Really? Tall that to the negroes, and women without the vote. There are places both still happen, but it's gotten radically better for them in the last 200 years. Even in the last 50.
It takes time. It takes resources. And it's not universal. But change does occur.
And Satan was found singing show tunes about being allowed onto the surface of the Earth, and Dick Cheney had a hunting accident where he killed Kenny. (South Park movie, I highly ecommend it.)
Unfortunately, what was also missing was war dialers, which allow easy scanning of thousands of phone numbers so a call center in India can abuse far more people in a night far more efficiently by only connecting when someone actually picks up. This makes such phone-spamming abuse far more widespread.
And there are also plenty of technologies for *faking* caller-ID, to look like it's from a bank or some other peroson, technologies like this (http://www.spoofcard.com/). This is the wet dream of fraudsters, prank phone callers and telephone stalkers, to confuse their victim's attempts to trace the caller back and reduce the likelihood of being able to say "oh, it's a blocked Caller-ID: I'll let them leave a message".
It could help a bit: tracking a fraudulent or stalking call back to the original number demonstrates their crime, without having to establish that they were in fact stalking or committing other fraud. Like nailing Al Capone on tax evasion, it should be easier to prove. And your average script kiddie with a friend's warez helping him run a war dialer becomes more easy to prosecute, without having to establish the level of damage they've actually done.
It's not necessary for that. Seriously: with a warrant, and modern telco systems, it's usually straightforward to obtain the caller's location despite any Caller-ID.
Caller-ID is to ease warrant free tracking: it's useful to us at home to block stalkers, telephone salespeople, and childish prank calls, and puts tools formerly only available with a warrant in a somewhat limited form for us civilians. But it's also a nasty, nasty tool for tracking legitimate but appropriately anonymous speech. Child abuse hotlines, suicide hotlines, the ACLU, whistleblower support groups, and numerous others have reasons to not want that data in their hands, or to have it safely obscurable by the person reaching out to them.
That hints to me that this rule is about monitoring, not about crime prevention.
Your logic is flawed, I'm afraid. Linux apparently does not do it beause it's a fundamentally stupid "feature", appropriate for trade show demos but a really bad idea in the real world, since it subverts the basic security policies of most NAT's.
You do realize that Theo de Raadt is the leader of OpenBSD, not FreeBSD, right? And that Theo got kicked off of CVS write access to NetBSD for various reasons, including his personality and tendency to pick stupid fights instead of getting things working?
Security is just a matter of configuration. Oh, my. You've never actually run an MS based externally facing server, have you?
Let's take the BSOD. Basic Exchange Server 5.0 couldn't handle simultaneous incoming port 25 connections. Period, end of sentence, it wasn't fixed properly until about 5.5.
And I see your point about Exchange store. I've simply had the argument with new-to-the-business admins that external forwardnig MTA's don't need any significant local storage, and had to walk through the requirements with them. Then I had to explain that they had to store the mail for up to 3 days. Then I had to explain about rewriting the envelopes of the messages correctly, so that the external and internal mail servers were distinguishable for debugging reasons but the user still saw their mail to the correct "From:" line, and why using this kind of system broke their SPF filters on inbound mail (which they hadn't realized had to be moved out to the external mail servers).
That was a long, painful week the last time I did this. They finally gave up and bought some Linux based external spam filters, which did the job very nicely.
Bush the elder used to be head of the CIA, involved in all sorts of questionable and illegal deals. (Look up his support of Manual Noriega's cocaine trade during his term as CIA director.) The hatred was there: it's been re-justified and enhanced by the miserable failure of Iraq, and possibilities of winding it down peacefully evaporated for another 30 or 50 years.
People do terrorism for logical reasons: it's effective warfare against a vastly, vastly superior military foe. It's only effective when you have enough support from the common citizens so that you can hide among them. Iraq was a military problem, not a terrorist one, before we invaded. We're killing more people there than Saddam did: that takes *work*.
From that experience, armoring a mail service with Exchange servers in front of it is like painting your house with watercolors. You can make pretty pictures, but you'll get smeared by every storm.
They're very expensive, they take expensive hardware to make physically robust, maintaining security for them is dreadful, they can't take much standard SMTP load, and they blue screen of death frequently (though less frequently than they used to, I admit).
Also note: there is no such thing as "no store" MTA's. You *MUST* have storage, to deal with temporary bounces when downstream MTA's go down. And since a spam or email worm deluge can easily saturate a 100BaseT uplink for a major company's mail services, you have to be ready to deal with that. That's a lot more Exchange servers than almost any other MTA.
Virtualizing Palladium is non-trivial. Like most encryption technologies, it's designed to be computationally expensive, which makes emulation awkward for file-based decryptions, and will make doing it in emulation painful indeed. Also, numerous of its technologies are patented: this makes it very difficult indeed to get it built into licensed software form the US, or to import commercial software that supports it.
