cbs.com video's in full screen are horrifically broken with Twinview (Nvidia proprietary driver implementing dual head). It full-screens a single screen (properly), but then centers the video between the monitors, so you can only watch one half of the video. Other video sites get it right (Youtube, Hulu), why can't CBS?
I blame both CBS and Adobe, but particularly Adobe.(CBS shouldn't be able to mess up like that.)
(Running fullscreen flash video in Debian on a regular basis. It's a real processor hog, though.)
That depends entirely on local law. Some jurisdictions have mandatory random audits. Others require a recount for any close elections. Granted, most places don't have sufficient controls in place. Note that your argument also applies historically to paper based elections. (It's just easier to mess-up/forge an electronic election.)
I've been an Elections Inspector in New York State for the last five years. Every time one of these stories crop up I wrote a detailed summary of the procedures and technology we use. In spite of these procedures including the retention of paper ballots I still can't convince the tinfoil hat crowd that our elections aren't being decided by a shadowy cabal working out of the Diebold offices. I've about given up on trying to convince them otherwise.
It's a matter of where shadowy cabals may exists. Personally, I see Diebold as dangerously incompetent. The fact that it's possible for Diebold to have rigged elections is disturbing. (incompetence is sometimes just a ruse.)
There are legitimate concerns surrounding so-called DRE (direct electronic record) systems but why those concerns have morphed into people being suspicious of other technology is beyond me.
I need to be able to understand and see how fraud is being prevented at every step. If I can imagine fraud, the step where it may take place must be done in public view. Why all the rabid debate concerning electronic systems? It's because the first generation was so badly bungled. Most voting systems should be given this level of concern, but rarely are. (Note: it's usually far easier to address such issues with lower tech solutions.)
Some days it seems that nothing will satisfy this crowd short of a system where everybody raises their hand.
I'm with you here. Unfortunate, but true.
I'm glad Florida switched away from a DRE system. Don't be surprised when people crop up and start fretting that the optical scan system is pwned though.
Sometimes, it is.
The problem isn't the technology, so much as how clueless the voters, personnel, and officials are (or tend to be). If there was a sufficient level of "cluefulness" (if you will), I don't think electronic elections would have happened without VVPAT.
(Belligerent clueless officials (not you), look a lot like corrupt officials. We see these a lot. Which are they? Clueless or corrupt?)
The majority of the voting population doesn't know enough about voting technology to care.
Close. The majority of the voting population doesn't know enough about voting to care. Subtle difference, but important. Voters should be wary of new voting technology and techniques by default. They shouldn't need to know enough about the technology to be wary. History of vote manipulating techniques should really be taught in our schools. It's more interesting and useful that most of the junk rammed down our throats.
Pretty sure I said our system retains the paper ballots. I hope we never have to use them but they are there if needed.
What?!? Never use them?
I'm glad the paper ballots are there so we can audit the optical scan machines
"Can audit"? "Can"? I hope this is a grammatical faux pas. You should audit every election. Full audits are rarely necessary, but several randomly chosen precincts should be audited each and every election. It needs to be made clear that there is risk of getting caught perpetrating fraud. (I'll leave alone the important definition of "random" for the moment.)
The GP is also correct when he says the existence of the paper ballots allows for a recount if foulplay is suspected. The same is not true for touchscreens.
If seals can be made, duplicate seals can be made (and sometimes are, allegedly). Seals only increase the difficulty of messing with the hardware. If tampering occurs in spite of seals, it is most likely an inside job (but not necessarily). Given enough time and access, many seals can be forged that pass casual examination. Most seals will only be given casual examination anyway.
(Granted, I live on the West Coast, nowhere near New York. I have no clue what kind of seals you use, how easy they are to create or forge, etc. Potential insider duplication of seals remains a fundamental problem that must be addressed, though.)
I no longer think it would be impossible to implement decently. Google Tech Talk has an interesting 1.5h video about the subject...
Thanks. I'll watch that later. The GPP, though, wasn't talking about cryptographic verification. He was talking about mandatory VVPAT and audits (as per the link in his.sig). I too, have not seen an algorithm (cryptographic or otherwise) that allows voters to verify their votes after they leave their polling place without making it susceptible to manipulation or identity leakage of some kind. (granted, some are far better than others)
... Schneier also has a small blog post, hinting that there could well be some self-enforcing algorithms that let us confirm the system is secure even if we don't know all the details to test it.
I'd be interested in hearing about them. Unfortunately, he doesn't talk about them. He just nebulously speculates that they might exist. (useful, but light-years from practical)
Funny. They can make nuclear bombs and make the computer networks and installations controlling them secure, but can't protect the democracy itself by just making secure ballot boxes too. Must be a lot tougher than making nukes, I guess.
