have to insist on higher standards.
Well, anecdotal evidence can only be answered with... more anecdotal evidence:-).
I have no issues with my MacBook. I waited maybe a month after the initial model release before purchasing it. It seems solid - in the metaphorical sense - in the literal sense it really is solid; a beautifully assembled machine. Performance is excellent. Humankind is progressing.
No yellow stains or exploding batteries here. The only downside is that the machine is a bit slow to switch between sleep / wake states.
Control of the ocean? It is not territory. There is no such thing as naval supremacy until you neutralise the enemy's navy. The RN experience in the Falklands showed this - the fleet was at extreme risk for the duration of the conflict: 150 anti-sub munitions launched, all at false targets. How can the USN guarantee that one of its CVN groups won't be tagged in transit by a non-US SSN lurking outside one of the few US domestic carrier bases? It can't, and there's a lot of ocean to cross. Once the US starts to lose carriers, twelve won't seem like many ships at all in the context of the world's oceans. At this point, one suspects, the 'invasion' gets called off.
But let's say the great American armada escapes the SSN pickets relatively unscathed and assembles off the coast of wherever (taking into account that it is self-defeating to land an army in a location much remote from its objective). As soon as a beach-head is committed to it demands constant resupply by sea. Thus the USN has to establish a naval blockade in a fixed known location to protect its amphibs and merchant vessels. It also has to protect all its naval convoys to and from this location. You now have a situation where one or two SSK leakers or salvos of sea skimmers can take out the equipment for a heavy division in one hit - equipment that cannot be quickly replaced. If the attack is anywhere on the European littoral - the USN also has to overmatch the combined European air forces operating in the radar cover of their own coastal topography - a scenario much rehearsed during the Cold War - not a credible proposition. In other words, as soon as your strike force moves within range and stops, it quickly dies. Just as the RN task force would have died if the objective of the landing had been Beunos Aires instead of San Carlos water (which was at the extreme limit of the FAA's attack range).
This is the 'surprise' attack scenario. The world's navies and air forces will not voluntarily come out to be defeated and will assume a defensive posture from the outset. You should also expect that an effort to 'prepare the ground' by aerial attrition of cities, ports and production facilities (realistically by using your limited stock of CALCMs - you'll lose your bombers, including the handful of B2s in the inventory, to SAMs and interceptors) will put the world on the first rung of a ladder to all-out nuclear exchange.
There is not going to be another WWII, or for that matter, another Korea. Forget Inchon: the developed world is not nearly so defenceless as North Korea was in the 40s and 50s. Wars like that are history. The only future military victories will be over diplomatically isolated poorly equipped renegade states. Punching a well-defended enemy without knocking him out - even if he cannot or will not retaliate in kind - is utterly pointless.
If the US were to use a different tactic - merchant blockade using her own submarine fleet - then yes, inter-continental trade is curtailed. But two can play at this game, and unlike Eurasia, the US is a net energy importer.
We no longer live in the WWII era. Weapons are much more lethal than they were: the net effect of this is that, in a war between developed nations, territories and oceans are even more difficult to control than they were formerly. In other words, we will not see a repeat of a WWII-style war.
Those much-vaunted USN carrier groups represent an attempt by the American navy to remain relevant in a new era. Yet in most NATO naval exercises, 'leakers' get through. A 'leaker' is an OPFOR submarine which has evaded detection to move within strike range - just one heavyweight torp on target and the carrier group no longer has a mission. Consequently, the true role of the US navy today is gunboat diplomacy - beating up on weak nations. They will never again prosecute a war 'for real' since is it is much cheaper for a defending nation to build SSNs (let alone the much more numerous SSKs used in littoral combat) than it is for the attacker to build carrier-based surface fleets. It is often overlooked that the RN task force that recaptured the Falklands (a carrier group which included 15 modern sub-hunting frigates and several modern sub-hunting SSNs) was unable to engage and destroy the *single* Argentine SSK (a German-built Type 209) that was operating in the area for the duration of hostilities: it was only luck that the ARA sub did not sink one or more of the RN's capital ships. Around 100 Type 209 submarines have been built, most for export, and this is just one type of modern non-US non-nuclear submarine being built at a low-level peacetime rate.