Second, Palladium is based on phoning back to the mother ship. *Every single Palladium key* is revocable, and replaceable by the registered key owners or their upstream signatories, including Microsoft itself. The upgrade and shift to new keys is designed to be vendor controllable. This makes a single signed key of limited usefulness and limited lifespan.
You cannot include DVD playing Xine in a default distribution in the US, due to restrictions on libdvdcss. libdvdcss happened becuse the DVD software vendors absolutely refused to write any usable DVD software for Linux, so it had to be reverse engineered. This causes legal difficulties if you're in an office or university environment and get caught using Linux to play your DVD's.
Can I hire you to replace the Perl programmers my clients keep using before I arrive? Fancy degrees, exciting resumes with lots of recommendations from their little CPAN spewing peers, and they've never heard of checking for error conditions before proceeding merrily down their paths of database destruction. Or having case statements that report that they didn't understand what they were trying to process.
Actually checking that something worked before proceeding to the next and dangerous step seems to be wildly ignored in numerous modern programming styles. It helps keep me employed, but it wastes a lot of my time and my client's money.
DRM is really one of the core components of Vista. It makes virtualization easier to defeat than you may realize. Go look up Palladium, renamed "Trusted Computing". It's hardware level authentication and software access control, and it's specifically designed to weld host authentication to file access. Those keys are hardware stored, on the motherboard, not software stored. And the encryption chips or CPU based encryption is not directly accessible to emulation, not without paying a genuinely unacceptable performance penalty in use.
And a lot of the MRI systems are IRIX, with an increasing use of Linux. Laptops and desktops are critical at the nursing stations and doctor's offices as well, for medical record and prescription management.
Slashdot Mirror
Really? Tall that to the negroes, and women without the vote. There are places both still happen, but it's gotten radically better for them in the last 200 years. Even in the last 50.
It takes time. It takes resources. And it's not universal. But change does occur.
No, I predict a lot of flaming trolls will invent FUD wholesale, to try and obscure its usefulness and the history of how it has evolved.
I'm sorry, but is irony somehow missing on Slashdot?
Not if you both read Slashdot.
And Satan was found singing show tunes about being allowed onto the surface of the Earth, and Dick Cheney had a hunting accident where he killed Kenny. (South Park movie, I highly ecommend it.)
Perhaps in honor if Mr. Stallman's hygiene habits, you could remember to bathe this year?
When I looked, the article seemed to be slashdotted and was difficult to read.
Ohly if they could send *all* of the copies, on an orbit spiraling into the sun. That game was amazingly bad.
So it's time to sell such phone cards from Gore, Alabama?
Unfortunately, what was also missing was war dialers, which allow easy scanning of thousands of phone numbers so a call center in India can abuse far more people in a night far more efficiently by only connecting when someone actually picks up. This makes such phone-spamming abuse far more widespread.
And there are also plenty of technologies for *faking* caller-ID, to look like it's from a bank or some other peroson, technologies like this (http://www.spoofcard.com/). This is the wet dream of fraudsters, prank phone callers and telephone stalkers, to confuse their victim's attempts to trace the caller back and reduce the likelihood of being able to say "oh, it's a blocked Caller-ID: I'll let them leave a message".
Ahh. I see you've been noticing how HP illegally obtained phone records of reporters, hoping to plug an internal leak?
It could help a bit: tracking a fraudulent or stalking call back to the original number demonstrates their crime, without having to establish that they were in fact stalking or committing other fraud. Like nailing Al Capone on tax evasion, it should be easier to prove. And your average script kiddie with a friend's warez helping him run a war dialer becomes more easy to prosecute, without having to establish the level of damage they've actually done.
It's still troubling for other reasons.
It's not necessary for that. Seriously: with a warrant, and modern telco systems, it's usually straightforward to obtain the caller's location despite any Caller-ID.
Caller-ID is to ease warrant free tracking: it's useful to us at home to block stalkers, telephone salespeople, and childish prank calls, and puts tools formerly only available with a warrant in a somewhat limited form for us civilians. But it's also a nasty, nasty tool for tracking legitimate but appropriately anonymous speech. Child abuse hotlines, suicide hotlines, the ACLU, whistleblower support groups, and numerous others have reasons to not want that data in their hands, or to have it safely obscurable by the person reaching out to them.
That hints to me that this rule is about monitoring, not about crime prevention.
Your logic is flawed, I'm afraid. Linux apparently does not do it beause it's a fundamentally stupid "feature", appropriate for trade show demos but a really bad idea in the real world, since it subverts the basic security policies of most NAT's.