In some ways, yes. A reasonable definition of "secure ballot box" is one whose operation is clear and understandable to the voter (meaning: the voter can tell if something fraudulent might happen). Informing a critical mass of voters about the inner workings of electronic voting machines, and allowing the public to verify each stage of machine construction, assembly, and programming is a near impossible task. Taking reasonable short cuts (COTS hardware) simplifies this immensely, but still leaves a ton of work to be done which needs voter oversight. It is daunting indeed, which is half the reason the general public is given almost no oversight at all.
And how do you know that our nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure? It is sometimes alleged that other nations nuclear capabilities were stolen from the US. If a breach capable of the launch or theft of nuclear weapons occurred within this country, I would almost be surprised to find out about it. (Surely it's many orders of magnitude more secure than our voting process.)
I'm under the impression that requirements exist, aren't stringent enough, are being ignored left and right, and the public isn't even allowed to know that they don't pass (read: haven't been tested). Our own government is either sufficiently incompetent to give away our elections, or sufficiently corrupt to sell them.
Within the analogy, getting it right on the next go around would be a hybrid of armor, camo, and reincarnation. Too many people believe that the system rebuild process is sufficient all on it's own. It doesn't protect against data loss, data theft, or future attack. It's vital, yes, but it's not the panacea that many people see it as. (That was my point.)
Some reporters have that luxury. Others are more generalists and deal with a variety of topics...
A vast majority of Open Source projects really need a tech oriented reporter...
I'm tech oriented... I know something about most areas of technology, and more-than-something about some of them.
Then the post you replied to doesn't apply to you;)
By contrast, you will be much, much more likely to ask the right questions and receive useful answers (as opposed to those reporters who see computers as email machines). You still can't expect a non-PR person to drop everything and answer you "right now" (hobbyist or engineer). If they understand that you're tech savvy, you'll be perceived as an interruption, but not a total waste of time.
An interesting perspective. It's wrong (my opinion), but valuable.
Open Source projects rarely have unforeseen newsworthy stories. A vast majority of the time, it can either wait a few days (filler material), or you should have started asking several days before the event. (An Open Source project released a new version? Oh, my! We didn't see that coming! They didn't even have a release candidate or two or three. What's a changelog?)
Programming is relatively slow, methodical work. Programmers rarely have a get-things-done-right-this-moment mindset. To make matters worse, interruptions cost time twice: once to deal with the interruption, and once to figure out exactly what they were doing before you interrupted them. A series of interruptions can quickly become a bad day. Can you see why a programmer might want to deal with a reporter when he gets around to it? (read: is no longer concentrating on code) (leads to unanswered calls and unchecked email.)
Unless there is a company behind the project (a monetary incentive), few projects are going to have a drop-whatever-you're-doing attitude favoring reporters (and most of those companies have designated PR people). If you want something that even approximates a timely response, you'll need to give your what/why/for-whom/deadline tuple right upfront. Consider asking your IT people what they know (you may be surprised, or horrified), but don't take their word for it. Ask them to point you to a good resource.
A vast majority of Open Source projects really need a tech oriented reporter. Others need time for the reporter to acclimate. It's that simple. Unless there is a sizable company behind the project, there is no way in the world a general reporter is going to be fair and accurate (emphasis on accurate). You might as well be writing about non-Euclidean geometry or M-theory.
And people wonder why the "traditional media" is failing?
Unless there is sudden news to report on, you must take enough time to gather good information (or at least due diligence). By "sudden" I mean: something unexpected has come up today, and absolutely must be in the news/paper tonight/tomorrow or it will be stale. Most open source related news won't qualify as sudden (from my layman's perspective). If you don't have enough time, then your boss is killing your company. (It's called "foresight". It's important, really.) It's only "the nature of the beast" if said beast has been lobotomized.
so the actual question is: who pays you for the time you spent proving you were innocent? The classic question in democracy.
No need to blame Democracy. (Unless you are a US liberal or something.) It could be phrased as a classic problem of any country that actually permits you to argue your innocence before the law. It's a problem, but it's a step up from the alternative.
Slashdot Mirror
You need to back it up with references. Posting something on the article comments page will sometimes help, but not nearly as well.
I could be wrong, but I think the beep needs to occur once every 8 seconds or so (CA).
There are some who claim just such a system. A few of them actually look like they work until you examine them very closely.
It's a very appealing notion, which is why it keeps resurfacing. I too believe it to be impossible, but I will continue to debunk them one at a time.
cbs.com video's in full screen are horrifically broken with Twinview (Nvidia proprietary driver implementing dual head). It full-screens a single screen (properly), but then centers the video between the monitors, so you can only watch one half of the video. Other video sites get it right (Youtube, Hulu), why can't CBS?
I blame both CBS and Adobe, but particularly Adobe.(CBS shouldn't be able to mess up like that.)