If America's navy cannot move within strike range of the enemy because littoral waters are denied (and they would indeed be denied by any reasonably capable enemy) then she cannot land forces by sea. Any attempt to construct an air bridge will be defeated by the lack of local air superiority (owing to carrier denial). The US cannot then establish a permanent land presence and the 'invasion' will fail. A situation not altogether unlike that faced by the Wehrmacht - the most powerful aggressor army of the day - in 1940, except that the Atlantic and the Pacific are much wider than the Channel and the North Sea.
It's worth noting that the reciprocal applies - the US is under no threat of invasion (and has not been since 1814).
Of course, the foregoing assumes that a new all-out war would not involve civilian targets and would remain non-nuclear. If, as is more likely, a new global war were to escalate through use of remotely-launched attrition weapons against cities and civilian infrastructures, then we would be looking at exactly the same type of war that was envisaged in the Cold War era. Why does anyone assume that since the dissolution of the USSR, any emerging stand-off would develop differently? (It should be noted that the productive output of Russia is slightly less than that of Portugal.) The term MAD was coined with good reason, but any such war would, on strict scoring, be 'won' by the 'rest of the world', not the US, since the 'rest of the world' can afford more hydrogen bombs. It would be a pyrrhic victory, obviously.
Slashdot Mirror
I'd like to agree with you about this, but I can't. IT disasters (and we are talking very large sums of money) will be one of the two sad legacies of this government. Hard to say whether it's down to outright corruption, or down to an amazing level of gullibility when tempted with promises of 'miraculous' technological solutions. We are likely to see the whole thing repeated with ID cards and the National Identity Register. This government is radically less competent and / or trustworthy than its predecessors. As an electorate, we're going to have to try to learn from this. The warning signs are, perhaps, easy to miss. 'A good day to bury bad news', for example. In future, any government that indulges that sort of thing, for even a moment, should be out on its ear at the next election. Collectively, we have to insist on higher standards.
Well, anecdotal evidence can only be answered with ... more anecdotal evidence :-).
I have no issues with my MacBook. I waited maybe a month after the initial model release before purchasing it. It seems solid - in the metaphorical sense - in the literal sense it really is solid; a beautifully assembled machine. Performance is excellent. Humankind is progressing.
No yellow stains or exploding batteries here. The only downside is that the machine is a bit slow to switch between sleep / wake states.
Control of the ocean? It is not territory. There is no such thing as naval supremacy until you neutralise the enemy's navy. The RN experience in the Falklands showed this - the fleet was at extreme risk for the duration of the conflict: 150 anti-sub munitions launched, all at false targets. How can the USN guarantee that one of its CVN groups won't be tagged in transit by a non-US SSN lurking outside one of the few US domestic carrier bases? It can't, and there's a lot of ocean to cross. Once the US starts to lose carriers, twelve won't seem like many ships at all in the context of the world's oceans. At this point, one suspects, the 'invasion' gets called off.
But let's say the great American armada escapes the SSN pickets relatively unscathed and assembles off the coast of wherever (taking into account that it is self-defeating to land an army in a location much remote from its objective). As soon as a beach-head is committed to it demands constant resupply by sea. Thus the USN has to establish a naval blockade in a fixed known location to protect its amphibs and merchant vessels. It also has to protect all its naval convoys to and from this location. You now have a situation where one or two SSK leakers or salvos of sea skimmers can take out the equipment for a heavy division in one hit - equipment that cannot be quickly replaced. If the attack is anywhere on the European littoral - the USN also has to overmatch the combined European air forces operating in the radar cover of their own coastal topography - a scenario much rehearsed during the Cold War - not a credible proposition. In other words, as soon as your strike force moves within range and stops, it quickly dies. Just as the RN task force would have died if the objective of the landing had been Beunos Aires instead of San Carlos water (which was at the extreme limit of the FAA's attack range).