You do realize that Theo de Raadt is the leader of OpenBSD, not FreeBSD, right? And that Theo got kicked off of CVS write access to NetBSD for various reasons, including his personality and tendency to pick stupid fights instead of getting things working?
It's also one of those concepts which looks great on paper, but is sadly shown as so much idealistic BS in the real world.
Kind of like ReiserFS itself, actually. Complex, sophisticated, capable of stunning performance, and likely to crack up under unexpected loads.
His father does sound like a paranoid freak who contributed to this, though, doesn't he?
Security is just a matter of configuration. Oh, my. You've never actually run an MS based externally facing server, have you?
Let's take the BSOD. Basic Exchange Server 5.0 couldn't handle simultaneous incoming port 25 connections. Period, end of sentence, it wasn't fixed properly until about 5.5.
And I see your point about Exchange store. I've simply had the argument with new-to-the-business admins that external forwardnig MTA's don't need any significant local storage, and had to walk through the requirements with them. Then I had to explain that they had to store the mail for up to 3 days. Then I had to explain about rewriting the envelopes of the messages correctly, so that the external and internal mail servers were distinguishable for debugging reasons but the user still saw their mail to the correct "From:" line, and why using this kind of system broke their SPF filters on inbound mail (which they hadn't realized had to be moved out to the external mail servers).
That was a long, painful week the last time I did this. They finally gave up and bought some Linux based external spam filters, which did the job very nicely.
You have seen the movie "Wagging the Dog", haven't you?
Which Bush?
Bush the elder used to be head of the CIA, involved in all sorts of questionable and illegal deals. (Look up his support of Manual Noriega's cocaine trade during his term as CIA director.) The hatred was there: it's been re-justified and enhanced by the miserable failure of Iraq, and possibilities of winding it down peacefully evaporated for another 30 or 50 years.
People do terrorism for logical reasons: it's effective warfare against a vastly, vastly superior military foe. It's only effective when you have enough support from the common citizens so that you can hide among them. Iraq was a military problem, not a terrorist one, before we invaded. We're killing more people there than Saddam did: that takes *work*.
From that experience, armoring a mail service with Exchange servers in front of it is like painting your house with watercolors. You can make pretty pictures, but you'll get smeared by every storm.
They're very expensive, they take expensive hardware to make physically robust, maintaining security for them is dreadful, they can't take much standard SMTP load, and they blue screen of death frequently (though less frequently than they used to, I admit).
Also note: there is no such thing as "no store" MTA's. You *MUST* have storage, to deal with temporary bounces when downstream MTA's go down. And since a spam or email worm deluge can easily saturate a 100BaseT uplink for a major company's mail services, you have to be ready to deal with that. That's a lot more Exchange servers than almost any other MTA.
Virtualizing Palladium is non-trivial. Like most encryption technologies, it's designed to be computationally expensive, which makes emulation awkward for file-based decryptions, and will make doing it in emulation painful indeed. Also, numerous of its technologies are patented: this makes it very difficult indeed to get it built into licensed software form the US, or to import commercial software that supports it.
Second, Palladium is based on phoning back to the mother ship. *Every single Palladium key* is revocable, and replaceable by the registered key owners or their upstream signatories, including Microsoft itself. The upgrade and shift to new keys is designed to be vendor controllable. This makes a single signed key of limited usefulness and limited lifespan.
You cannot include DVD playing Xine in a default distribution in the US, due to restrictions on libdvdcss. libdvdcss happened becuse the DVD software vendors absolutely refused to write any usable DVD software for Linux, so it had to be reverse engineered. This causes legal difficulties if you're in an office or university environment and get caught using Linux to play your DVD's.
Sad, but true.
Can I hire you to replace the Perl programmers my clients keep using before I arrive? Fancy degrees, exciting resumes with lots of recommendations from their little CPAN spewing peers, and they've never heard of checking for error conditions before proceeding merrily down their paths of database destruction. Or having case statements that report that they didn't understand what they were trying to process.
Actually checking that something worked before proceeding to the next and dangerous step seems to be wildly ignored in numerous modern programming styles. It helps keep me employed, but it wastes a lot of my time and my client's money.
I think you misspelled:
sudo -H -c "yum update"
You reboot only if the kernel changes.
DRM is really one of the core components of Vista. It makes virtualization easier to defeat than you may realize. Go look up Palladium, renamed "Trusted Computing". It's hardware level authentication and software access control, and it's specifically designed to weld host authentication to file access. Those keys are hardware stored, on the motherboard, not software stored. And the encryption chips or CPU based encryption is not directly accessible to emulation, not without paying a genuinely unacceptable performance penalty in use.
And a lot of the MRI systems are IRIX, with an increasing use of Linux. Laptops and desktops are critical at the nursing stations and doctor's offices as well, for medical record and prescription management.