(Running fullscreen flash video in Debian on a regular basis. It's a real processor hog, though.)
That depends entirely on local law. Some jurisdictions have mandatory random audits. Others require a recount for any close elections. Granted, most places don't have sufficient controls in place. Note that your argument also applies historically to paper based elections. (It's just easier to mess-up/forge an electronic election.)
I've been an Elections Inspector in New York State for the last five years. Every time one of these stories crop up I wrote a detailed summary of the procedures and technology we use. In spite of these procedures including the retention of paper ballots I still can't convince the tinfoil hat crowd that our elections aren't being decided by a shadowy cabal working out of the Diebold offices. I've about given up on trying to convince them otherwise.
It's a matter of where shadowy cabals may exists. Personally, I see Diebold as dangerously incompetent. The fact that it's possible for Diebold to have rigged elections is disturbing. (incompetence is sometimes just a ruse.)
There are legitimate concerns surrounding so-called DRE (direct electronic record) systems but why those concerns have morphed into people being suspicious of other technology is beyond me.
I need to be able to understand and see how fraud is being prevented at every step. If I can imagine fraud, the step where it may take place must be done in public view. Why all the rabid debate concerning electronic systems? It's because the first generation was so badly bungled. Most voting systems should be given this level of concern, but rarely are. (Note: it's usually far easier to address such issues with lower tech solutions.)
Some days it seems that nothing will satisfy this crowd short of a system where everybody raises their hand.
I'm with you here. Unfortunate, but true.
I'm glad Florida switched away from a DRE system. Don't be surprised when people crop up and start fretting that the optical scan system is pwned though.
Sometimes, it is.
The problem isn't the technology, so much as how clueless the voters, personnel, and officials are (or tend to be). If there was a sufficient level of "cluefulness" (if you will), I don't think electronic elections would have happened without VVPAT.
(Belligerent clueless officials (not you), look a lot like corrupt officials. We see these a lot. Which are they? Clueless or corrupt?)
The majority of the voting population doesn't know enough about voting technology to care.
Close. The majority of the voting population doesn't know enough about voting to care. Subtle difference, but important. Voters should be wary of new voting technology and techniques by default. They shouldn't need to know enough about the technology to be wary. History of vote manipulating techniques should really be taught in our schools. It's more interesting and useful that most of the junk rammed down our throats.
Pretty sure I said our system retains the paper ballots. I hope we never have to use them but they are there if needed.
What?!? Never use them?
I'm glad the paper ballots are there so we can audit the optical scan machines
"Can audit"? "Can"? I hope this is a grammatical faux pas. You should audit every election. Full audits are rarely necessary, but several randomly chosen precincts should be audited each and every election. It needs to be made clear that there is risk of getting caught perpetrating fraud. (I'll leave alone the important definition of "random" for the moment.)
*sigh*: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VVPAT
The GP is also correct when he says the existence of the paper ballots allows for a recount if foulplay is suspected. The same is not true for touchscreens.
In a word:VVPAT. (now mandatory in many states)
Good guess. You have been at this for a while. ;)
If seals can be made, duplicate seals can be made (and sometimes are, allegedly). Seals only increase the difficulty of messing with the hardware. If tampering occurs in spite of seals, it is most likely an inside job (but not necessarily). Given enough time and access, many seals can be forged that pass casual examination. Most seals will only be given casual examination anyway.
(Granted, I live on the West Coast, nowhere near New York. I have no clue what kind of seals you use, how easy they are to create or forge, etc. Potential insider duplication of seals remains a fundamental problem that must be addressed, though.)
I no longer think it would be impossible to implement decently. Google Tech Talk has an interesting 1.5h video about the subject ...
Thanks. I'll watch that later. The GPP, though, wasn't talking about cryptographic verification. He was talking about mandatory VVPAT and audits (as per the link in his .sig). I too, have not seen an algorithm (cryptographic or otherwise) that allows voters to verify their votes after they leave their polling place without making it susceptible to manipulation or identity leakage of some kind. (granted, some are far better than others)
... Schneier also has a small blog post, hinting that there could well be some self-enforcing algorithms that let us confirm the system is secure even if we don't know all the details to test it.
I'd be interested in hearing about them. Unfortunately, he doesn't talk about them. He just nebulously speculates that they might exist. (useful, but light-years from practical)
Funny. They can make nuclear bombs and make the computer networks and installations controlling them secure, but can't protect the democracy itself by just making secure ballot boxes too. Must be a lot tougher than making nukes, I guess.
In some ways, yes. A reasonable definition of "secure ballot box" is one whose operation is clear and understandable to the voter (meaning: the voter can tell if something fraudulent might happen). Informing a critical mass of voters about the inner workings of electronic voting machines, and allowing the public to verify each stage of machine construction, assembly, and programming is a near impossible task. Taking reasonable short cuts (COTS hardware) simplifies this immensely, but still leaves a ton of work to be done which needs voter oversight. It is daunting indeed, which is half the reason the general public is given almost no oversight at all.