This is the 'surprise' attack scenario. The world's navies and air forces will not voluntarily come out to be defeated and will assume a defensive posture from the outset. You should also expect that an effort to 'prepare the ground' by aerial attrition of cities, ports and production facilities (realistically by using your limited stock of CALCMs - you'll lose your bombers, including the handful of B2s in the inventory, to SAMs and interceptors) will put the world on the first rung of a ladder to all-out nuclear exchange.
There is not going to be another WWII, or for that matter, another Korea. Forget Inchon: the developed world is not nearly so defenceless as North Korea was in the 40s and 50s. Wars like that are history. The only future military victories will be over diplomatically isolated poorly equipped renegade states. Punching a well-defended enemy without knocking him out - even if he cannot or will not retaliate in kind - is utterly pointless.
If the US were to use a different tactic - merchant blockade using her own submarine fleet - then yes, inter-continental trade is curtailed. But two can play at this game, and unlike Eurasia, the US is a net energy importer.
Regards,
Charlie
Time for a reality check.
We no longer live in the WWII era. Weapons are much more lethal than they were: the net effect of this is that, in a war between developed nations, territories and oceans are even more difficult to control than they were formerly. In other words, we will not see a repeat of a WWII-style war.
Those much-vaunted USN carrier groups represent an attempt by the American navy to remain relevant in a new era. Yet in most NATO naval exercises, 'leakers' get through. A 'leaker' is an OPFOR submarine which has evaded detection to move within strike range - just one heavyweight torp on target and the carrier group no longer has a mission. Consequently, the true role of the US navy today is gunboat diplomacy - beating up on weak nations. They will never again prosecute a war 'for real' since is it is much cheaper for a defending nation to build SSNs (let alone the much more numerous SSKs used in littoral combat) than it is for the attacker to build carrier-based surface fleets. It is often overlooked that the RN task force that recaptured the Falklands (a carrier group which included 15 modern sub-hunting frigates and several modern sub-hunting SSNs) was unable to engage and destroy the *single* Argentine SSK (a German-built Type 209) that was operating in the area for the duration of hostilities: it was only luck that the ARA sub did not sink one or more of the RN's capital ships. Around 100 Type 209 submarines have been built, most for export, and this is just one type of modern non-US non-nuclear submarine being built at a low-level peacetime rate.
If America's navy cannot move within strike range of the enemy because littoral waters are denied (and they would indeed be denied by any reasonably capable enemy) then she cannot land forces by sea. Any attempt to construct an air bridge will be defeated by the lack of local air superiority (owing to carrier denial). The US cannot then establish a permanent land presence and the 'invasion' will fail. A situation not altogether unlike that faced by the Wehrmacht - the most powerful aggressor army of the day - in 1940, except that the Atlantic and the Pacific are much wider than the Channel and the North Sea.
It's worth noting that the reciprocal applies - the US is under no threat of invasion (and has not been since 1814).
Of course, the foregoing assumes that a new all-out war would not involve civilian targets and would remain non-nuclear. If, as is more likely, a new global war were to escalate through use of remotely-launched attrition weapons against cities and civilian infrastructures, then we would be looking at exactly the same type of war that was envisaged in the Cold War era. Why does anyone assume that since the dissolution of the USSR, any emerging stand-off would develop differently? (It should be noted that the productive output of Russia is slightly less than that of Portugal.) The term MAD was coined with good reason, but any such war would, on strict scoring, be 'won' by the 'rest of the world', not the US, since the 'rest of the world' can afford more hydrogen bombs. It would be a pyrrhic victory, obviously.
Grow up.
Regards,
Charlie