Slashdot Mirror


User: DavidMoore

DavidMoore's activity in the archive.

Stories
0
Comments
6
First seen
Last seen
Profile
(view on slashdot.org)

Comments · 6

  1. Re:Net Telescope on Analysis of the Witty Worm · · Score: 1

    Last time I checked, there were over 70 /8s
    without any assigned addresses. There isn't a lack of addresses, but partially that is because everyone worked hard to reduce the rate at which they were being given out.

  2. Re:an inside job? on SCO Not Lying About DoS Attack · · Score: 1

    The graphs suggest that the bandwidth was only consumed for couple hour periods in the night time, with the majority of the time just being under a lower rate SYN flood loading the servers more than the links.

  3. Re:SCO Not lying... on SCO Not Lying About DoS Attack · · Score: 2, Interesting

    The peaks are large, but the majority of the time the load is much lower. 4,000 pps syn flood is under 1.5 Mbit/sec. So plenty of room for other traffic. SCO had both bandwidth problems from having a relatively small pipe and server load from the syn flood.

  4. Correct URL on SCO Not Lying About DoS Attack · · Score: 5, Informative

    CAIDA Analysis of SCO DoS Please use this link, the other one goes to a slow XML server.

  5. Re:Backscatter on Security Experts Doubt SCO's Claims of DoS · · Score: 2, Informative
  6. CAIDA Analysis of SCO DoS Attack on Security Experts Doubt SCO's Claims of DoS · · Score: 2, Informative
    At 3:20 AM PST on Wednesday, December 10, 2003, the CAIDA Network Telescope began to receive backscatter traffic indicating a distributed denial-of-service attack against the SCO Group. Early in the attack, unknown perpetrators targeted SCO's web servers with a SYN flood of approximately 34,000 packets per second. Around 2:50 AM PST Thursday morning, the attacker(s) began to attack SCO's ftp (file transfer protocol) servers in addition to continuing the web server attack. Together www.sco.com and ftp.sco.com experienced a SYN flood of over 50,000 packet-per-second early Thursday morning. By mid-morning (Thursday December 11, 9 AM PST), the attack rate had reduced considerably to around 3,700 packets per second.

    For more information (and graph of attack), see CAIDA's writeup.