And how do you know that our nuclear arsenal is reasonably secure? It is sometimes alleged that other nations nuclear capabilities were stolen from the US. If a breach capable of the launch or theft of nuclear weapons occurred within this country, I would almost be surprised to find out about it. (Surely it's many orders of magnitude more secure than our voting process.)
More than that. State assemblies, etc, are often gerrymandered as well. (Yes, the Democrat and Republican parties care - just not as much.)
I'm under the impression that requirements exist, aren't stringent enough, are being ignored left and right, and the public isn't even allowed to know that they don't pass (read: haven't been tested). Our own government is either sufficiently incompetent to give away our elections, or sufficiently corrupt to sell them.
It's a farce, and I'm not laughing.
Within the analogy, getting it right on the next go around would be a hybrid of armor, camo, and reincarnation. Too many people believe that the system rebuild process is sufficient all on it's own. It doesn't protect against data loss, data theft, or future attack. It's vital, yes, but it's not the panacea that many people see it as. (That was my point.)
In contrast, far too many people feel that better camouflage is the only solution.
(And far too many people think that reincarnation is the only solution... Have I taken this analogy a bit too far?)
Some reporters have that luxury. Others are more generalists and deal with a variety of topics...
A vast majority of Open Source projects really need a tech oriented reporter...
I'm tech oriented... I know something about most areas of technology, and more-than-something about some of them.
Then the post you replied to doesn't apply to you ;)
By contrast, you will be much, much more likely to ask the right questions and receive useful answers (as opposed to those reporters who see computers as email machines). You still can't expect a non-PR person to drop everything and answer you "right now" (hobbyist or engineer). If they understand that you're tech savvy, you'll be perceived as an interruption, but not a total waste of time.
An interesting perspective. It's wrong (my opinion), but valuable.
Open Source projects rarely have unforeseen newsworthy stories. A vast majority of the time, it can either wait a few days (filler material), or you should have started asking several days before the event. (An Open Source project released a new version? Oh, my! We didn't see that coming! They didn't even have a release candidate or two or three. What's a changelog?)
Programming is relatively slow, methodical work. Programmers rarely have a get-things-done-right-this-moment mindset. To make matters worse, interruptions cost time twice: once to deal with the interruption, and once to figure out exactly what they were doing before you interrupted them. A series of interruptions can quickly become a bad day. Can you see why a programmer might want to deal with a reporter when he gets around to it? (read: is no longer concentrating on code) (leads to unanswered calls and unchecked email.)
Unless there is a company behind the project (a monetary incentive), few projects are going to have a drop-whatever-you're-doing attitude favoring reporters (and most of those companies have designated PR people). If you want something that even approximates a timely response, you'll need to give your what/why/for-whom/deadline tuple right upfront. Consider asking your IT people what they know (you may be surprised, or horrified), but don't take their word for it. Ask them to point you to a good resource.
Touché.
A vast majority of Open Source projects really need a tech oriented reporter. Others need time for the reporter to acclimate. It's that simple. Unless there is a sizable company behind the project, there is no way in the world a general reporter is going to be fair and accurate (emphasis on accurate). You might as well be writing about non-Euclidean geometry or M-theory.
I think you meant "most".
(Why doesn't Slashdot support the "strike" tag?!?)
And people wonder why the "traditional media" is failing?
Unless there is sudden news to report on, you must take enough time to gather good information (or at least due diligence). By "sudden" I mean: something unexpected has come up today, and absolutely must be in the news/paper tonight/tomorrow or it will be stale. Most open source related news won't qualify as sudden (from my layman's perspective). If you don't have enough time, then your boss is killing your company. (It's called "foresight". It's important, really.) It's only "the nature of the beast" if said beast has been lobotomized.
ANY wake-on-lan will require some type of forwarding in order to be entirely passive. Again:
Not exactly a secure network environment by any standard.
(Not saying that they're networks are sufficiently secure, only that this should not be possible.)
You seem rather stuck on this. You have yet to make a compelling argument.
Are you a small business owner in a big city? (It sounds like you might be.) Do you know a small business owner in a big city?
It sounds to me like your problem isn't meter feeding at all, but availability of parking. Care to refute?
(Note: "criminal" activity next door is not a parking problem, it's a law enforcement problem. There's a big difference.)
so the actual question is: who pays you for the time you spent proving you were innocent? The classic question in democracy.
No need to blame Democracy. (Unless you are a US liberal or something.) It could be phrased as a classic problem of any country that actually permits you to argue your innocence before the law. It's a problem, but it's a step up from the alternative.